Introduction

This decision resolves a recurring tension in Louisiana’s civil service disciplinary framework: who ultimately calibrates the punishment of a classified municipal police employee—the appointing authority, the civil service board, or the courts? The Supreme Court of Louisiana affirms the Monroe Municipal Fire and Police Civil Service Board’s reduction of the City’s termination of Reginald Brown (interim chief at the time of the underlying events) to a ninety-day suspension without pay. Along the way, the Court clarifies the statutory roles of boards and courts under La. R.S. 33:2501 and related provisions, drawing bright lines around:

• The board’s factfinding and remedial authority to modify discipline when the appointing authority’s sanction is unreasonable—even where the appointing authority acted “in good faith for cause.”
• The strict limits on judicial review: reviewing courts may only determine whether the board’s decision was made in good faith for cause; they cannot reweigh the sanction or impose their own, and they may not modify the board’s penalty if the board acted in good faith for cause.

The factual dispute centered on whether Brown delayed asking the Louisiana State Police (LSP) to take over a criminal investigation into an excessive-force complaint because of an imminent mayoral election, and whether his statements and polygraph results supported termination. The board found “good faith for cause” to discipline Brown but deemed termination excessive, imposing a ninety-day suspension. The district court reinstated termination; the court of appeal restored the board’s suspension; the Supreme Court affirmed.

Summary of the Judgment

• Holding: The board’s decision to reduce termination to a ninety-day suspension was made in good faith for cause and was reasonably supported by the administrative record. The judgment of the court of appeal reinstating the board’s sanction is affirmed.
• Review Structure Clarified:
  • Board level (La. R.S. 33:2501(A)-(C)): The board conducts a de novo evidentiary hearing to determine the reasonableness of the appointing authority’s action, decides “good faith for cause,” and may affirm, reverse, or modify the sanction. Modification is justified where the appointing authority’s punishment is unreasonable; boards owe “substantial deference” to the appointing authority and are not “de facto pardon boards.”
  • Judicial review (La. R.S. 33:2501(E)): The district court sits as an appellate court. Review is confined to whether the board’s decision was made in good faith for cause. Factual findings are reviewed for manifest error; legal issues de novo. Crucially, courts cannot modify the board’s discipline if the board acted in good faith for cause.
• Application to the Record: The record supported discipline for Brown’s failure to refer to LSP sooner but did not reasonably support findings that he failed a properly administered polygraph, lied in his interrogation/pre-disciplinary hearing, or delayed for personal/political gain. Thus, termination was unreasonably harsh; a ninety-day suspension was within the board’s discretion.

Background and Procedural Posture

In July 2020, an excessive-force complaint (with body-camera footage) alleged that Officer Jared Desadier kicked a prone arrestee, Timothy Williams. Interim Chief Brown immediately placed involved officers on administrative leave, notified the city attorney and mayor, initiated administrative processes, and met with command staff. Although the city attorney recommended referral to LSP, Brown initially intended an internal criminal investigation (consistent, he said, with department practice to refer only shootings or deaths in custody). The mayoral election occurred on July 11; on the following Monday, Brown asked LSP to take the case, but LSP declined. The department proceeded and arrested Desadier on July 25.

A new mayor and interim chief thereafter launched an internal inquiry into Brown’s handling. Brown was interrogated and required to take a polygraph centered on whether the election affected his timing in contacting LSP. The City’s polygraph examiner found deception; Brown’s expert (a retired FBI polygraph unit chief) testified the test was improperly constructed and unreliable. The appointing authority (the new chief) terminated Brown for four reasons: (1) failing a properly administered polygraph; (2) lying during interrogation and at the pre-disciplinary hearing; (3) improperly delaying an LSP referral; and (4) delaying for personal benefit.

The civil service board found “good faith for cause” to discipline but reduced the penalty to a ninety-day suspension without pay. The district court reinstated termination. The court of appeal reversed, restoring the board’s suspension. The Supreme Court granted certiorari and affirmed the court of appeal.

