Reciprocal Discipline in New York: When a Foreign Probation Sanction Becomes a Public Censure

1. Introduction

Matter of Tejada (2026 NY Slip Op 00020) is a reciprocal-discipline decision of the Appellate Division, First Department, arising from attorney Margarita Claribel Tejada’s discipline in Utah. Utah imposed a one-year term of probation (with trust-accounting education, fee-agreement corrections, and supervision). New York’s Attorney Grievance Committee (AGC) moved under 22 NYCRR 1240.13 and Judiciary Law § 90(2) to impose reciprocal discipline, requesting a public censure (or other relief deemed appropriate).

The key issues were: (1) whether any defense to reciprocal discipline applied under 22 NYCRR 1240.13, and (2) what New York sanction should be imposed where the foreign jurisdiction ordered “probation,” a form of discipline not expressly provided in New York’s 22 NYCRR 1240 framework.

The court also noted its jurisdiction over respondent based on her business address on file with the Office of Court Administration within the First Judicial Department (22 NYCRR 1240.7[a][2]), and that respondent did not self-report the Utah discipline as required by 22 NYCRR 1240.16(d).

2. Summary of the Opinion

The First Department granted the AGC’s motion for reciprocal discipline and publicly censured respondent. Respondent did not appear in the New York proceeding and therefore asserted none of the enumerated defenses. The court independently concluded that no defense was available because: respondent had notice and an opportunity to be heard in Utah; she admitted the misconduct via a discipline-by-consent agreement; and the fee-related misconduct would constitute misconduct in New York under Rule 1.5(a).

On sanction, the court reiterated that it gives significant weight to the foreign jurisdiction’s sanction, but because New York’s disciplinary rules do not provide for “probation” as a sanction, the court selected the closest New York analogue—public censure—consistent with First Department precedent for comparable misconduct.

3. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1) Matter of Milara, 194 AD3d 108, 110 [1st Dept 2021]

Milara supplies the governing framework for reciprocal discipline under 22 NYCRR 1240.13 by defining the three exclusive defenses: (1) lack of notice/opportunity to be heard; (2) infirmity of proof; or (3) non-misconduct in New York. The Tejada court applied Milara directly, emphasizing that a respondent who entered a foreign consent discipline typically forecloses the first two defenses (notice/proof) and must still confront whether the conduct maps onto New York misconduct.

2) Matter of Blumenthal, 165 AD3d 85, 86 [1st Dept 2018] (citing Matter of Jaffe, 78 AD3d 152 [1st Dept 2010])

Blumenthal, relying on Jaffe, states the First Department’s “general rule” in reciprocal discipline: “significant weight should be given” to the sanction imposed where the misconduct occurred because that jurisdiction has the greatest interest in sanctioning misconduct within its borders. Tejada uses this principle as the starting point for sanction selection, then confronts the practical problem that the foreign sanction (probation) is not a listed New York disciplinary sanction under 22 NYCRR 1240.

3) Matter of Tustaniwsky, 204 AD3d 162, 165 [1st Dept 2022]

Tustaniwsky is cited for the proposition that “[o]nly in rare instances” will the court depart from its general rule of deferring to the foreign sanction. In Tejada, the court treats the “rare instance” concept as a caution against materially increasing or decreasing discipline absent reason—yet it still must translate the foreign sanction into an available New York form, choosing public censure as a functional equivalent rather than a departure driven by disagreement with Utah’s assessment.

4) Comparable-misconduct sanction line: Matter of Doria, 165 AD3d 33 [1st Dept 2018]; Matter of Kuzmin, 98 AD3d 266 [1st Dept 2012]; Matter of Wertheimer, 286 AD2d 44 [1st Dept 2001]; Matter of Cipolla, 233 AD2d 58 [1st Dept 1997]

These cases are cited not for the reciprocal-discipline framework, but for calibration of the appropriate New York sanction for “comparable misconduct.” By referencing this line, the court signals that public censure falls within the First Department’s established sanction range for excessive fee practices and related billing improprieties, thereby grounding its “translation” of Utah probation into a New York-available disposition.

