Reckless Police Pursuits, Emergency Response Immunity, and Dying Declarations after Withdrawal of Life Support: Commentary on Mormann v. City of Manchester

I. Introduction

The Iowa Supreme Court’s decision in Sandra K. Mormann, Individually and as Administrator of the Estate of Augustin G. Mormann, and Daniel J. Mormann, Individually v. City of Manchester, Iowa and James Louis Wessels (No. 24-0828, filed Nov. 21, 2025) addresses a cluster of important questions at the intersection of municipal immunity, police liability, and evidence law.

The case arises from a high-speed pursuit that ended when Manchester police lieutenant James Wessels’ cruiser twice contacted the motorcycle driven by 31‑year‑old Augustin (“Gus”) Mormann on a rural road, causing a catastrophic crash. Rendered quadriplegic, ventilator‑dependent, and in severe distress, Mormann later chose to discontinue life support and died. His parents sued Wessels and the City of Manchester, ultimately trying the case solely on common law assault and battery theories and obtaining a jury verdict of $4.25 million in compensatory damages and $10,000 in punitive damages.

On appeal, the City and Wessels mounted a multi‑front attack:

Invoking emergency response immunity under the Iowa Municipal Tort Claims Act (IMTCA), Iowa Code § 670.4(1)(k).
Arguing that assault and battery were never properly pleaded and should not have gone to the jury.
Challenging the sufficiency of the evidence on assault, battery, and punitive damages.
Contesting the admission of the decedent’s statement as a “dying declaration” under Iowa R. Evid. 5.804(b)(2).
Attacking the admission of evidence regarding internal dashcam/bodycam policies and the lack of video of the pursuit.

Justice Waterman, writing for a unanimous court, affirmed across the board. The opinion reinforces and refines several key principles:

Reaffirming that reckless driving by emergency responders falls outside IMTCA emergency response immunity when Iowa Code § 321.231 applies, and that a recklessness finding in a bifurcated punitive‑damages phase can defeat that immunity.
Clarifying that plaintiffs in excessive‑force cases may rely on common law assault and battery even if those labels appear late, so long as the underlying factual theory has been consistently pleaded and litigated.
Confirming that comparative fault is not a defense to intentional torts such as assault and battery.
Holding that a catastrophically injured patient’s decision to withdraw life support does not convert his death into “suicide” for purposes of the dying‑declaration hearsay exception, and that statements about the precipitating injury can qualify as statements about the “cause and circumstances” of death.
Endorsing the use of internal police policies and failures to record (dashcam/bodycam) as relevant evidence of officer intent and willfulness.

Collectively, these holdings significantly shape Iowa’s law governing high‑speed police pursuits, municipal tort immunity, and key evidence doctrines.

II. Summary of the Opinion

A. Factual Background

On December 10, 2020, Iowa State Trooper Eric Payne clocked a motorcycle at 99 mph in a 65 mph zone on Highway 20 near Manchester. When Payne attempted to stop the rider (later identified as Gus Mormann), the motorcyclist repeatedly exited and reentered the highway to evade capture, weaved through traffic at extreme speed, and ultimately sped off an exit toward Manchester, entering a 35 mph zone at approximately 70 mph.

Concerned about pedestrian and traffic safety as the pursuit moved into residential and downtown areas, Payne disengaged, slowing his pursuit and trailing from a distance. At that point, Manchester police lieutenant Wessels inserted his cruiser into the gap between Payne and the motorcycle, activated lights and sirens, and began his own close pursuit through town and into surrounding rural roads. He did not activate either his dashcam or bodycam, contrary to department policy.

On 165th Street, a rural county road with low rises and blind curves, Wessels reached speeds in excess of 100 mph. Cresting a rise, he suddenly came upon the motorcycle, which had decelerated to approximately 62 mph (still over the posted limit). To avoid rear‑ending the motorcycle, he pulled into the left lane to pass, and his right mirror struck the motorcycle. Approaching a blind left curve almost immediately thereafter, Wessels moved back into the right lane ahead of the motorcycle and braked. According to plaintiffs’ reconstruction expert, this maneuver led to a second contact: the motorcycle hit the left rear quarter panel of the cruiser, Mormann’s body struck the side of the car, and the motorcycle flipped into the ditch, where Mormann lay motionless, paralyzed and later ventilator‑dependent.

