Reasonableness, Not Ability to Pay: Attorney’s Fees Under Vermont’s Abusive-Litigation Statute in Knapp (Dasler) v. Dasler

I. Introduction

The Vermont Supreme Court’s decision in Jennifer Knapp (Dasler) v. Timothy Dasler, 2025 VT 66, clarifies a critical question under Vermont’s relatively new abusive-litigation statute, 15 V.S.A. §§ 1181–1185: when a court awards attorney’s fees to a victim of abusive litigation under § 1184(b)(1), must the court make individualized findings about the abusive litigant’s ability to pay?

The Court holds that it need not. The governing standard is reasonableness of the fee, assessed under a conventional “lodestar” analysis, not a “needs and ability to pay” inquiry akin to divorce “suit money” awards. Although a trial court may consider a litigant’s financial circumstances, the abusive litigant’s inability to pay does not shield them from a fee award, and the court is not required to make detailed findings on financial capacity.

The decision thus solidifies Vermont’s abusive-litigation regime as victim-centered and compensatory, allowing courts to award “reasonable attorney’s fees and costs of responding to the abusive litigation” without the limitations that apply to traditional divorce fee awards or Rule 11 sanctions.

II. Factual and Procedural Background

A. The Parties and Prior Litigation

Jennifer Knapp and Timothy Dasler divorced in 2018. In the years following the divorce, litigation between them proliferated across multiple courts and forums. According to the trial court’s findings—summarized and affirmed in a prior Vermont Supreme Court decision, Knapp v. Dasler, 2024 VT 65—Mr. Dasler:

• Continually attempted to relitigate prior final court orders;
• Filed motions for reconsideration of nearly every order issued, most of which were denied for lack of new facts or law;
• Made “horrible” and unsubstantiated allegations against Ms. Knapp in his filings;
• Filed numerous unsuccessful appeals to the Vermont Supreme Court; and
• Initiated litigation in six different courts raising the same or similar issues.

The trial court found that these repetitive filings were made “for the purpose of abusing, harassing, or intimidating” Ms. Knapp. In December 2023, it entered an abusive-litigation order under 15 V.S.A. § 1181, restricting Mr. Dasler from further litigation against Ms. Knapp absent specific conditions. The Supreme Court affirmed that order in 2024 VT 65.

B. The Attorney’s Fee Request Under the Abusive-Litigation Statute

In connection with her request for an abusive-litigation order, Ms. Knapp sought recovery of her attorney’s fees and costs under 15 V.S.A. § 1184(b)(1), which authorizes a court to:

award[] the other party reasonable attorney's fees and costs of responding to the abusive litigation, including the cost of seeking the order restricting abusive litigation.

She requested $12,430 in fees and costs, supported by:

• An itemized billing statement; and
• An affidavit attesting to the work performed and rates charged.

Acting pro se, Mr. Dasler opposed the motion. He argued:

• Some fees were unrelated to the abusive-litigation proceeding;
• The charges and hours were excessive; and
• He could not afford to pay the requested fees, as reflected in his financial statement of income, expenses, and assets.

C. The Trial Court’s Fee Award

In January 2024, the trial court issued an order awarding Ms. Knapp $5970 in attorney’s fees and $30 in costs (total $6000).

The court:

• Reviewed the general law of attorney’s fees in Vermont, including the “American Rule” and recognized exceptions;
• Noted that, unlike broad equitable fee awards or divorce “suit money,” Ms. Knapp’s request was grounded in a specific statutory authorization: 15 V.S.A. § 1184(b)(1);
• Applied a lodestar analysis (reasonable hours × reasonable rate), per L’Esperance v. Benware and Evans v. Cote;
• Limited the fee award to work reasonably related to:
  • Ms. Knapp’s motion for an abusive-litigation order; and
  • Litigating Mr. Dasler’s contemporaneous contempt, dismissal, and sanctions motions addressed at the November 2023 hearing.
• Found the hours and rates of Ms. Knapp’s counsel reasonable; and
• Determined that no upward or downward adjustment of the lodestar was warranted, despite reviewing Mr. Dasler’s financial statement and claimed inability to pay.

The resulting lodestar (and final) fee was $5940 in attorney’s fees plus $30 in costs.

D. Motion for Reconsideration and Appeal

Mr. Dasler moved for reconsideration, arguing primarily:

• The court was required to make individualized factual findings on his ability to pay before awarding fees; and
• Divorce cases awarding fees as “suit money” showed that a “needs and ability” analysis is mandatory whenever fees are awarded in a family-law context.

