Reese v. State: Limits on Cronic, Rule 61, and Brady Challenges After a Global Guilty Plea

I. Introduction

The Delaware Supreme Court’s order in Reese v. State (No. 6, 2025, decided November 24, 2025) addresses a familiar but difficult corner of criminal procedure: when, if ever, a defendant who has entered a negotiated guilty plea—especially as part of a multi-jurisdictional “global” disposition—can later unwind that plea on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel or alleged Brady violations.

Allen Reese, a counselor employed by Delaware Guidance Services, was accused of sexually abusing a fifteen-year-old foster child in both Delaware and Maryland. After DNA was collected and before he could fly to Morocco—a country with no extradition treaty with the United States—he was arrested in Maryland. Facing criminal exposure in both states and strong inculpatory DNA evidence, Reese entered into a coordinated resolution of both prosecutions: he would first plead guilty and be sentenced in Delaware and then return to Maryland to plead guilty there, with concurrent sentences.

Following his Delaware plea and sentence, Reese pursued postconviction relief under Delaware Superior Court Criminal Rule 61, arguing chiefly that his Delaware counsel:

failed him at arraignment and effectively abandoned him under United States v. Cronic,
failed to investigate and present his preferred defense before advising a guilty plea,
misled him about prospects for commutation in order to induce the plea, and
was aided by a State that suppressed favorable evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland.

The Superior Court denied relief; Reese appealed. The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed, relying on well-settled precedent but applying it in a context—global plea negotiations across two states and intentional bypass of formal discovery—that gives this order meaningful precedential weight for Delaware practice.

In doing so, the Court re-emphasized:

the narrowness of the Cronic presumption of prejudice, especially at arraignment,
the stringent standards for undoing a guilty plea based on alleged ineffective assistance,
the binding effect of statements made during the plea colloquy, and
the breadth of waiver created by a knowing, voluntary guilty plea, including waiver of pre-plea Brady claims and discovery-based complaints—particularly where the defendant deliberately bypassed discovery to secure a global plea bargain.

II. Factual and Procedural Background

A. Underlying Conduct and Maryland Custody

Reese, a counselor for Delaware Guidance Services, was accused in November 2019 of taking a fifteen-year-old foster child from Delaware to Maryland and sexually assaulting him in both states. As part of the investigation, authorities collected DNA from Reese; his DNA was later found on the child’s genitals. Shortly after this collection, Reese booked a flight to Morocco, a country that lacks an extradition treaty with the United States. He was arrested in Maryland before he could depart.

The opinion references prior litigation, including a federal case (Reese v. Bounds, 2021 WL 849108 (D. Md. Mar. 5, 2021)), mainly to document these background facts, including the DNA evidence and the attempted flight.

B. Delaware Indictment and the Two-State “Global” Plea

In June 2020, while Reese was incarcerated in Maryland, a Delaware grand jury indicted him for:

First-degree sexual abuse of a child by a person in a position of trust, authority, or supervision under 11 Del. C. § 778(1);
Second-degree sexual abuse of a child by a person in a position of trust, authority, or supervision under 11 Del. C. § 778A(1); and
Endangering the welfare of a child under 11 Del. C. § 1102(a)(1)(a).

Delaware counsel entered an appearance in July 2020 and filed an initial discovery request, but the case largely sat inactive for about a year because Reese remained in Maryland custody and had not yet been arrested on the Delaware charges.

At a July 9, 2021 status conference, Reese’s Delaware attorney advised the Superior Court that a global plea deal had been negotiated. Under that arrangement:

Reese would first be transferred from Maryland to Delaware;
He would plead guilty and be sentenced in Delaware;
He would then be returned to Maryland, where his pending case (temporarily suspended to facilitate the Delaware plea) would be reactivated and resolved via plea; and
His Maryland and Delaware sentences would run concurrently.

C. Arraignment, Bond, and Guilty Plea in Delaware

On July 20, 2021, Reese was transferred to Delaware and appeared for arraignment. Counsel entered a not guilty plea and waived reading of the indictment. Because Reese’s transfer had not been accomplished via an interstate detainer, the State requested that he be held without bond or, alternatively, that the court set a $1 million cash bond. Defense counsel explicitly stated there was no objection to a million-dollar cash bond, “given the complex nature of getting here with the intent of plea[d]ing him.” The court imposed a $1 million cash bond.

