Record-Based Justification Suffices: Tenth Circuit Affirms Alcohol-Abstinence and Bar-Restriction Conditions Under Plain-Error Review Even Without On-the-Record Reasons

Introduction

In United States v. Lindsay (10th Cir. Oct. 7, 2025), the Tenth Circuit affirmed a special condition of supervised release requiring total abstinence from alcohol and prohibiting the defendant from frequenting establishments whose main business is alcohol. Although the district court did not articulate its reasons for imposing the alcohol-related restrictions, the panel assumed—without deciding—that this omission was a “plain” error. Nonetheless, it held the error did not affect the defendant’s substantial rights because the record provided a sufficient basis to support the condition. The court also clarified that U.S.S.G. § 5D1.3(d)(4) does not limit alcohol-related restrictions to defendants who are current abusers; rather, such conditions may be “otherwise appropriate in particular cases.”

The case arises from a COVID-era Economic Injury Disaster Loan (EIDL) fraud. The defendant, Adonijah Lindsay, pleaded guilty to two counts of wire fraud for falsely claiming substantial pre-pandemic business revenues while he was incarcerated. At sentencing, the district court imposed a 36-month prison term and five years of supervised release, including the now-challenged alcohol-abstinence and bar restrictions. Defense counsel did not object to these conditions at sentencing. On appeal, Lindsay argued the restrictions were unsupported by the record and excessive, particularly given the lack of a nexus between alcohol and his wire-fraud offense.

Summary of the Opinion

The Tenth Circuit affirmed under plain-error review. While assuming the district court erred by failing to provide at least a generalized statement of reasons for the alcohol-related conditions, the panel concluded the error did not affect Lindsay’s substantial rights. Under binding circuit law, special conditions are vacated on plain-error review only if “the record reveals no basis for the conditions.” Here, the record supplied several bases:

Lindsay’s long-term use of alcohol beginning at age 12, including historical episodes of drinking to the point of passing out before age 18.
His admitted use of alcohol while on prior federal supervised release despite an abstinence condition.
His use of marijuana from age 13 until 2020, the year he obtained an EIDL loan and participated in other fraudulent applications.
A January 2023 drink temporally proximate to a January 13, 2023 arrest for fraud and larceny involving conduct from November 2022.

The court held that these facts rendered the alcohol restrictions reasonably related to the § 3553(a)(1) history-and-characteristics factor and the § 3553(a)(2)(D) correctional-treatment factor. It also concluded the restrictions did not impose a greater deprivation of liberty than reasonably necessary. The panel further rejected the argument that the policy statement in U.S.S.G. § 5D1.3(d)(4) forbids such conditions absent a finding of current abuse, pointing to the guideline’s “in particular cases” language as an independent basis for appropriateness.

The court distinguished out-of-circuit cases vacating similar conditions, noting they either applied the more lenient abuse-of-discretion standard or involved defendants with no history of substance problems and no PSR recommendation for the condition. Finally, although the government moved in the district court during the appeal to remove the alcohol restrictions (a motion the district court denied), the Tenth Circuit observed that nothing in its decision precludes the district court from removing the conditions in the future.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