The trial court rejected these arguments, distinguishing divorce “suit money” (under 15 V.S.A. §§ 606–607) from the abusive-litigation statute. It reaffirmed that:

• Under § 1184(b)(1), the standard is reasonableness, not financial-need balancing; and
• Individualized findings on ability to pay are not required.

On appeal, Mr. Dasler continued to argue that:

• The court was legally obligated to consider the parties’ financial circumstances (and primarily his inability to pay) in determining fees;
• Such an analysis was supposedly required both in divorce fee awards and in sanctions imposed under Vermont Rule of Civil Procedure 11, and must therefore apply to § 1184; and
• The fee award infringed constitutional fairness, retroactively penalized him for pre-statute conduct, and impaired his fundamental right of access to the courts.

III. Summary of the Opinion

The Vermont Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Eaton, affirmed the fee award. The Court held:

1. Statutory standard is “reasonableness,” not “ability to pay.” For attorney’s fees awarded under 15 V.S.A. § 1184(b)(1), the trial court’s task is to award reasonable fees and costs responding to abusive litigation. The statute does not require:
   • Individualized findings on the abusive litigant’s ability to pay; or
   • Application of the divorce “suit money” standard tied to financial needs and ability to pay.
2. Use of the lodestar method was appropriate. The trial court properly:
   • Computed a lodestar figure (reasonable hours × reasonable rate);
   • Considered relevant factors (novelty, complexity, attorney experience, results obtained); and
   • Chose not to adjust the lodestar, including after reviewing Mr. Dasler’s financial statement.
3. No abuse of discretion. The amount of a statutory fee award is reviewed for abuse of discretion. The record supported the trial court’s conclusions about reasonableness and the decision not to reduce the award based on claimed inability to pay.
4. Abusive-litigation statute is victim-centered and not limited by Rule 11 “parsimony.”
   • Rule 11 focuses on deterring and punishing litigation abuse and contains a “parsimony” requirement, limiting sanctions to what is sufficient to deter future misconduct.
   • By contrast, the abusive-litigation statute is designed to protect victims from being abused through litigation and allows courts to award “reasonable attorney’s fees and costs” without a similar deterrence-only limit.
5. Retroactivity and constitutional attacks are foreclosed and, in any event, unfounded.
   • The Court reaffirmed its earlier holding in 2024 VT 65 that the abusive-litigation statute was applied prospectively only to post-enactment filings.
6. No violation of access to justice. An individual does not have a right to use the courts to harass or abuse others, and lack of financial resources does not immunize a litigant from consequences for abusive litigation.

IV. Detailed Analysis

A. Statutory Framework: Vermont’s Abusive-Litigation Statute

The attorney’s-fee award arose under 15 V.S.A. § 1184, part of a statutory scheme intended to shield victims of domestic abuse and former partners from harassment via the legal system. The Court, referencing its prior decision in Knapp v. Dasler, 2024 VT 65, reiterated that the statute:

is clearly intended to protect parties from harassment in the form of frivolous litigation by former partners or abusers.

Section 1184(b)(1) specifically authorizes the court to impose conditions on an abusive litigant, including:

awarding the other party reasonable attorney's fees and costs of responding to the abusive litigation, including the cost of seeking the order restricting abusive litigation.

Key features of this scheme, as highlighted by the Court, include:

• A focus on protection of victims from continued abuse, harassment, or intimidation via litigation;
• Authority to impose broad “conditions” deemed “necessary and appropriate” to that protective purpose; and
• Express authorization for full recovery of “reasonable” fees and costs incurred in responding to abusive litigation and securing an abusive-litigation order.

This remedial context is central: unlike ordinary fee-shifting provisions or punishment-oriented sanction regimes, § 1184 is crafted to make victims whole and to halt litigation-based abuse.

B. Standard of Review and Discretion Over Statutory Fee Awards

The Court confirmed the familiar principle that when attorney’s fees are awarded pursuant to a statute, the amount of the award is reviewed for abuse of discretion. The Court cited:

• Kwon v. Eaton, 2010 VT 73 – Recognizing that the amount of a fee award under a statute depends on the facts and is within the trial court’s discretion.

This deferential standard is particularly significant where:

• The trial court has presided over extensive, protracted litigation;
• It has first-hand familiarity with the parties, the pattern of filings, and the practical burdens imposed; and
• The fee request is supported with detailed billing and sworn affidavits.

