Recusal Requires Objective Evidence of Bias: Brookins v. Figuccio

Introduction

Brookins v. Figuccio, decided by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit on June 2, 2025, tested the boundaries of a federal judge’s duty to recuse under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a). Reverend Juan Jose Brookins, acting pro se as Trust Protector for the Claudio Bulent Akpinar Figuccio Trust and interpleader under 28 U.S.C. § 1335, appealed the district court’s sua sponte dismissal of his complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and its subsequent denial of his motion to disqualify the presiding judge. The key issue on appeal was whether the judge’s adverse rulings and procedural handling of Brookins’s case gave rise to a reasonable question of impartiality.

Summary of the Judgment

The Second Circuit affirmed. It held (1) that Brookins abandoned all arguments except his recusal claim by failing to identify any other issues in his brief; (2) that under § 455(a) an objective observer would not reasonably question the district judge’s impartiality based solely on routine judicial rulings, the issuance of a show-cause order, or the sua sponte dismissal procedure; and (3) that there was no evidence of deep-seated antagonism or extra-procedural bias. Accordingly, the court concluded the district judge did not abuse her discretion in denying recusal and affirmed the dismissal of Brookins’s case.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

McLeod v. Jewish Guild for the Blind, 864 F.3d 154 (2d Cir. 2017): Reinforces liberal construction of pro se pleadings but underscores that pro se litigants must comply with Rule 28(a) in framing appeal issues.
Bertin v. United States, 478 F.3d 489 (2d Cir. 2007): Acknowledges that courts “read pro se submissions to raise the strongest arguments” but will not “manufacture claims of error.”
Moates v. Barkley, 147 F.3d 207 (2d Cir. 1998): Emphasizes that Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 28(a) requires a clear statement of issues; failure to do so results in abandonment.
Green v. Dep’t of Educ. of N.Y.C., 16 F.4th 1070 (2d Cir. 2021): Confirms that unbriefed issues are deemed abandoned on appeal.
LoCascio v. United States, 473 F.3d 493 (2d Cir. 2007): Establishes that recusal rulings rest within the district court’s discretion and are overturned only for abuse of that discretion.
Cox v. Onondaga County Sheriff’s Dept., 760 F.3d 139 (2d Cir. 2014): Cites § 455(a)’s objective standard—whether a disinterested observer could reasonably question impartiality.
S.E.C. v. Razmilovic, 738 F.3d 14 (2d Cir. 2013): Clarifies that § 455(a) recusal is unwarranted absent judicial misconduct beyond routine rulings or administration.
Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540 (1994): Holds that judicial rulings, “ordinary admonishments,” or unfavorable decisions do not themselves establish a disqualifying bias.
Gallop v. Cheney, 645 F.3d 519 (2d Cir. 2011): Reiterates that adverse rulings alone rarely suffice for recusal.
Chen v. Chen Qualified Settlement Fund, 552 F.3d 218 (2d Cir. 2009): Affirms that bias claims require more than dissatisfaction with outcomes.

Legal Reasoning

The court’s reasoning unfolds in two steps. First, it applies the “abandonment” doctrine: Brookins’s brief identified only the recusal issue, thus waiving any challenge to the sua sponte dismissal or the denial of reconsideration. Second, it evaluates recusal under § 455(a), asking whether an objective, informed observer, knowing all circumstances, could reasonably question the judge’s impartiality. The court stressed that:

Judges may rule on their own initiative (sua sponte) and issue show-cause orders to test jurisdiction. Due process is satisfied where a litigant receives notice and an opportunity to respond before dismissal.
Absent evidence that the judge relied on extra-judicial sources or harbored “deep-seated and unequivocal antagonism,” routine procedural rulings—even against a pro se litigant—do not mandate recusal.
General allegations of bias or unfairness, unsupported by objective facts, are insufficient.

Impact

Though a non-precedential summary order, Brookins v. Figuccio reinforces bedrock principles governing judicial recusal and the treatment of pro se litigants. It warns that:

Litigants cannot turn routine procedural rulings—show-cause orders, jurisdictional inquiries, sua sponte dismissals—into grounds for recusal absent concrete evidence of personal bias.
Appellate courts will strictly enforce Rule 28(a); failure to brief an issue results in abandonment, even for pro se parties.
Future recusal motions must present more than dissatisfaction with adverse rulings; they require factual proof of extrajudicial prejudice or antagonism.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Sua Sponte: Latin for “on its own initiative.” Courts may raise issues—like jurisdiction—without a party’s prompting, provided they give notice and an opportunity to respond.
Diversity Jurisdiction: Federal subject-matter jurisdiction based on parties being citizens of different states and an amount in controversy exceeding $75,000.
Recusal (28 U.S.C. § 455): A judge must step aside when their impartiality “might reasonably be questioned” (subsection (a)) or when they have a personal bias or interest (subsection (b)).
Abandonment Doctrine: Issues not raised in an appellant’s brief are waived on appeal.

Conclusion

Brookins v. Figuccio underscores that judicial disqualification demands more than mere displeasure with rulings. Under § 455(a), an objective standard protects both the appearance and reality of impartial adjudication. Routine procedures—sua sponte actions, show-cause orders, jurisdictional dismissals—do not by themselves require recusal, nor do they violate due process if a litigant is heard before dismissal. Finally, appellate courts will not manufacture arguments for pro se litigants; clear adherence to briefing rules remains essential. Together, these principles preserve judicial efficiency and fairness while safeguarding the integrity of the federal bench.