Three days later, on July 23, 2021, Reese appeared for a plea hearing. He pleaded guilty to:

First-degree sexual abuse of a child by a person in a position of trust under 11 Del. C. § 778(2) (a lesser-included offense of the count charged under § 778(1), carrying a lower minimum mandatory sentence), and
Second-degree sexual abuse of a child by a person in a position of trust under 11 Del. C. § 778A(1).

After a detailed plea colloquy, the Superior Court found that Reese’s plea was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary, accepted it, and sentenced him—consistent with the plea agreement—to thirteen years of unsuspended imprisonment, followed by decreasing levels of supervision. On October 28, 2021, Reese completed the second half of the global resolution by pleading guilty in Maryland to sexual abuse of a minor.

D. Postconviction Motion Under Rule 61

In July 2022, Reese filed a Rule 61 motion for postconviction relief, focusing primarily on alleged ineffective assistance of counsel in connection with his decision to plead guilty. The Superior Court appointed postconviction counsel, who moved to withdraw on the ground that no non-frivolous Rule 61 claims could be ethically advanced. The court granted that motion and then, after full briefing by Reese, the State, and trial counsel, denied the motion in a memorandum opinion dated December 20, 2024. Reese appealed that denial to the Delaware Supreme Court.

III. Summary of the Supreme Court’s Decision

The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court’s denial of Reese’s Rule 61 motion. Key holdings include:

No Cronic violation at arraignment. Arraignment’s core function is limited to advising the defendant of the charges and taking a plea under Rule 10. Counsel’s actions—entering a not guilty plea and waiving the reading—satisfied this role. Not objecting to the State’s $1 million cash bond request, in the context of a negotiated global plea and Reese’s flight risk, did not constitute a “complete denial of counsel” warranting a presumption of prejudice under United States v. Cronic.
Strickland standard not met for plea advice and investigation. Reese did not show that counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness in evaluating the evidence (including Reese’s DNA on the victim) or in recommending a plea rather than trial. Counsel’s alleged failure to investigate GPS data or inconsistencies in the victim’s statements did not undermine confidence in the decision to plead, particularly where Reese himself acknowledged having discussed that evidence with counsel before entering the plea.
No credible basis to upset the plea based on alleged misadvice about commutation. Reese’s sworn statements during the plea colloquy—that no promises beyond the written agreement had been made—bind him absent clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, which he did not provide.
Brady claim waived and factually unsupported. Because Reese entered a knowing, voluntary guilty plea, he waived claims of pre-plea errors, including alleged Brady violations, consistent with Delaware precedent (e.g., Benson, Mack). Moreover, Reese knew about the GPS data and alleged inconsistencies before pleading, and he intentionally bypassed Delaware’s discovery process to expedite a two-state plea; under those circumstances, he could not plausibly claim prejudice from nondisclosure.
Actual-innocence exception not satisfied. The materials Reese cited (GPS data, inconsistencies in the child’s account, and the child’s mental health history) did not constitute “new evidence” creating a strong inference of his factual innocence, as required to escape Rule 61’s procedural bar under Rule 61(i)(5).

Taken together, the Court’s order reaffirms—and sharpens—Delaware’s approach to:

the narrow scope of the Cronic presumption of prejudice,
the demanding nature of ineffective-assistance claims after a guilty plea, and
the extensive waiver of pre-plea rights and claims, including Brady, arising from a knowing and voluntary plea—particularly where the defendant affirmatively chose to give up discovery to secure a global resolution.

IV. Detailed Analysis

A. Standards of Review and Rule 61 Framework

The Court begins by stating the standard of review:

Denial of a Rule 61 postconviction motion is reviewed for abuse of discretion (Ploof v. State).
Legal and constitutional questions—including ineffective-assistance claims—are reviewed de novo.

Under Rule 61, Delaware courts must first consider procedural bars before reaching the merits:

Rule 61(i)(3) generally bars grounds for relief not raised in prior proceedings unless the defendant shows “cause” and “prejudice.”
Rule 61(i)(5) provides an exception if the movant pleads with particularity new evidence creating a strong inference of actual innocence in fact.
Delaware precedent (Cephas v. State, citing Green v. State) recognizes that ineffective-assistance claims brought in a timely first postconviction motion are usually not procedurally barred.

