Recall Alone Is Not Enough for Article III Standing: Sixth Circuit Demands Plausible Contamination Allegations in Benefit-of-the-Bargain and Risk-of-Illness Suits

Case: Ward v. J.M. Smucker Co., No. 24-3387 (6th Cir. Sept. 10, 2025) (Not Recommended for Publication)

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Panel: Gilman, Stranch, and Larsen, Circuit Judges

Author: Judge Jane B. Stranch

Introduction

In May 2022, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), with the CDC and state partners, announced a multistate outbreak of Salmonella Senftenberg infections linked to certain Jif peanut butter products manufactured at J.M. Smucker Company’s Lexington, Kentucky facility. Smucker initiated a voluntary recall covering more than forty product lines, identified by specific lot codes.

Six consumers—Naythan A. Ward, Joe Pisciotti, Cameron Bopp, Tyneisha Ferguson, John Kraljevich, and James C. Mullins—filed a putative class action under Ohio law alleging that Smucker sold them contaminated peanut butter, depriving them of the benefit of their bargain and exposing them to an increased risk of illness. They also asserted, in the alternative on appeal, that even if their particular units were not contaminated, they were “adulterated” because prepared or packed under insanitary conditions. The district court dismissed for lack of Article III standing. The Sixth Circuit affirmed.

The central question was whether, at the pleading stage, a plaintiff who bought a recalled food product plausibly alleges a concrete injury-in-fact by asserting contamination or increased risk of illness based largely on the fact of a recall and generalized outbreak data. The Sixth Circuit held that a recall alone, without factual enhancement—such as testing, data, or product-specific details—does not plausibly allege contamination of a particular purchased unit and therefore does not establish standing for either a benefit-of-the-bargain or increased-risk theory. The court also held that plaintiffs forfeited their “adulteration” theory by failing to present it to the district court.

Summary of the Opinion

The Sixth Circuit affirmed dismissal for lack of standing. Although the court acknowledged that both overpayment for a defective product and increased risk of illness can qualify as concrete injuries, plaintiffs must plausibly allege that their own products were defective (contaminated) or otherwise meet a recognized theory of injury. Here:

Contamination and Risk-of-Illness Theories: Plaintiffs alleged they bought peanut butter from recalled product lines and could not consume it, and that an outbreak resulted in 16 reported illnesses across 12 states. But they alleged no testing, sampling, or product-specific facts indicating that the units they purchased were contaminated. The court held that a product recall, standing alone, is insufficient to nudge contamination from possible to plausible, and thus insufficient to establish injury-in-fact for either overpayment or risk-of-illness claims.
Adulteration Theory: Plaintiffs argued on appeal that, regardless of contamination, the products were “adulterated” under 21 U.S.C. § 342(a) because they were prepared in insanitary conditions. The court declined to consider this theory because plaintiffs did not present it below and did not show the exceptional circumstances necessary to avoid forfeiture on appeal.
Mootness: The court did not reach Smucker’s mootness argument because lack of standing was dispositive.

