Reckless-Force Robbery and the ACCA: Tenth Circuit Declares Oklahoma Armed Robbery Not a “Violent Felony” Under § 924(e)(2)(B)(i)

Introduction

In United States v. Campbell (10th Cir. Sept. 30, 2025), a published decision authored by Judge Moritz and joined in relevant part by Judge Matheson, the Tenth Circuit issued a consequential Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) ruling with direct ramifications for Oklahoma robbery convictions. The panel:

Affirmed the denial of a suppression motion after concluding that an officer’s reasonable suspicion did not dissipate before a frisk that uncovered a firearm.
Rejected a constitutional challenge to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) under binding circuit precedent.
Vacated a 240‑month sentence imposed under the ACCA, holding that Oklahoma armed robbery can be committed with a reckless state of mind as to the force employed and therefore is not a “violent felony” under the ACCA’s elements clause.

Judge Kelly concurred in part and dissented in part, disagreeing with the ACCA holding on the ground that any error was not “plain” under the demanding plain-error standard. The majority’s ACCA ruling establishes a new, binding circuit precedent for Oklahoma robbery: because the offense can be accomplished with a reckless use of force, it is not categorically a violent felony under § 924(e)(2)(B)(i).

Case Overview

Parties and Posture

Michael Andre Campbell appealed from the Western District of Oklahoma following his conviction for being a felon in possession of a firearm (18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)) and the imposition of a 240‑month sentence under the ACCA (18 U.S.C. § 924(e)). The Tenth Circuit affirmed the conviction but vacated the sentence and remanded for resentencing.

Factual Background

Around 11:30 p.m., Teresa Cooper called 911 to report that her home camera showed a Black man and woman taking items from her back porch. Officer Mullinix arrived within approximately one minute in a dimly lit residential area and encountered Campbell—a Black man—near the back of the home by trash cans, close to the reported scene. Campbell asserted that he lived there, moved toward a nearby car with its driver’s door open and a pit bull inside, and repeatedly ignored commands to keep his hands up. Mullinix testified he observed a black magazine in Campbell’s waistband (a finding credited by the district court and undisputed on appeal). Campbell argued with the officer, asked about probable cause, and attempted to access his pockets and car despite repeated instructions not to do so. Before placing Campbell in the patrol vehicle to verify identity information, Mullinix conducted a frisk; Campbell admitted he was armed. The officer recovered a handgun and a knife.

Procedural Background

Campbell moved to suppress the firearm, arguing that reasonable suspicion dissipated before the frisk. The district court denied the motion. A jury convicted him. At sentencing, the court adopted a Guidelines range of 262–327 months (CHC VI, TOL 34), which would otherwise have been capped by the then-applicable 10‑year statutory maximum for § 922(g)(1) (pre‑BSCA). The court instead applied the ACCA based on five prior Oklahoma armed robbery convictions and imposed 240 months. Campbell appealed: (1) the suppression ruling; (2) the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1) (for preservation); and (3) his ACCA designation.

Summary of the Opinion

Suppression affirmed: The officer had reasonable suspicion based on the rapid response to the homeowner’s 911 report, the close temporal and spatial proximity to the suspected burglary, the match to the caller’s description, the late hour/poor lighting, the officer’s observation of a magazine indicating Campbell was armed, and Campbell’s noncompliance. That reasonable suspicion had not dissipated before the frisk.
Constitutionality of § 922(g)(1): Bound by Tenth Circuit precedent (Vincent v. Bondi, 127 F.4th 1263 (10th Cir. 2025)), the court rejected the Bruen/Rahimi challenge to § 922(g)(1).
ACCA vacated: Applying Borden v. United States and Oklahoma interpretive caselaw (notably Traxler v. State), the court held that Oklahoma armed robbery can be committed with a reckless use of force. Because the ACCA’s elements clause requires purposeful or knowing force “against the person of another,” Oklahoma armed robbery is not a categorically qualifying violent felony. The district court’s application of the ACCA was plain error; sentence vacated and remanded. Judge Kelly dissented on this point, arguing the error was not “plain.”