With this framework, the Court turns to Reese’s specific arguments.

B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel and the Strickland/Hill/Albury Framework

1. The governing test

The Court restates the “well-worn” Strickland v. Washington standard:

Deficiency: Counsel’s performance must fall below an objective standard of reasonableness (i.e., not within the wide range of professionally competent assistance).
Prejudice: There must be a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result would have been different.

The Court underscores two important glosses:

There is a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance (Albury v. State).
In the plea context, the prejudice prong is governed by Hill v. Lockhart: the defendant must show a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would have rejected the plea and insisted on going to trial.

Where the alleged error is a failure to investigate, Albury refines the prejudice inquiry: did the unperformed investigation have a reasonable likelihood of altering counsel’s recommendation about whether to plead?

2. The attempted pivot to Cronic

Reese argued that counsel’s conduct at the arraignment amounted to a complete denial of counsel at a “critical stage” of the proceeding, invoking United States v. Cronic. Under Cronic, prejudice is presumed—not merely possible—if:

the defendant is completely denied counsel at a critical stage,
counsel entirely fails to subject the prosecution’s case to meaningful adversarial testing, or
the surrounding circumstances make effective assistance of counsel almost impossible even for a competent attorney.

Reese claimed that:

Counsel failed to inform the court that Reese no longer wished to go forward with the global plea and instead wanted a trial; and
Counsel failed to object to the State’s request for a $1 million cash bond, reportedly prioritizing protection of the negotiated plea over Reese’s interests.

3. The Court’s view of arraignment and why Cronic does not apply

The Court’s treatment of these arguments is a central part of the opinion’s precedential value.

Under Delaware Superior Court Criminal Rule 10(a), the purpose of arraignment is:

To inform the defendant of the substance of the charges against him and [to have him] called ... to plead thereto.

At arraignment, counsel:

entered a plea of not guilty on Reese’s behalf, and
waived the formal reading of the charges.

The Court holds this sufficed. The defendant knew the charges, and any choice to enter a guilty plea would be made—and scrutinized—three days later at the plea hearing. The question whether Reese would ultimately accept the negotiated deal was not decided at arraignment.

On the bond question, the Court notes Reese’s custody and flight-risk profile:

He had already been in custody in Maryland; and
He had previously attempted to flee by booking a flight to Morocco, a non-extradition country.

Given these facts and the procedural complexity of the interstate transfer absent a formal detainer, the Court concluded:

Reese failed to identify any legitimate basis for objecting to the State’s request for a high cash bond; and
Counsel’s decision not to object—indeed, to state no objection “given the complex nature of getting here with the intent of plea[d]ing him”—did not reflect abandonment but rather a strategic acceptance of a status quo (continued custody) that was already the reality in Maryland.

Accordingly, the Court finds no “breakdown in the adversarial process” that would justify presuming prejudice under Cronic. The ordinary Strickland framework applies.

This is a notable clarification: even at a “critical stage,” counsel’s limited or even passive performance is not enough to trigger Cronic unless there is functional non-representation. Entering a not guilty plea and waiving a reading at arraignment—even in the face of a high bond—meets the threshold of representation.

4. No Strickland prejudice from arraignment conduct

Even under Strickland, Reese could not show prejudice from counsel’s arraignment handling. The Court stresses:

Changing his mind about the global plea was a decision Reese could have communicated directly to the judge at the July 23 plea hearing. That was his last clear chance, not the arraignment.
He does not demonstrate a reasonable probability that, if counsel had objected to bond or announced Reese’s alleged desire to abandon the plea, he (Reese) would not have pled guilty.

In other words, nothing about counsel’s actions at arraignment plausibly altered the defendant’s substantive choices three days later when the plea was entered.

5. Alleged failure to investigate: GPS data, inconsistencies, and the proposed defense

Reese also claimed counsel was ineffective in advising a guilty plea rather than going to trial because counsel:

placed undue weight on the incriminating DNA evidence, and
failed adequately to investigate or develop a proposed defense: that the child allegedly forced Reese to spit on the child’s hand, and the child then touched his own genitals—an explanation Reese claimed would account for the DNA.

