Recognition of PREA-Complaint Retaliation and Limits of Sovereign Immunity for Voyeuristic Tort in Williamson v. Bolton

Introduction

In Bobby Williamson v. Brian Bolton, No. 24-2246 (3d Cir. Apr. 29, 2025), the Third Circuit addressed the interplay of First Amendment retaliation claims, Pennsylvania sovereign immunity for intentional torts, and the statutory framework of the Prison Rape Elimination Act (PREA). Pro se appellant Bobby Williamson, an inmate at SCI Huntingdon, alleged that Correctional Officer Brian Bolton peered into a urinal stall in an act of voyeurism—an alleged violation of PREA—and that, after Williamson filed a PREA complaint, he was subjected to disciplinary charges (Class I misconduct for lying), cell restriction, loss of his prison job, and other retaliatory acts by multiple officers. The district court dismissed all claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) and denied leave to add new allegations of subsequent strip‐search abuses. On appeal, the Third Circuit affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for further proceedings.

Summary of the Judgment

The Third Circuit’s per curiam decision resolved three core issues:

1. Retaliation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983: The court held that Williamson’s allegation—that he was charged with a Class I misconduct in retaliation for filing a PREA complaint against Officer Bolton—stated a plausible First Amendment claim. The district court’s dismissal was vacated, and the claim was remanded.
2. Conspiracy under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3): Williamson’s bare assertion of a conspiracy among correctional officers failed to allege “enough factual matter” to support an agreement to deprive him of equal protection. The Third Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the § 1985(3) claim.
3. State-law invasion of privacy tort: The district court had applied sovereign immunity to dismiss Williamson’s claim that Officer Bolton’s voyeurism constituted an intentional tort. The Third Circuit concluded that voyeurism falls “outside the scope of authorized duties” and is not protected by sovereign immunity—and therefore vacated the dismissal of the invasion-of-privacy claim and remanded for further proceedings.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

• Rauser v. Horn, 241 F.3d 330 (3d Cir. 2001): Articulated the three elements of a prisoner First Amendment retaliation claim.
• Watson v. Rozum, 834 F.3d 417 (3d Cir. 2016): Confirmed that filing institutional grievances (including PREA complaints) is protected conduct and clarified the “same-decision” defense burden shift.
• Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), and Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007): Established the facial plausibility standard for dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6).
• Dooley v. Wetzel, 957 F.3d 366 (3d Cir. 2020): Confirmed plenary review of § 1915A dismissals in prisoner cases.
• Justice v. Lombardo, 208 A.3d 1057 (Pa. 2019): Interpreted Pennsylvania sovereign immunity’s “scope of employment” test for intentional torts by state actors.

Legal Reasoning

The Third Circuit’s opinion hinged on two key legal analyses:

1. First Amendment Retaliation

To survive a § 1983 motion to dismiss, a prisoner must plead that:

1. He engaged in protected conduct—here, filing a grievance or PREA complaint;
2. He suffered an adverse action sufficient to deter a person of ordinary firmness—here, a Class I misconduct charge, job loss, and cell restriction;
3. The protected conduct was a substantial or motivating factor in the adverse action.

The court accepted Williamson’s allegations as true, found them sufficient to state a claim, and rejected the district court’s reliance on the “some evidence” standard (Superintendent, Mass. Corr. Inst. v. Hill) as inapplicable to a retaliation context. The court further held that the “same-decision” defense—that defendants would have disciplined him anyway—was fact-specific and not apparent on the face of the complaint.

2. Sovereign Immunity for Intentional Torts

Under the Pennsylvania Sovereign Immunity Act, state employees are immune from suit for accidental or negligent acts within the scope of their employment, but not for intentional acts that are:

• “Different in kind from that authorized” (e.g., voyeurism is not a penological duty).
• “Far beyond authorized time or space limits.”
• “Too little actuated by a purpose to serve the master.”

Officer Bolton’s alleged voyeuristic conduct—peering at an inmate using a toilet—fits squarely outside authorized duties, falling under PREA’s own definition of prohibited sexual abuse. Thus, the tort claim for invasion of privacy could proceed.

Impact

Williamson v. Bolton has important implications:

• Prisoner Retaliation Suits: Confirms that filing a PREA complaint is protected First Amendment conduct and that courts should apply the Twombly/Iqbal plausibility standard to retaliation claims, not the “some evidence” test.
• “Same-Decision” Defense: Reinforces that the fact-intensive inquiry belongs to the fact-finder, not the pleading stage, unless the complaint itself forecloses the defense.
• Sovereign Immunity Boundaries: Clarifies that intentional torts involving sexual misconduct—voyeurism, strip searches without penological justification—cannot hide behind state immunity if they fall outside the scope of official duties.
• PREA’s Regulatory Scope: Raises questions about the extent to which the Attorney General’s regulation of “voyeurism” under PREA fits within Congress’s original authorization to punish “rape.” Lower courts and policymakers may revisit the statutory definitions underpinning PREA’s national standards.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• PREA (Prison Rape Elimination Act): A federal law that requires zero tolerance for sexual abuse in correctional settings and mandates national standards to prevent and investigate such incidents.
• Class I Misconduct: The most serious category of prison disciplinary infractions, triggering job loss, cell restriction, or other penalties.
• “Some Evidence” Standard: A due‐process test from Hill, used to review prison disciplinary decisions, but not to assess retaliation pleadings under the First Amendment.
• “Same-Decision” Defense: A defendant’s assertion that the adverse action would have been taken regardless of protected conduct; requires a fact-specific analysis.
• Pennsylvania Sovereign Immunity: Protects state actors from tort liability for acts within their authorized duties; does not shield intentional misconduct beyond or outside those duties.
• Section 1915A Screening: Mandates early judicial review of prisoner complaints to dismiss frivolous or malicious claims prior to service.

Conclusion

Williamson v. Bolton advances the law in two significant areas. First, it reaffirms that inmates may assert First Amendment retaliation claims when disciplined in response to filing good‐faith PREA complaints, and it properly situates the “same-decision” defense at the summary-judgment or trial stage. Second, it delineates the outer bounds of state sovereign immunity by holding that voyeuristic conduct—prohibited by PREA and not within an officer’s penological duties—may give rise to an intentional tort claim in state court. These clarifications will guide lower courts, prison administrators, and legislators in policing in‐custody sexual misconduct and protecting prisoners’ fundamental rights.