Reconciling Bowen, Great-West, and California:
American Public Health Association v. NIH Establishes District-Court Jurisdiction to Vacate Federal Grant Terminations Under the APA

1. Introduction

In American Public Health Association v. National Institutes of Health, No. 25-1611/-1612 (1st Cir. July 18 2025), the First Circuit denied the federal government’s request to stay a district-court judgment that had vacated sweeping NIH grant terminations promulgated after three 2025 Executive Orders. Two consolidated plaintiff groups—the American Public Health Association et al. (private researchers) and sixteen States—contended that the so-called “Challenged Directives” and the template “Termination Letters” were ultra vires, arbitrary and capricious, and discriminatory.

Beyond the immediate public-health stakes, the case sets a crucial precedent on a recurring jurisdictional puzzle: when do lawsuits attacking federal grant decisions belong in district court under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and when must they proceed in the Court of Federal Claims under the Tucker Act? Confronting the Supreme Court’s terse emergency order in Department of Education v. California, 145 S. Ct. 966 (2025), and the older landmarks Bowen v. Massachusetts, 487 U.S. 879 (1988), and Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204 (2002), the First Circuit held that declaratory vacatur of arbitrary NIH grant cancellations is not a Tucker-Act money-damages claim. Consequently, district courts retain jurisdiction to set such terminations aside— even when the practical effect is to unlock federal funds.

2. Summary of the Judgment

• Stay Denied. Applying Nken v. Holder, the court found the government unlikely to succeed on appeal, insufficiently threatened with irreparable harm, and unable to tip the equitable balance.
• Jurisdiction Confirmed. The court distinguished Great-West and California, embraced Bowen, and ruled that the APA’s waiver of sovereign immunity covers suits seeking declaratory vacatur of unlawful grant terminations.
• APA Merits. The panel agreed that the directives and ensuing cancellations were “breathtakingly arbitrary and capricious,” lacking definitions, scientific rationale, or consideration of reliance interests.
• Public Interest. Continued research on cancer, minority health, infectious disease, and gender-affirming care outweighed the government’s asserted fiscal concerns.

3. Detailed Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited and Their Influence

1. Bowen v. Massachusetts (1988) – Recognized district-court APA jurisdiction to set aside HHS Medicaid “disallowances,” even though the inevitable consequence was state reimbursement. The First Circuit treats Bowen as the controlling analogue: relief was declaratory, not a money judgment, and the “primary function” was statutory review.
2. Great-West Life & Annuity v. Knudson (2002) – Labeled contractual reimbursement suits for “past-due sums” as legal claims beyond ERISA’s equitable remedies. The panel distinguished Great-West because plaintiffs’ theory here did not enforce contractual clauses or demand payment as damages.
3. Dept. of Educ. v. California (2025) – A shadow-docket stay where the Supreme Court characterized district-court relief as enforcement of “past-due grant obligations.” The First Circuit parsed the stay briefing, noting that California involved time-limited TROs compelling immediate payouts, whereas the orders below merely vacated unlawful decisions.
4. Lincoln v. Vigil (1993) – Held that reallocations from lump-sum appropriations can be committed to agency discretion. The court found Lincoln inapposite because Congress here had imposed statutory criteria on NIH funding (e.g., cancer and minority-health mandates) and regulations cabined termination authority (45 C.F.R. § 75.372(a)).
5. Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association v. State Farm (1983); FCC v. Fox (2009); DHS v. Regents (2020) – Provide substantive APA standards: reasoned decision-making, non-circular rationale, and treatment of reliance interests. The district court’s findings, adopted implicitly by the panel, tracked these precedents.

3.2 The Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. APA Versus Tucker Act.
   The Tucker Act confers exclusive jurisdiction on the Court of Federal Claims for “express or implied contract” suits seeking money damages. The panel emphasized two escape valves:
   • § 702 of the APA restores district-court jurisdiction for suits seeking “relief other than money damages.”
   • B owen’s principle that fund disbursement is a mere by-product of reviewing agency legality.
   The orders did not compel payment but vacated impermissible agency action; any future disbursement flows from the statutory grant-making regime, not from a judicial money judgment.
2. Justiciability of Grant Terminations.
   Although NIH draws its grants from lump-sum appropriations, Congress layered substantive criteria (women’s cancers, minority health, etc.) and regulations that render terminations reviewable. Hence, the “committed to discretion” exception (5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2)) is inapplicable.
3. Arbitrary & Capricious Findings.
   The directives banned vaguely-defined categories (DEI, “gender ideology”) without analysis, borrowed boilerplate drafted by staff in the “Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE),” and ignored reliance interests—jeopardizing ongoing clinical trials and multi-year datasets. These lapses violated State Farm’s demand for rational explanation and Regents’ requirement to weigh reliance.
4. Stay Framework.
   Applying the four Nken factors:
   1. Likelihood of success – Low, given jurisdictional precedent and glaring APA deficiencies.
   2. Irreparable injury – Government’s speculative difficulty clawing back funds outweighed by irreversible harm to scientific studies and patient welfare.
   3. Harm to opposing parties – Plaintiffs face euthanized lab animals, invalidated trials, lost personnel.
   4. Public interest – Society benefits when agencies obey statutory limits and vital health research continues.

3.3 Potential Impact of the Decision

• Roadmap for Post-California Litigation. The opinion supplies lower courts with a method to reconcile emergency Supreme Court stays with existing merits precedent.
• Reaffirmed Role of Vacatur. By blessing vacatur—even of agency actions whose reversal releases funds—the decision strengthens plaintiffs’ ability to seek broad, program-level relief under the APA.
• Constraints on Ideological Policy Swings. Executive attempts to defund research based on political or cultural criteria must survive State-Farm scrutiny and respect statutory research mandates.
• Guidance on Lump-Sum Appropriations. Agencies receiving block funding cannot evade judicial review by invoking discretion where Congress or regulations impose discernible standards.
• Stays Pending Appeal. Federal defendants must quantify financial harms and confront concrete, often non-monetary, injuries to plaintiffs; mere assertion of fiscal impact is insufficient.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Administrative Procedure Act (APA)

The 1946 statute that lets federal courts review most agency actions. Key provisions here: § 702 (sovereign-immunity waiver) and § 706 (scope of review—“arbitrary and capricious”).

Tucker Act

28 U.S.C. § 1491 – Channels contract and monetary claims against the United States to the Court of Federal Claims. It does not cover suits seeking non-monetary equitable relief.

Vacatur

An equitable remedy that nullifies (“sets aside”) an unlawful agency action; it differs from an injunction because it does not direct future conduct but erases the rule or decision.

Stay Pending Appeal

A temporary pause on a lower-court order while the appellate court reviews the merits. Governed by the four-factor test in Nken v. Holder (2009).

Arbitrary and Capricious

A legal standard requiring agencies to offer rational, evidence-based explanations and to consider important factors, including reliance interests.

5. Conclusion

The First Circuit’s decision in American Public Health Association v. NIH delivers a meticulous synthesis of Supreme Court precedent, reaffirming that district courts remain the proper forum for APA challenges to sweeping grant-funding decisions, even when vacatur predictably unleashes federal dollars. By holding that political edicts cannot circumvent statutory research mandates or regulatory safeguards, the opinion safeguards scientific integrity, clarifies the limits of executive discretion, and refines the jurisprudence on federal-grant litigation after California. Future litigants and courts confronting similar jurisdictional and APA questions now have a comprehensive blueprint: focus on the nature of the relief sought and the presence (or absence) of contract-based money claims, and ensure any agency shift is grounded in reasoned analysis and statutory fidelity.