The decision whether a judge should recuse is reviewed for abuse of discretion, per Kirksey v. State, underscoring the deference afforded to trial judges’ decisions not to step aside.

B. Judicial Disqualification Under NRS 1.230 and NCJC Rule 2.11

1. Governing Standards

Two sources govern judicial disqualification in Nevada:

1. NRS 1.230(1), which prohibits a judge from acting in a proceeding where the judge “entertains actual bias or prejudice for or against one of the parties.” Judges are presumed unbiased, as reaffirmed in Millen v. Eighth Judicial District Court.
2. NCJC Rule 2.11(A), requiring disqualification in any proceeding in which a judge’s “impartiality might reasonably be questioned,” an objective standard interpreted in Ybarra v. State.

However, Nevada’s doctrinal structure distinguishes between:

• Bias from an extrajudicial source, where the objective “reasonable question” test of Rule 2.11(A) applies more readily; and
• Bias arising from judicial rulings and conduct within the case itself, where a heightened standard—drawn from the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540 (1994)—controls.

In Canarelli, the Nevada Supreme Court held that where the alleged bias is purely intra-judicial, the NCJC’s objective standard gives way to the more demanding Liteky approach; this case applies that framework again.

2. The Liteky Standard in Nevada

Under Liteky and as quoted in Canarelli, disqualification based on intra-judicial conduct is warranted only when the judge has formed an opinion that:

“Displays a deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible.”

The court reinforces key points from Liteky:

• Judicial rulings or comments made in the course of a proceeding “almost never” constitute a valid basis for a bias motion.
• Even a judge who becomes “exceedingly ill disposed” toward a party is not automatically disqualified if their views arise from information properly acquired during the case.

The opinion also cites:

• Cameron v. State, where remarks in a proceeding are not indicative of improper bias unless they show the judge has closed his or her mind to all evidence; and
• Federal appellate cases such as United States v. Young and United States v. Wecht, where pretrial comments predicting likely conviction or accepting prosecution evidence at length did not meet the Liteky threshold.

By contrast, the court acknowledges that in extreme cases, such as United States v. Liggins, where a judge made disparaging remarks suggesting racial bias, disqualification is appropriate.

3. Application to Williams’s Disqualification Request

Williams advanced no claim of extrajudicial bias. All his allegations arose from:

• The content and tone of the severance order; and
• The judge’s acceptance of contested prosecution facts and repeated declarations of “murder” and rejection of self-defense.

Because the alleged bias was intra-judicial, the Liteky standard applied. The Supreme Court held:

• While the severance order was problematic, it did not demonstrate “deep-seated favoritism or antagonism” that rendered fair judgment impossible.
• The order provided insufficient evidence that Judge Sigurdson harbored an enduring, personal animus toward Williams beyond conclusions (however flawed) drawn from her understanding of the evidence.
• Judge Hardy correctly applied the Liteky-based standard and did not abuse his discretion in denying disqualification.

Accordingly, the court refused to mandate recusal under NRS 1.230(1) and NCJC Rule 2.11(A).

C. Supervisory Authority and Reassignment: The Robin Framework

1. Source of Supervisory Power

The court then pivots to a separate doctrinal track: supervisory authority. It notes that courts do not derive all power to reassign cases solely from statutes governing recusal and bias. Instead:

• Federal courts have long recognized under 28 U.S.C. § 2106 a power to reassign cases on remand to promote the appearance of justice, even “absent proof of personal bias.”
• In Nevada, this supervisory power is grounded in the Nevada Constitution, art. 6, § 19(1), which vests the Supreme Court with supervisory authority over lower courts.

2. The Robin Factors

The Nevada Supreme Court explicitly embraces the analytical framework from United States v. Robin, 553 F.2d 8 (2d Cir. 1977), which asks whether reassignment is appropriate by examining:

1. Whether the judge on remand would have substantial difficulty putting out of mind previously expressed views or findings determined to be erroneous;
2. Whether reassignment is advisable to preserve the appearance of justice; and
3. Whether reassignment would cause undue waste or duplication of judicial resources, disproportionate to any benefit in perceived fairness.

Robin also notes that reassignment is particularly appropriate where a judge:

• Has “repeatedly adhered to an erroneous view” even after the error is highlighted.

The opinion further cites federal decisions applying or extending Robin:

• United States v. Jacobs: reassignment warranted though there was no bias, where the judge had erroneously dismissed an indictment, refused to correct the error, and continued to act favorably toward the defendant.
• State of California v. Montrose Chemical Corp. of California: reassignment allowed under supervisory authority even when the party had not properly raised formal bias below.
• United States v. Peguero: applying the Robin factors without a finding of personal bias.
• In re International Business Machines Corp.: rejecting the idea that reassignment can occur only if statutory recusal standards (like Liteky) are satisfied.

