Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Sentencing Discretion and Reasonableness

• United States v. Hanrahan (10th Cir. 2007) and United States v. Woody (10th Cir. 2022): Every sentence must be substantively reasonable; the appellate task is to decide whether the sentence is “severe enough to exceed the bounds of what would be reasonable.”
• United States v. McComb (10th Cir. 2007): The standard is abuse of discretion—upholding sentences within the “bounds of permissible choice.”
• United States v. Smart (10th Cir. 2008): District courts must consider the factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), including the advisory guideline range and the nature and circumstances of the offense.
• United States v. Cookson (10th Cir. 2019): Not all § 3553(a) factors must bear equal weight; the district court has discretion to emphasize some more heavily.
• United States v. Crosby (10th Cir. 2024): While a court cannot rely “exclusively” on a single factor, Doty clarifies that outsized weight on the nature/circumstances of a prolonged offense can still be reasonable when other factors are considered.
• Payne v. Tennessee (U.S. 1991): The harm to a victim is a legitimate and important consideration at sentencing; Doty extends this logic to prolonged sexual exploitation.

Deterrence vs. Low Recidivism Risk

• United States v. Irey (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc): A “low” risk of reoffending is not “no” risk; the gravity of potential harm in sexual-offense recidivism justifies significant sentences. Doty adopts this reasoning.
• United States v. Walker (10th Cir. 2017): Courts must consider both specific and general deterrence; Doty explicitly balances a low individual risk against the need to deter similar conduct by others.
• United States v. Elmore (6th Cir. 2014) and United States v. Wilcox (8th Cir. 2012): Affirmed sentences where courts gave more weight to punishment/deterrence than to low recidivism assessments; Doty aligns with this approach.
• United States v. Crespo-Rios (1st Cir. 2015): A warning against over-reliance on low recidivism to the exclusion of other § 3553(a) factors; Doty models the opposite—considering deterrence and public safety.

Unwarranted Disparities and Comparative Data

• United States v. Gantt (10th Cir. 2012): The advisory Guidelines generally account for § 3553(a)(6) disparity concerns; deviating courts must explain why the range is too low given case-specific facts.
• United States v. Verdin-Garcia (10th Cir. 2008): Disparity analysis is national, not limited to a single district; Doty invokes this to discount comparisons to 16 local cases.
• United States v. Franklin (10th Cir. 2015) and United States v. Lente (10th Cir. 2014), quoting United States v. Scherrer (1st Cir. 2006): Comparing a sentence to a few counsel-selected cases is “almost always useless” because no two cases are identical. Doty illustrates this point, noting 14 of the 16 local cases involved less than a year of abuse.
• United States v. Faunce (10th Cir. 2023), quoting United States v. Rodriguez (5th Cir. 2017): A district court cannot abuse its discretion by failing to consider facts not presented to it. Doty uses this to marginalize new comparative data first raised on appeal—even if judicially noticeable (see United States v. Guevara-Lopez (10th Cir. 2025)).
• United States v. Lucero (10th Cir. 2025); United States v. Valdez (10th Cir. 2025); United States v. Garcia (10th Cir. 2020); United States v. Cortez (10th Cir. 2025): National averages rarely prove similarly situated comparators; Doty follows this line, noting the defendant’s atypical conduct justified rejecting averages as benchmarks.

Supervised-Release Conditions Affecting Constitutional Rights

• United States v. Henry (10th Cir. 2020): Conditions of supervised release cannot violate statutory or constitutional requirements.
• United States v. Koch (10th Cir. 2020): Adult pornography is protected speech; a ban implicates a fundamental right and requires a particularized explanation grounded in compelling circumstances.
• United States v. Francis (10th Cir. 2018): Even if a court inadequately explains a condition, an appellate court may affirm under plain-error review if the condition is supportable on the record when the defendant failed to object—a central pillar of Doty’s supervised-release holding.
• United States v. Malone (10th Cir. 2019): Plain error requires a showing that the error affected substantial rights; in Doty, any assumed explanatory omission did not prejudice the defendant because the record supplied a compelling basis.

Legal Reasoning

1) Upward Variance and Substantive Reasonableness

The district court began with the properly calculated advisory range (33–41 months) but concluded that the range understated the seriousness of the offense. It “benchmarked” its variance by reference to an offense-level analog (level 29, range 87–108 months) and imposed 96 months. The Tenth Circuit did not fault this method of explanation. Instead, it assessed whether the end result resided within the broad discretion afforded sentencing judges.