Reese argued that:

GPS data,
contradictions in the child’s statements to investigators, and
the child’s mental health background

would have reinforced this alternative narrative, and that counsel was unfamiliar with or had not sufficiently reviewed this evidence before advising a plea.

The Court’s response is twofold:

Factual premise undermined by Reese’s own affidavit. Reese’s affidavit stated that he had discussed the GPS data and “significant contradictions” in the child’s police interview with counsel on July 11, 2021—before the July 23 guilty plea. This admission belies his claim that counsel was unaware of or failed to review this evidence. It also suggests that counsel considered, but rejected, Reese’s preferred theory as a viable trial strategy.
Strategic judgment upheld under the presumption of reasonableness. The Court observes that disagreements over strategy—such as counsel’s assessment of the weight of DNA evidence versus impeachment material—do not overcome the strong presumption that counsel’s advice was professionally reasonable. There is no indication that the evidence Reese proffers would likely have changed counsel’s recommendation or meaningfully improved his prospects at trial, particularly in light of the DNA on the child’s genitals and Reese’s attempted flight.

Accordingly, Reese’s failure-to-investigate claim fails on both prongs of Strickland and the case-specific prejudice test articulated in Albury for plea decisions.

6. Actual innocence and the Rule 61(i)(5) gateway

Because Reese raised issues (like the validity of his guilty plea) that would ordinarily be procedurally barred under Rule 61(i)(3) for not having been asserted earlier, he attempted to invoke the “actual innocence” escape hatch in Rule 61(i)(5).

Rule 61(i)(5) requires that the movant plead with particularity that new evidence exists that creates a strong inference of actual innocence in fact. The Court held:

The GPS data and inconsistencies in the victim’s account are, at best, impeaching or circumstantial and were known before the plea.
The child’s mental health history, even if it might affect credibility, does not credibly point to Reese’s factual innocence in light of the DNA evidence and other circumstances.

Thus, these materials did not satisfy the “strong inference of actual innocence” threshold. Reese could not circumvent the procedural bar to directly challenging the voluntariness of his plea on this basis.

C. Alleged Misinformation About Commutation

Reese further asserted that counsel misled him about his prospects for commutation (essentially a reduction of sentence through executive clemency) to induce his guilty plea.

The Court addresses this succinctly but with an important reaffirmation of doctrine:

During the plea colloquy, Reese explicitly stated that no promises had been made to him other than those contained in the written plea agreement.
The judge also emphasized the minimum mandatory sentences, the very limited scope for any “redos or modifications,” and that what they did that day was “pretty much what you’re going to have to live with for a while.” Reese affirmed that he understood.

Drawing on cases like Dorio v. State, the Court reiterates that a defendant is bound by his sworn statements at the plea hearing absent clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. Reese failed to produce such evidence; his later claims about alleged off-the-record commutation promises therefore cannot defeat the strong presumption of verity attaching to his in-court statements.

This aspect of the decision underscores a central theme: the plea colloquy is the controlling record of the parties’ agreement and the defendant’s understanding. Later attempts to contradict it face an extremely high evidentiary bar.

D. Brady Claim: Suppression, Guilty Plea Waiver, and Intentional Bypass of Discovery

Reese’s final major claim was that the State violated Brady v. Maryland by failing to produce favorable evidence (GPS data, inconsistent statements, etc.) before his guilty plea. To analyze this, it is helpful to distinguish several distinct principles the Court applies.

1. Elements of a Brady claim (simplified)

Under Brady and its progeny, a defendant must show:

The evidence was favorable to the accused (exculpatory or impeaching);
The evidence was suppressed by the State, either willfully or inadvertently; and
Prejudice: there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed, the result would have been different.

The Reese opinion does not walk through each element in detail because it disposes of the claim primarily on waiver and knowledge grounds.

2. Waiver of pre-plea Brady claims by guilty plea

The Court invokes settled Delaware law that a knowing and voluntary guilty plea waives the right to challenge prior errors, including alleged Brady violations. The opinion cites, among others, Benson v. State and Mack v. State to reinforce this proposition.

