Reasonableness of a Single Takedown Kick During a Rapid Arrest; District Courts’ Discretion to Decline Florida Battery Claims After Federal Dismissal

Introduction

This unpublished, per curiam decision from the Eleventh Circuit addresses two recurring questions in Fourth Amendment and supplemental jurisdiction doctrine:

When is a single, decisive use of force—a kick to force a suspect to the ground—objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment during a “tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving” arrest?
May a federal district court decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a Florida state-law battery claim after disposing of the federal excessive-force claim, even where some cases suggest the standards substantially overlap?

In Joshua Smola v. Sheriff, Hillsborough County Florida, No. 24-13512 (11th Cir. Oct. 22, 2025) (Non-Argument Calendar), a panel of Judges Branch, Grant, and Anderson affirmed summary judgment for Deputy Jack Thompson on Smola’s Fourth Amendment excessive-force claim and upheld the district court’s discretionary decision to dismiss a parallel Florida battery claim against Sheriff Chad Chronister without prejudice. The decision is “Not for Publication” and therefore non-binding in the Eleventh Circuit, but it is instructive on the application of Graham v. Connor’s reasonableness factors to short, fluid encounters captured on video, and it reaffirms the robust discretion district courts retain to decline supplemental jurisdiction over unresolved questions of state law once federal claims have been resolved.

Summary of the Opinion

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed in full:

Fourth Amendment Excessive Force: Viewing the record and the home-surveillance video in the light most favorable to Smola (and resolving video ambiguities in his favor), the panel held that Deputy Thompson’s single kick to move Smola from a slow kneel to a prone position within seconds of a furtive waistband movement was not objectively unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Because no constitutional violation occurred, the panel did not reach the “clearly established law” prong of qualified immunity.
Supplemental Jurisdiction over Florida Battery: The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by declining supplemental jurisdiction over Smola’s state-law battery claim against the Sheriff, given federalism concerns and the timing and uncertainty about whether Florida’s “clearly excessive force” standard is coextensive with the federal Fourth Amendment standard. The panel rejected the Sheriff’s cross-appeal arguing that the district court should have retained and granted summary judgment in light of later Eleventh Circuit language in Baxter v. Santiago-Miranda.

Case Background

Smola—a convicted felon in possession of a firearm, driving a stolen vehicle, and carrying a knife and multiple controlled substances—arrived with a passenger at a residence. Deputies in unmarked cars, wearing vests marked SHERIFF, arrived to arrest the passenger. As deputies approached, Deputy Thompson yelled for Smola to put his hands up and to get on the ground. The video (no audio) shows Smola move behind the car, reach to his waistband, and bend down; Smola admits he tossed his firearm under the car to avoid detection. The parties dispute whether deputies saw the toss. Smola then backed away with arms up and lowered slowly to a knee. Within roughly ten seconds of entering the yard, Thompson closed distance and delivered a quick kick to Smola’s lower back to force him prone, whereupon another deputy handcuffed him. The entire encounter—from arrival to cuffing—lasted under twenty seconds.

