Reasserting the “Light Most Favorable” Mandate and Jury Primacy for Extreme Emotional Disturbance Instructions: Justice Ecker’s Dissent in State v. Henderson

Introduction

In State v. Henderson (Supreme Court of Connecticut, September 23, 2025), Justice Ecker authored a comprehensive dissent addressing when a defendant is entitled to a jury instruction on the statutory mitigation of extreme emotional disturbance (EED) under General Statutes § 53a-54a(a). The case centers on whether the trial court erred by refusing to instruct the jury on EED in a domestic homicide, and whether the appellate majority then compounded that error by evaluating the record through a restrictive lens contrary to the controlling standard: the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the defendant when determining entitlement to an instruction.

The parties include the State of Connecticut and the defendant, Carlton Henderson. Henderson sought to mitigate a murder charge to manslaughter by establishing, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he acted under the influence of EED for which there was a reasonable explanation or excuse, evaluated from the defendant’s situation and perspective at the time. The majority held that no rational juror could find the subjective element of EED satisfied on this record and therefore declined to reach the objective reasonableness element. Justice Ecker’s dissent challenges that conclusion as legally and methodologically unsound, emphasizing jury trial rights, legislative supremacy over statutory policy choices, and the long-settled “light most favorable” standard for giving a defense instruction in close cases.

At stake is not only Henderson’s entitlement to have a jury consider mitigation to manslaughter, but a broader doctrinal question: how courts must calibrate their gatekeeping role when a statute commits a normatively loaded, fact-intensive mitigation inquiry to the jury.

Summary of the Opinion (Dissent)

Justice Ecker’s dissent advances four core propositions:

Statutory fidelity and separation of powers require courts to apply § 53a-54a(a) as written; courts may not recalibrate the availability of EED instructions based on policy concerns about intimate-partner homicides.
The operative question is legal and reviewed plenarily: whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the defendant, any rational juror could find the affirmative defense established by a preponderance of the evidence. This is a “lenient” threshold designed to respect the jury’s constitutional fact-finding prerogative.
Properly viewing the record, a rational juror could find both the subjective and objective elements of EED. The dissent details the defendant’s long-term addiction, traumatic losses, imminent loss of home/family/financial security, holiday isolation, escalating paranoia, and the knife-wielding confrontation on the morning of the homicide, coupled with the defendant’s testimony that he “blanked out,” to demonstrate a sufficient foundation for an EED instruction.
The trial court’s refusal to instruct was harmful error under any standard because it deprived the defendant of his statutory mitigation defense; the case should be reversed and remanded for a new trial.

The dissent also forcefully critiques the majority’s reliance on postcrime conduct and “consciousness of guilt” to negate the defense, its use of out-of-state authority to reshape Connecticut practice, and its reading of Elliott’s “loss of self-control” guideline as a quasi-element that risks collapsing into the insanity defense.