Detailed Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992), and Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330 (2016): These decisions frame Article III standing’s core: a plaintiff must show a concrete and particularized injury that is actual or imminent, traceable to the defendant, and redressable by the court. The Sixth Circuit applied Lujan/Spokeo to emphasize that the injury element cannot be conjectural.
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009): These cases supply the plausibility standard. Conclusory assertions (e.g., “each plaintiff purchased contaminated peanut butter”) require supporting factual content to move a claim from conceivable to plausible. The Sixth Circuit used Twombly/Iqbal to assess the sufficiency of plaintiffs’ factual allegations of contamination.
Ass’n of Am. Physicians & Surgeons v. FDA, 13 F.4th 531 (6th Cir. 2021); Mosley v. Kohl’s Dep’t Stores, Inc., 942 F.3d 752 (6th Cir. 2019); Mackinac Ctr. for Pub. Pol’y v. Cardona, 102 F.4th 343 (6th Cir. 2024): These decisions address pleading-stage standing. On a facial attack, courts accept factual allegations as true and draw reasonable inferences for the plaintiff, but may consider the complaint and its attachments. The panel applied this framework, scrutinizing what the complaint actually alleged.
Sutton v. St. Jude Med. S.C., Inc., 419 F.3d 568 (6th Cir. 2005): Sutton recognizes that increased risk of illness can constitute injury-in-fact. The Sixth Circuit cited Sutton to acknowledge the viability of risk-of-harm injuries, but distinguished this case because plaintiffs did not plausibly allege that their own products exposed them to a significant risk.
Speerly v. General Motors, LLC, 143 F.4th 306 (6th Cir. 2025) (en banc), and Loreto v. Procter & Gamble Co., 515 F. App’x 576 (6th Cir. 2013): Speerly (en banc) confirms that overpayment for a defective product is a concrete injury. Loreto is consistent with that principle. The panel relied on these to accept that benefit-of-the-bargain injuries are cognizable—if plaintiffs plausibly plead the existence of a defect affecting their purchased units. Here, that plausibility was missing.
Huertas v. Bayer US LLC, 120 F.4th 1169 (3d Cir. 2024): Highly influential, Huertas held that recall alone does not make contamination plausible. But allegations of testing showing benzene in most sampled units supported standing there. The Sixth Circuit adopted Huertas’s guidance: while plausibility is a “lenient” standard and plaintiffs need not show that all recalled units were contaminated, more than a recall itself is required to plausibly allege contamination of a particular purchase.
Debernardis v. IQ Formulations, LLC, 942 F.3d 1076 (11th Cir. 2019): Recognized standing where a plaintiff purchased “adulterated” products under the FDCA. The Sixth Circuit noted this supportive authority for an adulteration-anchored injury—but did not reach the merits because the argument was forfeited.
Bailey v. Floyd Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 106 F.3d 135 (6th Cir. 1997), and Glennborough Homeowners Ass’n v. USPS, 21 F.4th 410 (6th Cir. 2021): These cases support the principle that arguments raised for the first time on appeal are forfeited absent exceptional circumstances. The court invoked this to reject the newly raised adulteration theory.
State ex rel. Tenn. Gen. Assembly v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 931 F.3d 499 (6th Cir. 2019), and Ames v. LaRose, 86 F.4th 729 (6th Cir. 2023): Reaffirm subject-matter jurisdiction’s standing requirement and the de novo standard of review for dismissals on standing grounds.

Legal Reasoning

The plaintiffs framed two injuries tied to contamination: economic loss (overpayment/benefit-of-the-bargain) and increased risk of illness. Both depended on the premise that their purchased jars were contaminated. The complaint alleged:

FDA and CDC identified sixteen infections across twelve states linked to the facility; and
Smucker recalled more than forty product lines, with the FDA urging consumers to discard products within certain lot codes;
Each named plaintiff purchased a jar from a recalled product line and therefore could not consume it.

The court accepted that plaintiffs need only plausibly plead standing at this stage and that conclusory allegations of contamination must be supported by factual content. Importantly, it held that the mere fact a product was subject to a recall does not itself make it plausible that a particular unit was contaminated. Citing Huertas, the court underscored the line between possibility and plausibility: generalized recall announcements and a small number of outbreak cases show some contamination occurred somewhere, but do not reasonably support an inference that any given consumer’s jar was contaminated.

The plaintiffs did not allege any testing, sampling, or data regarding the contaminated proportion of units, nor did they provide product-specific details (e.g., lot numbers tied to known contamination, lab results from their jars, or investigative findings concerning the scope of contamination at the Lexington facility). The panel stressed that testing is not the only way to plead plausibly, but some further factual enhancement is needed to make contamination of the purchased unit a reasonable inference, not a speculative one.

With contamination implausibly pled, both the benefit-of-the-bargain and risk-of-illness theories failed at the injury prong. The court then addressed the alternative “adulteration” theory—that even absent contamination, the products were prepared under insanitary conditions and therefore “adulterated” under 21 U.S.C. § 342(a), causing economic injury. Although the Eleventh Circuit (in Debernardis) has recognized such an injury-in-fact theory, the Sixth Circuit declined to consider it here because plaintiffs did not raise it in the district court and did not demonstrate that ignoring the argument would cause a plain miscarriage of justice. The court thus deemed the theory forfeited.

Because the lack of standing was dispositive, the panel did not reach Smucker’s mootness arguments.