Smola suffered a broken rib and a spleen laceration (treated with rest and pain management; no medical bills). He sued Thompson for Fourth Amendment excessive force and sued Sheriff Chronister (in his official capacity) for battery under Florida law. The district court granted summary judgment to Thompson (and, alternatively, held the law was not clearly established for “a single kick” in perceived-danger circumstances) and declined supplemental jurisdiction over the state claim, dismissing it without prejudice. Smola appealed, and the Sheriff cross-appealed.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989): The touchstone. The court applies Graham’s objective reasonableness test as assessed from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, avoiding “the 20/20 vision of hindsight,” and mindful that many encounters are “tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving.” Graham frames the totality-of-circumstances analysis.
Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007): Video governs where it clearly depicts events; however, Eleventh Circuit precedent requires that ambiguities in the video be construed in favor of the non-movant. The panel follows that approach, citing Scott for the “facts in the light depicted by the videotape” rule, while also citing Baker (below) to resolve ambiguities for Smola.
Baker v. City of Madison, 67 F.4th 1268 (11th Cir. 2023): Clarifies that any ambiguity in the video must be resolved in the non-movant’s favor at summary judgment. The panel invokes Baker to treat the deputies as not having seen the gun toss, because the video does not unambiguously show their vantage point.
Tillis ex rel. Wuenschel v. Brown, 12 F.4th 1291 (11th Cir. 2021): Reinforces that reasonableness is judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer and based on the totality of circumstances.
Barnes v. Felix, 605 U.S. 73, 79 (2025): Cited for assessing reasonableness from the on-scene perspective and considering all circumstances (an iteration of Graham’s framework).
Lewis v. City of West Palm Beach, 561 F.3d 1288 (11th Cir. 2009): Invoked in discussing injury. While severity of injury is not dispositive of reasonableness, the panel notes lack of long-term effects and limited treatment in weighing the governmental and individual interests.
“Gratuitous force” line of cases distinguished:
- Hadley v. Gutierrez, 526 F.3d 1324 (11th Cir. 2008): A single punch to a handcuffed, compliant suspect can be excessive. Distinguishable because Smola was not cuffed, had just made a waistband movement, retreated, and was only slowly kneeling.
- Smith v. Mattox, 127 F.3d 1416 (11th Cir. 1997): Breaking the arm of a suspect who had “docilely submitted to arrest” and offered “no resistance at all” is excessive. The panel finds this case dissimilar; Smola’s slow compliance and retreat did not present docility or total submission.
- Richmond v. Badia, 47 F.4th 1172 (11th Cir. 2022), and others (Jones v. Ceinski, Stryker v. City of Homewood, Cantu v. City of Dothan, Patel v. City of Madison, Stephens v. DeGiovanni, Saunders v. Duke): These decisions often condemn “gratuitous” force against suspects already under control, handcuffed, or fully compliant. The panel explains those circumstances are materially different from a short, dynamic encounter pre-handcuffing.
Qualified Immunity Baselines: Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7 (2015) (protects all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law); Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009) (permitting courts to address prongs in any order; here, the panel stops at no constitutional violation).
Supplemental Jurisdiction: Silas v. Sheriff of Broward County, 55 F.4th 863 (11th Cir. 2022) (abuse-of-discretion review; federalism concerns support declining state-law claims after federal claims are gone); Raney v. Allstate Ins. Co., 370 F.3d 1086 (11th Cir. 2004) (encouraging dismissal of remaining state claims when federal claims drop out); Baggett v. First Nat’l Bank of Gainesville, 117 F.3d 1342 (11th Cir. 1997) (deference to state courts on unsettled state-law issues).
Florida Battery and Sovereign Immunity: Fla. Stat. § 768.28(9)(a) (official-capacity claim against the governmental entity is the exclusive remedy unless the officer acted with malice, bad faith, or wanton and willful disregard); Paul v. Holbrook, 696 So. 2d 1311 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997) (battery elements).
Baxter v. Santiago-Miranda, 121 F.4th 873 (11th Cir. 2024): The panel addresses Baxter in a footnote, noting Baxter’s statement that Eleventh Circuit cases apply the same Fourth Amendment analysis to Florida battery claims, citing Davis v. Williams, 451 F.3d 759 (11th Cir. 2006). The panel finds no abuse in the district court’s earlier decision to decline jurisdiction before Baxter and observes that Davis did not expressly hold the standards are per se identical for summary judgment purposes.

Legal Reasoning

1) Fourth Amendment Excessive Force and Qualified Immunity

The court conducts the first qualified-immunity inquiry: whether the force was objectively unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Applying Graham and the totality-of-circumstances approach, several factors inform the analysis:

Severity of the crime and context: Although deputies arrived to arrest Smola’s passenger, Smola’s own conduct strongly suggested seriousness—he was a felon later found in possession of a firearm (a second-degree felony under Fla. Stat. § 790.23), a knife, and multiple controlled substances, and he had been driving a stolen vehicle. The objective reality of weapons and contraband, even if not fully known to the officers in the moment, is consistent with the apparent volatility the deputies perceived.
Immediate threat to officers or others: The panel places significant weight on the “furtive movement” to the waistband—an action widely associated with weapon access—and on the fact that Smola concealed his movement by ducking behind the car. Even construing the video in Smola’s favor (that deputies did not actually see the gun toss), a reasonable officer could believe Smola still had a weapon or was attempting to access one.
Resistance or flight: The video shows Smola backing away and only slowly kneeling rather than lying prone promptly as commanded. The court characterizes this as slow compliance and retreat in a high-risk, seconds-long encounter, justifying decisive control measures.
Duration and tempo: Less than 20 seconds elapsed from arrival to cuffing, and less than 10 seconds between Thompson entering the yard and delivering the kick. The compressed timeframe supports the need for quick, forceful tactics to neutralize perceived risk.
Nature of the force and resulting injury: The force was a single kick to move Smola to a prone position. While Smola suffered a broken rib and a spleen laceration, the panel notes the lack of long-term effects and limited treatment measures (rest and pain management). Although injury severity is neither necessary nor sufficient to decide reasonableness, the panel includes this in its balance of interests.

Against this backdrop, the court concludes that Thompson’s kick was a measured, transitional use of force to gain control in a rapidly developing situation involving a likely armed suspect who was not yet handcuffed and was not fully compliant with commands. The court expressly distinguishes the “gratuitous force” cases where force was used after control was gained or against handcuffed, compliant suspects. Having found no constitutional violation, the panel does not reach whether the law was clearly established for such single-kick, perceived-danger scenarios.

