Reciprocal Discipline Accrues on Entry of Foreign Order: Florida Supreme Court Clarifies Limitations Timing and Affirms Authority to Impose Harsher Sanctions in The Florida Bar v. Klayman

Introduction

In The Florida Bar v. Larry Elliot Klayman (Fla. Nov. 6, 2025), the Supreme Court of Florida imposed a two-year suspension on a Florida lawyer based on reciprocal discipline flowing from two suspensions previously entered by the District of Columbia Court of Appeals (90 days in 2020; 18 months in 2022). This opinion is notable not merely for its disposition, but for the Court’s articulation of when a reciprocal discipline “cause of action” accrues for timeliness purposes under Rule Regulating The Florida Bar 3-7.16(a). The Court holds that in a reciprocal discipline case, the accrual event is the entry of the foreign disciplinary judgment—not the date of the underlying conduct—thereby rendering timely The Florida Bar’s 2023 initiation of proceedings premised on 2020 and 2022 D.C. orders. The Court also reaffirms that foreign disciplinary adjudications constitute conclusive proof of misconduct in Florida absent narrow exceptions and that Florida may impose a harsher sanction than the one assessed by the originating jurisdiction.

The case arises from two sets of underlying facts. The first (Count One) involved conflicts of interest from the early 2000s, where Klayman appeared against his former organizational client, Judicial Watch, on behalf of three separate clients (Cobas, Benson, and Paul) without the organization’s consent. The second (Count Two) involved multiple ethical violations during Klayman’s representation of a client, Elham Sataki, including fee issues, failure to abide by client objectives, confidentiality breaches, personal-interest conflicts, and failure to withdraw despite discharge.

Klayman challenged the Florida referee’s report across the board, principally arguing that the Florida proceeding was time-barred by the six-year limitations period in Rule 3-7.16(a) and that the D.C. proceedings suffered from due process and evidentiary defects. The Court rejected these arguments, approved the referee’s findings and recommendations, and imposed a two-year suspension with costs.

Summary of the Opinion

• Reciprocal discipline framework: The Court applied Rule Regulating The Florida Bar 3-4.6 and long-standing precedent that an adjudication of misconduct by a foreign jurisdiction is conclusive proof of that misconduct in Florida unless the respondent shows a lack of notice/opportunity to be heard, a “paucity of proof,” or some other “grave reason” making it unjust to accept the foreign judgment.
• No defect in foreign proceedings: Klayman participated at every stage in D.C., and the record supported the D.C. Court of Appeals’ findings; thus, the Court found no due process deficiency and no “paucity of proof” or other “grave reason” to disregard the foreign orders.
• Timeliness and accrual: The Court held that a reciprocal discipline cause of action accrues upon entry of the foreign discipline order(s), not at the time of the underlying conduct. Consequently, The Florida Bar’s 2023 proceeding was timely as it followed the D.C. judgments (2020 and 2022). The Court expressly rejected reliance on conflict-of-laws principles (Merkle v. Robinson) in this timeliness context.
• Sanction: Considering applicable Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, aggravating and mitigating factors, and comparative case law, the Court approved a two-year suspension—harsher than D.C.’s combined suspensions—consistent with Florida’s authority to impose more severe sanctions in reciprocal cases.
• Costs and compliance: The Court imposed costs of $4,536.93 and directed compliance with rule 3-5.1(h) and, if applicable, rule 3-6.1, with the suspension effective 30 days from the opinion unless the respondent certifies he does not need the time to protect existing clients.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

The Court anchored its analysis in well-established Florida reciprocal discipline jurisprudence and sanctioning standards:

• Reciprocal discipline—conclusive proof rule:
  • Florida Bar v. Kandekore, 766 So. 2d 1004 (Fla. 2000) and Florida Bar v. Wilkes, 179 So. 2d 193 (Fla. 1965): These cases provide the foundational rule that a foreign adjudication of guilt is conclusive proof of misconduct in Florida, subject to narrow exceptions: lack of notice/opportunity to be heard, “paucity of proof,” or other “grave reason” rendering acceptance unjust. The Court applies this framework to uphold the D.C. orders.
• Standard of review and deference to factual findings:
  • Florida Bar v. Schwartz, 284 So. 3d 393 (Fla. 2019); Florida Bar v. Shoureas, 913 So. 2d 554 (Fla. 2005); Florida Bar v. Germain, 957 So. 2d 613 (Fla. 2007): These decisions set the limits of appellate review of referees’ factual findings—upheld if supported by competent, substantial evidence—and clarify the challenger’s burden to show the absence of supporting evidence or clear contradiction.
  • Florida Bar v. Tobkin, 944 So. 2d 219 (Fla. 2006) and Florida Bar v. Thomas, 582 So. 2d 1177 (Fla. 1991): The referee’s credibility determinations are afforded deference and will not be overturned absent clear and convincing evidence of error. This supports rejecting Klayman’s challenges to the referee’s characterization and weight assessments.
• Accrual and timeliness:
  • Section 95.031(1), Florida Statutes (2023) and R.R. v. New Life Community Church of CMA, Inc., 303 So. 3d 916 (Fla. 2020): The Court derives its accrual rule from Florida’s general principle that a cause of action accrues when the last element occurs. In the reciprocal context, that last element is the foreign judgment of discipline, not the underlying misconduct. This directly addresses Rule 3-7.16(a)’s six-year window to “open an investigation.”
  • Merkle v. Robinson, 737 So. 2d 540 (Fla. 1999): The Court distinguishes Merkle’s significant-relationship test as a conflict-of-laws tool for torts, not a timeliness yardstick for Bar discipline; thus, it is inapplicable to the accrual question in reciprocal cases.
• Sanctioning authority and standards:
  • Florida Bar v. Strems, 357 So. 3d 77 (Fla. 2022); Florida Bar v. Alters, 260 So. 3d 72 (Fla. 2018); Florida Bar v. Anderson, 538 So. 2d 852 (Fla. 1989): These cases confirm that while referees must consult the Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions and case law, the Supreme Court bears ultimate responsibility for determining appropriate discipline.
  • Florida Bar v. Hagendorf, 921 So. 2d 611 (Fla. 2006): Florida is free to impose a more severe sanction than that imposed by the foreign jurisdiction in reciprocal discipline.
  • Florida Bar v. Scheinberg, 129 So. 3d 315 (Fla. 2013); Florida Bar v. Horton, 332 So. 3d 943 (Fla. 2019); Florida Bar v. Glueck, 985 So. 2d 1052 (Fla. 2008): These cases address the presumption of correctness for aggravation/mitigation findings and the challenger’s burden to show clear error.
  • Florida Bar v. Herman, 8 So. 3d 1100 (Fla. 2009) and Florida Bar v. Maurice, 955 So. 2d 535 (Fla. 2007): The Court uses these to benchmark sanction length against comparable violations.
  • Florida Bar v. Rush, 361 So. 3d 796 (Fla. 2023): Demonstrates enhanced sanctions for attorneys who ignore client directives and elevate personal interests; nonetheless, the Court imposes a somewhat lesser sanction here given the referee’s mitigation findings and distinct motivational aspects.

Legal Reasoning

1. Limited review of facts; acceptance of foreign adjudications:

   The Court reiterates that it will not reweigh evidence where the referee’s findings rest on competent, substantial evidence. In the reciprocal context, D.C.’s adjudications are conclusive proof of misconduct. Klayman’s assertions of retaliatory motives and due process defects fail because he fully participated in the proceedings and the record supports the D.C. findings. Importantly, the referee’s descriptive phrasing (e.g., characterizing Klayman’s “strong feelings” for Sataki) does not drive the result; the foreign orders themselves establish the violations and serve as the evidentiary cornerstone.

2. The “paucity of proof” and “grave reason” exceptions:

   The Court carefully applied the Wilkes/Kandekore exceptions. It found no paucity of proof: the record reflected clear conflicts with Judicial Watch (Counts involving Cobas, Benson, and Paul) and extensive documentation of the Sataki-related violations (client directives, confidentiality, fee agreement writings, personal-interest conflicts, and failure to withdraw). As to “grave reason,” the Court rejected the argument that the passage of time in D.C. (which has no limitations period for attorney discipline) rendered Florida’s acceptance unjust. The D.C. process complied with D.C. law, and Florida’s reciprocal discipline mechanism is designed to respond to the foreign discipline itself, regardless of when the underlying conduct occurred.

3. Accrual and timeliness under Rule 3-7.16(a):

   The pivotal doctrinal development is the Court’s articulation of accrual for reciprocal discipline. Invoking section 95.031(1)’s general rule, the Court holds that the cause of action accrues upon the last element—here, the entry of the foreign disciplinary judgment—making the timing of the underlying misconduct immaterial for Rule 3-7.16(a) purposes in reciprocal cases. Because D.C. discipline issued in 2020 and 2022 and the Bar opened this proceeding in 2023, the matter is timely. The Court explicitly distinguishes and declines to apply Merkle’s significant-relationship test, emphasizing that reciprocal discipline timeliness is an accrual question, not a conflict-of-laws inquiry.

4. Sanction analysis:

   The Court affirms the referee’s application of the Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions:

   • Standard 4.2(b): Knowingly revealing client information causing injury or potential injury (confidentiality issues with Sataki).
   • Standard 4.3(b): Knowingly failing to avoid conflicts of interest causing injury or potential injury (Judicial Watch matters and personal-interest conflict with Sataki).
   • Standard 7.1(b): Knowing violations of professional duties causing injury or potential injury to clients, the public, or the legal system.