Here, the Court finds:

Reese’s plea was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary, as confirmed by the plea colloquy.
He entered the plea with awareness that the State had produced no Delaware discovery—a fact tied to his custody in Maryland and the special nature of the two-state plea negotiation.

Given this, Reese’s Brady arguments are categorically waived by his plea.

3. Defendant’s own knowledge and “suppression”

The Court underscores another critical barrier to Reese’s Brady claim: he already knew about the supposed “withheld” evidence—specifically the GPS data and contradictions in the victim’s statements—before he pled.

This matters because Brady focuses on the State’s suppression of evidence unknown to the defense. When the defendant himself has the information, it is hard to say that the prosecution suppressed it in a way that undermined the fairness of the proceeding.

4. Intentional bypass of discovery as a bar to prejudicial Brady claims

The Court adopts particularly strong language in endorsing the Superior Court’s reasoning:

Reese “cannot claim in good faith that he was prejudiced by the absence of certain Delaware discovery after intentionally bypassing the Delaware discovery process” and pleading guilty.

This sentence is arguably the most forward-looking aspect of the opinion. It indicates that:

When a defendant strategically chooses to accept a plea—especially a global plea—instead of engaging in or waiting for full discovery,
He cannot later credibly claim that nondisclosure of that same discovery prejudiced him, absent some independent showing (such as truly unknown, material evidence).

This has practical bite in multi-jurisdictional cases, where delays in one state’s discovery might be traded away in favor of a prompt, coordinated resolution.

E. Clarifying the Boundary Between Conflict of Interest and Strategic Alignment

Reese attempted to frame some of his complaints as a conflict-of-interest problem, contending that counsel cared more about preserving a plea deal negotiated among “five people” (presumably prosecutors and defense counsel in both states plus Reese) than about Reese’s individual interest.

The Court rejects this characterization, noting:

Reese did not identify any personal interest of counsel (e.g., financial stake, divided loyalty between co-defendants, or a prior conflicting representation) that could have compromised professional judgment.
Alignment with the plea’s overall structure (including concurrent time and a lower minimum-mandatory conviction in Delaware) is more naturally seen as strategic advocacy, aiming to minimize overall exposure in two sovereigns, rather than as a conflict.

This point, while brief, is important: a lawyer’s interest in seeing a negotiated global resolution succeed is not itself a “conflict of interest” unless it diverges materially from the client’s legal interests or is driven by some independent personal motive.

V. Precedents and Their Influence on the Court’s Reasoning

A. Strickland, Hill, and Albury: The Ineffective Assistance Backbone

The Court leans heavily on:

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) – sets the basic two-prong IAC test (deficiency and prejudice) and the presumption of reasonable strategic judgment.
Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (1985) – adapts the prejudice inquiry to the guilty-plea context (defendant must show he would have gone to trial).
Albury v. State, 551 A.2d 53 (Del. 1988) – emphasizes the strong presumption of reasonableness and clarifies prejudice where the alleged error is failure to investigate or discover evidence before a plea.

These cases shape both the Court’s doctrinal framing and its tone. The Reese order is explicit that disagreements over strategy, or speculation that a more thorough investigation might have yielded a marginally better bargaining position, fall well short of satisfying Strickland.

B. Cronic: Rare Presumptions of Prejudice

United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984), addresses the rare circumstances in which prejudice is presumed without the need to show specific adverse outcomes. Reese tried to fit his arraignment experience into this narrow category.

The Court, however, uses Cronic to illustrate how exceptional those situations are:

Actual denial of counsel at a critical stage,
Complete failure to subject the prosecution to adversarial testing, or
Circumstances making effective representation impossible (e.g., extremely truncated preparation time coupled with case complexity).

By holding that entering a plea and not contesting bond at arraignment did not amount to such a breakdown, the Court reinforces a narrow construction of Cronic in Delaware: most claims of deficient performance at discrete pretrial hearings must proceed under Strickland, not Cronic.

C. Brady and Its Delaware Counterparts: Benson and Mack

The Reese decision cites:

Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) – the foundational disclosure obligation for exculpatory and impeachment evidence.
Benson v. State, 2020 WL 5951371 (Del. Oct. 6, 2020) – affirming that a knowing and voluntary guilty plea waives pre-plea Brady claims.
Mack v. State, 2019 WL 7342514 (Del. Dec. 30, 2019) – reinforcing the same waiver principle.

