Rebutting the SGA Presumption Requires Concrete Proof of Subsidy: Fourth Circuit Affirms Step-Four Denial Based on Religious Employment and “As Actually Performed” Past Work

Case: William Kinlaw v. Frank Bisignano, Commissioner of Social Security

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit (Unpublished)

Date: September 24, 2025

Panel: Judges Agee and Wynn; Senior Judge Traxler (per curiam)

Disposition: Affirmed

Note: Unpublished decisions are not binding precedent in the Fourth Circuit; this opinion is nevertheless persuasive for its fact-intensive application of settled Social Security principles.

Introduction

This appeal arises from the denial of Social Security disability insurance benefits to William Kinlaw, a former unarmed security guard and long-serving associate minister. After four administrative hearings before three ALJs, two agency remands, and district court review, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the ALJ’s final denial.

The opinion addresses three recurring issues in disability adjudications:

When earnings create a presumption of substantial gainful activity (SGA), what kind of evidence suffices to rebut that presumption as a “subsidy” under 20 C.F.R. § 404.1574?
How may an ALJ rely on a claimant’s ability to perform past relevant work (PRW) “as actually performed” to deny benefits at step four?
Under the pre–March 27, 2017 treating physician rule, when may an ALJ discount a treating source’s opinion in favor of state agency reviewers?

The court’s decision, while unpublished, provides a clear, practical blueprint: (1) wages above the regulatory thresholds—including in religious or charitable settings—trigger a rebuttable presumption of SGA that can be overcome only with concrete proof that pay exceeded the reasonable value of the work performed; (2) step-one inconsistencies may be harmless where the denial rests on step four; and (3) for older claims, treating opinions lacking objective support may be given little weight where contradicted by the record and daily activities, including contemporaneous work.

Summary of the Opinion

The Fourth Circuit applied the deferential substantial-evidence standard and affirmed the ALJ’s denial at step four. The court held:

SGA and subsidy: Kinlaw’s 2019 wages as an associate minister exceeded the SGA threshold, creating a presumption of SGA. His rebuttal—that the raise was charitable—failed for lack of evidence that his pay exceeded the reasonable value of his work. The senior pastor’s letter confirmed added responsibilities and did not support a subsidy finding.
Past relevant work (PRW): The ALJ properly found Kinlaw could perform his past work as a pastoral assistant and as an unarmed security guard “as actually performed,” making step five unnecessary. For the security guard role, the ALJ reasonably credited testimony that the job did not require physical restraint and that the 2013 job loss stemmed from sleeping on duty, not functional incapacity.
Treating physician opinion: Applying the pre-2017 regulations, the ALJ permissibly gave little weight to the treating physician’s stricter limitations (essentially sedentary capacity) as inadequately explained and inconsistent with the medical record, daily activities, and ongoing work at gainful levels. Greater weight to the state agency physicians’ light-work assessments was supported by substantial evidence.
Harmless error: A stray, inconsistent statement at step one was a scrivener’s error and harmless because the ALJ did not deny the claim at step one and proceeded through step four.

Detailed Analysis

A. Precedents and Authorities Cited

Ard v. O’Malley, 110 F.4th 613 (4th Cir. 2024): Recites statutory definition of “disability.” The court uses Ard as a touchstone for the Act’s core standard.
Shinaberry v. Saul, 952 F.3d 113 (4th Cir. 2020): Describes the five-step sequential evaluation, the role of the RFC, and the shift of burdens at step five. The court leans on Shinaberry’s framework to structure the analysis.
Thomas v. Berryhill, 916 F.3d 307 (4th Cir. 2019): Articulates the deferential “substantial evidence” review—courts do not reweigh evidence or make credibility determinations.
Hancock v. Astrue, 667 F.3d 470 (4th Cir. 2012): Reiterates that where evidence permits multiple reasonable interpretations, it is the ALJ’s job—not the court’s—to choose among them.
Payne v. Sullivan, 946 F.2d 1081 (4th Cir. 1991): The central SGA precedent: earnings above regulatory thresholds create a rebuttable presumption of SGA.
Mastro v. Apfel, 270 F.3d 171 (4th Cir. 2001): Interprets the pre-2017 treating physician rule—controlling weight applies only if well-supported and not inconsistent with other substantial evidence; otherwise the ALJ may discount the opinion.
Regulatory authorities:
- 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520 (five-step sequential evaluation)
- 20 C.F.R. § 404.1560(b), § 404.1565(a) (2012) (past relevant work definition; note: amended in 2024 to a five-year lookback)
- 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(b) (definition of light work)
- 20 C.F.R. § 404.1572 (definitions of “substantial” and “gainful”)
- 20 C.F.R. § 404.1574 (earnings guidelines; subsidy and rebuttal of SGA)
- 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2) (pre-2017 treating physician rule)

These authorities collectively frame the limited scope of judicial review, the primacy of earnings in SGA determinations, the nature of subsidies, and the standards for weighing medical opinions in older-filed claims.

B. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

1) SGA presumption and subsidy rebuttal in religious employment

The court affirmed the ALJ’s use of the earnings guidelines to find SGA in 2019 for Kinlaw’s associate minister work. Because his 2019 wages ($25,680) exceeded the regulatory threshold ($14,640), the Payne presumption of SGA attached. To rebut, Kinlaw had to show his pay exceeded the reasonable value of his services—i.e., a “subsidy” under § 404.1574(a)(2). The record did not do so:

Kinlaw acknowledged he took on additional duties after 2018 (opening the church for events and locking up after rehearsals), undermining the notion of pure charity.
The senior pastor’s letter noted that other associate ministers made less but emphasized that Kinlaw had longer tenure and “increased responsibilities.” It did not state that his pay exceeded the value of his work, that he required special supervision or accommodations, or that the church intended a wage subsidy.
The ALJ permissibly questioned the credibility of Kinlaw’s “charitable raise” narrative and reasonably found the evidence insufficient to convert his wages into a subsidy for SGA purposes.

The court rejected the invitation to reweigh the evidence, reiterating that under Hancock and Thomas, that is the ALJ’s province. The key legal principle—salient for religious or charitable employers—is that high earnings trigger SGA unless the claimant produces concrete evidence that pay exceeds the true value of the work performed.

2) Step four denial anchored in “as actually performed” PRW

The ALJ found Kinlaw could perform his past work as both a pastoral assistant and an unarmed security guard. The court emphasized that step four asks whether the claimant can do past work “as actually performed” or “as generally performed.” The ALJ relied on the former:

Security guard: Crediting Kinlaw’s testimony, the ALJ found he was not required to restrain individuals and would summon armed guards if needed. The record indicated the separation from employment was due to sleeping on duty, not functional inability. Substantial evidence supported the conclusion that he could still do the job as he actually did it.
Pastoral assistant: Because Kinlaw continued to perform the role at SGA levels during the insured period, the ALJ found he retained the functional capacity to perform it. The claimant’s own work thus confirmed capacity and contradicted allegations of disabling severity.

Having determined the claimant could perform PRW “as actually performed,” the court found it unnecessary to reach arguments about the “generally performed” standard or step five.

3) Weighing medical opinions under the pre-2017 treating physician rule

Applying 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2) and Mastro, the ALJ gave little weight to the treating physician’s restrictive limitations and greater weight to two state agency physicians who opined to light work with postural and manipulative limits. The ALJ’s rationale, affirmed by the court, was that:

The treating opinion lacked supporting explanation, clinical findings, and objective test references; it was primarily grounded in subjective complaints.
The treating notes showed normal gait and strength despite range-of-motion limits, and conservative treatment post-surgery.
Daily activities (self-care, driving, shopping, assisting a terminally ill sister) and SGA-level pastoral work were inconsistent with the alleged sedentary-level restrictions.
The treating physician’s assertion that Kinlaw could not restrain individuals was not germane to the actual security job, which did not require restraint.

The court held this weighing to be within the ALJ’s discretion and supported by substantial evidence.

4) Harmless error at step one

Although the ALJ made a stray statement suggesting Kinlaw’s work did not rise to SGA, the decision elsewhere repeatedly found SGA in 2013 and 2019 and did not deny at step one. The court deemed the inconsistency a scrivener’s error and harmless, especially since the dispositive denial occurred at step four. The opinion also clarified that the ALJ’s inadvertent reliance on the original onset date rather than the amended April 3, 2013 date was harmless in context.

C. Impact and Practical Implications

1) SGA in religious and charitable contexts

The opinion underscores that SGA presumptions apply with full force to religious or charitable employment. A post-onset or post-DLI raise—standing alone—does not convert earnings into a subsidy. To rebut the SGA presumption, claimants must marshal specific evidence that:

They received pay above the going rate for similar workers performing similar duties; and
The differential reflected sheltering or charity, demonstrated by special supervision, discrete accommodations reducing productivity, reduced responsibilities, or employer statements that wages exceeded the reasonable value of work performed.

Absent such proof, courts will treat earnings above thresholds as SGA, often fatal to disability claims at step one or, as here, as powerful evidence at step four that the claimant can still perform PRW.