Impact and Implications

This decision provides clear, practical guidance for standing in “no-injury” product cases—especially food contamination and recall litigation—within the Sixth Circuit:

Recall ≠ Contamination of a Particular Unit: Plaintiffs cannot rely on a recall alone to satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement. They must plausibly allege that their purchased unit was defective/contaminated or otherwise legally deficient.
Plausibility Pathways: Allegations that may suffice include product-level facts such as lot numbers tied to identified contamination, testing or sampling results, regulatory inspection findings detailing the scope and pervasiveness of contamination, or other data demonstrating that contamination was sufficiently widespread to make it plausible that a given unit was affected.
Risk-of-Illness Claims Are Viable, But Require Exposure Facts: Sutton remains good law; increased risk can be a concrete injury. But plaintiffs must plausibly allege exposure to the risk via their own purchased products.
Benefit-of-the-Bargain/Overpayment Claims Remain Cognizable: The Sixth Circuit’s en banc decision in Speerly confirms that overpayment for a defective product is a concrete injury. This case clarifies the prerequisite: plaintiffs must plausibly plead that a defect existed in their units.
Alternative Theories Must Be Preserved: An “adulteration” theory can ground injury-in-fact (as recognized by sister circuits), but must be presented in the district court. Appellate courts will not entertain new standing theories absent exceptional circumstances.
Alignment with Sister Circuits: The Sixth Circuit’s approach aligns with the Third Circuit’s Huertas decision and contributes to a growing consensus that recall announcements, by themselves, do not confer Article III standing.
Practical Effects on Class Actions: Early motions to dismiss will likely succeed against recall-based putative classes that lack product-specific or scope-of-contamination allegations. Plaintiffs’ counsel should anticipate the need for pre-suit investigation to gather testing and regulatory facts to meet plausibility.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Article III Standing: A federal court can hear a case only if the plaintiff shows a concrete and particularized injury that is actual or imminent, caused by the defendant, and redressable by the court.
Injury-in-Fact: The real-world harm a plaintiff must show; economic loss (overpayment) or increased risk of illness can both qualify if tied to the plaintiff’s own circumstances.
Plausibility Pleading (Twombly/Iqbal): Complaints must contain facts that make the claim reasonably believable, not just possible. Conclusory statements need factual support.
Benefit-of-the-Bargain Injury: Paying for a product believed to be safe or defect-free when it is not. Cognizable if the product actually had the defect (or if another legally recognized deficiency is plausibly alleged).
Increased Risk of Illness: Exposure to a heightened risk can be an injury, but plaintiffs must plausibly allege they were actually exposed (e.g., by using a defective or contaminated product).
Adulterated Food (21 U.S.C. § 342(a)): Food prepared, packed, or held under insanitary conditions whereby it may have become contaminated or injurious to health. Purchasing adulterated food can, in some courts, constitute injury-in-fact—but the theory must be timely raised.
Facial Attack on Standing: A motion arguing that even if the complaint’s allegations are true, they do not establish standing. Courts accept allegations as true but still require plausibility.
Forfeiture on Appeal: Arguments not made in the district court are typically not considered for the first time on appeal unless extraordinary circumstances are shown.
“Not Recommended for Publication”: The decision is nonprecedential within the circuit, but it can be persuasive and signals how the court is likely to approach similar issues.

Practice Pointers

For Plaintiffs:
- Attach or describe product-specific facts: lot codes, purchase dates, store locations, and any match to contamination data.
- Include testing or sampling results, regulatory inspection findings, or internal data (where available) showing the scope of contamination or unsanitary conditions.
- Plead alternative injury theories (e.g., adulteration) from the outset to preserve them.
- Allege usage/exposure facts to support increased risk claims.
For Defendants:
- On a motion to dismiss, emphasize the absence of product-specific allegations or scope-of-contamination facts.
- Distinguish recall breadth from contamination prevalence; argue that recall does not imply contamination of any given unit.
- Identify standing theories not raised below as forfeited on appeal.

Conclusion

The Sixth Circuit’s decision affirms a clear and important pleading rule: a recall, by itself, does not make it plausible that an individual plaintiff’s product was contaminated, and without plausible contamination or a properly preserved alternative theory (such as adulteration), plaintiffs cannot establish Article III injury-in-fact for either benefit-of-the-bargain or increased-risk claims. The ruling aligns with the Third Circuit’s Huertas decision and complements the Sixth Circuit’s en banc recognition in Speerly that overpayment injuries are concrete—provided the defect is plausibly alleged as to the plaintiff’s own purchase.

Going forward, consumer class actions premised on contamination or recalls in the Sixth Circuit will need factual enhancement beyond a recall notice and generalized outbreak statistics. Plaintiffs should marshal testing, regulatory findings, or product-specific details to cross the plausibility threshold. Defendants, in turn, have a sturdy basis to challenge recall-based complaints that lack such specifics. Though nonprecedential, this opinion offers a precise roadmap for litigants and courts confronting standing in recall-driven consumer suits.