Medical examination revealed fractures of the C4–C6 vertebrae and permanent paralysis from the neck down. Toxicology showed methamphetamine use sometime within the prior three days. After more than a month hospitalized and ventilator‑dependent, Mormann decided to withdraw life support. He was removed from life-sustaining devices, lingered for about thirty hours, and died on January 15, 2021. During this period, he told his mother: “I got ran off the road, pushed off the road at a high rate of speed.”

In the aftermath, Manchester’s police chief falsely assured the family that the crash had been recorded and concealed for almost a month the fact that Wessels had never activated his cameras in violation of policy.

B. Procedural History

The Mormanns initially filed a petition asserting several state constitutional claims (under article I, §§ 1, 2, 8, and 9) plus wrongful death and consortium. While the case was pending:

The Legislature enacted Iowa Code § 670.4A (2022), creating a form of municipal “qualified immunity” and a heightened pleading standard for certain claims.
The Iowa Supreme Court in Burnett v. Smith, 990 N.W.2d 289 (Iowa 2023), overruled Godfrey v. State, 898 N.W.2d 844 (Iowa 2017), and ended the regime of implied damages actions under various provisions of the Iowa Constitution.

Relying on Burnett, the district court granted summary judgment dismissing the plaintiffs’ state constitutional claims. This left only common law claims, ultimately framed and submitted as assault and battery (the plaintiffs chose not to submit negligence/recklessness to avoid comparative fault instructions).

After an 8‑day jury trial:

The jury found that Wessels committed both assault and battery against Mormann and rejected the justification (lawful‑force) defense.
The jury awarded $4.25 million in compensatory damages against both Wessels and the City.
In a bifurcated punitive damages phase, the same jury found that Wessels acted with willful, wanton, and reckless disregard for Mormann’s rights and safety, awarding $10,000 in punitive damages against Wessels individually.

The district court denied post‑trial motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) and for a new trial. The City and Wessels appealed.

C. Issues on Appeal and Holdings

On appeal, the defendants raised six primary issues. The Supreme Court’s resolutions can be summarized as follows:

Emergency Response Immunity (Iowa Code § 670.4(1)(k))
The Court reaffirmed Hoffert v. Luze, 578 N.W.2d 681 (Iowa 1998), holding that Iowa Code § 321.231 is “an express statute dealing with claims regarding emergency response vehicles.” Under § 321.231(5), emergency vehicle operators remain liable for driving with “reckless disregard for the safety of others.” The jury’s punitive‑phase finding that Wessels acted recklessly was sufficient to defeat the City’s and Wessels’ emergency response immunity. No constitutional ruling on the statute was necessary.
Adequacy of Pleadings for Assault and Battery
Applying Iowa’s liberal notice‑pleading standard, the Court held that although the petitions did not use the words “assault” or “battery,” they consistently alleged that Wessels intentionally (or recklessly) struck the motorcycle and “ran [Mormann] off the road,” causing injury and death. This gave fair notice of assault and battery claims. There was no abuse of discretion in allowing those claims to go to the jury.
Sufficiency of the Evidence on Assault and Battery
Viewing the record in the light most favorable to the verdict, the Court held:
- There was substantial evidence that Mormann reasonably anticipated harmful or offensive contact (supporting assault), based on prior contact and close following.
- There was substantial evidence of intentional, harmful contact with Mormann’s person (supporting battery), including expert testimony that his arm or elbow struck the cruiser’s quarter panel, and that the maneuver amounted to an intentional use of deadly force not justified by the circumstances.
Admissibility of the Decedent’s Statement as a Dying Declaration
The Court upheld admission of the decedent’s statement (“I got ran off the road, pushed off the road at a high rate of speed”) under Iowa R. Evid. 5.804(b)(2). It rejected the argument that withdrawal of life support converts the death into “suicide” such that the dying declaration presumption should not apply. The Court held:
- Withdrawal of life support in the face of catastrophic injury is distinct from suicide.
- Mormann spoke under a clear sense of impending death, and his statement addressed the “cause and circumstances” of his death because the crash injuries necessitated life support and ultimately led to his demise.
Admission of Police Dashcam/Bodycam Policy Evidence
The Court held that internal policy evidence and proof that Wessels failed to activate cameras were relevant and admissible under Iowa R. Evid. 5.401 and 5.403 to show intent and willfulness, and did not pose unfair prejudice outweighing probative value.
Submission of Punitive Damages
The Court concluded that ample evidence supported the jury’s finding that Wessels acted with willful and wanton disregard—continuing a high‑speed rural pursuit contrary to policy, using intentional vehicle contact amounting to deadly force without justification, and doing so without recording—warranting punitive damages.