The Supreme Court’s analysis repeatedly underscores that disagreement with the outcome—such as the size of the award or the weight given to ability to pay—does not amount to an abuse of discretion. It cited:

• Meyncke v. Meyncke, 2009 VT 84 – Mere disagreement with the trial court’s reasoning or result is insufficient to demonstrate abuse of discretion.

C. The Lodestar Method and the Reasonableness Standard

The trial court applied the lodestar method, which the Supreme Court endorsed as the correct starting point for assessing fee reasonableness:

• L’Esperance v. Benware, 2003 VT 43 – Defines the “lodestar” as “the number of hours reasonably expended on the case multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate.”
• Evans v. Cote, 2014 VT 104 – Explains that courts begin with the lodestar and then adjust up or down based on case-specific factors, including novelty, attorney experience, and results obtained.

Applying that framework, the trial court:

1. Scope-limited the fee request to:
   • Time spent pursuing the abusive-litigation order; and
   • Defending against Mr. Dasler’s post-enactment contempt, dismissal, and sanctions motions adjudicated at the November 2023 hearing.
   This ensured that the fee award was tied directly to “responding to the abusive litigation” within the meaning of § 1184(b)(1).
2. Found the hours reasonable, taking into account:
   • The need to marshal and synthesize a litigation history spanning several years;
   • The complexity introduced by the new abusive-litigation statute; and
   • The volume and repetitiveness of Mr. Dasler’s filings.
3. Found the hourly rates reasonable, given counsel’s experience and the nature of the case.
4. Chose not to adjust the lodestar, after considering:
   • The non-complex factual issues but novel statutory framework;
   • The favorable result achieved for Ms. Knapp (restrictions on abusive litigation and denial of adverse motions); and
   • The financial statement and claimed inability to pay submitted by Mr. Dasler.

The Supreme Court fully endorsed this methodology and outcome. It emphasized that § 1184(b)(1) directs courts to award “reasonable attorney’s fees and costs,” and that the trial court had:

• Applied the correct legal standard (lodestar + adjustment factors);
• Considered the relevant circumstances, including financial information; and
• Explained its reasoning adequately for appellate review.

Crucially, the Court held that the statute does not impose any additional requirement of individualized findings regarding ability to pay.

D. Ability to Pay and the Rejection of the Divorce “Suit Money” Model

A major axis of the opinion is its clear distinction between:

• Traditional divorce-related attorney’s fees awarded as “suit money”; and
• Attorney’s fees awarded under the abusive-litigation statute.

In divorce, fees may be awarded under 15 V.S.A. §§ 606–607, where, as the Court has long held, the primary considerations are:

• The financial needs of the party seeking fees; and
• The ability of the other party to pay.

The Court cited and discussed:

• Nevitt v. Nevitt, 155 Vt. 391 (1990) – Recognizes that in divorce actions, attorney’s fees can be awarded as “suit money” where “justice and equity so indicate.”
• Turner v. Turner, 2004 VT 5 (mem.) – Confirms that in suit-money awards, “the primary consideration” is the supporting party’s ability to pay and the recipient’s financial needs.
• Downs v. Downs, 159 Vt. 467 (1993) – Emphasizes that the considerations governing suit-money awards differ from those applicable to fee awards in non-divorce cases.

The Supreme Court firmly rejected the appellant’s attempt to import these divorce-specific principles into the abusive-litigation context. It held:

• This case is post-judgment by several years, not a contemporaneous divorce action.
• The fee award arises under 15 V.S.A. § 1184(b)(1), a specific statutory fee-shifting provision, not under the general divorce “suit money” statutes.
• Under § 1184(b)(1), the operative standard is reasonableness, which does not mandate individualized findings on ability to pay.

Accordingly:

The standard for determining such fees was reasonableness, which did not require individualized findings as to Mr. Dasler’s ability to pay.

The Court did not hold that financial circumstances are wholly irrelevant. Rather:

• The trial court did review the financial statement and consider Mr. Dasler’s argument that he could not afford to pay;
• It simply concluded that no downward departure from the lodestar was warranted; and
• The Supreme Court held that the trial court was not required to go further by making detailed, itemized findings on ability to pay.

This is a critical doctrinal point: under § 1184(b)(1), the abusive litigant’s ability to pay is not the structural centerpiece of the analysis—reasonableness of the fee is. Ability to pay may be considered within that reasonableness framework, but it does not control or require a separate analytic track, as in suit-money awards.