   Aggravators included dishonest/selfish motive, pattern of misconduct, multiple offenses, obstruction and deceptive practices in the disciplinary process, refusal to acknowledge wrongfulness, and substantial experience. Mitigators included character/reputation and remoteness of prior discipline. The Court rejected Klayman’s contention that additional mitigation (absence of prior discipline, lack of selfish motive, cooperative attitude) should be found, concluding the record did not compel those findings. Comparing case law, the Court found two years appropriate—more severe than D.C.’s discipline but justified by Florida authority to enhance sanctions in reciprocal cases and by the breadth and pattern of violations.

Impact and Prospective Significance

The decision carries several important implications for Florida’s lawyer discipline regime and for multijurisdictional practice:

• Accrual rule firmly established: In reciprocal discipline, Florida’s cause of action accrues on the date of the foreign disciplinary order—not the date of underlying acts. This will shape limitations defenses and filing strategies for the Bar, ensuring that reciprocal proceedings are not derailed by aged conduct so long as the foreign adjudication is recent.
• Deference to foreign process; narrow exceptions: The Court reinforces that Florida will generally accept foreign discipline as conclusive proof unless the respondent meets a demanding burden to show due process defects, paucity of proof, or other grave injustice. Assertions of bias or retaliatory motives, without demonstrable procedural or evidentiary deficiencies, will not suffice.
• No “grave reason” from differing limitation schemes: The absence of a statute of limitations in the foreign jurisdiction’s disciplinary system (e.g., D.C.) does not, by itself, make it unjust for Florida to accept the judgment. Florida will not import a foreign timeliness review into its reciprocal acceptance analysis, nor will it treat time lapse alone as a grave reason not to reciprocate.
• Sanctioning latitude: Florida is free to impose a harsher sanction than that assessed elsewhere, calibrated to Florida’s Standards, aggravation/mitigation, and comparative case law. Practitioners should not assume Florida will mirror sister-state discipline.
• Substantive reminders for practitioners:
  • Conflicts of interest: Prior organizational clients require informed consent before adverse representation (Rule 1.9 analogues). Serving in leadership or in-house roles heightens conflict exposure.
  • Client autonomy and confidentiality: Lawyers must abide by clients’ objectives (Rule 1.2), communicate adequately (Rule 1.4), protect confidences (Rule 1.6), and avoid injecting personal interests (Rule 1.7) into representation.
  • Termination and withdrawal: Upon discharge, withdrawal is mandatory (Rule 1.16); unilateral action (e.g., filing appeals) post-discharge is sanctionable absent client instruction and authority.
  • Fees: Contingency fee agreements must be in writing and adhered to (Rule 1.5(b), (c)); unilateral fee alterations are prohibited.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Reciprocal discipline: When a lawyer disciplined in one jurisdiction is also licensed in Florida, the Florida Supreme Court may impose discipline for the same misconduct. Florida largely treats the foreign adjudication as conclusive proof, subject to narrow defenses.
• “Conclusive proof” with exceptions: Florida will accept the foreign finding unless the respondent proves (a) lack of notice or opportunity to be heard; (b) a “paucity of proof” (so little evidence that accepting the finding would be unjust); or (c) some “other grave reason” making acceptance unjust.
• Paucity of proof: Not a disagreement over evidence weight; it means the foreign record is so barren that accepting its judgment would be fundamentally unfair.
• Accrual of cause of action: The legal “clock” starts when all elements of the claim exist. For reciprocal discipline, the decisive element is the foreign disciplinary order itself; thus, Florida’s proceeding is timely if brought within the applicable window after that order, regardless of when the underlying conduct occurred.
• Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions: A structured framework that guides sanction selection based on duty violated, mental state, injury, and aggravating/mitigating factors.
• Aggravation and mitigation: Factors that can increase or decrease the sanction, including patterns of misconduct, selfish motive, prior discipline (aggravators), or character evidence and remoteness of prior offenses (mitigators).
• Harsher Florida sanctions: Florida is not bound to duplicate the foreign punishment; it may adjust based on its own standards and case law.

Conclusion

The Florida Bar v. Klayman clarifies two core pillars of Florida’s reciprocal discipline jurisprudence. First, it confirms that foreign disciplinary orders are conclusive proof of misconduct in Florida absent narrow, well-defined exceptions—none of which the respondent carried here. Second, and most significantly for future practice, it establishes that the timeliness of a Florida reciprocal proceeding turns on accrual at the time of the foreign disciplinary judgment, not on the age of the underlying conduct or any conflict-of-laws analysis. This accrual holding ensures reciprocal proceedings remain viable even when the underlying acts are old, so long as the foreign adjudication is recent.

Applying the Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions and comparative case law, the Court imposed a two-year suspension—demonstrating Florida’s readiness to levy stiffer sanctions than the originating jurisdiction when justified by patterns of misconduct, client harm, and aggravation. For Florida practitioners, the decision reinforces vital duties regarding conflicts, client autonomy, confidentiality, fee agreements, and withdrawal. For Bar counsel and courts, it provides a clear, administrable rule for timeliness in reciprocal cases and reaffirms the integrity and comity of cross-jurisdictional attorney regulation.