Analysis

A. Statutory and Doctrinal Framework Applied

• Employee status and governing law: Brown, a Monroe police officer (municipality within La. R.S. 33:2471–2508), is covered by the municipal fire and police civil service scheme and La. Const. art. X, §16.
• Board hearing (La. R.S. 33:2501(A)-(C)):
  • An employee may demand a hearing to test the reasonableness of the appointing authority’s corrective or disciplinary action.
  • The appointing authority bears the preponderance burden to prove discipline was taken “in good faith for cause.” “Cause” maps to specific grounds in La. R.S. 33:2500(A) (e.g., insubordination, dishonesty, unsatisfactory performance, failure to perform a duty).
  • “Good faith” turns on motivation—i.e., not arbitrary/capricious, prejudiced, or politically expedient.
  • The board may affirm, reverse (with reinstatement, potentially with back pay), or modify discipline by imposing a lesser sanction “appropriate under the circumstances.” Modification is linked to the board’s statutory duty to determine reasonableness and is exercised with “substantial deference” to the appointing authority; boards are cautioned not to become “de facto pardon boards.”
• Judicial review (La. R.S. 33:2501(E)):
  • Any party may appeal “any decision” of the board.
  • The district court sits as an appellate court; the hearing is confined to whether the board’s decision was made in good faith for cause.
  • Standard of review: manifest error (facts and credibility); de novo (legal questions).
  • Critically, if the record reasonably supports that the board acted in good faith for cause, courts must affirm. Courts have no authority to modify the board’s penalty in that posture.

B. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• Shields v. City of Shreveport, 579 So.2d 961 (La. 1991): Establishes that the appointing authority bears the burden of proof; clarifies “good faith for cause” and confirms the board’s factfinding role at the hearing.
• Moore v. Ware, 839 So.2d 940 (La. 2003): Board’s factual findings receive the same deference as a trial court; manifest error governs; courts do not retry facts.
• City of Bossier City v. Vernon, 100 So.3d 301 (La. 2012): Confirms the board’s authority to modify even where the appointing authority acted in good faith for cause, because the board must determine whether the particular sanction is commensurate with the proven infraction.
• Mathieu v. New Orleans Public Library, 50 So.3d 1259 (La. 2010): Emphasizes “substantial deference” to the appointing authority on the choice of discipline, underscoring that modification is not a free-ranging second-guessing.
• Lange v. Orleans Levee District, 56 So.3d 925 (La. 2010): Cautions that civil service bodies are not “de facto pardon boards.” The majority uses this to temper board discretion.
• Meiners v. St. Tammany Parish Fire Prot. Dist. No. 4, 341 So.3d 558 (La. 2020) (per curiam): Reiterates that courts reviewing a board decision cannot modify sanctions once they find the board acted in good faith for cause.
• Marchiafava v. Baton Rouge Fire & Police Civil Serv. Bd., 233 La. 17, 96 So.2d 26 (1957): Early statement that appellate courts do not substitute their disciplinary choices for that of the board when the board acted in good faith for cause.
• Hayes Fund v. Kerr-McGee, 193 So.3d 1110 (La. 2015): Recites the manifest error standard used by the Court in reviewing the board’s factfinding.
• White v. City of Mandeville, 387 So.3d 612 (La. App. 1 Cir. 2024): Affirms the board’s special vantage point on credibility, a theme the majority invokes in deferring to the board’s implicit credibility calls.
• Monroe Municipal Fire & Police Civil Service Bd. v. Brown, 371 So.3d 448 (La. 2023) (per curiam): Confirms district courts act in an appellate, not de novo, capacity when reviewing board decisions.

Collectively, these cases support the Court’s central conclusions: boards have a bounded but real power to adjust sanctions based on reasonableness; the district court’s role is appellate and tightly confined to testing the board’s good-faith-for-cause decision; and appellate courts must defer to the board’s on-the-ground credibility determinations.

C. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. All board outcomes are judicially reviewable—but only for “good faith for cause.”

