Red-Light Violation Requires Intersection Entry; A.R.S. § 28-672 Cannot Attach When the Fatal Collision Occurs Before the Intersection

Case: STATE OF ARIZONA v. HON. GORDON/OWEN (Ariz. Dec. 12, 2025) | Posture: Special action review; Court of Appeals opinion (State v. Gordon, 257 Ariz. 95 (App. 2024)) vacated; superior court affirmed.

1. Introduction

This decision addresses the reach of Arizona’s “enhanced penalty” traffic-fatality statute, A.R.S. § 28-672, when the State predicates criminal liability on a red-light violation under A.R.S. § 28-645(A)(3)(a). The case arose after Gregory James Owen, driving a motorhome, rear-ended a Jeep stopped at a red light at SR 95 and Acoma Blvd. The impact propelled the Jeep through the intersection, killing a passenger. Owen’s motorhome also continued into and through the intersection while the signal was red.

The central legal question was narrow but consequential: does § 28-672 apply when the fatal collision occurs before the offending vehicle enters the intersection against the red signal? Put differently, does the “red-light” predicate offense exist—and can it “result in an accident”—when the injury-producing impact precedes intersection entry?

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Arizona Supreme Court held that a violation of § 28-645(A)(3)(a) occurs only upon entering the intersection against the red signal. Because § 28-672 requires a sequence—first the predicate moving violation and then an accident that results from that violation—the enhanced penalty statute cannot apply when the fatal accident occurs before intersection entry.

Accordingly, the Court vacated the Court of Appeals’ decision in State v. Gordon and affirmed the superior court’s reversal of the municipal court conviction and its directed verdict of acquittal on the § 28-672 charge.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited

The Court’s analysis was heavily textual and methodologically explicit, drawing on multiple Arizona statutory-interpretation decisions and a smaller set of traffic-statute applications.

A. Statutory-interpretation framework (plain meaning, no enlargement)

Cao v. PFP Dorsey Invs., LLC, 257 Ariz. 109 (2024) and In re Drummond, 257 Ariz. 15 (2024): cited for de novo review and the commitment to effectuate unambiguous statutory text.
BSI Holdings, LLC v. Ariz. Dep't of Transp., 244 Ariz. 17 (2018), State v. Luviano, 255 Ariz. 225 (2023), and Ariz. ex rel. Brnovich v. Maricopa Cnty. Cmty. Coll. Dist. Bd., 243 Ariz 539 (2018): used to reinforce “ordinary meaning” and context-sensitive reading.
Mussi v. Hobbs, 255 Ariz. 395 (2023), Arizonans for Second Chances, Rehab., & Pub. Safety v. Hobbs, 249 Ariz. 396 (2020), and City of Phoenix v. Yates, 69 Ariz. 68 (1949): invoked for the anti-surplusage principle—courts must give effect to every statutory word and phrase.
State ex rel. Morrison v. Anway, 87 Ariz. 206 (1960) and Town of Scottsdale v. State ex rel. Pickrell, 98 Ariz. 382 (1965): relied on for the rule against judicial expansion of statutes beyond their express provisions.
City of Phoenix v. Butler, 110 Ariz. 160 (1973): cited for the proposition that courts may not rewrite statutes.
Farris v. Advantage Cap. Corp., 217 Ariz. 1 (2007) and Parrot v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 212 Ariz. 255 (2006): used to underscore that plain language is the best indicator of legislative intent, making extra-textual searches inappropriate absent ambiguity.
S. Arizona Home Builders Ass'n v. Town of Marana, 254 Ariz. 281 (2023) and State ex rel. Arizona Dep't of Revenue v. Tunkey, 254 Ariz. 432 (2023): cited to emphasize a consistent plain-meaning methodology and to critique approaches that prioritize perceived “intent” over enacted text.
Bilke v. State, 206 Ariz. 462 (2003): referenced for the limited “absurdity” escape valve; the majority concluded its reading was not absurd.