Detailed Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Terry v. Ohio: Governs investigatory stops and frisks; an officer may detain on reasonable suspicion and conduct a protective frisk when warranted by safety concerns.
United States v. Sokolow; United States v. Pettit; United States v. Young; United States v. Conner; United States v. McHugh; United States v. Fisher; United States v. Madrid: Tenth Circuit and Supreme Court decisions articulating the totality-of-the-circumstances standard for reasonable suspicion, including the weight of time-of-night, proximity to a reported crime, caller reliability, and officer safety.
United States v. Trestyn; United States v. McSwain; United States v. Pena-Montes: Dissipation cases; reasonable suspicion can be dispelled when facts negate the basis for the stop (e.g., license plate visible on approach). Distinguishing these, the court held safety concerns and unresolved suspicion justified continued detention in Campbell.
United States v. Daniels (10th Cir. 2024): Cautioned against treating mere firearm presence as inherently suspicious in Second Amendment terms; distinguished here because the officer was responding to an obviously illegal burglary report and observed indicia of a gun in the context of that suspected crime.
New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen; United States v. Rahimi; Vincent v. Bondi: Bruen and Rahimi reframed Second Amendment analysis; Vincent (binding circuit precedent) upholds § 922(g)(1) under current law in the Tenth Circuit.
Borden v. United States (2021): ACCA elements clause requires the “use of physical force against the person of another,” which demands purposeful or knowing force; recklessness is insufficient. The Tenth Circuit recognizes Borden’s plurality as binding (United States v. Kepler).
Oklahoma robbery statutes and caselaw:
- Okla. Stat. tit. 21, §§ 791–792, 801: Define robbery (“wrongful taking … by means of force or fear”) and armed robbery (robbery with a firearm or dangerous weapon).
- Traxler v. State (Okla. Crim. App. 1952): Interprets Oklahoma robbery as not requiring “felonious intent” and broadly states “no state of mind or belief is involved” beyond the intention to do the proscribed act.
- Fletcher v. State; Langdell v. State; Hammon v. State: Describe robbery as a general-intent offense; no separate instruction on specific intent required.
- Quinn v. State: Explains Oklahoma general-intent crimes can be satisfied by reckless conduct.
- Mitchell v. State; Smith v. State: Unconscious-victim cases emphasizing purposeful use of force in that factual context; the majority reads them as not establishing a universal purposeful-force requirement.
United States v. Sjodin (10th Cir. 2025): Rejects parsing different mens rea for separate elements where state high-court caselaw indicates a unitary state of mind for the offense; supports reading Traxler as setting a single mens rea framework for robbery.
People v. Anderson (Cal. 2011); United States v. Dixon (9th Cir. 2015): California Supreme Court recognized robbery completed with reckless force, prompting the Ninth Circuit to hold California robbery is not an ACCA violent felony; persuasive analogy for Oklahoma.
United States v. Deiter; United States v. Wilson; Carter v. United States: Federal bank robbery is a general-intent offense requiring knowledge as to the taking by force; the majority deems these inapposite because Oklahoma law independently controls state robbery mens rea.
United States v. Titties; United States v. Mendez; United States v. Taylor (2022): Categorical approach methodology; “realistic probability” requirement is satisfied by statutory text and authoritative state caselaw; actual prosecution examples are unnecessary where state law clearly covers the broader conduct.
United States v. Fagatele; United States v. Carr (7th Cir. 2024): Plain-error and ambiguity in state law; the majority distinguishes these, finding Oklahoma caselaw sufficiently clear to render the ACCA error “plain.”

Legal Reasoning

I. Suppression

The court applied the two-step Terry framework:

Initiation: The rapid arrival following a homeowner’s 911 report, the match to the described suspect demographic, proximity to the reported location, time of night, and poor lighting amply created reasonable suspicion of burglary. The officer’s credited observation of a magazine in Campbell’s waistband heightened safety concerns and the suspicion that a gun might be involved in the burglary.
Scope and Duration: Reasonable suspicion did not dissipate before the frisk. Campbell’s argumentative noncompliance, repeated reaching toward pockets and the car, and the officer’s need to secure the scene justified continuing the detention and a safety frisk. The court rejected the notion that the officer had to verify identity immediately (Trestyn’s “reasonably could have observed” language was traffic-stop specific). Daniels’ caution against treating gun possession as suspicious did not apply because the suspected offense—burglary—is “obviously illegal,” and the observed firearm-related evidence was part of the totality pointing to armed criminal activity.