   The Court rejects the City’s argument that holding the district court lacked power to alter the board’s sanction “forecloses meaningful review.” The statute draws no distinction among the board’s three options (affirm, reverse, modify): all qualify as “decisions” reviewable under La. R.S. 33:2501(E). The review, however, is strictly confined to whether the board’s decision was made in good faith for cause. Courts lack statutory authority to substitute or adjust the sanction if the board’s decision passes that test (Meiners; Marchiafava).

2. The board’s remedial discretion is anchored in reasonableness and tempered by deference.

   While La. R.S. 33:2501(C)(1) permits modification, the board’s paramount duty under La. R.S. 33:2501(A) is to determine the reasonableness of the appointing authority’s action. Modification is warranted only if the appointing authority’s sanction is unreasonable. The Court reiterates substantial deference to the appointing authority’s chosen discipline and warns (citing Lange) that boards are not pardon boards.

3. Applying the framework to the record.
   • The appointing authority’s letter identified four grounds: (1) failure of a “properly administered” polygraph; (2) untruthfulness; (3) improper delay of the LSP referral; (4) delay for personal benefit.
   • The board heard dueling experts on the polygraph. Brown’s expert (retired FBI polygraph unit chief) testified the test was unreliable given improper construction and length of questions and their focus on intent. One of the City’s experts conceded the questions were “a little wordy.”
   • Brown consistently denied that the election influenced his timing and explained his initial decision for an internal investigation, later changed after staff discussions and further consideration of the city attorney’s advice; LSP declined the referral.
   • Multiple witnesses supported Brown’s account; no witness offered direct evidence of political motivation or instruction to delay.
   • The Court concludes the record supports discipline for neglect (not contacting LSP sooner in a high-profile matter, in tension with the city attorney’s recommendation and the need to avoid the appearance of political influence) but not for dishonesty, polygraph failure (as “properly administered”), or self-serving political motive.
4. Result: Given these findings (and deference to the board’s credibility judgments), the board’s reduction to a ninety-day suspension was within its statutory discretion and not arbitrary or capricious; judicial modification was impermissible.

D. The Separate Opinions: Areas of Agreement and Contest

• Weimer, C.J. (concurring in part, dissenting in part):
  • Agrees the record reasonably supports the board’s sanction.
  • Critiques the majority for not fully engaging decades of jurisprudence explicating “reasonableness,” especially the board’s duty to assess whether a sanction is commensurate with the infraction (Vernon; Evans).
  • Argues the district court is not categorically precluded from reviewing the board’s penalty; it may assess whether the board’s decision to modify was itself made in good faith for cause. Suggests the court of appeal overstated the district court’s lack of authority under the statute.
• Hughes, J. (concurring in part, dissenting in part):
  • Would find no basis for any discipline, stressing the immediate administrative actions taken by Brown, the department’s practice on LSP referrals, LSP’s refusal to accept the case, and concerns about the “bogus” polygraph.
• McCallum, J. (concurring in part, dissenting in part):
  • Would reinstate the termination, finding no rational basis in the record for the board’s reduction of the penalty; endorses the district court’s view.
• Guidry, J.: Concurs in the result.

These opinions reflect a robust dialogue about how far boards may go in modifying sanctions and how narrowly courts should cabin their review. The majority’s rule, however, is clear: courts review the board’s decision for “good faith for cause” and may not modify the sanction if that standard is met.

Impact and Practical Implications

1) For Appointing Authorities

• Charge articulation matters: Termination letters should specify conduct and statutory grounds (La. R.S. 33:2500(A)) and avoid overreliance on fragile proof (e.g., polygraph results whose reliability can be undermined).
• “Appearance” of political influence is relevant: The majority acknowledges the need to avoid even the appearance of political impropriety, especially in high-visibility matters. Delays contrary to legal advice may justify discipline even if not politically motivated.
• Expect deference, not immunity: While the board affords substantial deference to the chosen penalty, it may reduce unreasonable sanctions. Build a record showing proportionality.