E. Relationship to Rule 11 Sanctions

The Court then addressed an analogy drawn by Mr. Dasler to Vermont Rule of Civil Procedure 11. In prior litigation, the Supreme Court had observed that Rule 11, which was in effect throughout the underlying proceedings, already:

• Prohibited frivolous, harassing, or baseless filings; and
• Provided a sanctions regime that could, in principle, have been applied to Mr. Dasler’s filings.

In this opinion, the Court elaborated on the differences between Rule 11 and the abusive-litigation statute:

1. Purpose of Rule 11 Sanctions
   • Citing White v. General Motors Corp., 908 F.2d 675 (10th Cir. 1990), the Court summarized Rule 11’s purposes:
     • Deterring future litigation abuse (primary goal);
     • Punishing present litigation abuse;
     • Compensating victims of litigation abuse; and
     • Streamlining court dockets and facilitating case management.
   • Rule 11 explicitly contains a “parsimony provision”:

     A sanction imposed for violation of this rule shall be limited to what is sufficient to deter repetition of such conduct or comparable conduct by others similarly situated.

2. Abusive-Litigation Statute’s Victim-Centered Focus
   • Citing Hamilton v. Boise Cascade Express, 519 F.3d 1197 (10th Cir. 2008), the Court characterized abusive-litigation statutes as taking a more “victim-centered” approach.
   • Vermont’s statute focuses on protecting victims from continued abuse through litigation and explicitly permits courts to impose conditions they deem “necessary and appropriate” to protect victims, including full reasonable attorney’s fees.
   • Significantly, § 1184 does not contain a parsimony clause limiting awards to what is minimally sufficient for deterrence.

The Court expressly declined to decide whether Rule 11 itself requires courts to consider a party’s ability to pay when imposing sanctions. The Reporter’s Notes suggest that such consideration is permitted, but the Court noted that those notes are not binding (citing Filter Equipment Co. v. IBM, 142 Vt. 499 (1983)).

Importantly, the Court held that even if:

• Rule 11 were interpreted to mandate consideration of ability to pay; and
• This requirement were somehow imported into § 1184(b)(1);

the trial court in this case complied, because it reviewed and considered the financial statement and rejected the argument that inability to pay justified a lower fee.

Thus, Rule 11 does not constrain the breadth of § 1184(b)(1) fee awards, and the absence of a parsimony clause highlights the Legislature’s intent to permit full reasonable compensation, not merely minimal deterrent sanctions.

F. Retroactivity, Finality, and Collateral Attack

Mr. Dasler argued that imposing fees under § 1184(b)(1) retroactively penalized him for past conduct and violated constitutional fairness. The Supreme Court disposed of these claims on both procedural and substantive grounds.

1. Issue Preclusion / Collateral Attack
   • The Court invoked Town of Pawlet v. Banyai, 2024 VT 13, reaffirming that final judgments are conclusive and not subject to collateral attack.
   • In 2024 VT 65, the Court had already held:
     • The abusive-litigation statute was not applied retrospectively to Mr. Dasler’s pre-enactment filings;
     • Those earlier filings and orders remained unaffected; and
     • The abusive-litigation order impacted only motions filed after the statute’s enactment (e.g., his October 2023 motion to dismiss and November 2023 sanctions motion, plus later filings).
   • Accordingly, the retroactivity argument had already been litigated and decided and could not be reargued in this appeal in a new guise.
2. Substantive Reaffirmation
   • Even on the merits, the Court reiterated:
     • The statute was applied only to post-enactment conduct (i.e., filings made after the statute became effective);
     • The fee award related to the costs of responding to that post-enactment abusive litigation and of obtaining the abusive-litigation order; and
     • Therefore, there was no unconstitutional retroactive penalty for prior litigation behavior.

G. Access to Justice and Self-Representation

On appeal, apparently for the first time, Mr. Dasler argued that the fee award:

• Created a barrier to his access to the courts; and
• Penalized him for being an “inadequate” self-represented litigant.

The Court, assuming without deciding that the issue was preserved, rejected this contention emphatically:

• It reiterated that the right of access to the courts is not unlimited. Citing Zorn v. Smith, 2011 VT 10, the Court underscored that litigants cannot “abuse the courts by inundating them with frivolous suits which burden the administration of the courts for no useful purpose.”
• It stressed that self-representation and financial hardship do not immunize a litigant from consequences for abusive litigation. The Legislature has determined that victims of litigation harassment may recover the costs of responding to such abuse.
• Citing Alizadeh v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 910 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1990), the Court quoted the principle that deterrence of frivolous suits is not served by “creating an exception for frivolous suits by the impecunious.”

