Recognition of Compensation for Temporary Regulatory Takings under the Fifth Amendment

Recognition of Compensation for Temporary Regulatory Takings under the Fifth Amendment

Introduction

In the landmark case First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, California, 482 U.S. 304 (1987), the United States Supreme Court addressed the pivotal issue of compensation for regulatory takings under the Fifth Amendment. The case revolved around the First English Evangelical Lutheran Church's claim that an interim flood protection ordinance enacted by the County of Los Angeles effectively denied them all use of their property, Lutherglen, thereby constituting a taking requiring just compensation.

The key issues in this case were whether the denial of all use of property due to a temporary regulatory measure constitutes a compensable taking under the Fifth Amendment and whether compensation should be provided for the period during which the property was effectively taken, even if the regulation was later deemed invalid.

The parties involved were the First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale (appellant) and the County of Los Angeles (appellee), alongside various amici curiae who presented additional perspectives on the matter.

Summary of the Judgment

The Supreme Court held in favor of the First English Evangelical Lutheran Church, reversing the decision of the California Court of Appeal. The Court determined that under the Fifth Amendment's Just Compensation Clause, landowners are entitled to recover damages for the time before it is definitively determined that a regulation constitutes a taking. This marked a significant shift from previous interpretations, such as those in AGINS v. TIBURON, which limited compensation to only nonmonetary relief until a regulation was conclusively invalidated.

Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered the majority opinion, supported by Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, Powell, and Scalia. Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Blackmun and O'Connor, filed a dissenting opinion, arguing against the majority's interpretation and emphasizing the distinction between temporary and permanent regulatory takings.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

The judgment extensively analyzed and distinguished several key precedents:

  • AGINS v. TIBURON, 24 Cal.3d 266, 598 P.2d 25 (1979):

    • In Agins, the California Supreme Court held that a landowner could not maintain an inverse condemnation suit based solely on a regulatory taking without seeking declaratory relief or a writ of mandamus. The state courts interpreted this to limit compensation to nonmonetary relief unless the regulation was deemed excessive.

  • SAN DIEGO GAS ELECTRIC CO. v. SAN DIEGO, 450 U.S. 621 (1981):

    • This case highlighted the complexities involved in regulatory takings, emphasizing the need for a nuanced approach to determine when compensation is warranted.

  • Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172 (1985):

    • The Court in this case addressed the ripeness of compensation claims, stating that compensation claims are ripe for review once the state has determined that inverse condemnation procedures are unavailable.

  • Other notable cases include MACDONALD, SOMMER FRATES v. YOLO COUNTY and UNITED STATES v. CLARKE.

The majority distinguished these precedents by focusing on the unique circumstances of First English Evangelical Lutheran Church, particularly the temporary nature of the ordinance and the immediate denial of all property use, which necessitated compensation even before a final determination of a taking.

Legal Reasoning

The Court reasoned that the Just Compensation Clause is designed to secure compensation when governmental interference amounts to a taking, irrespective of whether the interference is temporary or permanent. The temporary denial of all use of property by the interim ordinance effectively amounted to a taking that warranted compensation for the period during which the property was unusable.

Chief Justice Rehnquist emphasized that the Fifth Amendment does not limit governmental interference with property rights but instead ensures that just compensation is provided when such interference constitutes a taking. The Court held that "temporary" regulatory takings that deny a landowner all use of their property are not categorically different from permanent takings, thereby requiring compensation.

Impact

This judgment has profound implications for land-use regulation and property rights. It established that governments must compensate property owners not only for permanent takings but also for temporary restrictions that effectively deprive the owner of use of their property. This decision potentially broadens the scope of compensable takings, influencing future litigation and municipal regulatory practices.

Moreover, it compels governments to carefully assess the impact of temporary regulations on property owners and to consider the necessity of providing compensation when such regulations irreparably affect property use, even if the regulations are later invalidated.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Regulatory Taking

A regulatory taking occurs when a government's regulation limits the use of private property to such an extent that it effectively "takes" the property, even without formal eminent domain proceedings. Unlike physical takings, which involve tangible occupation or movement of property, regulatory takings involve restrictions that diminish the property's value or utility.