B. Meaning and application of the red-light statute

Flashberg v. Krebs, 8 Ariz. App. 254 (1968): treated as confirming that a materially similar predecessor of § 28-645(A)(3)(a) “imposes the duty to stop for a red light before entering an intersection,” supporting the majority’s focus on the intersection boundary as an element that must be satisfied.
Lemieux v. Superior Court, 132 Ariz. 214 (1982): cited for the proposition that liability under a similar version “turns on the precise location” of the vehicle when the light changed—again highlighting location at/within the intersection as legally dispositive.

C. The Court of Appeals’ reliance on “accident” as a continuous event

State v. Gordon, 257 Ariz. 95 (App. 2024): the decision under review, which held the “accident” could be treated as a continuous event spanning the initial collision through eventual rest, allowing § 28-672 to apply even if the first impact occurred pre-intersection.
State v. Powers, 200 Ariz. 123 (App. 2001) and State v. Powers, 200 Ariz. 363 (2001): the majority deemed these “accident/scene” cases inapposite because they arose in a Double Jeopardy/unit-of-prosecution context (leaving the scene of an accident), not in a causation-sequence problem linking a predicate violation to a resulting accident.
State v. Moninger, 258 Ariz. 18 (2024): used to explain why “unit of prosecution” analysis, which drove Powers, does not translate to § 28-672’s structure.
Commonwealth v. Satterfield, 255 A.3d 438 (Pa. 2021) and Nield v. State, 677 N.E.2d 79 (In. 1997): referenced as additional out-of-state authorities cited below; the majority rejected their relevance for the same reason it rejected Powers.

D. Legislative “loopholes,” victim rights, and restitution

State v. Patel, 251 Ariz. 131 (2021): used for two distinct points: (1) understanding the enhanced penalty statute’s focus (addressing certain non-driver fatalities) and (2) illustrating that perceived “loopholes” are for legislative repair, not judicial expansion.
State v. Jones, 188 Ariz. 388 (1997): relied on to justify dictionary use when statutory terms are undefined.

E. Dissent’s authorities (and the majority’s response)

Brogdon v. State, 683 S.E.2d 99 (Ga. Ct. App. 2009): the dissent used this to argue that stopping “before entering the intersection” can mean stopping behind already-stopped vehicles, even if one never enters the intersection. The majority rejected Brogdon as inconsistent with Arizona’s interpretive approach and as effectively rewriting the statute.
State v. Estrada, 201 Ariz. 247 (2001) and Perini Land Dev. Co. v. Pima County, 170 Ariz. 380 (1992): cited by the dissent for the “absurd results” doctrine; the majority responded that the outcome may be undesirable but not absurd, and any fix belongs to the Legislature.
In re Chalmers, 571 P.3d 885 (2025) and State v. Serrato, 568 P.3d 756 (2025): cited by the dissent for a purpose/effectiveness canon; the majority maintained Arizona prioritizes enacted text absent ambiguity.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

A. The predicate offense: what, exactly, is a “red-light violation” under § 28-645(A)(3)(a)?

The majority read § 28-645(A)(3)(a) as containing an intersection-based location element: traffic facing a steady red signal must “stop before entering the intersection” and “remain standing.” From that structure, the Court reasoned that a violation occurs in only two ways: (1) entering the intersection on red without stopping, or (2) stopping and then entering the intersection on red. In both scenarios, intersection entry is necessary to complete the violation.

Key move: The Court treated “before entering the intersection” as a boundary that defines when the legal duty is breached—i.e., the offense is not merely “failing to stop,” but “entering the statutorily defined intersection while still in a red-signal condition.” The definition of “intersection” in A.R.S. § 28-601(8) supported a clear geographic line.

The majority also grounded this reading in the anti-surplusage canon (Mussi v. Hobbs / City of Phoenix v. Yates), reasoning that accepting the State’s and dissent’s approach would “void” the statutory phrase “before entering the intersection” by transforming the offense into a free-floating “failure to stop somewhere before the light.”

B. The enhanced penalty structure: § 28-672 requires sequential causation

Section 28-672 imposes criminal penalties when a listed civil traffic violation “results in an accident” that causes serious injury or death. The majority construed “results in” according to ordinary meaning (“to happen or issue as a consequence or effect”), concluding that the statute requires a causal sequence: (1) violation → (2) accident → (3) injury/death.