The Court’s message is clear: the courts remain open to good-faith litigants, including those who are self-represented or financially distressed, but there is no right to weaponize the judicial system to harass an ex-spouse.

H. Other Precedents and Their Role

Several additional precedents surfaced in the Court’s reasoning:

• DJ Painting, Inc. v. Baraw Enterprises, Inc., 172 Vt. 239 (2001)
  • Reiterates Vermont’s adherence to the American Rule: each party ordinarily bears its own attorney’s fees absent a statutory or contractual exception.
  • Recognizes that courts can, in “exceptional cases and for dominating reasons of justice,” use their equitable powers to award fees.
  • In Knapp, the Supreme Court notes this background but emphasizes that the fee award here rests squarely on a specific statutory provision (§ 1184(b)(1)), not on broad equitable power.
• New England Power Co. v. Town of Barnet, 134 Vt. 498 (1976)
  • Explains the purpose of findings of fact: to clearly show what was decided and how.
  • Used here to support the conclusion that the trial court was not required to produce detailed, item-by-item financial findings to justify its decision not to reduce the fee award.
• Out-of-jurisdiction authorities discussed and distinguished:
  • In re MJK Clearing, Inc., 286 B.R. 109 (Bankr. D. Minn. 2002) – Concerning specific performance in contract/bankruptcy contexts; not applicable because no contract-based fee claim or equitable specific performance remedy was at issue.
  • Hunt Development Group, L.P. v. Dick Corp., 2010 WL 11601053 (W.D. Tex. Dec. 8, 2010) – Addressing attorney’s fees under Texas unjust enrichment law; irrelevant to a Vermont statutory abusive-litigation fee award.

These citations function mainly to:

• Reinforce that the fee award here is rooted in statutory authority rather than free-floating equitable discretion; and
• Underscore that analogies drawn from contract, bankruptcy, or unjust-enrichment fee doctrines do not control the interpretation of § 1184(b)(1).

V. Clarifying Key Legal Concepts

1. The American Rule and Its Exceptions

Under the American Rule, each party generally pays its own attorney’s fees. Vermont follows this principle, as summarized in DJ Painting. Exceptions arise when:

• A statute expressly authorizes fee-shifting (e.g., 15 V.S.A. § 1184(b)(1));
• The parties’ contract contains an attorney’s fee provision; or
• A court, in “exceptional cases,” uses its equitable powers to award fees to prevent injustice.

Knapp (Dasler) sits firmly within the statutory exception category.

2. The Lodestar Method

The lodestar method is a structured way to calculate a reasonable attorney’s fee:

1. Reasonable Hours – Courts look at the time counsel reasonably needed to perform necessary tasks. Unnecessary, duplicative, or excessive hours can be excluded.
2. Reasonable Hourly Rate – The rate should be in line with prevailing rates for similar work by lawyers of similar skill and experience in the relevant community.
3. Adjustment – Courts may adjust the lodestar up or down based on factors such as:
   • Novelty and difficulty of the issues;
   • Attorney skill and experience;
   • Results obtained;
   • Any other case-specific considerations.

In this case, the trial court set a lodestar at $5940 and found no basis for adjustment, a determination the Supreme Court upheld.

3. “Suit Money” in Divorce vs. Statutory Fee Awards

“Suit money” refers to attorney’s fees awarded during or in connection with divorce proceedings to enable the financially weaker spouse to litigate on roughly equal footing. Key attributes:

• Grounded in 15 V.S.A. §§ 606–607;
• Used primarily to ensure fairness and access to representation in divorce and related matters;
• The “primary consideration” is the paying party’s ability to pay and the recipient’s financial need.

In contrast, § 1184(b)(1) fee awards:

• Compensate victims of abusive litigation for the costs of defending against and restraining harassment;
• Are governed by a reasonableness standard, not a financial-need balancing test;
• Do not require the court to treat ability to pay as the primary or determinative factor.

4. Collateral Attack and Finality

A collateral attack occurs when a party attempts, in a new proceeding or appeal, to re-litigate issues that were or could have been decided in a previous final judgment.

The Court’s reliance on Town of Pawlet v. Banyai underscores that:

• Once a judgment is final, issues necessarily decided cannot be revisited in subsequent proceedings between the same parties;
• Mr. Dasler’s renewed retroactivity and “no new post-enactment conduct” arguments were barred because they had been addressed and rejected in his earlier appeal (2024 VT 65).