B. Legal Reasoning

1. Jurisdiction and triggering event. The First Department asserted jurisdiction based on respondent’s OCA-registered business address (22 NYCRR 1240.7[a][2]) and proceeded on the Utah order approving a discipline by consent and settlement agreement.
2. Reciprocal-discipline eligibility and defenses. Applying Matter of Milara, the court confirmed that respondent had no viable defense: she had notice and voluntarily consented; she admitted the conduct (negating infirmity-of-proof arguments); and the core conduct (unreasonable/excessive fees) would violate New York Rule 1.5(a).
3. Sanction selection and “translation” problem. The court reiterated deference principles from Matter of Blumenthal/Matter of Jaffe and the “rare instances” caution from Matter of Tustaniwsky. But it then confronted a structural mismatch: “probation” is not a disciplinary form provided for in 22 NYCRR 1240. Rather than attempt to replicate Utah’s supervisory conditions in a non-enumerated format, the court selected a public censure as the appropriate New York sanction, citing comparable-misconduct precedent as confirmation that censure is proportionate.
4. Practical enforcement posture. Respondent’s nonappearance did not prevent relief; reciprocal discipline proceeds on the foreign order and the limited defenses, and the record (including admissions in the Utah DBC) was sufficient to determine misconduct and sanction.

C. Impact

• Clarifies sanction conversion where foreign probation is imposed. The decision illustrates how the First Department operationalizes “significant weight” deference when the foreign jurisdiction uses a sanction New York does not list under 22 NYCRR 1240—by selecting a closest available analogue (here, public censure) supported by comparable-misconduct precedent.
• Reinforces the narrow reciprocal-discipline defenses. Where an attorney consented to discipline and admitted facts, Tejada shows that defenses under 22 NYCRR 1240.13 will almost never succeed unless the conduct is not misconduct in New York.
• Signals billing and trust-account compliance expectations. Although the court focused its New York misconduct equivalence discussion on fee excessiveness (Rule 1.5[a]), the fact pattern underscores that billing for clerical work at attorney rates, charging for non-incurred expenses, and mishandling retainers will predictably trigger discipline—especially where a foreign record exists.
• Highlights self-reporting exposure. The opinion notes respondent failed to notify the AGC as required by 22 NYCRR 1240.16(d), underscoring that New York expects prompt reporting and may learn of discipline through inter-jurisdictional channels regardless.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Reciprocal discipline (22 NYCRR 1240.13)

A process where New York imposes discipline based on another jurisdiction’s disciplinary order, unless the lawyer proves one of three limited defenses (no notice/opportunity, infirm proof, or the conduct is not misconduct in New York).

“Infirmity of proof”

A claim that the foreign record does not reliably establish misconduct. Admissions in a consent discipline typically eliminate this defense.

Public censure

A formal, public disciplinary rebuke by the court. It is less severe than suspension but more serious than a private admonition (where available).

Unreasonable/excessive fees (Rule 1.5[a])

A prohibition on fee arrangements or billing that is excessive in relation to the work performed, including charging attorney rates for clerical tasks or billing for expenses not actually incurred.

Trust accounting / segregation of client funds (concept reflected in Utah’s URPC rule 1.15[a])

Client funds (like unearned retainers) generally must be kept separate from a lawyer’s own money, typically in a dedicated trust account, to prevent misuse and enable accurate accounting.

5. Conclusion

Matter of Tejada reaffirms New York’s reciprocal-discipline framework: absent one of the three enumerated defenses, the First Department will impose discipline based on a foreign order, giving significant weight to the foreign jurisdiction’s sanction. Importantly, the case demonstrates how the court handles foreign “probation” when New York’s 22 NYCRR 1240 does not provide probation as a disciplinary form—by imposing a public censure as a proportionate, precedent-supported New York analogue. The decision also serves as a cautionary reminder that consent discipline and factual admissions in another state will largely control the New York outcome, and that questionable billing practices and client-fund handling are recurring drivers of discipline across jurisdictions.