II. Constitutionality of § 922(g)(1)

Campbell’s Bruen/Rahimi-based challenge was foreclosed by binding circuit precedent, Vincent v. Bondi, which upholds § 922(g)(1) in the Tenth Circuit absent en banc or Supreme Court intervention.

III. ACCA: Oklahoma Armed Robbery Is Not a “Violent Felony” Under the Elements Clause

The ACCA’s elements clause, § 924(e)(2)(B)(i), covers offenses that have “as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another.” Borden holds this phrase demands purposeful or knowing conduct directed “against” another; reckless conduct is not enough.

Under the categorical approach, the court examined the minimum conduct criminalized by Oklahoma’s armed robbery statute, which incorporates the general robbery definition (“wrongful taking … by means of force or fear”). While the statutory text and pattern jury instruction are silent on mens rea, Oklahoma’s interpretive caselaw fills the gap:

Traxler broadly declared Oklahoma robbery does not require a specific intent beyond the intention to do the proscribed act, famously stating “No state of mind or belief is involved.”
Subsequent OCCA decisions describe robbery as a general-intent crime, and Oklahoma doctrine (Quinn) teaches that general intent is satisfied by reckless conduct.

Consistent with Sjodin’s interpretive approach, the majority refused to slice mens rea by element (e.g., one state of mind for “taking,” another for “force”). Instead, it read Traxler to set a unified, non‑specific‑intent framework for robbery that permits convictions where the force component is reckless. That places the Oklahoma offense outside the ACCA’s elements clause as construed in Borden.

The court also rejected arguments that:

Federal bank-robbery cases should govern: State interpretive law controls the meaning of state robbery, and Oklahoma took a different path than federal law.
Actual prosecutions are required to show “realistic probability”: Where the statutory text and authoritative state caselaw plainly embrace the broader conduct, prosecution exemplars are unnecessary (Titties; Taylor).
Ambiguity defeats “plain error”: The majority found Oklahoma law sufficiently clear—Traxler’s breadth, later OCCA confirmations of general intent, and Quinn’s linkage of general intent to recklessness—to make the district court’s ACCA ruling “plainly” erroneous post‑Borden.

Because the government did not contest prongs three and four of plain-error review, the panel vacated the sentence and remanded for resentencing without the ACCA enhancement. The government also conceded that the armed-robbery priors are not “crimes of violence” under the applicable Guidelines provision in this case, narrowing the advisory range on remand.

The Dissent (Judge Kelly)

Judge Kelly agreed on the suppression and § 922(g)(1) issues but dissented from the ACCA holding. He emphasized:

Plain error is a “rigorous” standard; ambiguity in state law cannot suffice. In his view, Traxler concerned “felonious intent” to steal and did not clearly address the mens rea for the “force or fear” element.
Unconscious-victim cases (Mitchell; Smith) suggest purposeful conduct in at least some robbery scenarios. The statutory language—force “to obtain or retain” property—implies intentionally directed conduct, resonating with Borden’s “against the person of another.”
Without Oklahoma cases affirming robbery based on reckless force, the “realistic probability” requirement is unmet, especially on plain-error review (citing Fagatele and the D.C. District Court’s survey placing Oklahoma among states with unclear robbery mens rea).

For these reasons, he would have affirmed the ACCA sentence.

Impact and Implications

1) Oklahoma Robbery Priors and the ACCA

Binding Tenth Circuit precedent now holds that Oklahoma armed robbery is not categorically a “violent felony” under § 924(e)(2)(B)(i) because it can be committed with a reckless use of force.
Practically, federal defendants in the Tenth Circuit with Oklahoma robbery priors should not qualify for ACCA predicates on the elements-clause theory. Robbery is not among the ACCA’s enumerated offenses, and the residual clause is defunct (Johnson 2015).