Inverse Condemnation

Inverse condemnation is a legal claim by a property owner against the government, alleging that government actions have taken their property without just compensation, thus requiring the government to compensate the owner as if through eminent domain proceedings.

Just Compensation Clause

This is a provision in the Fifth Amendment that mandates the government to provide fair compensation when it takes private property for public use. It ensures that property owners are not left uncompensated when their property is significantly impacted by governmental actions.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court's decision in First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles marks a significant advancement in the interpretation of the Fifth Amendment's Just Compensation Clause. By recognizing that temporary regulatory takings can warrant compensation, the Court ensures greater protection for property owners against governmental overreach. This ruling not only rectifies the limitations imposed by prior cases like AGINS v. TIBURON but also sets a precedent that balances governmental regulatory powers with individual property rights. Moving forward, this decision will serve as a critical reference point for both courts and municipalities in addressing the complexities of regulatory takings and the obligations of compensation.

Case Details

Year: 1987
Court: U.S. Supreme Court

Judge(s)

John Paul StevensHarry Andrew BlackmunWilliam Hubbs RehnquistSandra Day O'Connor

Attorney(S)

Michael M. Berger argued the cause for appellant. With him on the briefs was Jerrold A. Fadem. Jack R. White argued the cause for appellee. With him on the brief were DeWitt W. Clinton, Charles J. Moore, and Darlene B. Fischer. Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the American College of Real Estate Lawyers by Robert O. Hetlage, David A. Richards, Eugene J. Morris, and John P. Trevaskis, Jr.; for the California Association of Realtors by William M. Pfeiffer; for the California Building Industry Association by Gideon Kanner; for the National Association of Home Builders by Kenneth B. Bley and Gus Bauman; for the National Association of Realtors by William D. North; and for the Pacific Legal Foundation et al. by Ronald A. Zumbrun and Robert K. Best. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the United States by Solicitor General Fried, Assistant Attorney General Habicht, Deputy Solicitor General Ayer, Deputy Assistant Attorneys General Marzulla, Hookano, and Kmiec, and Edwin S. Kneedler and Peter R. Steenland, Jr.; for the State of California et al. by John K. Van de Kamp, Attorney General of California, Andrea Sheridan Ordin, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Richard C. Jacobs, N. Gregory Taylor, and Theodora Berger, Assistant Attorneys General, and Craig C. Thompson and Richard M. Frank, Deputy Attorneys General, joined by the Attorneys General for their respective States as follows: Harold M. Brown of Alaska, John Steven Clark of Arkansas, Jim Smith of Florida, Corinne K. A. Watanabe of Hawaii, Neil F. Hartigan of Illinois, James E. Tierney of Maine, Francis X. Bellotti of Massachusetts, Hubert H. Humphrey III of Minnesota, Edwin L. Pittman of Mississippi, William L. Webster of Missouri, Stephen E. Merrill of New Hampshire, Robert Abrams of New York, Nicholas J. Spaeth of North Dakota, Michael Turpin of Oklahoma, T. Travis Medlock of South Carolina, Mark V. Meierhenry of South Dakota, Jim Maddox of Texas, David L. Wilkinson of Utah, Jeffrey L. Amestoy of Vermont, Mary Sue Terry of Virginia, Kenneth O. Eikenberry of Washington, Archie G. McClintock of Wyoming, and Hector Rivera Cruz of Puerto Rico; for the city of Los Angeles et al. by Gary R. Netzer, Claudia McGee Henry, and Anthony Saul Alperin; for the National Association of Counties et al. by Benna Ruth Solomon, Joyce Holmes Benjamin, and Beate Bloch; and for the Conservation Foundation et al. by Fred P. Bosselman and Elizabeth S. Merritt.

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