3. Nevada’s Use of Reassignment Prior to Williams

The court notes that Nevada has rarely—but meaningfully—invoked reassignment independently of bias findings:

• Wickliffe v. Sunrise Hospital, Inc.: case reassigned where the trial court undermined proceedings by failing to follow prior Supreme Court instructions, even without a finding of bias.
• Fortunet, Inc. v. Playbook LLC (unpublished order): reassignment ordered despite rejecting bias contentions, based on prior sanctions requiring reversal and to avoid the appearance of impropriety.
• Valley Health System, LLC v. Eighth Judicial District Court (unpublished order): expressly applying the Robin factors and ordering reassignment where the judge issued conclusory and premature findings implicating counsel in potential felonious conduct without evidentiary support.

In Valley Health, the court also rejected the argument that direct reassignment is permissible only via a formal motion for disqualification based on bias—explicitly affirming that supervisory reassignment stands on its own doctrinal footing.

D. Application of the Robin Factors in Williams

1. First Factor: Difficulty Setting Aside Prior Erroneous Findings

The Supreme Court is candid that the severance order’s findings were improper:

• They were “premature and inappropriate” for a ruling on severance, which did not require a determination of whether Williams acted in self-defense or committed “murder.”
• They were repeated more than ten times, despite being unnecessary to the procedural issue.
• They appeared to rest on the State’s unsupported account that the bag contained fentanyl, which later proved inaccurate even by the State’s own subsequent representation.

Even after the problems were flagged in the disqualification motion, Judge Sigurdson:

• Did not correct or clarify her findings; and
• Filed an affidavit only denying bias, without engaging with the substance of the concerns.

On this record, the Supreme Court expresses doubt that the judge could readily put aside her previously stated views:

“It is not clear to us that Judge Sigurdson would be able to put out of her mind previously expressed views or gratuitous findings determined to be erroneous—in fact, she has already suggested an unwillingness to do so when given the chance.”

This weighs in favor of reassignment under the first Robin factor.

2. Second Factor: Preserving the Appearance of Justice

The court’s language is particularly forceful here. It frames the case as implicating not just procedural optics but core constitutional values:

• To subject Williams to further proceedings before a judge who has already declared him guilty of “murder” multiple times would “hollow out the guarantees of due process.”
• It would undermine the “presumption of innocence, ‘a basic component of a fair trial under our system of criminal justice’” (quoting Watters v. State, which in turn relied on Estelle v. Williams).
• The judge’s gratuitous repetition of the term “murder” and explicit rejection of self-defense at an early stage, unmoored from any evidentiary hearing, created a serious appearance problem.

The court thus characterizes this case as a “rare instance” in which reassignment is warranted to protect the presumption of innocence and the integrity of the justice system.

3. Third Factor: Efficiency and Judicial Resources

Reassignment at a very early stage in the case—before trial or extensive motions practice—meant:

• There would be no undue duplication of effort or significant waste of judicial resources.
• On the contrary, reassignment might prevent future inefficiency, as the court notes it would be “both inefficient and unfair” to allow the case to proceed under a cloud of apparent prejudgment, only to confront the same issues on appeal after trial.

The court cites Robin’s concern about avoiding an “exercise in futility” in which appellate courts “march up the hill only to march right down again.” It reasons that early intervention via reassignment can prevent a compromised trial that would later require reversal or heavily contested review.

E. Bridging the Two Tracks: No Bias, Yet Reassignment

One of the opinion’s most important contributions is its explicit recognition that:

• Failure to meet the Liteky standard for bias does not bar reassignment under supervisory authority; and
• Conversely, reassignment does not require a finding of personal or actual bias under NRS 1.230 or NCJC Rule 2.11.

By citing In re IBM and its own decisions in Wickliffe, Fortunet, and Valley Health, the court underscores that:

“Failure to meet one of these two standards—under Liteky for judicial bias, or under the Robin factors—does not foreclose reassignment where the other standard is satisfied.”

In Williams, the doctrinal paths diverge:

• The court declines to label the district judge as biased under the strict legal standard governing recusal; but
• It nonetheless intervenes to protect the presumption of innocence and public confidence, by ordering reassignment based on its supervisory power and the Robin factors.

F. Complex Concepts Simplified

1. Writ of Mandamus

A writ of mandamus is an extraordinary order from a higher court directing a lower court or official to perform a legal duty. In this case, Williams used mandamus to ask the Nevada Supreme Court to:

• Compel disqualification of the judge (which the court declined to do); and
• Order reassignment (which the court did).

2. Judicial Disqualification vs. Reassignment

• Disqualification/recusal means the judge is legally barred from presiding over a particular case due to actual or perceived bias; it is governed by statutes and judicial ethics rules.
• Reassignment means the appellate court directs that the case be reassigned to a different judge, often on remand or in an extraordinary writ, as part of its supervisory authority. It can happen even when the judge is not formally disqualified or found biased.

3. Extrajudicial vs. Intra-judicial Bias

• Extrajudicial bias: arises from information or relationships outside the courtroom (e.g., a judge’s personal dealings with a party). This more easily justifies recusal under the objective “reasonable question” standard.
• Intra-judicial bias: arises from what the judge learns or says during the case (e.g., comments, rulings, in-court exchanges). This triggers the stricter Liteky “deep-seated favoritism or antagonism” standard.