Notably, while the defendants initially argued that § 670.4A’s municipal “qualified immunity” and heightened pleading applied, the Iowa Supreme Court’s intervening decision in Doe v. West Dubuque Community School District, 20 N.W.3d 798 (Iowa 2025), held that § 670.4A does not apply to common law torts like assault and battery. Defendants conceded this point in supplemental briefing and withdrew that argument.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents and Prior Cases Shaping the Decision

1. Hoffert v. Luze and the Emergency Response–Recklessness Framework

The central statutory issue involved the interplay between:

IMTCA emergency response immunity, Iowa Code § 670.4(1)(k) (immunity for claims “based upon or arising out of an act or omission of a municipality in connection with an emergency response” unless another “express statute dealing with such claims” imposes liability), and
Emergency vehicle driving statute, Iowa Code § 321.231(5) (2021), which:
- Exempts emergency vehicles from certain traffic rules while responding to emergencies, but
- Expressly states that drivers are not relieved from the duty to drive with “due regard” for others’ safety and are not protected “from the consequences of [their] reckless disregard for the safety of others.”

In Hoffert v. Luze, 578 N.W.2d 681 (Iowa 1998), the Iowa Supreme Court held:

Section 321.231 is an “express statute dealing with claims regarding emergency response vehicles” within the meaning of § 670.4(1).
Thus, § 321.231 operates as an exception to emergency response immunity: when the emergency driver acts with “reckless disregard,” immunity is lost.

In Mormann, the defendants attempted to narrow Hoffert, arguing that § 321.231 merely sets a heightened standard of culpability (recklessness instead of negligence) but does not itself “impose liability” and therefore does not qualify as the requisite “express statute.” The Court rejected this narrow reading, emphasizing both:

The plain language of § 670.4(1), which requires only that another statute deal “with such claims,” not that it independently create a new cause of action.
Stare decisis: Hoffert had already settled the issue, and subsequent cases (Penny v. City of Winterset, 999 N.W.2d 650 (Iowa 2023); Martinez v. State, 986 N.W.2d 121 (Iowa 2023)) had reaffirmed the recklessness standard for emergency-driver liability.

The Court also declined to follow the nonprecedential court of appeals decision in Christiansen v. Eral, which had held pre‑2022 § 321.231 insufficient to defeat immunity in a PIT‑maneuver case. Christiansen was both nonbinding and distinguishable, particularly because Wessels himself denied employing a PIT maneuver and plaintiffs’ theory did not hinge on the specific PIT language added later to § 321.231.

2. Morris v. Leaf, Penny, and the Definition of “Reckless”

The standard for “reckless” operation under § 321.231(5) comes from Morris v. Leaf, 534 N.W.2d 388 (Iowa 1995), quoted again in recent cases:

[A] plaintiff must show that the actor has intentionally done an act of an unreasonable character in disregard of a risk known to or so obvious that he must be taken to have been aware of it, and so great as to make it highly probable that harm would follow.

Penny and Martinez reaffirmed that this standard governs civil liability for emergency drivers under § 321.231. In Mormann, the same formulation appears in the punitive‑damages instruction; the jury found willful, wanton, and reckless conduct under exactly this language.

3. Godfrey, Burnett, and the Retreat from Implied Constitutional Damages

The backdrop of the pleadings dispute is the Court’s doctrinal shift in Burnett v. Smith, 990 N.W.2d 289 (Iowa 2023), overruling Godfrey v. State, 898 N.W.2d 844 (Iowa 2017).

Godfrey (2017): A sharply divided Court first recognized implied private causes of action for damages directly under various provisions of the Iowa Constitution, despite article XII, section 1, which vests implementation authority in the legislature.
Burnett (2023): Retreated from that experiment, holding that implied state constitutional torts were “unconstitutional and unwieldy,” restoring the status quo ante. Post‑Burnett, plaintiffs generally must seek relief for governmental misconduct through statutes or common law, not directly under the Iowa Constitution.

In Mormann, this shift meant that plaintiffs’ original constitutional excessive‑force and due‑process counts were dismissed on summary judgment. Their case survived only because they could—and did—reframe the same conduct as common law assault and battery against the officer and vicarious liability against the City.