Analysis

Precedents and Authorities Cited and Their Role

Statute: § 53a-54a(a) — EED is an affirmative defense to murder requiring (1) that the defendant acted “under the influence” of an extreme emotional disturbance; and (2) that there was a reasonable explanation or excuse, determined from the viewpoint of a person in the defendant’s situation under the circumstances as the defendant believed them to be. The defendant bears the burden by a preponderance. The dissent underscores fidelity to this statutory design and warns against judicial “improvement” of the statute (citing DiLieto v. County Obstetrics & Gynecology Group, P.C., 316 Conn. 790 (2015)).
Two-element EED framework reaffirmed: State v. Parris, 352 Conn. 652 (2025) (hybrid subjective-objective standard; jury can understand and apply it).
Entitlement-to-instruction threshold: State v. Person, 236 Conn. 342 (1996) (defendant entitled to EED instruction only if sufficient evidence exists for a rational juror to find defense by a preponderance); State v. Belle, 215 Conn. 257 (1990) (overruled on unrelated point) and State v. Hargett, 343 Conn. 604 (2022) (facts viewed in the light most favorable to giving the instruction).
“Light most favorable” as ubiquitous, lenient review: State v. Evans, 203 Conn. 212 (1987) (sufficiency); Evans Products Co. v. Clinton Building Supply, Inc., 174 Conn. 512 (1978) (summary judgment, favorable inferences); special caution where state of mind is at issue: Suarez v. Dickmont Plastics Corp., 229 Conn. 99 (1994); State v. Rodriguez, 180 Conn. 382 (1980); Hinds v. Commissioner of Correction, 321 Conn. 56 (2016). The dissent quotes the “most lenient standard of review” description (State v. Preston, 248 Conn. 472 (1999) (Berdon, J., dissenting)).
Jury trial right and judicial restraint in close cases: Howard v. MacDonald, 270 Conn. 111 (2004); State v. Langston, 346 Conn. 605 (2023); State v. LaBrec, 270 Conn. 548 (2004); State v. Smith, 262 Conn. 453 (2003) (in close cases, courts should generally give the instruction).
Elliott “guidelines” for subjective EED: State v. Elliott, 177 Conn. 1 (1979) — (1) not insanity; (2) exposed to an extremely unusual and overwhelming state (more than “mere annoyance”); (3) extreme emotional reaction causing loss of self-control/overborne reason (e.g., passion, anger, grief). The dissent emphasizes these are guidelines, not elements (State v. Campbell, 328 Conn. 444 (2018)); EED can “simmer” and need not be sudden (Campbell; Elliott).
Connecticut practice giving EED instructions in less dramatic contexts: State v. Haynes, 352 Conn. 236 (2025) (threat to remove dreadlocks); State v. Person, 236 Conn. 342 (1996) (break-up); State v. Raguseo, 225 Conn. 114 (1993) (parking dispute); State v. Casey, 201 Conn. 174 (1986) (soapy water on seeded lawn).
Intoxication within EED narratives: State v. Aviles, 277 Conn. 281 (2006) (smoked “dust”); State v. Kaddah, 250 Conn. 563 (1999) (alcohol plus medical conditions); State v. Asherman, 193 Conn. 695 (1984) (obvious intoxication).
Postcrime conduct and “consciousness of guilt”: The dissent rejects the proposition (as in State v. Jusino, 163 Conn. App. 618 (2016)) that consciousness of guilt is “entirely inconsistent” with EED, citing cases where courts gave EED instructions despite flight, concealment, calm demeanor, or cleanup: Aviles, Ortiz, Elliott, O’Brien-Veader, 318 Conn. 514 (2015). The dissent distinguishes New York authority often used to draw postcrime inferences (e.g., Zamora v. Phillips, People v. Dominguez, People v. Feris), urging caution in importing those heuristics into Connecticut’s jury-centric framework.
Mens rea can form (or change) instantaneously: State v. Cooper, 227 Conn. 417 (1993). This supports the dissent’s view that postcrime composure or flight does not negate the possibility that the homicide itself was committed under the influence of an EED.
Harmless error and instructional rights: State v. Adam P., 351 Conn. 213 (2025) (standards for constitutional vs. non-constitutional instructional error); State v. Aviles (EED instruction generally treated as non-constitutional), State v. Austin, 244 Conn. 226 (1998). Even so, the dissent deems the error harmful under any standard, analogizing to State v. Wilson, 242 Conn. 605 (1997) (failure to define “wrongfulness” in insanity defense), Casey (failure to instruct that EED need not follow a provoking event), and Baltas, 311 Conn. 786 (2014) (motive-to-fabricate instruction).
Statutory policy and the Model Penal Code: The dissent situates EED within the 1969 adoption of Model Penal Code principles; the mitigation invites jury empathy for significant emotional trauma (citing Herbert Wechsler). It notes EED’s importance not only for domestic-violence perpetrators but also for victims driven to homicide by extreme abuse (e.g., Maddox v. Lord, 818 F.2d 1058 (2d Cir. 1987)).

Legal Reasoning: Why the Instruction Was Required

Justice Ecker’s reasoning proceeds from first principles of constitutional structure and jury function to application on a highly particularized record.