In synthesizing these, the Court affirms a strong rule: once a defendant knowingly and voluntarily pleads guilty, he cannot litigate alleged pre-plea discovery violations—including Brady—through Rule 61, absent extraordinary circumstances (e.g., actual innocence supported by new evidence).

D. Rule 61 and Prior Delaware Authority: Ploof, Bradley, Cephas, Green

Ploof v. State, 75 A.3d 811 (Del. 2013), supplies the abuse-of-discretion standard for Rule 61 denials and reiterates the familiarity of Strickland.
Bradley v. State, 135 A.3d 748 (Del. 2016), underpins the requirement that Rule 61 courts address procedural issues before reaching the merits.
Cephas v. State, 2022 WL 1552149 (Del. May 17, 2022), citing Green v. State, 238 A.3d 160 (Del. 2020), clarifies that timely first IAC claims in postconviction motions are not generally procedurally defaulted—even though other types of claims might be.

These decisions supply the analytical scaffolding for how Reese’s claims were sorted into:

those that could be heard on the merits (IAC, due to timeliness), and
those that were procedurally barred unless saved by actual innocence (direct attack on the guilty plea, Brady issues).

E. Plea Colloquy Finality: Dorio

Dorio v. State, 2012 WL 6632923 (Del. Dec. 18, 2012), undergirds the Court’s insistence that a defendant is bound by his sworn statements in a plea colloquy absent clear and convincing evidence to the contrary.

Reese’s attempt to override his own statements (“no promises beyond the written plea agreement”) by later alleging off-the-record assurances about commutation failed this exacting standard.

VI. Complex Concepts Simplified

A. Postconviction Relief and Rule 61

Postconviction relief is a mechanism, usually used after direct appeals are complete or time-barred, for challenging a conviction or sentence on grounds not—or not properly—raised earlier. Delaware’s Rule 61 is the primary vehicle in state court.

Key Rule 61 concepts:

Procedural default (Rule 61(i)(3)): If you could have raised an issue earlier (for example, on direct appeal) but did not, you are generally barred from raising it in a Rule 61 motion unless you show “cause” (a good reason) and “prejudice” (actual harm).
Actual innocence (Rule 61(i)(5)): Even if a claim would otherwise be barred, you may proceed if you bring new evidence that creates a strong inference that you are factually innocent (i.e., you did not commit the crime).
First-time IAC claims: Because ineffective assistance claims often require evidence outside the trial record and may not be appropriate for direct appeal, Delaware generally allows such claims to be raised for the first time under Rule 61 without treating them as procedurally defaulted.

B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

To establish ineffective assistance, a defendant must show:

Deficient performance: The lawyer made serious errors—more than just losing a case or tactical disagreements. The performance must fall below the standard of a reasonably competent attorney.
Prejudice: The mistakes had real consequences. In guilty plea cases, this means the defendant must show a reasonable probability that he would have rejected the plea and gone to trial but for counsel’s errors.

The courts assume, in the first instance, that counsel’s conduct was reasonable and strategic. Overcoming this presumption is difficult.

C. Cronic vs. Strickland

Cronic and Strickland are two sides of the same constitutional coin.

Strickland requires proof of both deficiency and prejudice; it is the default standard.
Cronic is reserved for rare cases where things are so bad that courts will presume prejudice (for example, if counsel is absent from a critical stage altogether).

Reese illustrates that:

Standing next to a client at arraignment, entering a plea, and managing bond—even passively—counts as representation.
Absent something extreme, complaints about how vigorously counsel argued (or did not argue) fit within Strickland, not Cronic.

D. Brady Violations

A Brady violation occurs when:

The prosecution withholds evidence favorable to the defense,
The evidence is material (i.e., it could reasonably affect the outcome), and
The defense did not know and could not have obtained the evidence by reasonable diligence.

If a defendant already knows about the evidence, or decides not to pursue discovery for strategic reasons (as in a fast-track plea), then it becomes much harder to argue that the State’s failure to produce that evidence was a Brady violation causing prejudice.

