Recognizing Anxiety as a Disability and the Employer’s Interactive‐Process Duty

Introduction

Way v. City of Missouri City, No. 24-20144 (5th Cir. Apr. 9, 2025) addresses the interplay of three major employment statutes—the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), and the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act (TCHRA)—in the context of an attorney, Jamilah Way, who suffered from anxiety and uterine fibroids while employed as the First Assistant City Attorney. After she disclosed her conditions, sought accommodations, and took statutory leave, Way was terminated upon return from FMLA leave. The Fifth Circuit’s decision affirms in part, reverses in part, and remands, establishing a clear rule that (1) anxiety can qualify as a disability under the ADA and (2) an employer’s failure to engage in a good-faith interactive process to consider reasonable accommodations can support a discrimination claim.

Summary of the Judgment

The Fifth Circuit reviewed summary judgment granted by the district court in favor of the City of Missouri City. Way had asserted:

• Discrimination under the ADA and TCHRA for failure to accommodate her anxiety and fibroids;
• Retaliation under the ADA and TCHRA;
• FMLA interference (denial of benefits, including alleged improper pay coding); and
• FMLA retaliation (termination in response to taking leave).

The Fifth Circuit held:

• The district court erred in granting summary judgment on Way’s ADA/TCHRA discrimination claim as to her anxiety. A jury could find Way’s anxiety a qualifying disability, that she disclosed it, requested specific accommodations, and that the City failed to engage in the required interactive process.
• Summary judgment was properly granted on her failure-to-accommodate claims relating to fibroids, because the record showed the City granted her schedule-flex and remote-work requests.
• The ADA/TCHRA retaliation claims failed for lack of a causal link between protected activity and termination.
• The FMLA interference claim (improper pay reduction) failed for lack of prejudice—both FMLA leave and “administrative leave” were unpaid.
• The FMLA retaliation claim survived: Way’s termination shortly after requesting additional leave and inconsistencies in the City’s budget‐based explanation raised a triable issue of pretext under the “cat’s paw” doctrine.

Judgment: Affirmed in part (fibroids-based ADA/discrimination, all retaliation under ADA/TCHRA, FMLA interference) and reversed in part (anxiety‐based ADA/TCHRA discrimination, FMLA retaliation), remanded for trial on those issues.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

• Taylor v. Principal Financial Group (93 F.3d 155): Defines “reasonable accommodation” and employer’s interactive‐process duty.
• 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j),(i) (ADA Amendments Act regulations): Broad construction of “substantially limits” and “major life activities.”
• Chevron Phillips Chem. Co. v. EEOC (570 F.3d 606): Employer’s failure to engage in meaningful dialogue violates the ADA.
• Cutrera v. Board of Supervisors of LSU (429 F.3d 108): Outlines the interactive‐process requirement and employer’s liability if it refuses good‐faith participation.
• Feist v. Louisiana Department of Justice (730 F.3d 450): Elements of ADA retaliation; protected activity includes requesting accommodations.
• Staub v. Proctor Hospital (562 U.S. 411): Cat’s paw liability standard for imputing a biased supervisor’s animus to the formal decision‐maker.
• Zamora v. City of Houston (798 F.3d 326): To establish cat’s paw liability, employee must show supervisor’s retaliatory animus and but-for causation.
• Caldwell v. KHOU‐TV (850 F.3d 237): FMLA interference elements; prejudice requirement.
• Wheat v. Florida Par. Juvenile Justice Commission (811 F.3d 702): FMLA retaliation framework under McDonnell Douglas.

Legal Reasoning

1. Anxiety as a Disability: The ADA’s definition—“physical or mental impairment that substantially limits a major life activity”—is construed broadly. Way’s uncontested evidence (doctor visits, racing heart, inability to sleep, tearful episodes at work) raises triable issues that her anxiety affected thinking, sleeping, and other functions.

2. Disclosure and Accommodation: Way notified her supervisor in writing of her anxiety and requested “clear expectations, timelines, and workflows” in writing. That satisfied the notice requirement and triggered the City’s interactive‐process duty. On summary judgment a jury must decide whether the City’s responses (sarcasm, silence, no written workflows) breached that duty.

3. Fibroids‐Related Accommodation: Unlike anxiety, Way’s schedule-flex and remote-work requests—supported by a medical certification—were granted. There is no record evidence of denial or bad-faith, so no ADA claim survives.

4. ADA/TCHRA Retaliation: Although requesting accommodation is a protected activity, the 18‐month gap between Way’s early requests and her January 2021 termination precludes a causal inference based on temporal proximity alone, and no additional evidence links them.

5. FMLA Interference: Way alleged an improper pay reduction. Both forms of leave at issue were unpaid, and the only “evidence” of mis-coding was a conclusory declaration. Without showing actual lost wages or benefits, she cannot prove prejudice.

6. FMLA Retaliation and Cat’s Paw Liability: Way returned from leave on December 16, sought four more days of leave, and was terminated on January 19. The City’s proffered reason—elimination of budgeted position—was undercut by (a) the budget consultant’s report showing funds for additional support staff, (b) the supervisor’s August 2019 memo calling the position “impractical,” and (c) the timing of termination. A reasonable jury could find the City Council acted as a mere “rubber stamp” (cat’s paw) for a supervisor’s retaliatory animus.

Potential Impact

• Reinforces that mental health conditions (including anxiety) can be ADA disabilities when they substantially limit life activities.
• Emphasizes the critical nature of the interactive process—mere acknowledgment of a request is insufficient if no meaningful dialogue or follow-up occurs.
• Clarifies that FMLA retaliation claims may proceed on a cat’s‐paw theory even when formal decision-makers lack personal knowledge of the employee’s protected leave.
• Guides employers to ensure consistency between budget‐driven workforce changes and legitimate business needs, particularly when an employee has invoked statutory leave rights.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• “Major Life Activities” under ADA: Broadly includes caring for oneself, sleeping, concentrating, thinking, and bodily functions like reproduction.
• Interactive Process: A two-way conversation between employer and employee to identify reasonable accommodations—more than mere receipt of a request.
• “Cat’s Paw” Liability: When a supervisor with discriminatory intent influences the ultimate decision-maker, the employer may be held liable even if the formal decider lacked bias.
• FMLA Interference vs. Retaliation: Interference claims allege denial of rights (leave, reinstatement, pay); retaliation claims allege adverse actions (discipline, firing) taken because an employee exercised FMLA rights.

Conclusion

Way v. City of Missouri City is a landmark Fifth Circuit ruling that (1) confirms anxiety can qualify as an ADA disability, (2) underscores an employer’s strict duty to engage in the interactive process once an accommodation request is made, and (3) illustrates how a supervisor’s retaliatory animus can be imputed to an employer under the cat’s-paw theory in FMLA cases. Going forward, employers must promptly, genuinely, and transparently address accommodation requests and guard against budgetary rationales that may mask prohibited retaliation.