4. Presumption of Innocence

The presumption of innocence is the foundational rule that a criminal defendant is considered innocent unless and until the State proves guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. It:

• Shapes trial structure, burden of proof, and jury instructions; and
• Requires judicial neutrality and restraint, particularly during pretrial rulings, so that the judge does not appear to have predetermined guilt.

The Supreme Court in Williams treats the presumption of innocence not just as a trial-stage doctrine but as a value that informs pretrial judicial conduct.

5. Severance and Res Gestae

• Severance is the process of splitting multiple charges into separate trials, often to avoid unfair prejudice when separate offenses are tried together.
• Res gestae refers loosely to contextual or background evidence that is sufficiently connected to the charged crime that it may be admissible to explain the circumstances, even if it might otherwise be “other acts” evidence.

In Williams, the defense sought to sever the drug possession charge from the murder, while the State argued that the drug evidence was part of the same episode and admissible as res gestae. The Supreme Court did not review the severance ruling itself; its concern was that the judge went further and decided the ultimate issue of guilt while resolving a procedural motion.

V. Impact and Broader Significance

A. Clarifying Nevada’s Two-Track Approach to Judicial Impartiality

Williams clarifies and reinforces a two-track system:

1. Recusal/Disqualification Track (Bias Track)
   • Governs whether a judge is legally disqualified from serving on a case.
   • For intra-judicial allegations, applies the extremely demanding Liteky test.
   • In Williams, this track yielded no disqualification.
2. Supervisory Reassignment Track
   • Grounded in the Nevada Constitution, independent of recusal statutes.
   • Guided by the Robin factors: ability to set aside prior views, appearance of justice, and efficiency.
   • In Williams, this track justified reassignment to another judge at an early stage.

The decision thus preserves the rigor of the bias standard, while acknowledging the need for a more flexible supervisory tool to maintain public confidence in the courts.

B. Strong Message on the Presumption of Innocence and Judicial Restraint

The opinion sends a clear message to trial judges, particularly in criminal cases:

• Rulings on pretrial motions—such as severance—should be confined to issues necessary to the motion.
• Judges must avoid gratuitous, repeated findings of guilt or premature rejection of defenses (like self-defense) before evidence is heard and factual disputes are resolved.
• Doing so can undermine the presumption of innocence and necessitate corrective action from the Supreme Court, even absent legally disqualifying bias.

In this sense, Williams is both doctrinal and didactic: it not only clarifies the law but also educates trial judges about how pretrial language can jeopardize the integrity—and appearance—of criminal proceedings.

C. Practical Consequences for Litigants and Counsel

• Defense Counsel now have a more defined pathway to seek relief when a judge’s pretrial orders cross from firm rulings into apparent prejudgment, even if traditional bias standards cannot be met. Framing arguments in terms of the Robin factors and presumption-of-innocence concerns may be an effective approach.
• Prosecutors are indirectly cautioned that factually unsupported assertions—even if made in motions practice and not at trial—can lead to appellate intervention if adopted uncritically by the court.
• Trial Judges are reminded to correct or clarify problematic orders when concerns are raised, rather than relying solely on denials of bias. Failure to do so may tilt the Robin analysis toward reassignment.

D. Alignment with, and Refinement of, Prior Cases

Williams builds on and harmonizes several strands of Nevada and federal jurisprudence:

• It reaffirms Canarelli’s adoption of Liteky for intra-judicial bias, despite Justice Cadish’s earlier concerns (expressed in dissent there) that this standard might inadequately protect public confidence.
• It deploys the Valley Health approach—invoking Robin and exercising supervisory power—to address a similar pattern: premature and unsupported judicial findings injuring the appearance of fairness.
• It explicitly rejects any notion (suggested by some arguments in Valley Health) that reassignment is available only when bias is formally alleged and proved.

In this way, Williams can be read as a partial answer to the policy concerns expressed in the Canarelli dissent: even if the legal standard for recusal remains stringent, the Supreme Court will not hesitate to use reassignment to safeguard confidence in the judiciary where circumstances so warrant.

VI. Conclusion

Williams v. District Court is a landmark clarification in Nevada’s law of judicial impartiality and appellate oversight. Its core holding is structurally simple but doctrinally powerful:

• No disqualifying bias was found under NRS 1.230(1) and NCJC Rule 2.11, because the conduct at issue was intra-judicial and did not meet the severe Liteky standard of “deep-seated favoritism or antagonism.”
• Nevertheless, reassignment of the case to a new judge was ordered under the Nevada Supreme Court’s constitutional supervisory authority, guided by the Robin factors, to:
  • Address repeated, unnecessary pretrial findings of “murder” and rejection of self-defense;
  • Correct the uncritical adoption of unsupported prosecution facts; and
  • Preserve the presumption of innocence and the appearance of justice.

The decision thus firmly separates the question, “Is this judge legally biased?” from the separate question, “Should this case proceed before this judge?” In doing so, it arms the Nevada Supreme Court—and, indirectly, litigants—with a refined doctrinal toolkit for managing rare but serious threats to public confidence in the fairness of criminal proceedings.

For future cases, Williams stands as a warning against pretrial judicial overreach and a reaffirmation that preserving both the reality and the appearance of justice may sometimes require reassignment, even in the absence of formal disqualification.