E. Global Plea Agreements and Concurrent Sentences

A global plea is a coordinated agreement resolving charges in more than one jurisdiction (for example, two states) as part of a single package. A common feature, as here, is that sentences in each jurisdiction will run concurrently (at the same time) rather than consecutively (back-to-back).

Global pleas often involve trade-offs:

Defendants may waive certain procedural protections (like complete discovery in each jurisdiction) to achieve a predictable, finite total sentence.
Later attacks on these resolutions face additional hurdles, especially when defendants knowingly chose speed and certainty over full litigation and discovery.

VII. Impact and Implications

A. For Defense Counsel

Reese has several practical implications for defense attorneys in Delaware:

Arraignment Advocacy: While counsel should ordinarily advocate for reasonable bail, Reese suggests that failure to object to an obviously justified high bail (especially where the defendant is already incarcerated elsewhere and has a serious flight history) will not readily support an IAC finding, let alone a Cronic presumption.
Plea Advice Documentation: Counsel should carefully document discussions of evidence (like GPS data and witness inconsistencies) and strategic rationales for plea recommendations. Reese’s affidavit, admitting such discussions occurred, played directly against him and in favor of counsel’s reasonableness.
Global Plea Counseling: If a client is bypassing discovery to secure a global disposition, that trade-off should be explicitly explained and documented. Reese shows that courts will later enforce the consequences of such choices: the client cannot complain of lack of discovery he chose to forego.
Managing Client Expectations About Clemency: Counsel must exercise extreme caution when discussing possible commutation or similar executive actions. Any discussion should be framed as speculative and not part of the plea’s terms. Courts will treat the written plea agreement and the colloquy as exhaustive and binding.

B. For Prosecutors

The decision also offers guidance to the State:

Discovery and Global Deals: While it remains prudent to disclose core discovery in serious cases, Reese makes clear that a defendant who knowingly pleads before receiving formal discovery—especially to facilitate a global plea—will have difficulty later arguing Brady prejudice.
Plea Colloquies: Prosecutors should insist that the colloquy addresses:
- the minimum mandatory nature of charges,
- the lack of off-the-record promises, and
- the limited possibilities of sentence modification.
This narrows the room for later collateral attacks.

C. For Courts and Future Litigation

For the Delaware judiciary and future litigants:

Cronic’s narrowness reaffirmed: Reese can be cited to resist expansive arguments that relatively routine pretrial proceedings (like arraignment) become grounds for presumed prejudice based on counsel’s perceived passivity.
Rule 61’s actual innocence gateway remains stringent: Merely impeaching or credibility-related evidence will not generally suffice to create the “strong inference of actual innocence” required by Rule 61(i)(5).
Global pleas and waiver doctrine: The opinion specifically articulates that an intentional bypass of discovery to facilitate a plea forecloses later arguments that nondisclosure of that same discovery was prejudicial. This can shape how Delaware courts treat other global plea challenges and how they weigh claims about discovery in such contexts.

VIII. Conclusion

The Delaware Supreme Court’s order in Reese v. State does not innovate wholly new doctrinal tests, but it makes significant contributions to the practical application of existing law in a modern, multi-jurisdictional prosecution context.

Key takeaways include:

Cronic remains an exceptional remedy. Even at arraignment, alleged underperformance by counsel is analyzed under Strickland unless there is near-total absence of advocacy.
Ineffective-assistance claims after a plea face high barriers. A defendant must show not only clear deficiency but a reasonable probability that he would have gone to trial, taking into account the full evidentiary picture—including incriminating facts like DNA and attempted flight.
Plea colloquy representations are paramount. Courts will hold defendants to what they say under oath about promises, understanding of minimum mandatories, and their voluntariness in pleading.
A knowing guilty plea waives pre-plea Brady and discovery-based claims. This is especially so where the defendant consciously foregoes discovery to secure a global plea and cannot show new evidence that strongly suggests factual innocence.

In short, Reese reinforces that a guilty plea—particularly one that is part of a carefully negotiated, two-state resolution—carries substantial finality. Absent clear constitutional violations or compelling new evidence of actual innocence, Delaware courts will be reluctant to unravel such pleas through postconviction litigation.