4. Doe v. West Dubuque and the Limits of § 670.4A Qualified Immunity

The City initially sought protection under Iowa Code § 670.4A, enacted in 2021 to create a form of municipal “qualified immunity” and heightened pleading for certain claims. In Doe v. West Dubuque Community School District, 20 N.W.3d 798 (Iowa 2025), however, the Iowa Supreme Court held that:

Section 670.4A’s heightened pleading requirement and immunity do not apply to common law tort claims (such as assault and battery).

After Doe issued while this appeal was pending, defendants appropriately abandoned any reliance on § 670.4A. The result is a clear line: municipalities and their employees retain § 670.4A protections only in the discrete class of claims covered by that statute, not in traditional intentional tort actions.

5. Evidence Precedents: Dying Declarations and Police Policy Evidence

Dying Declarations: The Court built on Bratton v. Bond, 408 N.W.2d 39 (Iowa 1987), reaffirming that a declarant’s “sense of impending death” may be shown by express language or by condition, and that the declarant must be “without hope or expectation of recovery.” Polk County Sheriff v. Iowa District Court, 594 N.W.2d 421 (Iowa 1999), supplied a crucial distinction between suicide and refusing burdensome, noncurative treatment.
Police policy evidence: The Court favorably cited federal decisions:
- United States v. Rodella, 804 F.3d 1317 (10th Cir. 2015), which upheld admission of pursuit‑policy training evidence to help a jury understand proper pursuit tactics.
- United States v. Proano, 912 F.3d 431 (7th Cir. 2019), which explained why training and policy evidence is often probative of whether an officer acted “willfully” or with reckless disregard.

B. Legal Reasoning by Issue

1. Emergency Response Immunity and Recklessness

The Court first addressed Iowa Code § 670.4(1)(k) emergency response immunity, while explicitly invoking the doctrine of constitutional avoidance: courts should decide cases on statutory grounds where possible, rather than reach constitutional questions. Having just decided Sikora v. State, 23 N.W.3d 300 (Iowa 2025), on broader issues of constitutional adjudication, the Court declined to address the plaintiffs’ constitutional challenge to § 670.4(1)(k) because a statutory resolution was available.

Key reasoning:

The IMTCA broadly abolishes traditional sovereign immunity, making municipalities “subject to liability for [their] torts and those of [their] officers and employees” unless a specific immunity applies (Iowa Code § 670.2, § 670.1(4)).
Section 670.4(1)(k) carves out immunity for claims “based upon or arising out of” emergency responses, unless an “express statute” dealing with such claims provides otherwise.
Hoffert interpreted § 321.231 as exactly such an “express statute,” meaning that when an emergency driver acts with “reckless disregard for the safety of others,” § 321.231(5) strips away immunity.

A critical procedural twist in Mormann is that the recklessness finding occurred in the punitive damages phase only, due to the defendants’ successful motion to bifurcate. In the compensatory phase, the jury was instructed only on assault, battery, and justification; no recklessness instruction was given. In the punitive phase, however, the jury was instructed using the classic Morris v. Leaf recklessness definition and returned a supplemental verdict that Wessels acted with “willful, wanton, and reckless disregard” for Mormann’s safety.

The defendants argued that because recklessness was not formally found during the compensatory phase, they remained immune under § 670.4(1)(k). The Court rejected this argument as hypertechnical and self‑contradictory:

The same jury heard all of the evidence in a bifurcated proceeding requested by the defense; the recklessness finding would have been contemporaneous with the liability verdict had the trial not been bifurcated.
The statutory question is whether the officer acted with reckless disregard, which the jury clearly found, not whether that label appeared on a particular phase’s special verdict form.
To allow a defendant to invoke a bifurcation they requested as a technical shield to immunity defeat would exalt form over substance.

Thus, the Court held that the jury’s punitive‑phase recklessness finding satisfied § 321.231(5), thereby defeating § 670.4(1)(k) immunity. The JNOV motion on immunity was correctly denied.

2. Pleading of Assault and Battery in a Notice‑Pleading Regime

The City argued that the assault and battery claims were both inadequately pleaded and raised too late (disclosed only a week before trial), thus unfairly prejudicing their defense strategy, especially their intended comparative fault defense.

The Court framed the question under Iowa’s notice‑pleading standard, as summarized in Terrace Hill Society Foundation v. Terrace Hill Commission, 6 N.W.3d 290 (Iowa 2024):

Plaintiff need not plead every element or cite a specific legal theory.
The petition must provide factual allegations that give the defendant “fair notice” of the incident and the general nature of the claim, allowing an adequate response and discovery.