Legislative supremacy and judicial role: Because EED is a statutory mitigation, courts should not “improve” the legislature’s scheme or narrow access to the defense for policy reasons (e.g., to avoid a perceived proliferation of EED claims in domestic homicides). The statute entrusts the mixed subjective-objective assessment to jurors; judges must not preempt that choice absent a clear legal insufficiency.
The threshold for an instruction is low by design: An instruction must be given if any rational juror could find the defense by a preponderance when the facts are viewed in the defendant’s favor. This is the “most lenient” review because the only consequence is allowing the jury to decide a factual question, subject to later sufficiency safeguards.
Application to Henderson’s record: The dissent presents a narrative that, if credited, satisfies both EED elements:
- Subjective influence: Henderson’s lifelong PCP and alcohol addiction, traumatic family history (estrangement, deaths of grandmother, brother, father), social isolation, escalating substance use, paranoia about infidelity, imminent loss of home, family, and stability, isolation over the Thanksgiving holiday, and sleep deprivation culminated in a knife-wielding confrontation by the decedent. Henderson testified he “went into a blur” and “blanked out,” felt shocked/angry, and acted out in front of a child (contrary to prior patterns), repeatedly uttering “it’s over” during the homicide and fleeing in a chaotic manner. The dissent identifies at least six datapoints from which a juror could infer loss of self-control/overborne reason consistent with the third Elliott guideline.
- Objective reasonableness of the disturbance: Although the majority did not reach this element, the dissent explains why a rational juror could find the explanation reasonable from Henderson’s situation and perspective: catastrophic personal losses and destabilizers, chronic addiction that exacerbated paranoia and emotional volatility, the timing and nature of the decedent’s break-up/eviction efforts, and the escalatory introduction of a knife. Connecticut courts have instructed on EED in contexts far less severe, including mere personal affronts or property inconveniences; Henderson’s context exceeds those baselines.
Errors in the majority’s approach:
- Misuse of pre- and postcrime conduct: Reading ambiguous statements and texts as threats rather than crediting benign inferences contravenes the “light most favorable” rule. Postcrime composure, routines (a trip to Dunkin’ Donuts), or flight do not negate a transient EED during the homicide; consciousness of guilt is consistent with manslaughter-level culpability and stands in tension only with insanity, which is not at issue.
- Overreliance on out-of-state heuristics: The dissent cautions against importing New York practice that treats postcrime comportment as an anti-EED indicator; Connecticut’s doctrine is jury-centered, its guidelines are non-exhaustive, and its caselaw reflects a willingness to instruct even when defendants fled, hid, or appeared calm.
- Miscasting Elliott’s third guideline: The statute requires action “under the influence” of an EED; that is not synonymous with legal insanity or a total inability to reason. Treating “loss of self-control” as a quasi-element risks collapsing EED into insanity and undermines the statute’s text and purpose. Elliott is guidance; it is not a substitute element test.
- Policy-based narrowing: Echoing a decades-old dissent’s concern about break-up homicides, the majority’s framing risks a de facto categorical bar in intimate-partner contexts. Ecker underscores that any such narrowing belongs to the legislature.
Harmless error: Without the instruction, the defense was effectively nullified. Because the EED mitigation asks whether the disturbance was reasonable (not the killing), and the burden is merely preponderance, it is reasonably possible/probable a properly instructed jury could have found EED.

Impact

Although a dissent is not binding, Justice Ecker’s opinion is likely to exert gravitational influence in several ways:

Trial practice recalibration: The dissent offers a precise, jury-centric roadmap: when in doubt, instruct. Trial judges, sensitive to appellate risk and constitutional jury values, may be more inclined to give EED instructions in close cases rather than invite reversal.
Appellate framing of the record: The dissent strongly re-centers the “light most favorable” standard as genuinely generous to the defense at the instruction stage, admonishing against judicial credibility judgments or negative inferencing when the salient issues are motive, intent, and subjective emotional state.
Consciousness-of-guilt doctrine: By disentangling consciousness of guilt from EED, the dissent resists an evidentiary short-circuit that would let postcrime behavior vitiate a transient emotional state at the moment of the crime. Expect litigants to cite Henderson’s dissent to argue that flight, cleanup, or routine-seeking in shock are not dispositive against EED.
Elliott’s continued status as guidance: The opinion urges courts not to convert Elliott’s factors into elements, and it highlights conceptual tension between “loss of self-control” and the statute’s “under the influence” language. This may prompt future majority opinions—or legislative refinement—clarifying the role and phrasing of the third guideline.
Domestic violence and EED: The dissent rejects a categorical skepticism toward EED in intimate-partner contexts. If the majority’s approach hardens, defendants in such cases could face a higher gatekeeping bar; the dissent supplies counter-authority to keep the jury’s role robust in evaluating whether the disturbance—not the act—was reasonable.
Legislative dialogue: Ecker explicitly invites the legislature to revisit and, if desired, recalibrate EED’s scope. That candid nudge may spur hearings or clarifications—e.g., codifying the “light most favorable” threshold; clarifying the relevance of postcrime conduct; or refining the language of Elliott’s third factor to align with “under the influence.”