5. Abusive Litigation and Access to Justice

The abusive-litigation statute—and this decision—are built on a nuanced view of access to justice:

• Individuals do have a right to bring legitimate disputes to court, including through self-representation.
• However, that right is not a license to repeatedly file baseless, harassing, or duplicative actions, especially where the filings serve primarily to abuse or intimidate a former partner.
• The statute exists to prevent the civil justice system from being used as a vehicle for ongoing abuse.

The Court’s invocation of Zorn v. Smith and Alizadeh reinforces that an “access to courts” argument cannot sanitize abusive tactics or immunize an impecunious litigant from consequences for such abuse.

VI. Likely Impact and Future Applications

A. Strengthening the Abusive-Litigation Statute’s Teeth

By confirming that attorney’s fees under § 1184(b)(1):

• Are governed by a reasonableness standard; and
• Do not require detailed, individualized findings on the abusive litigant’s ability to pay;

the Court enhances the statute’s practical effectiveness. Victims are more likely to seek and obtain relief when:

• They can recover the actual, reasonable costs incurred in defending against abusive filings; and
• They are not left bearing the financial burden of restraining their abuser’s misuse of the courts.

B. Guidance for Trial Courts

The decision provides concrete guidance to Vermont trial courts:

• Use the lodestar method to assess fee requests under § 1184(b)(1).
• Limit fees to work reasonably attributable to:
  • Responding to abusive litigation; and
  • Securing the abusive-litigation order.
• Explain the reasoning sufficiently in the findings and order (what fees were included, why the hours and rates are reasonable, why any adjustments were or were not made).
• Consider financial information if presented, but:
  • Do not treat it as a mandatory or overriding factor; and
  • Recognize that full reasonable compensation may be warranted despite a litigant’s protest of inability to pay.

C. Implications for Litigants and Counsel

For victims of abusive litigation and their lawyers:

• Maintaining careful time records and itemized billing will be essential to support a lodestar-based fee application;
• Attorneys should document the linkage between specific tasks and:
  • Responding to abusive filings; and
  • Pursuing the abusive-litigation order.
• They can confidently seek full reasonable compensation under § 1184(b)(1), knowing that courts are not required to drastically discount fees due to an abuser’s asserted financial hardship.

For alleged abusive litigants:

• The decision underscores that self-representation and limited means will not excuse repeated baseless filings or shield them from fee liability.
• Arguments about inability to pay will be weighed—but not necessarily favored—within the broader reasonableness analysis.

D. Relationship to Rule 11 and Other Sanctions Regimes

The opinion carefully distinguishes—but does not displace—Rule 11:

• Rule 11 remains a powerful deterrent and remedial mechanism, with a deterrence-focused, parsimony-limited sanctions regime;
• Section 1184 creates an additional, specialized remedy tailored to the context of abusive litigation by former partners and abusers;
• In future cases, courts can deploy both tools where appropriate, but the scope and conditions of fee awards under § 1184 are not constrained by Rule 11’s parsimony language.

This dual-track approach allows courts to tailor sanctions and remedies to both:

• Systemic concerns about litigation abuse (Rule 11); and
• Individualized protection and compensation for victims (15 V.S.A. §§ 1181–1185).

VII. Conclusion

Knapp (Dasler) v. Dasler, 2025 VT 66, is a significant elaboration of Vermont’s abusive-litigation statute. It establishes that:

• Attorney’s fees awarded under 15 V.S.A. § 1184(b)(1) are governed by a reasonableness standard, implemented through the lodestar method;
• There is no requirement that the trial court make individualized findings on the abusive litigant’s ability to pay, nor to apply the divorce “suit money” framework focused on needs and ability;
• The abusive-litigation statute is victim-centered and not bounded by Rule 11’s parsimony requirement, enabling full reasonable compensation for the costs of responding to abusive litigation;
• Attempts to relitigate retroactivity and prior conduct are barred as collateral attacks on issues already decided; and
• The right of access to the courts does not extend to using litigation as a tool of harassment, and financial hardship does not immunize an abusive litigant from fee liability.

As Vermont’s courts and practitioners continue to implement the abusive-litigation statute, this decision offers a clear, structured framework: focus on the reasonableness of the victim’s fees and the protective purpose of the statute, not on the abuser’s ability to pay. In doing so, the Court reinforces the judiciary’s role in ensuring that the courts are forums for resolving disputes, not instruments of ongoing abuse.