Here, from the outset, plaintiffs consistently alleged:

Wessels engaged in a high‑speed pursuit of the motorcycle.
He twice struck the motorcycle and intentionally “ran [Mormann] off the road.”
These impacts caused the crash, catastrophic injuries, and ultimately death.

Those factual allegations are the classic building blocks of assault and battery. Notably:

Originally, plaintiffs styled their main claims as state constitutional “excessive force” claims—functionally equivalent in many respects to assault and battery (see Wagner v. State, 952 N.W.2d 853, 855 (Iowa 2020), describing excessive force and assault/battery as “functional equivalents”).
As Burnett eliminated implied constitutional actions, plaintiffs shifted to explicitly common law labels without changing the factual core.

The Court emphasized:

The defendants were on notice from day one that the lawsuit alleged intentional vehicle contact to force a stop; nothing in trial proof or theory surprised them.
No new witnesses or evidence were added by styling the claim as assault and battery; it was simply a more accurate doctrinal label for the same conduct.
Under Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.402(4), leave to amend “to conform to the proof” should be freely given where justice requires and there is no unfair surprise.

As to the defendants’ claimed “prejudice”—loss of a comparative fault defense—the Court noted:

Under Iowa law, comparative fault is not a defense to intentional torts such as assault and battery (Carson v. Webb, 486 N.W.2d 278 (Iowa 1992); Mulhern v. Catholic Health Initiatives, 799 N.W.2d 104 (Iowa 2011)).
Plaintiffs, as “masters of their pleadings” (Haskenhoff v. Homeland Energy Solutions, LLC, 897 N.W.2d 553, 579 (Iowa 2017)), are entitled to frame their case to avoid defenses such as comparative fault if a different viable theory exists.
The City could not identify any concrete step in discovery or trial strategy it would have changed had the term “battery” appeared in the original petition.

Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing assault and battery claims to go to the jury, and the IMTCA § 670.4A “particularity” requirement was inapplicable per Doe.

3. Sufficiency of the Evidence: Assault

Assault under Iowa civil law (tracking Iowa Civil Jury Instruction 1900.2) requires:

An act intended to put another in fear of physical pain, injury, or offensive contact.
The act would be deemed insulting or offensive by a reasonable person.
The victim reasonably believes the act may be carried out immediately.
Causation and damages.

Defendants focused on the third element, arguing there was no evidence that Mormann was actually aware of an impending collision and thus could not “reasonably believe” harmful contact was about to occur.

The Court rejected this as inconsistent with the record viewed favorably to the verdict:

Evidence showed that Wessels initially passed the motorcycle on the left and struck it with his right mirror—a first contact.
Shortly thereafter, he pulled back into the right lane ahead of the motorcycle and abruptly slowed, leading to a second collision.
This sequence (prior contact, close tailing, braking ahead) provides a reasonable basis to infer that:
- Mormann was aware of the cruiser’s close, dangerous proximity, and
- He reasonably anticipated further harmful contact when Wessels moved back in front of him on a blind curve and decelerated.

Given that direct evidence of subjective fear is rarely available (especially where the victim is deceased), it was permissible for the jury to infer awareness and reasonable apprehension from circumstantial evidence of Wessels’ aggressive driving pattern and prior actual contact.

4. Sufficiency of the Evidence: Battery

Battery requires:

An act intending to cause a harmful or offensive contact with the person of another, and
A harmful or offensive contact results, either directly or indirectly.

Defendants mounted two related challenges:

No intent: They portrayed the collision as the inadvertent result of lawful pursuit maneuvers and necessary braking to avoid unseen oncoming traffic.
No “contact with the person”: They argued that any impact was cruiser‑to‑motorcycle, not cruiser‑to‑body, and that such vehicle‑to‑vehicle impacts cannot constitute battery.

On intent, the Court pointed to multiple strands of evidence:

Expert testimony (accident reconstructionist Billington) that the cruiser’s movements were consistent with intentional car‑to‑motorcycle contact and that the collision sequence could not be explained purely as an emergency avoidance maneuver.
Policy expert (Alpert) testimony that car‑to‑motorcycle contact constitutes deadly force, unjustified under the circumstances.
Wessels’ failure to activate recording devices contrary to policy, from which the jury could infer consciousness of wrongful intent.

