Reconciling Child Witness Protection with the Confrontation Clause: Mandatory Screens under Miss. Code § 99-43-101(2)(g)

Introduction

This commentary examines the Supreme Court of Mississippi’s decision in Pitts v. State of Mississippi (2025), which addresses the interplay between the rights of child crime victims and the constitutional confrontation rights of criminal defendants. In February 2021, Jeffrey Clyde Pitts was convicted of sexually battering his four-year-old daughter, AGC, a conviction affirmed by the Court of Appeals and then by the Supreme Court of Mississippi on certiorari. The core issue on review was whether the trial court’s mandatory use of a screen—required by Mississippi Code § 99-43-101(2)(g)—to block the child’s view of her father violated his Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses against him. Four justices granted certiorari; the majority affirmed, emphasizing statutory text and state victims’-rights policy, while a vigorous dissent urged adherence to United States Supreme Court confrontation precedents.

Summary of the Judgment

Chief Justice Randolph, writing for the majority, held that:

Pitts received full confrontation protections (oath, cross-examination, jury observation, real-time testimony) despite his daughter’s testimony behind a screen.
Mississippi Code § 99-43-101(2)(g) is mandatory and unambiguous; it requires use of a screen upon motion in any case where a child testifies.
Under state constitutional victims’-rights Amendment 2 (art. 3, § 26A), the legislature may enact procedural laws to protect crime victims; § 99-43-101(2)(g) implements that grant of authority.
No showing of individualized “serious emotional trauma” was required because the statute’s plain text contains no such condition.
The essential elements of confrontation were met: AGC testified live under oath, subject to full cross-examination, with her demeanor observable (via screen and Zoom feed), and Pitts could hear, see, and consult with counsel.

The majority thus affirmed the conviction, emphasizing deference to legislative enactments and the broad, mandatory text of § 99-43-101(2)(g). Justice Maxwell concurred in result, expressing concern over certiorari practice but not the outcome. Justice King dissented, arguing that mandatory screens violate the United States Supreme Court’s rulings in Coy v. Iowa and Maryland v. Craig, which require individualized findings before restricting face-to-face confrontation.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

Coy v. Iowa (487 U.S. 1012, 1021–22 (1988)): Held that a statutorily imposed presumption of trauma did not justify a screen between child witnesses and the accused; emphasized need for case-specific findings.
Maryland v. Craig (497 U.S. 836, 850 (1990)): Upheld one-way closed-circuit testimony of child witnesses only upon a finding that face-to-face confrontation would cause “serious emotional distress” to that child.
Mattox v. United States (156 U.S. 237 (1895)): Grounded confrontation in common law; outlined core purposes (oath, cross-examination, jury observation).
Other Confrontation Clause authorities: Green, Pointer, Roberts, and more, affirming the right to oath, cross-examination, and demeanor assessment.
State constitutional and statutory provisions: Mississippi’s Crime Victims’ Bill of Rights (Miss. Code §§ 99-43-1 to ‑101), and Amendment 2 to the Mississippi Constitution (art. 3, § 26A).

Legal Reasoning

The majority’s reasoning proceeds in three steps:

Statutory Text Controls. When § 99-43-101(2)(g) “unambiguously do[es] not require a trial judge to make a specific finding of emotional trauma,” the court must enforce its plain meaning. The mandatory “shall” compels use of a screen upon motion when a child testifies.
Victims’-Rights Constitutional Authority. By popular vote in 1998, Mississippians amended art. 3, § 26A to empower the legislature “to enact substantive and procedural laws to define, implement, preserve and protect the rights guaranteed to victims.” The court saw § 99-43-101(2)(g) as a valid exercise of that authority, subject to—but not overridden by—the Confrontation Clause.
Confrontation Clause Satisfied. All essential elements—live oath, full cross-examination, jury observation of demeanor, and defendant’s ability to see/hear/consult—remained intact. The Zoom feed further mitigated any symbolic loss of “face-to-face” presence.

The dissent, by contrast, emphasizes that both Coy and Craig require case-specific findings of necessity before abridging face-to-face confrontation; § 99-43-101(2)(g) contains no such exception, and the trial court made no individualized finding that the four-year-old would suffer serious emotional distress if she saw her father.

Impact

This decision resolves a split in authority over whether mandatory child-witness protection devices are consistent with the Sixth Amendment. It upholds Mississippi’s crime-victims statute as a valid exercise of state constitutional power, likely emboldening other jurisdictions with similar provisions. Defendants will remain subject to screen statutes without individualized hearings, provided the legislature has spoken plainly. Future challenges may arise in cases without Zoom or where jury observation is alleged to be impaired.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Confrontation Clause: Guarantees a criminal defendant the right to face and cross-examine witnesses; core elements are oath, cross-examination, and jury’s ability to judge witness demeanor.
“Shall” vs. “May”: “Shall” indicates a mandatory obligation; trial courts cannot refuse to apply a statute using “shall” even if they believe it unwise.
Case-Specific Findings: In Confrontation Clause exceptions (e.g., Coy, Craig), courts must hold a hearing and find that the specific child would suffer serious trauma if forced to see the defendant.
Victims’-Rights Amendment (Art. 3, § 26A): Mississippi voters authorized substantive and procedural laws protecting crime victims without impairing defendants’ constitutional rights.
Tender Years Exception (Evid. 803(25)): Permits hearsay statements by very young victims when reliability factors are met; separate from live-testimony screen statutes.

Conclusion

Pitts v. State affirms that a plainly written, mandatory statute providing a screen for child witnesses may stand despite a defendant’s face-to-face confrontation interest, so long as the core elements of the right to confrontation remain intact. The decision underlines two guiding principles: first, courts must give effect to unambiguous legislative enactments, especially those rooted in a state constitutional victims’-rights scheme; second, where all critical elements—oath, cross-examination, real-time testimony, and demeanor observation—are preserved, statutory devices that symbolically limit “face-to-face” contact may pass constitutional muster. This ruling shapes the landscape of child-victim testimony in Mississippi, balancing crime victims’ protections with defendants’ Sixth Amendment rights.