Complex Concepts Simplified

What is Extreme Emotional Disturbance (EED)? It is not a justification; it is a mitigation. A defendant who establishes EED is not acquitted—he is convicted of manslaughter rather than murder. The question is whether the defendant was under the influence of an extreme emotional disturbance when committing the act and whether that disturbance had a reasonable explanation or excuse from the defendant’s perspective and situation.
Subjective versus Objective Elements: The defendant must prove both: (1) subjectively, he actually was under the influence of an EED; and (2) objectively, the disturbance itself had a reasonable explanation or excuse, evaluated from the viewpoint of a person in the defendant’s situation at the time as he believed things to be. The objective inquiry evaluates the disturbance, not whether the killing was reasonable.
“Light Most Favorable” Standard: When deciding whether to give the instruction, courts take the facts and draw all reasonable inferences in the defendant’s favor. The court does not weigh credibility; it asks only whether any rational juror could find the defense by a preponderance. If yes, the jury should decide.
Elliott’s Guidelines (not elements): Courts may consider: (1) the disturbance is not legal insanity; (2) the situation was extremely unusual and overwhelming (not mere irritation); and (3) the defendant’s emotional reaction led to a loss of self-control/overborne reason (e.g., passion, anger, grief). The dissent cautions that the statute’s phrase “under the influence” should not be eclipsed by an over-demanding reading of (3).
EED versus Insanity: Insanity (under § 53a-13) turns on a mental disease or defect producing a substantial incapacity to appreciate wrongfulness or to conform conduct to law. EED assumes the defendant remains criminally responsible; indeed, consciousness of guilt (flight, evasion) is consistent with EED but inconsistent with insanity.
“Simmering” EED: The disturbance need not be sudden. It can build over time (“brooding”) and reach a breaking point, even if the defendant anticipated the stressor (e.g., a breakup or eviction). The law recognizes that longstanding trauma can culminate in an acute, overwhelming reaction.
Burden of Proof: The defendant bears the burden to prove EED by a preponderance (more likely than not)—a lower threshold than the State’s burden to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
Consciousness of Guilt: Evidence like fleeing, hiding, or appearing calm is often used to show that a defendant knew he was guilty of a crime. It does not, by itself, show that the defendant could not have been under the influence of an EED during the offense. Emotions are dynamic; composure later does not negate an earlier acute disturbance.

Conclusion

Justice Ecker’s dissent in State v. Henderson is a detailed reaffirmation of three foundational commitments in Connecticut criminal law: deference to the legislature’s statutory design, rigorous adherence to the “light most favorable” standard when deciding whether to give a jury instruction on a statutory mitigation, and robust respect for the jury’s constitutional primacy in resolving close fact questions about human emotion and culpability.

On the record as characterized through the proper lens, the dissent persuasively identifies ample evidence from which a rational juror could find both the subjective influence of an EED and a reasonable explanation or excuse from the defendant’s situational perspective. It critiques the majority’s contrary result as resting on negative inferences, undue reliance on postcrime behavior and out-of-state heuristics, and an over-demanding gloss on Elliott’s third guideline that risks conflating EED with insanity.

The dissent’s practical takeaway is clear: in close cases, instruct. That approach honors the statute, preserves the jury’s role, and ensures that defendants are not foreclosed from the only mitigation the legislature has chosen to make available in cases like this. Whether future cases embrace this framework as controlling or the legislature undertakes clarifications, the Henderson dissent will serve as a touchstone for courts, counsel, and policymakers navigating the difficult boundary between legal doctrine and the complex realities of human emotional experience at the moment of a homicide.