On contact-with-the-person, the Court took a two‑step approach:

Legal principle: The Restatement (Second) of Torts recognizes that harmful contact may be indirect and that contact with objects “so connected with the body” as to be treated as part of the person can suffice (§ 18 & cmt. c). Courts have recognized intentional vehicle collisions as batteries where the vehicle is used as the instrument of harmful contact against an occupied vehicle or motorcycle (citing cases from Maryland, California, Florida, and Idaho).
Factual finding: The Court ultimately did not need to resolve whether pure vehicle‑to‑vehicle contact alone would always suffice, because experts testified here that:
- Marks and indentations on the left quarter panel of the cruiser were consistent with direct body contact (arm or elbow), analogous to “pedestrian‑vehicle” impacts.
- This occurred as the motorcycle was forced up and over the wheel area, exposing the rider’s body to the vehicle.

Thus, the evidence supported a finding of both intentional conduct and direct harmful contact with Mormann’s person, satisfying the elements of battery.

The Court also noted that expert testimony on excessive force and deadly force supported the jury in rejecting the “justification” defense: Wessels’ actions were not objectively reasonable under the circumstances, and deadly force was unwarranted.

5. Dying Declaration under Iowa R. Evid. 5.804(b)(2)

The decedent’s statement—“I got ran off the road, pushed off the road at a high rate of speed”—was offered through his mother and admitted as a dying declaration. Defendants’ challenges centered on two points:

Suicide analogy: Because Mormann chose to have life support removed and, at least in theory, could have reversed that decision, defendants argued his death was essentially suicide, undercutting the reliability presumption behind dying declarations (they cited authority that suicide notes are not generally treated as dying declarations).
Cause and circumstances: They further argued the true cause of death was the voluntary withdrawal of life support, not the crash; thus a statement about being “pushed off the road” was not about the cause or circumstances of death.

The Court rejected both arguments.

a. Unavailability and Sense of Imminent Death

Unavailability was straightforward: Mormann was deceased (Iowa R. Evid. 5.804(a)(4)). As to sense of imminent death, the Court found:

Mormann was catastrophically injured (quadriplegic with grave prognosis).
He made the statement after removal of life support, knowing he had only hours to live.
His condition and context showed he was “without hope or expectation of recovery,” satisfying Bratton.

Crucially, the Court held that the mere fact the declarant could theoretically have changed his mind does not negate an “imminent apprehension of death” in this context. Many patients receiving life‑sustaining care still experience a genuine sense of impending death—sufficient for the exception.

b. Withdrawal of Life Support ≠ Suicide

Drawing heavily on Polk County Sheriff and its reliance on Thor v. Superior Court, the Court emphasized a critical distinction:

Refusal or withdrawal of burdensome, noncurative treatment by one suffering from a serious, life‑threatening condition is not suicide; the underlying disease or injury is the actual cause of death.
Suicide, by contrast, involves “deliberately set[ting] in motion a course of events aimed at [one’s] own demise” (e.g., a hunger strike by a healthy prisoner wishing to avoid serving a sentence).

Under this framework:

Mormann’s catastrophic spinal injury was the underlying cause of death.
Withdrawal of life support merely allowed natural physiological consequences to proceed.
His act was thus more akin to refusing extraordinary measures in a terminal illness, not initiating suicide.

The Court declined to draw an evidentiary line excluding otherwise qualifying dying declarations merely because death follows voluntary withdrawal of treatment.

C. Statement Concerning the “Cause and Circumstances” of Death

Iowa R. Evid. 5.804(b)(2) requires that the statement concerned the “cause or circumstances” of the declarant’s imminent death. Defendants argued the immediate cause was the act of removing life support.

The Court adopted a broader, but logical, causal perspective:

There is a chain of causation: the crash caused catastrophic cervical fractures; those fractures necessitated life support; withdrawal of life support allowed those injuries to become lethal.
As the Court put it, the crash was “the hook from which the whole chain hangs.”
Therefore, a statement about being “run off the road” directly addresses the cause and circumstances of the death-producing injuries.

The Court also cited Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990), recognizing a competent person’s constitutional liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment—underscoring that the law treats the underlying injury, not the refusal of treatment, as the primary cause of death in such cases.

Consequently, the dying declaration was properly admitted.

6. Admissibility of Internal Policies and Failure to Record

The plaintiffs introduced evidence that:

Manchester PD policy required activation of dash and body cameras during pursuits.
Other officers complied, but Wessels did not.
The police chief initially misled the family about the existence of video.

The defense argued this was unduly prejudicial under Iowa R. Evid. 5.403, encouraging the jury to conflate policy violations with tort liability and to infer bad character.