2) Supplemental Jurisdiction Over Florida Battery

After disposing of the federal claim, the district court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Smola’s Florida battery claim against the Sheriff (official capacity) under Fla. Stat. § 768.28(9)(a). The Eleventh Circuit affirms that decision as a proper exercise of discretion for several reasons:

Doctrinal discretion and federalism: Eleventh Circuit precedent “encourages” district courts to dismiss state-law claims when the federal claims are dismissed before trial, to avoid gratuitous pronouncements on state law and to respect state courts’ primacy on unsettled issues (Raney; Baggett; Silas).
Unsettled equivalence at the time: Although the parties agreed in the district court that the Florida “clearly excessive” battery standard and the federal “excessive force” standard were functionally similar, the court noted the absence of a binding decision expressly equating the standards for summary-judgment purposes at that time. That uncertainty favored dismissal without prejudice for state court resolution.
Baxter’s later statement not controlling retroactively: The panel explains that Baxter (2024) post-dated the district court’s ruling and, in any event, Davis’s language did not make a per se, across-the-board equivalence ruling for all procedural postures. Thus, no abuse of discretion occurred.

Impact and Implications

Police Practices and Training: The decision reinforces that a single, targeted takedown kick to move a suspect from partial compliance to a prone, controllable position can be reasonable where the suspect made a recent waistband movement, retreated, and is not yet handcuffed. Officers may rely on decisive control tactics in fast-moving, uncertain situations, particularly within seconds of perceived access to a weapon.
Boundaries of “Gratuitous Force” Jurisprudence: Plaintiffs often succeed by showing force was used after control was achieved or against handcuffed, compliant suspects. This opinion narrows that path when the encounter is still unfolding and the suspect has not fully complied, distinguishing Hadley, Smith, and similar cases. Slow or partial compliance will not necessarily preclude a short, decisive use of force to secure compliance.
Video Evidence and Summary Judgment: The panel’s dual approach—accepting the video’s depiction per Scott while resolving ambiguities for the non-movant per Baker—illustrates the governing method in the Eleventh Circuit. Litigants should identify and press any genuine ambiguity in video evidence; clear depictions can be dispositive, but equivocal angles or occlusions will be credited to the non-movant at this stage.
Injury Considerations: Although serious injury can occur from brief force, the panel’s discussion indicates that limited treatment and lack of long-term effects may weigh, at least at the margins, against finding the force objectively unreasonable when balanced against governmental interests.
Forum Selection and State-Law Claims in Florida: The supplemental-jurisdiction holding confirms that district courts may dismiss Florida battery claims without prejudice after federal claims fall out, especially where the precise state-law standard is unsettled or disputed. Plaintiffs seeking to preserve state claims should be ready to litigate in state court or consider pleading strategies that avoid early federal disposition. Defendants should be prepared for parallel state proceedings if federal courts decline jurisdiction.
Practical Litigation Takeaways:
- Expect courts to give substantial leeway to officers during the first seconds of an encounter involving potential weapons and partial compliance.
- Document the timeline precisely; the “seconds, not minutes” cadence mattered here.
- When asserting Florida battery in tandem with a § 1983 claim, anticipate possible dismissal without prejudice if the federal claim is resolved early; Baxter may inform arguments, but district courts retain broad discretion.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Qualified Immunity: A legal protection for officers that bars civil damages unless (1) they violated a constitutional right and (2) that right was “clearly established” at the time. Courts can decide either prong first. Here, the court stopped at prong one (no constitutional violation).
Objective Reasonableness (Graham): The measure for excessive force. Courts balance the individual’s Fourth Amendment interest against governmental interests (severity of crime, immediate threat, active resistance/flight) from the viewpoint of a reasonable officer on the scene, not with hindsight.
Furtive Waistband Movement: A critical cue to officers that a suspect may have or be reaching for a weapon, often justifying swift control tactics.
Gratuitous Force: Force used after a suspect is under control, handcuffed, or fully compliant. Such force is commonly held excessive.
Supplemental Jurisdiction: Federal courts may hear state-law claims related to federal claims. But when the federal claims drop out early, courts often dismiss remaining state claims to let state courts decide their own law.
Florida Sovereign Immunity (Fla. Stat. § 768.28(9)(a)): The exclusive remedy for injuries caused by state officers acting within the scope of employment is typically an official-capacity claim against the governmental entity. Individual-capacity liability attaches only for acts done in bad faith, with malicious purpose, or with wanton and willful disregard.

Conclusion

Smola underscores two key points in Eleventh Circuit practice. First, a single, forceful takedown maneuver during the initial seconds of an uncertain, potentially armed encounter—especially following a furtive waistband movement and less-than-rapid compliance—may be objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. The decision carefully distinguishes “gratuitous force” precedents where control has already been achieved. Second, the opinion affirms that district courts have broad discretion to decline supplemental jurisdiction over Florida battery claims once federal claims are resolved, particularly where the contours of state-law standards are unsettled or evolving.

Though unpublished and non-binding, this decision provides a practical roadmap for evaluating short, chaotic encounters captured on video and for managing parallel state-law tort claims after federal claims fall away. For law enforcement, it validates decisive, containment-focused tactics under fast-developing risk indicators; for litigants, it highlights the centrality of timing, compliance dynamics, and video evidence in the Graham analysis, and it counsels strategic foresight on forum and state-law issues in Florida.