Recalibrating Home Rule: The Appellate Division Upholds New York’s Even-Year Election Law

Introduction

County governments from eight regions (Onondaga, Nassau, Oneida, Rensselaer, Rockland, Dutchess, Orange, and a group of individual voters) brought consolidated actions attacking the 2023 “Even Year Election Law” (EYEL). They claimed the statute violated Article IX of the New York Constitution—New York’s “Home Rule” article—by usurping counties’ authority to determine the terms and timing of their local elections. Supreme Court (Onondaga County) agreed and enjoined the law.

On 7 May 2025 the Appellate Division, Fourth Department, unanimously reversed. It granted summary judgment to the State, Governor Hochul, and an Onondaga County elections commissioner, holding that EYEL

is a constitutionally valid general law,
does not abridge home-rule guarantees,
does not violate any federal or state constitutional right (takings, free speech/association, equal protection, due process, or the right to vote), and
may be implemented immediately (January 2025).

Summary of the Judgment

The key rulings are:

The EYEL—Chapter 741, Laws of 2023—survives the presumption-of-constitutionality analysis. Plaintiffs failed to show invalidity beyond a reasonable doubt.
Article IX does not give counties an exclusive constitutional right to set the length or timing of local offices; that power is statutory and remains subject to statewide “general laws.”
The EYEL qualifies as a general law (Art IX §3[d][1]) because it applies, in form and effect, to every county outside New York City and to every town or village that conducts local elections.
Even assuming it were “special,” the statute would still be valid because voter-participation presents a “substantial state concern.”
Other constitutional theories—Takings, legislative equivalency, First & Fourteenth Amendment claims—are meritless; the law only reschedules elections and is facially neutral.
No equitable need exists to delay implementation to the 2027 cycle; unlike redistricting cases, date-shifting does not create “inextricable confusion and chaos.”

Analysis

1. Precedents Cited

Overstock.com v. NYSDTF, 20 NY3d 586 (2013) – Presumption of constitutionality and burden of proof.
Fossella v. Adams, 2025 NY Slip Op 01668 – Courts strike statutes only as a “last resort.”
Stefanik v. Hochul, 43 NY3d 49 (2024) – Distinguishes what the Constitution prohibits vs. what it permits.
Baldwin UFSD v. Nassau County, 22 NY3d 606 (2014) – History and purpose of 1963 home-rule amendments.
Uniformed Firefighters Assn. v. NYC, 50 NY2d 85 (1980) & Harvey v. Finnick, 88 AD2d 40 (4th Dept 1982) – Defining “general law” versus “special law.”
Greater N.Y. Taxi Ass’n v. State, 21 NY3d 289 (2013); Empire State ABC v. Smith, 21 NY3d 309 (2013) – “Substantial state concern” doctrine.
Nydick v. Suffolk County Legislature, 81 Misc 2d 786 (1975) – Earlier debate on whether County Law §400(7) was a “general law.” Court distinguishes it.
Lanza v. Wagner, 11 NY2d 317 (1962) – No property right in public office.
Walsh v. Katz, 17 NY3d 336 (2011); U.S. precedents (Burdick, Anderson) – Balancing test for election regulations.
Sherrill v. O’Brien, 186 NY 1 (1906) – Limiting last-minute electoral disruptions.

These authorities together framed the court’s pathway: heavy deference to legislative judgments, narrow construction of home-rule limitations, and a flexible approach to election regulation where the State asserts a voter-participation interest.

2. Legal Reasoning

a) Home Rule and Article IX
Article IX grants counties the option of adopting charters and electing local officers, but it explicitly permits the Legislature to enact general laws about “terms of office.” The court found no language in §1 conferring exclusive county control. County charters are statutes, not constitutional texts; therefore they cannot elevate local prerogatives above subsequent statewide legislation.

b) General vs. Special Law
Under Art IX §3(d)(1), a law is “general” if it applies to all counties or to a full sub-class (“all counties outside a city”). EYEL reaches every county except those wholly within NYC; every such county has at least one affected elective office. Even though the law’s practical bite varies (appointed executives, 3-year terms, etc.), any variance is rationally tied to the subject matter—coordinating election calendars—and is therefore permissible. The court also invoked Uniformed Firefighters: perfect symmetry is unnecessary; reasonable classification suffices.

c) Substantial State Concern
Assuming arguendo EYEL were “special,” it would still stand because increasing turnout in low-salience local elections constitutes a “substantial state interest.” Cardozo’s concurrence in Adler v. Deegan (1929) legitimizes special laws that advance statewide concerns.

d) Savings Clause
Art IX §3(b) preserves pre-1963 local legislation “until repealed…in accordance with the Constitution.” EYEL is precisely such a repeal enacted by general law; the clause is therefore satisfied, not violated.

e) Other Constitutional Theories
• No Takings: public office is not private property (Lanza).
• No legislative-equivalency problem: the “abridged” rights are statutory.
• First & Fourteenth Amendment claims trigger minimal scrutiny because EYEL is neutral and imposes only incidental burdens (Walsh; Burdick). The State’s regulatory interest outweighs remote burdens.
• Equal protection and voting-rights theories fail for the same reason.

3. Likely Impact of the Decision

Election Administration: Most county, town, and village elections outside NYC will now appear on federal/state ballots beginning 2025, potentially boosting turnout and changing electorate composition for local offices.
Home Rule Doctrine: Reinforces that county charters are subordinate to later-enacted general laws; counties cannot constitutionalize charter provisions by fiat.
Legislative Latitude: Confirms the Legislature’s broad discretion to treat voter-participation as a “substantial state concern” justifying statewide uniformity—even over localized objections.
Future Litigation: Raises the bar for local governments challenging statewide election reforms; plaintiffs must now distinguish EYEL or attack it under federal pre-emption or Voting Rights Act theories rather than home-rule arguments.
Political Strategy: Campaign planning, fundraising calendars, and issue-salience will shift as local races share the ballot with presidential and gubernatorial contests.

Complex Concepts Simplified

General Law vs. Special Law: A general law applies, in text and effect, to every member of a constitutional class (e.g., “all counties”). A special law singles out fewer than all members. Classification must relate logically to the statute’s purpose.
Home Rule (Article IX): New York’s constitutional scheme granting local governments autonomy over “property, affairs or government,” but always subject to state laws that are general or address substantial state concerns.
Presumption of Constitutionality: Courts start with the assumption that statutes are valid; challengers must disprove validity “beyond a reasonable doubt.”
Substantial State Concern Doctrine: Even a special law may override local autonomy if the State shows a legitimate statewide interest (e.g., uniform election turnout, public safety, environmental protection).
Takings Clause: Protects private property from government seizure without compensation. Public offices are public trusts, not private property, so the Clause does not apply.

Conclusion

County of Onondaga v. State of New York clarifies the contours of New York’s home-rule protections and fortifies legislative authority over election scheduling. The Fourth Department confirmed that:

Local control over election timing is a statutory privilege, not a constitutional right;
The Legislature can enact uniform electoral calendars under its general-law power;
Broad policy goals—such as maximizing voter turnout—constitute substantial state concerns capable of displacing contrary local legislation;
Minimal, neutral burdens on electoral participants ordinarily survive First and Fourteenth Amendment scrutiny.

In the broader legal landscape, this judgment sets a precedent that New York courts will defer to statewide reforms aimed at enhancing democratic participation, even where those reforms intrude on established local practices. Home rule remains robust, but it is not absolute—particularly in the face of well-articulated statewide interests.