The Court held:

The evidence was plainly relevant under Rule 5.401 because it:
- Bore directly on Wessels’ intent and mental state (knowledge of policy, choice not to record, potential consciousness of wrongdoing).
- Explained department expectations and the significance of missing video to the jury.
Relying on Rodella and Proano, the Court endorsed the logic that:
- When an officer acts consistently with training and policy, that may support a finding of reasonable, non‑willful conduct.
- When an officer knowingly disregards training and policy, that may support an inference of willful or reckless behavior.
Any prejudicial impact did not “substantially outweigh” probative value under Rule 5.403. The evidence did not confuse the issues or inflame passions; it simply gave the jury a meaningful context for judging reasonableness and intent.

Thus, the Court found no abuse of discretion in admitting these policy‑related materials.

7. Evidence Supporting Punitive Damages

Finally, the Court found the record amply supported punitive damages against Wessels personally. Under Iowa law, punitive damages require “willful and wanton” conduct—often formulated in terms similar to the Morris recklessness standard.

Key supporting facts:

Wessels chose to continue a high‑speed pursuit in residential and rural areas after the initiating trooper and others had called off the chase for safety reasons, contrary to policy, even when the underlying traffic offense (speeding, traffic violations, drug possession) did not justify deadly force.
He pursued at over 100 mph on a rural road with rises and blind curves.
Expert testimony characterized his tactic—vehicle contact with a motorcycle—as deadly force, unjustified under applicable pursuit and use‑of‑force standards.
Evidence suggested intentional contact (including prior mirror strike and deliberate braking ahead of the motorcycle) and inferred an attempt to avoid recording his actions.

Given these facts, the jury’s conclusion that Wessels acted with “willful, wanton, and reckless disregard for the safety of others” was reasonable, and the district court correctly refused JNOV on punitive damages.

IV. Impact and Significance

A. Police Pursuits and Municipal Liability in Iowa

The decision has immediate implications for law enforcement and municipalities:

Recklessness remains the key gateway to liability in emergency response driving cases under § 321.231: mere negligence is not enough, but truly reckless conduct will strip away IMTCA emergency‑response immunity.
High-speed pursuits of motorcycles are particularly fraught:
- Experts testified that intentional vehicle contact with a motorcycle is deadly force and generally disallowed except in narrow circumstances.
- This case underscores that officers who use vehicle‑to-motorcycle contact to terminate a pursuit run a high risk of civil liability, especially when the underlying offense is comparatively minor.
Policy violations and recording failures matter: the Court validated plaintiffs’ use of pursuit‑policy violations and failure to activate cameras as evidence of intent and willfulness. Agencies should expect such evidence to play a prominent role in future litigation.

B. Shift from Constitutional Torts to Common Law Torts

After Burnett and Doe, plaintiffs in Iowa can no longer rely on implied state constitutional damages actions or on § 670.4A‑specific civil rights‑style claims when suing municipalities and officers for excessive force. Mormann demonstrates:

Common law intentional torts (assault, battery) are robust vehicles for challenging excessive force by officers.
Pleading need not be hypertechnical: if the factual allegations describe intentional harmful contact by an officer, plaintiffs may later label the theory “battery” or “assault” without necessarily being barred, provided defendants are not genuinely surprised.
Comparative fault is off the table for intentional torts and for punitive damages. This significantly increases the litigation stakes once a plaintiff successfully frames the case in intentional‑tort terms.

C. Evidentiary Law: Dying Declarations and End‑of‑Life Decisions

The Court’s dying declaration analysis provides important guidance for cases involving withdrawal of life support:

Withdrawal of life support in catastrophic injury cases does not negate the reliability rationale behind dying declarations.
The Court squarely rejects equating end‑of‑life treatment decisions with suicide for hearsay‑exception purposes.
Causation analysis looks to the injury that necessitated life support, not merely the final medical choice; thus statements about the precipitating trauma can qualify as statements about the “cause and circumstances” of death.

This approach respects patient autonomy while preserving the evidentiary utility of dying declarations in wrongful death and serious injury cases.