Key features of the district court’s reasoning made the variance reasonable:

• Nature and Circumstances (§ 3553(a)(1)): The abuse began when the victim was 14, was committed by a half-brother 9 years older, continued for roughly eight years, sometimes involved force, and culminated in manipulative behavior (a suicide threat upon disclosure of the victim’s boyfriend). The court found extraordinary harm—an assessment the panel deemed reasonable, citing Payne’s acknowledgement that victim harm is an important sentencing consideration.
• Deterrence (§ 3553(a)(2)(B)): While a psychosexual evaluation reported a low risk of sexual recidivism, the district court permissibly discounted this in favor of general deterrence. Echoing Irey and Walker (2017), the panel emphasized that a low risk is not no risk, and that the enormous potential harm from sexual offenses can justify substantial punishment to deter others.
• Disparity (§ 3553(a)(6)): The court considered the advisory range (which itself promotes uniformity) but explained why it was inadequate. The defense’s comparative materials were weak for several reasons: they were not presented below (per Faunce), were local rather than national (per Verdin-Garcia), and involved materially different conduct (per Franklin/Lente/Scherrer—most comparators involved less than a year of abuse). As to national averages, Lucero, Valdez, Garcia, and Cortez caution against relying on them absent a showing of similarity. Here, the district court identified a sensible basis for rejecting averages: the atypical length, frequency, and impact of Mr. Doty’s conduct.

Given these considerations, the Tenth Circuit concluded that the 96-month sentence was within the “bounds of permissible choice,” notwithstanding the advisory range and the low-risk assessment in the psychosexual evaluation.

2) Adult Pornography Prohibition on Supervised Release

Everyone agrees that an adult-pornography ban implicates a fundamental right. Under Koch, when a defendant preserves the issue, the district court must make an individualized, record-based showing of compelling circumstances and explain why the restriction is reasonably necessary and appropriately tailored. But preservation matters.

Plain-error review controlled because Mr. Doty did not object to the condition at sentencing. Under Malone, the question is whether any error affected substantial rights. Doty adopts Francis’s pragmatic approach: even if explanatory detail was lacking, the conviction stands where the record shows a supportable basis for the condition.

The record provided that basis. In his psychosexual evaluation, Mr. Doty admitted (a) frequent adult pornography use, including inadvertent exposure to child pornography; (b) sexual interest in pornography featuring significant age disparities (e.g., 20 vs. 50); and (c) frequent fantasies of participating in pornographic scenes. The panel reasoned that these factors created a legitimate concern that unrestricted access to adult pornography could fuel sexual interest connected to offending and increase the risk of future sexual conduct with underage partners. On that record, any shortfall in the district court’s explanation did not prejudice Mr. Doty, and the plain-error challenge failed.

Impact and Practical Consequences

For District Courts

• Weighting § 3553(a) factors: Doty confirms broad discretion to give substantial weight to the nature, duration, and victim impact of sexual offenses when varying upward, provided the judge engages with the statutory framework and articulates case-specific reasons.
• Explaining supervised-release conditions: Where conditions affect fundamental rights (e.g., adult pornography bans), district courts should make particularized findings on the record tying the condition to the defendant’s history and rehabilitation. Doty shows that omissions can be harmless on appeal under plain-error review, but a full explanation remains the better practice (and essential if the issue is preserved).

For Defense Counsel

• Preserve, preserve, preserve: Object to supervised-release conditions and to inadequate explanations at sentencing. Without preservation, Doty and Francis make reversal unlikely if the record can be marshaled to support the condition.
• Comparative sentencing evidence: If you intend to argue unwarranted disparities, present your data below, focus on national comparators, and demonstrate that the defendants are truly similarly situated (factually, legally, and guideline-wise). Local, counsel-selected cases with materially different facts are apt to be discounted.
• Low risk isn’t a trump card: Be prepared to address general deterrence and the gravity of potential harm; propose non-custodial safeguards and tailored conditions to mitigate risk if arguing for a lower sentence.

For Prosecutors

• Build the record for conditions: Psychosexual evaluations and defendant admissions can provide the “compelling circumstances” nexus needed to sustain speech-affecting conditions, and will insulate judgments on appeal—especially when the defense fails to object.
• Justifying variances: Emphasize duration, relational dynamics (e.g., familial trust), force or coercion, and victim impact; articulate how general deterrence and public protection justify the upward variance.

Broader Doctrinal Signals

• Substantive reasonableness remains highly deferential. Doty underscores that substantial upward variances in sexual-offense cases are sustainable where the district court builds a record linking the gravity and uniqueness of the conduct to § 3553(a) purposes.
• Disparity arguments face strict evidentiary demands. The Tenth Circuit continues to view guideline compliance as the principal guard against unwarranted disparities and scrutinizes comparator evidence rigorously for similarity and scope (national, not local).
• Plain-error review is outcome-determinative. For supervised-release conditions implicating constitutional rights, appellate relief is unlikely absent a preserved objection and a developed record undermining the condition’s necessity or tailoring.