2) The continuing vitality of “as actually performed” PRW

Practitioners often focus on the Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT) “generally performed” description. This case is a reminder that a claimant’s own description of how he actually did the job can control. If the job was less demanding than the DOT archetype—e.g., unarmed security work not requiring restraint—an ALJ may permissibly find capability to perform PRW without reaching step five.

3) Treating physician opinions in legacy cases

For claims filed before March 27, 2017, controlling weight remains available to treating sources, but only with objective support and consistency. Where a treating source’s conclusions are conclusory, rely largely on subjective reports, or are inconsistent with activities and objective findings, an ALJ may give little weight and instead credit state agency assessments grounded in the record.

4) Harmless-error doctrine in sequential evaluation

Minor inconsistencies at step one will not prompt reversal where the ALJ proceeds through later steps and the denial rests on an adequately supported step-four finding.

5) Regulatory update on PRW timeframe

The decision notes that the PRW lookback period changed from 15 years to 5 years in 2024. This case applied the prior 15-year rule because of the filing date, but future claims will be affected by the shortened window. Counsel should recalibrate PRW strategies accordingly.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Substantial Gainful Activity (SGA): Work that is both meaningful (substantial) and done for pay/profit (gainful). The SSA publishes monthly/annual earnings thresholds; earning more than the threshold usually creates a presumption of SGA.
Subsidy (SGA context): If a claimant is paid more than the reasonable value of the work performed—because of charity, accommodations, or sheltered work—the “excess” can be subtracted from earnings. The claimant must prove the excess.
Residual Functional Capacity (RFC): The most a claimant can do despite limitations, assessed between steps three and four. Here, the ALJ found “light work” with postural and manipulative limitations.
Light work: Generally involves lifting/carrying up to 20 pounds occasionally and 10 pounds frequently, with frequent standing/walking; specific postural and reaching/handling limits can be layered on (20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(b)).
Past Relevant Work (PRW): Work performed within the regulatory lookback period (15 years for older cases; 5 years now), long enough to learn, and at SGA levels. A claimant is not disabled if he can still do PRW “as actually performed” or “as generally performed.”
“As actually performed” vs. “as generally performed”: The former looks at how the claimant really did the job; the latter looks at the typical way the job is done nationally (often via DOT). Either can support a step-four denial.
Date Last Insured (DLI): The last date a claimant meets insured status for Title II benefits; disability must be established on or before this date.
Substantial evidence standard: A deferential judicial review standard—more than a scintilla, less than a preponderance. Courts do not reweigh evidence or make credibility determinations when the ALJ’s path is reasonable.
Treating physician rule (pre-2017): A treating source’s opinion may receive controlling weight if well-supported and consistent. Otherwise, the ALJ may assign less weight, considering supportability, consistency, and other factors.

Practice Pointers

Rebutting SGA in charitable settings: Obtain detailed employer statements documenting accommodations, supervision, reduced productivity, comparative pay scales, and explicit acknowledgment that wages exceeded the value of services.
Develop the “as actually performed” record: Claimants and counsel should describe job duties precisely. If the actual job required more than the DOT suggests, document those demands. Conversely, if it required less (e.g., no restraint), expect the ALJ to rely on that to find capability.
Support treating opinions: For legacy cases, ensure treating source opinions cite examination findings, imaging, and functional testing; address inconsistencies with daily activities; and explain how limitations map to work functions.
Address work after onset: Be prepared to explain any post-onset work—especially SGA-level work—and its implications for RFC and credibility. If claiming a subsidy, quantify it.
Harmless error preservation: Identify errors but evaluate materiality. Courts will not reverse for scrivener’s errors where the ALJ’s dispositive rationale is sound and supported.

Conclusion

The Fourth Circuit’s unpublished affirmance in Kinlaw solidifies a pragmatic set of lessons for Social Security practice:

High earnings—even in religious or charitable roles—invoke a strong presumption of SGA. Overcoming it requires concrete, employer-grounded evidence that pay exceeded the value of the work.
Claimants who continue to perform PRW at or near SGA levels face an uphill battle; their work activity can both undermine subjective complaints and independently support a step-four denial based on “as actually performed” duties.
Under the pre-2017 treating physician rule, conclusory or unsupported treating opinions may properly yield to better-supported state agency assessments, particularly where daily activities and contemporaneous work suggest greater functional capacity.
Procedural misstatements at step one are not outcome-determinative where the ALJ’s denial rests on a well-supported step-four finding.

While nonprecedential, Kinlaw offers a clear, evidence-driven roadmap for evaluating SGA in charitable employment, applying the PRW standards, and weighing medical opinions under legacy regulations. Its central principle—rebutting the SGA presumption requires tangible proof of a subsidy—will reverberate in future disputes over post-onset work and the boundaries between charity and substantial gainful activity.