2) For Civil Service Boards

• Independent reasonableness review: Boards have both the duty and the authority to ensure sanctions are commensurate, but they must anchor modifications in the record and exercise restraint consistent with statutory deference.
• Findings are not required—but are prudent: La. R.S. 33:2501(B)(2) does not require written findings if testimony is transcribed. Still, reasoned findings explaining why a sanction is unreasonable can fortify the decision against judicial challenge.
• Polygraph evidence is vulnerable: This case signals skepticism where tests are poorly constructed or focus on intent; boards should carefully weigh reliability and corroboration.

3) For Courts

• Scope of review is narrow: Courts assess only whether the board’s decision was made in good faith for cause. They do not retry facts, reassess credibility, or select a different sanction when the board acted in good faith for cause.
• Manifest error governs facts; de novo governs law: The board’s credibility assessments carry great weight given its exposure to witnesses.
• No authority to modify the board’s sanction: Meiners and Marchiafava, reaffirmed here, foreclose judicial substitution of penalties once the board’s good faith for cause is supported by the record.

4) For Practitioners and Employees

• Build the board record: The board hearing is the proving ground. Present live testimony, cross-examine opposing experts, and submit exhibits anticipating manifest-error review.
• Address motive evidence head-on: Where political timing is alleged, directly rebut with contemporaneous communications, policy explanations, and corroborating witness testimony.
• Consider expert critique of polygraphs: Expert testimony on test construction and reliability can be outcome-determinative when dishonesty is alleged based on polygraph alone.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Appointing authority: The official/entity that hires and disciplines the employee (e.g., the police chief or city leadership acting through the chief).
• Civil service board: An independent body that conducts a public, trial-like hearing to review the reasonableness of discipline and to determine if it was taken in good faith for cause.
• “Good faith for cause”:
  • Cause means a statutory ground exists for discipline (La. R.S. 33:2500(A): insubordination, dishonesty, failure to perform duties, etc.).
  • Good faith means the discipline is not arbitrary, capricious, prejudiced, or politically motivated; it is genuinely based on the cited cause.
• Reasonableness (La. R.S. 33:2501(A)): The board evaluates whether, under the circumstances proved, the discipline selected by the appointing authority is appropriate and commensurate.
• Manifest error: A deferential appellate standard; a factual finding is left undisturbed if it has a reasonable basis in the record.
• Arbitrary or capricious: Action without a rational basis; in this context, grounds to find lack of good faith.
• Burden of proof: The appointing authority must prove its case by a preponderance of the evidence at the board hearing.

Key Takeaways and Practice Pointers

• Boards may reduce a penalty—even when the appointing authority acted in good faith for cause—if the sanction is unreasonable under the circumstances, but with substantial deference to the appointing authority’s choice.
• On appeal, courts review the board’s decision solely for whether it was made in good faith for cause; they do not pick the penalty and cannot modify the board’s sanction if the board’s decision is supported by the record.
• Reliance on polygraph results can be precarious; absent proper administration and corroboration, such evidence may not sustain findings of dishonesty.
• Where political timing is alleged, evidentiary focus on contemporaneous steps, policy context, and external referrals (and their outcomes) will be crucial to defeat claims of political motive.
• Boards are not required to issue written findings if the hearing is transcribed, but doing so remains a best practice to demonstrate the rational basis for modification.

Conclusion

The Louisiana Supreme Court’s decision brings sharpened clarity to the allocation of authority in municipal civil service discipline: the board conducts a robust reasonableness review and may modify sanctions that are excessive in light of the proven conduct, while courts—respecting the board’s vantage point and statutory remit—limit their review to whether the board acted in good faith for cause. In the concrete circumstances presented, the board reasonably found neglect in timing but not dishonesty or political motive, and thus properly reduced termination to a ninety-day suspension.

This precedent reaffirms a balanced regime: deference to appointing authorities on discipline, tempered by an independent board duty to ensure proportionality, all within a tightly cabined appellate review that preserves the integrity of administrative factfinding and the civil service system’s core promise of merit-based personnel decisions.