D. Strategic Lessons for Litigators

For Plaintiffs:
- Frame excessive force cases under Iowa law as assault and battery where possible to avoid comparative fault defenses.
- Plead factual narratives clearly describing intentional harmful contact from the outset; precise legal labels can evolve as the law changes (Godfrey → Burnett transition).
- Develop evidence on internal policies, training, and recording practices; violations can powerfully support intent and punitive damages.
- Explore dying declarations in catastrophic injury cases where the decedent makes statements under impending awareness of death, even if life support withdrawal is involved.
For Defendants (Municipalities and Officers):
- Recognize that emergency‑response immunity is not absolute: reckless conduct will defeat it, and juries are well‑positioned to make that determination.
- Be cautious about requesting bifurcation: punitive‑phase findings can carry substantive consequences (such as defeating immunity) even if made later.
- Ensure strict adherence to recording and pursuit policies; failures will be used as evidence of willfulness and to undermine credibility.
- Do not assume § 670.4A provides protection against common law intentional torts; it does not.

V. Complex Concepts Simplified

1. Emergency Response Immunity vs. Recklessness

Think of IMTCA emergency response immunity as a shield for municipalities when their officers are responding to emergencies—so long as the officers are not acting recklessly. Iowa Code § 321.231 gives emergency drivers certain privileges (e.g., speeding, running red lights with lights/sirens on) but also says:

They must still drive with “due regard” for others’ safety.
If they drive with “reckless disregard” for safety, they can be held liable.

Recklessness here means more than carelessness. It means:

Purposefully doing something clearly dangerous,
Knowing (or being presumed to know) the risk is obvious and serious,
Where it is highly probable that someone will be harmed.

2. Assault vs. Battery

Assault is about creating reasonable fear of imminent harmful or offensive contact. No actual contact is needed; what matters is the victim’s reasonable belief that contact is about to occur.
Battery is about actual harmful or offensive contact with the person’s body (directly or through something very closely connected with the body).

In this case, assault is the fear of being hit by the police car; battery is the actual collision and body impact.

3. Dying Declaration

A “dying declaration” is a statement made by a person who believes they are about to die, about the cause or circumstances of what is killing them. Because people are thought to have little reason to lie at that moment, the law lets such statements be used in court even though they are hearsay.

To qualify, you need:

The person is unavailable to testify (e.g., dead).
They sincerely believe death is imminent and inevitable.
They are speaking about what caused their impending death.

Here, even though Mormann chose to end life support, the Court treated his spinal injuries from the crash as the true underlying cause of death, so his statement about being “run off the road” qualified.

4. Comparative Fault and Intentional Torts

“Comparative fault” is the idea that if both plaintiff and defendant share blame, damages are reduced by the plaintiff’s percentage of fault, and if the plaintiff is more than 50% at fault, he recovers nothing.

In Iowa, comparative fault does not apply to intentional torts like assault and battery. The law does not reduce liability for someone who intentionally harms another just because the victim was also negligent.

5. Punitive Damages

Punitive damages are extra damages, beyond compensation, meant to punish especially wrongful behavior and deter similar conduct. In Iowa, they require:

Willful or wanton conduct—or reckless disregard of others’ safety—that shows a conscious indifference to the consequences.

Here, the combination of policy violations, high‑speed pursuit in dangerous conditions, intentional vehicle contact with a motorcycle, and lack of justification met this standard.

VI. Conclusion

Mormann v. City of Manchester is a significant decision in Iowa law, especially for cases involving police pursuits, municipal immunity, and end‑of‑life evidentiary issues. The Court:

Reaffirmed that emergency response immunity under the IMTCA yields when an officer’s driving is reckless under § 321.231, and that a recklessness finding—even in a bifurcated punitive phase—can defeat that immunity.
Confirmed that, under Iowa’s notice‑pleading standard, plaintiffs may rely on common law assault and battery theories where the factual allegations of intentional harmful contact have been present throughout the litigation.
Reinforced that comparative fault is not a defense to intentional torts, shaping how excessive‑force cases will be framed post‑Burnett and post‑Doe.
Clarified that withdrawing life support due to catastrophic injury does not transform death into suicide for hearsay purposes and that statements about the crash causing those injuries can qualify as dying declarations.
Endorsed the admissibility and probative value of internal police policies and recording failures to show officer intent and willfulness.

By affirming a substantial compensatory verdict and a punitive award in the context of a deadly high‑speed motorcycle pursuit, the Iowa Supreme Court sends a clear signal: officers and municipalities will be held to account when emergency driving crosses the line from necessary risk‑taking into reckless, unjustified, and intentionally harmful conduct. At the same time, the decision provides a detailed roadmap for how litigants must plead, prove, and defend such cases within Iowa’s evolving framework of municipal liability and evidence law.