This sequencing did the decisive work. Even if the overall episode could be described as one continuous incident, the Court held § 28-672 does not criminalize “simultaneous” or “coincident” violation-and-accident; it requires the accident to be the consequence of the completed predicate violation. The majority reinforced this point with Arizona’s causation statute, A.R.S. § 13-203, and by contrasting robbery’s explicit “in the course of” language (A.R.S. § 13-1902; § 13-1901(2)) with § 28-672’s lack of comparable breadth.

C. Rejecting the “continuous accident” theory

The Court of Appeals in State v. Gordon treated “accident” as a continuous event from the first collision until vehicles come to rest, allowing § 28-672 to apply so long as the red-light noncompliance was part of that continuous event. The Supreme Court rejected that approach because it collapses the statutory sequence and because the authorities relied on—especially State v. Powers—arose in a different doctrinal setting (unit of prosecution / Double Jeopardy) and did not interpret “results in” as a causation-sequencing requirement.

D. Due process/fair warning and the rule against judicial expansion

The Court invoked A.R.S. § 13-104 and § 13-101(2)’s “fair warning” purpose to caution against expanding penal liability beyond the statute’s express terms. It also explicitly warned that judicial expansion can raise due process “fair warning” concerns (citing State v. Powers, 200 Ariz. 123).

E. Victim restitution: constitutional right, but only after a qualifying conviction

The majority acknowledged restitution as a constitutional right under the Victims’ Bill of Rights but emphasized that restitution depends on a conviction for the criminal conduct that caused the loss. On the majority’s reading, the death resulted from conduct that might violate a different traffic statute (the Court referenced A.R.S. § 28-701(A)), but that statute is not enumerated in § 28-672. Therefore, § 28-672 could not be used—by interpretation—to supply criminal liability (and restitution) where the Legislature did not.

3.3. Impact

Narrowing § 28-672 when predicated on red-light violations: Prosecutors must show the defendant committed the red-light violation (as the Court defined it) before the injury-producing accident—meaning intersection entry against red must precede the accident for this predicate.
Charging decisions will shift: Cases involving rear-end collisions at red lights that cause death pre-intersection will likely require alternative charges (traffic crimes, homicide theories where applicable, or other enumerated predicates if supported), because § 28-672 cannot be “stretched” to cover non-enumerated conduct.
Textual sequencing matters beyond traffic law: The Court’s insistence that “violation” and “accident” are independent events that must occur in sequence may influence future interpretations of result-based statutes—especially where lower courts are tempted to treat extended episodes as a single “continuous event.”
Legislative response invited: The majority expressly characterized the outcome as one the Legislature “may wish to address,” echoing State v. Patel’s theme that perceived gaps are for legislative correction.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

“Predicate offense”: The underlying traffic violation (§ 28-645(A)(3)(a)) that must be proven before § 28-672 can apply.
“Enhanced penalty statute” (A.R.S. § 28-672): A law that turns certain civil traffic violations into criminal liability when they cause (result in) an accident producing serious injury or death.
“Results in”: The Court treated this as ordinary cause-and-effect language requiring the violation to happen first and the accident to happen as its consequence.
Anti-surplusage canon: Courts avoid readings that make statutory words meaningless; here, “before entering the intersection” and the statutory definition of “intersection” had to do real work.
Unit of prosecution (why Powers didn’t fit): A doctrine about how many charges the State may bring for a single course of conduct; it differs from the causation/sequencing question in § 28-672.
Victim restitution vs. statutory coverage: Restitution is a protected right, but it must be tied to a conviction for the conduct the statute criminalizes; courts cannot expand criminal statutes to reach restitution-favorable outcomes.

5. Conclusion

STATE OF ARIZONA v. HON. GORDON/OWEN establishes a clear, defendant-protective rule of statutory sequencing in the § 28-672 context: when the predicate is the red-light statute, the red-light violation is not complete until the vehicle enters the intersection against the red signal, and § 28-672 does not apply if the fatal collision occurs before that entry. The opinion reinforces Arizona’s plain-meaning approach, resists purposive “gap-filling,” and signals that any expansion of § 28-672 to cover pre-intersection fatal rear-end collisions must come from the Legislature rather than the courts.