Reed v. Goertz: The Fundamental Adequacy Standard for Postconviction DNA Testing Procedures
Introduction
Reed v. Goertz is a Fifth Circuit decision issued on May 1, 2025, following the Supreme Court’s remand of the high-profile § 1983 challenge brought by death-row inmate Rodney Reed. Reed had been convicted of capital murder in Texas based largely on pre-trial DNA evidence matching sperm found in the victim to him. After exhausting ten state habeas petitions and one federal habeas petition, Reed filed a motion under Chapter 64 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure seeking modern “touch DNA” testing of items from the crime scene and the victim’s fiancé’s truck. The trial court and the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals both denied relief, and Reed then sued the Bastrop County District Attorney under § 1983, alleging that the state’s postconviction DNA-testing scheme violated his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights. The Fifth Circuit had initially held Reed’s claim time-barred under circuit precedent; the Supreme Court reversed on statute-of-limitations grounds and remanded for consideration of the merits. On remand, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal on the ground that Reed failed to show Texas’s statutory procedures were “fundamentally inadequate” to vindicate the right to postconviction DNA testing that Chapter 64 confers.
Summary of the Judgment
• The Fifth Circuit held that once a state creates a procedural right (here, to postconviction DNA testing under Chapter 64), the Due Process Clause protects that right against arbitrary or fundamentally unfair denial—but does not prescribe precisely what procedure must be adopted.
• Applying the Supreme Court’s framework in Osborne v. Delaware (restricting federal intrusion into state postconviction relief systems to only those procedures “fundamentally inadequate” to vindicate the substantive right), the court reviewed three core requirements of Chapter 64: the chain-of-custody requirement, the exculpatory-results requirement, and the “no unreasonable delay” requirement.
• Reed failed to show any of those requirements, either facially or as applied to him, transgressed fundamental principles of fairness. Because he could not carry his burden on at least one statutory element, Chapter 64’s scheme remains constitutionally adequate and the district court’s Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal was proper.
Analysis
1. Precedents Cited
Reed v. Goertz relies heavily on two Supreme Court precedents defining the intersection of due process and state-created postconviction rights:
- Osborne v. Delaware (2009): Held that the right to postconviction DNA testing is a state-created liberty interest; federal courts may invalidate state procedures only if they are “fundamentally inadequate” to vindicate that right. Osborne refused to import the more searching Mathews balancing test into the postconviction relief context and emphasized deference to state legislative design.
- Medina v. California (1992): Set the standard for procedural due process challenges in criminal cases—asking whether a rule offends “some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience” of the people or “transgresses any recognized principle of fairness in operation.” The Fifth Circuit applied Medina’s “fundamental fairness” test to Reed’s as-applied and facial challenges.
On more specific points, the court cites:
- Skinner v. Switzer (2011) and Ex parte Young (1908) for standing and justiciability of due process challenges to state postconviction testing procedures under § 1983;
- United States v. Salerno (1987) for the heavy burden borne by facial challengers;
- Arizona v. Youngblood (1988) for the principle that negligent loss or degradation of evidence, absent bad faith, does not violate due process;
- And Napue v. Illinois (1959) and Perry v. New Hampshire (2012) to distinguish trial-level due process protections from postconviction relief procedures, underscoring that the latter permit greater state flexibility.
2. Legal Reasoning
• State-Created Rights and Due Process Attachments
The court recognized that while the Fourteenth Amendment does not guarantee a free-standing right to postconviction DNA testing, a state may constitutionally choose to confer such a right. Once conferred, due process prohibits arbitrary or fundamentally unfair administration of that right.
• Fundamental Adequacy Standard
Rather than applying Mathews v. Eldridge, the court followed Medina and Osborne, asking whether Chapter 64 is so unfair, unjust or arbitrary that it is “fundamentally inadequate.” This standard respects state legislative judgment and avoids federal courts restructuring the state’s entire postconviction relief process.
• Three Core Statutory Requirements
Chapter 64 allows testing only if a movant proves each of the following to the convicting court:
- (a) A sufficient chain of custody to show the evidence was not “substituted, tampered with, replaced, or altered”;
- (b) A reasonable likelihood that exculpatory results (i.e. results excluding the convicted person as the biological source) would have prevented the conviction; and
- (c) That the motion was not filed to unreasonably delay the execution of sentence or administration of justice.
3. Impact
• Deference to State Statutory Schemes: Reed v. Goertz reaffirms that federal courts are constrained in their review of state postconviction relief statutes and will not override legitimate state procedural choices absent a showing of fundamental unfairness.
• Heightened Burden for Due Process Challenges: Inmates attacking state DNA-testing statutes under § 1983 must now overcome a narrow window—demonstrating that the state scheme is “fundamentally inadequate.” Ordinary disagreements with state evidentiary thresholds or timing provisions will not suffice.
• Preservation of Legislative Flexibility: This decision underscores that states retain broad latitude to design postconviction DNA-testing procedures, including placing burdens on convicted persons to prove chain of custody, materiality, and diligence.
Complex Concepts Simplified
- Chain of Custody: The documented history of evidence from collection to court to ensure it has not been altered. Chapter 64 requires movants to show the chain was intact.
- Exculpatory-Results Requirement: Movants must show that, had DNA testing excluded them as the source, there is a reasonable probability they would not have been convicted.
- No-Unreasonable-Delay Requirement: Movants must not have filed their DNA-testing motion purely to stall their sentence—courts look at when new techniques emerged and the movant’s litigation conduct.
- Procedural vs. Substantive Due Process: Procedural due process safeguards the fairness of procedures by which a state deprives someone of life, liberty or property. Substantive due process protects certain fundamental rights from government interference, regardless of procedure.
- Medina/Osborne Framework: A two-step inquiry—(1) did the state create a liberty interest? (2) are its procedures “fundamentally inadequate” to vindicate that interest?
Conclusion
Reed v. Goertz crystallizes the Supreme Court’s teaching that once a state elects to provide postconviction DNA testing, federal Due Process scrutiny is limited to ensuring the state’s procedures are not “fundamentally inadequate.” The Fifth Circuit’s careful application of Medina and Osborne upholds Chapter 64’s chain-of-custody, exculpation, and diligence requirements as constitutionally permissible. This decision places a clear thumb on the scale in favor of state legislative and judicial discretion in structuring postconviction relief, and it raises the bar for inmates seeking to invalidate state-provided DNA-testing remedies under § 1983. The broader lesson is that federal courts will not second-guess every evidentiary or timing threshold contained in a state’s statutory scheme—only those that strike at the very heart of procedural fairness as rooted in our traditions and conscience.
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