United States v. Francis, 891 F.3d 888 (10th Cir. 2018): The linchpin for the panel’s plain-error framework. Francis holds that, on plain-error review, special conditions of supervised release may be vacated only if “the record reveals no basis for the conditions.” The Lindsay panel applied this exact standard to conclude that even if the district court failed to explain the alcohol-related restrictions, the presence of a record basis defeats the “substantial rights” prong of plain error. Francis also confirms that a sentencing court need only provide a generalized statement of reasons for special conditions, not condition-by-condition justifications.
United States v. Richards, 958 F.3d 961 (10th Cir. 2020): Cited to underscore that U.S.S.G. § 5D1.3(d) contemplates more than just current substance abuse when recommending or permitting substance-related conditions. Richards supports reading § 5D1.3(d)(4) broadly, including its “in particular cases” proviso.
United States v. Teague, 443 F.3d 1310 (10th Cir. 2006): Addresses waiver versus forfeiture. The government argued Lindsay waived any challenge by affirmatively indicating no objection at sentencing. The panel declined to resolve this because Lindsay loses even under the more forgiving plain-error review for forfeited claims. Teague remains a background rule: waived rights are unreviewable; forfeited rights can receive plain-error review.
Out-of-circuit cases vacating alcohol conditions:
- United States v. Prendergast, 979 F.2d 1289 (8th Cir. 1992)
- United States v. Modena, 302 F.3d 626 (6th Cir. 2002)
- United States v. Betts, 511 F.3d 872 (9th Cir. 2007)
- United States v. Herrera-Angeles, 804 F. App’x 244 (5th Cir. 2020)
The panel found these cases distinguishable because (a) three applied the abuse-of-discretion standard, not plain error; and (b) none involved a defendant with a substantiated history of alcohol use/problems or prior noncompliance with abstinence conditions. Unlike those defendants, Lindsay’s record reflected early onset alcohol use, episodes of severe consumption, continuing use into adulthood (including on prior supervision), and a PSR recommending the restrictions.
Eugene S. v. Horizon Blue Cross Blue Shield of N.J., 663 F.3d 1124 (10th Cir. 2011): Cited in a footnote to justify limited disclosure of sealed PSR information necessary to explain the decision, applying the public’s right of access framework.

Legal Reasoning

The court’s reasoning proceeds along the familiar four-prong plain-error pathway:

Error: The panel assumed, without definitively holding, that the district court committed error by not articulating even a generalized reason for imposing the alcohol restrictions. This aligns with Francis, which expects a generalized explanation for special conditions.
Plainness: The government did not contest that any error was “plain,” and the panel again assumed this element in the defendant’s favor.
Substantial Rights: This is where Lindsay’s challenge failed. Under Francis, a defendant cannot demonstrate an effect on substantial rights if the record provides a basis for the condition—because in that event there is no reasonable probability of a different outcome had the error not occurred. Here, the record contained multiple indicia:
- A longstanding pattern of alcohol and marijuana use beginning in early adolescence and continuing through 2020 (the period of the EIDL fraud).
- Noncompliance with a prior federal abstinence condition.
- Recent alcohol use close in time to criminal conduct leading to a 2023 arrest.
These facts adequately connected the condition to the § 3553(a)(1) factor (history and characteristics) and the § 3553(a)(2)(D) factor (need for correctional treatment), and supported the conclusion that the restrictions did not exceed what was reasonably necessary for the purposes in § 3553(a)(2)(B)-(D).
Fairness, Integrity, or Public Reputation: Having found no effect on substantial rights, the panel did not reach this prong.

On the statutory and guidelines overlay, the court walked through 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d)’s three requirements for special conditions:

Reasonable relation to § 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(B)-(D) factors.
No greater deprivation of liberty than reasonably necessary for those § 3553(a)(2) purposes.
Consistency with pertinent Sentencing Commission policy statements.

Addressing the policy-statement prong, the court rejected the defense interpretation of U.S.S.G. § 5D1.3(d)(4) as requiring a finding of current substance abuse. The guideline’s text recommends a no-alcohol condition when the court has reason to believe a defendant “is an abuser,” but, critically, the guideline’s flush language also authorizes such conditions “in particular cases” even outside that scenario. Thus, current abuse is not a prerequisite; case-specific appropriateness can suffice.

The panel also noted a practical point favoring the government: the PSR recommended the condition, and defense counsel neither objected to the condition nor to the sufficiency of the district court’s explanation at sentencing, even when prompted. Although the panel did not rest its decision on waiver, this posture underscored the difficulty of meeting the plain-error standard.

Impact

The decision—while an unpublished order and judgment—carries meaningful persuasive value in the Tenth Circuit for several reasons:

Reinforcement of the “record basis” safeguard in plain-error review: Lindsay confirms that the absence of a stated rationale for special conditions will rarely yield reversal on plain-error review if the record contains any facts linking the condition to the defendant’s history, deterrence, public protection, or treatment needs. Practically, this heightens the importance of contemporaneous objections and record development at sentencing.
Clarification of U.S.S.G. § 5D1.3(d)(4): The panel’s reading highlights the “in particular cases” clause, signaling that alcohol restrictions need not be limited to defendants with provable current abuse. Past use patterns, noncompliance with prior conditions, or other individualized factors may justify such conditions consistent with § 3583(d).
No nexus-to-offense requirement: The offense need not be alcohol-related to sustain an alcohol condition, so long as the condition is reasonably tied to the defendant’s characteristics or other § 3553(a) objectives and the deprivation is not greater than necessary.
Strategic implications for counsel: Defense counsel should object to special conditions and to the adequacy of reasons at sentencing, present countervailing facts (e.g., negative assessments, treatment completion, long-term sobriety), and propose narrower alternatives (e.g., no-excess drinking rather than total abstinence, or a no-bar condition with exceptions). Absent such steps, appellate relief will be difficult under Francis’s “no basis in the record” standard.
Post-sentencing modification remains possible: The panel noted that nothing in its ruling prevents the district court from removing the alcohol-related restrictions in the future, echoing the general availability of modification procedures for supervised release conditions when circumstances warrant. The district court’s interim denial of the government’s motion to remove the conditions was explicitly not a merits ruling barring later reconsideration.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Special conditions of supervised release: These are tailored rules a defendant must follow after prison. By statute (18 U.S.C. § 3583(d)), they must (a) relate to the defendant’s history or sentencing goals like deterrence, public protection, or treatment; (b) not restrict liberty more than necessary; and (c) be consistent with Sentencing Commission policy statements.
Plain-error review: Applies when an issue was not properly preserved in the district court. The appellant must show (1) error, (2) that is clear or obvious (“plain”), (3) affecting substantial rights (usually, a reasonable probability of a different outcome), and (4) seriously affecting the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. If the record gives a plausible basis for the condition, prong three typically fails.
Waiver vs. forfeiture: Waiver is an intentional relinquishment of a known right; forfeiture is a failure to timely assert a right. Waived issues are generally unreviewable; forfeited issues can be reviewed for plain error. The panel did not decide whether Lindsay waived or forfeited because he lost even under plain-error review.
Policy statements vs. guidelines: The Sentencing Guidelines include advisory ranges and policy statements. Section 5D1.3(d)(4) is a policy statement addressing when courts should consider alcohol restrictions. Its “in particular cases” clause allows flexibility beyond current-abuse scenarios.
“No greater deprivation than reasonably necessary”: A proportionality limit drawn from § 3583(d)(2) that prevents overbroad or unnecessarily intrusive conditions. Courts examine the connection to sentencing goals and the availability of narrower alternatives.
Generalized statement of reasons: While courts are expected to explain why they impose special conditions, the Tenth Circuit does not require a separate, detailed explanation for each condition. A global, generalized rationale can suffice. Failure to give one may be error—but not necessarily a reversible one under plain-error review if the record can supply the missing rationale.

What the Court Did Not Decide

Whether defense counsel’s failure to object amounted to waiver (as opposed to forfeiture) for this issue.
That alcohol restrictions require proof of current abuse or a direct nexus to the offense conduct; instead, the court emphasized individualized appropriateness based on history and § 3553(a) needs.
That the conditions must remain in place indefinitely; the panel expressly noted the district court retains future authority to remove them.

Conclusion

United States v. Lindsay crystallizes two practical rules in supervised-release jurisprudence within the Tenth Circuit: first, on plain-error review, a missing on-the-record explanation for special conditions will not warrant vacatur if the record supplies any basis linking the condition to the statutory factors; second, U.S.S.G. § 5D1.3(d)(4) permits alcohol-related conditions not only for current substance abusers but also “in particular cases” where individualized circumstances (such as long-term use and prior noncompliance) justify them.

The decision strengthens the imperative for contemporaneous objections to special conditions and stresses the importance of building a record at sentencing—either to support tailored conditions or to demonstrate their unnecessary breadth. While the opinion is nonprecedential, it is persuasive authority that will likely shape district court practices and appellate outcomes in the Tenth Circuit: judges may continue to impose alcohol-related conditions even in non-substance-related offenses when the defendant’s history and characteristics support them, and appellate courts will hesitate to disturb those conditions absent a record devoid of justification. At the same time, the door remains open for post-sentencing modifications should later developments render such conditions unnecessary or unduly burdensome.