2) Sentencing Guidelines

The government conceded the Guidelines error here; expect litigation over whether Oklahoma robbery matches the enumerated “robbery” or “crime of violence” definitions in the Guidelines in other contexts. In this case, the concession suggests meaningful downward adjustments on remand.

3) Retroactivity and Collateral Review

Defendants previously sentenced as armed career criminals based on Oklahoma robbery priors may seek relief, subject to timing and procedural hurdles (e.g., § 2255 limitations, retroactivity frameworks, and the specifics of their priors and records).

4) Charging and Plea Strategy

Prosecutors cannot rely on Oklahoma robbery convictions to trigger the ACCA’s 15‑year minimum via the elements clause. They may need to evaluate other available predicates (e.g., burglary, arson, extortion, explosives) and consider alternative enhancements.
Defense counsel should scrutinize prior Oklahoma robbery convictions in ACCA and Guidelines cases and preserve Borden-based arguments—now buttressed by Campbell.

5) Policing and Fourth Amendment Practice

On the suppression front, the opinion reaffirms that officer safety and the totality of circumstances, including rapid response to a homeowner’s report and observed indicia of a weapon, can sustain reasonable suspicion and justify a protective frisk. Officers need not immediately “dispel” suspicion by verifying identity when safety concerns and ongoing uncertainty remain.

6) Unresolved or Future Questions

En banc review or subsequent Oklahoma appellate clarification could revisit the breadth of Traxler’s “no state of mind” statement as applied to the use-of-force element.
Litigation may explore whether other Oklahoma offenses involving force qualify under ACCA or the Guidelines after Campbell and Borden.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Reasonable suspicion: A common-sense, totality-based standard requiring more than a hunch but less than probable cause; it allows a brief detention to confirm or dispel suspicion.
Dissipation of reasonable suspicion: If facts develop that negate the basis for the stop, police must promptly end the detention; continuing the stop thereafter is unconstitutional.
Protective frisk (Terry frisk): A limited pat-down for weapons when an officer reasonably believes a suspect is armed and dangerous.
ACCA’s elements clause: Covers offenses that require, as an element, the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against another person.
Borden’s mens rea rule: For the ACCA, “use of force against another” means purposeful or knowing conduct aimed at another; recklessness does not qualify.
Categorical approach: Courts compare the statute of prior conviction to the federal definition; if the state statute covers broader conduct (e.g., reckless force), it cannot serve as a predicate, regardless of the defendant’s actual conduct.
Divisibility vs. indivisibility: If a statute lists alternative elements (not mere means), courts may use a limited record to identify which alternative formed the basis of conviction (modified categorical approach). The court assumed Oklahoma armed robbery is not divisible and applied the pure categorical approach.
Plain-error review: On unpreserved issues, reversal requires an error that is clear or obvious under current law, affects substantial rights, and seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.
General vs. specific intent: “General intent” typically means intent to do the prohibited act; it can be satisfied by recklessness in many jurisdictions. “Specific intent” requires a further mental state (e.g., intent to permanently deprive). The majority reads Oklahoma robbery as general-intent.

Conclusion

United States v. Campbell is a significant ACCA decision in the Tenth Circuit. While affirming the Fourth Amendment rulings and the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1) under circuit precedent, the court reshaped the ACCA landscape for Oklahoma prior convictions. Anchored in Borden and Oklahoma’s own interpretive law, the panel held that Oklahoma armed robbery can be committed with reckless force, placing it outside the ACCA’s elements clause. The dissent’s plain-error caution underscores that the state-law mens rea question is intricate; however, the majority’s reading of Traxler and its progeny carries the day and now binds district courts within the circuit.

The upshot: Oklahoma armed robbery no longer qualifies as an ACCA predicate in the Tenth Circuit under the elements clause. Sentencing courts must reevaluate enhancements premised on such priors, and litigants should recalibrate strategies accordingly. Campbell also offers a clear reaffirmation of Terry principles in the context of late-night, rapidly evolving investigations and provides guidance for integrating Second Amendment considerations into reasonable-suspicion analyses without undermining officer safety or constitutional constraints.