Reasonable Suspicion to Prolong a Traffic Stop May Be Grounded in Pre‑Stop Evasion, Persistent Nervousness, Vague Itinerary, and Unclear Vehicle Authorization

Introduction

In United States v. Marco Galvan, No. 24-10734 (11th Cir. Mar. 31, 2025) (per curiam) (unpublished), the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the denial of a suppression motion stemming from a traffic stop on Interstate 20 near Birmingham, Alabama. The case presents a textbook application of Rodriguez v. United States and the Eleventh Circuit’s en banc decision in United States v. Campbell on when an officer may conduct unrelated investigative steps during a traffic stop. The key issue was whether an officer had reasonable suspicion to prolong the stop for non-traffic inquiries—specifically, for calling a partner, running license-plate reader checks, and probing about potential contraband—before the driver consented to a search that uncovered nearly eleven kilograms of cocaine.

The panel held that the totality of circumstances—including the driver’s pre-stop exit behavior suggestive of evasion, persistent nervousness even after assurance of only a warning, lack of a driver’s license in hand, unclear authorization to operate a recently purchased vehicle not owned by the driver, and vague or conflicting travel and work details (including the driver traveling away from his stated destination)—created reasonable suspicion sufficient to justify the brief prolongation. This commentary unpacks the court’s reasoning, the precedents it relied upon, and the practical implications for law enforcement and defense practitioners.

Summary of the Opinion

Officer Edwards stopped Marco Galvan’s Nissan Altima for following too closely. Before lights were activated, Galvan exited the interstate—behavior the officer associated with avoiding police. During the encounter, Galvan appeared nervous and “shaking,” lacked his driver’s license and proof of insurance, presented a non-governmental ID card, stated he was from Texas, said the car belonged to his uncle but could not verify ownership details, and provided vague and inconsistent information about his work, hotel, and itinerary (including traveling away from Birmingham when he said he was heading to a nearby Hilton).

Approximately five minutes into the stop, Edwards called his partner to discuss his suspicions and ran license-plate reader queries. The government assumed for purposes of appeal that these checks were unrelated to the traffic mission and added time, framing the appeal around whether reasonable suspicion supported that prolongation. The panel concluded that it did, relying on the cumulative weight of evasive behavior, persistent nervousness, lack of documentation or verification, and inconsistent/vague travel plans. The court also noted in a footnote that continuing to detain Galvan to verify his out-of-state license would itself have been within the stop’s mission, and that the license was in fact confirmed later through a database not available to the stopping officer—after Galvan voluntarily consented to the search that revealed cocaine. The denial of the motion to suppress and the resulting conviction were affirmed.

Analysis

1) Procedural Posture and Standard of Review

The appeal followed a conditional guilty plea preserving the suppression issue. The district court had adopted a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation crediting the officer’s testimony (including observations of shaking and continued nervousness) and finding reasonable suspicion to extend the stop. On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit applied the familiar mixed standard: clear-error review for factual findings (with substantial deference to credibility determinations) and de novo review for legal conclusions. See United States v. Lewis, 674 F.3d 1298, 1302–03 (11th Cir. 2012). The court viewed the facts in the light most favorable to the government as the prevailing party below.

2) Legal Framework Governing Traffic Stops

Mission of a stop: A traffic stop justifies investigation of the violation and ordinary safety-related inquiries. See Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348, 354–55 (2015).
Ordinary inquiries: Checking driver’s license, warrants, registration, and proof of insurance; questions about travel plans and vehicle ownership are generally within the stop’s ordinary scope. See Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 355; United States v. Braddy, 11 F.4th 1298, 1310–11 (11th Cir. 2021).
Prolongation rule: An officer may conduct unrelated checks if they do not prolong the stop. If they do add time, the officer must have reasonable suspicion. See United States v. Campbell, 26 F.4th 860, 884 (11th Cir. 2022) (en banc) (defining unlawful prolongation as an unrelated inquiry that adds time without reasonable suspicion).
Reasonable suspicion: A low threshold focusing on probabilities and totality of circumstances, permitting commonsense inferences about human behavior, but requiring more than a hunch. See United States v. Gonzalez‑Zea, 995 F.3d 1297, 1302–03 (11th Cir. 2021); United States v. Acosta, 363 F.3d 1141, 1145 (11th Cir. 2004).

3) Precedents Cited and How They Shaped the Outcome

Rodriguez v. United States: Anchors the requirement that tasks unrelated to the traffic mission cannot measurably extend the stop absent reasonable suspicion. The panel applied Rodriguez’s mission concept, but, because the government assumed prolongation, the dispositive question became whether reasonable suspicion existed at the time unrelated steps were taken.
United States v. Campbell (en banc): Provided the Eleventh Circuit’s three-part articulation of unlawful prolongation. The court’s analysis implicitly tracked Campbell: the unrelated actions (radioing a partner, LPR queries) were assumed to add time; the court found the missing element—reasonable suspicion—was present, thereby validating the extension.
United States v. Braddy: Confirmed that questions about travel plans and vehicle ownership are ordinarily permissible. This narrowed the universe of what might count as “unrelated,” while also supporting the legitimacy of Edwards’s early questions that revealed inconsistencies.
United States v. Gonzalez‑Zea and United States v. Acosta: These cases emphasize that reasonable suspicion can arise from lawfully ambiguous or entirely legal behavior when viewed in totality. The panel explicitly acknowledged that each cited fact could have an innocent explanation, but totality controlled.
United States v. Bishop: Endorsed the relevance of nervousness and evasive behavior and clarified that facts with innocent explanations may still contribute to reasonable suspicion. The court relied on Bishop to legitimize weight assigned to Galvan’s exit behavior and demeanor.
United States v. Pruitt: Recognized that an inability to offer proof of ownership or authorization to operate a vehicle supports reasonable suspicion. Galvan’s lack of a license at hand, non-governmental ID, and uncertain ownership details fit this factor.
United States v. Boyce: Inconsistencies in travel plans (especially conflicting answers about destination) can raise suspicion of drug activity—drivers typically know where they are going. The panel found Galvan’s itinerary and hotel details vague and inconsistent with his actual route.
United States v. Simms: Continued nervousness even after being told the stop will result only in a warning is probative. The panel treated Galvan’s persistent nervousness as more than initial stop anxiety.
United States v. Lewis: Guided the deferential review of credibility findings, important because the officer’s testimony about shaking and nervousness was contested.

4) The Court’s Legal Reasoning Applied to the Facts

The government assumed that when Officer Edwards radioed his partner and ran license-plate reader queries, he had ventured into unrelated tasks that added time to the stop. The Eleventh Circuit accepted that framing and asked one question: At that point, did the officer already have reasonable suspicion of criminal activity?

The panel answered yes, identifying several interlocking factors that together created a particularized and objective basis for suspicion:

Evasive behavior: Galvan exited the interstate after the patrol car pulled behind him, before any lights or siren, consistent with avoidance. See Bishop.
Persistent nervousness: Shaking and continued visible anxiety even after being told he would receive only a warning, which the court has treated as probative. See Simms.
Identity and authorization gaps: No license in hand; a non-governmental ID unfamiliar to the officer; uncertainty about whether the uncle had changed the title; and lack of registration or other proof of authorization to operate the vehicle. See Pruitt.
Vague and conflicting travel/work plans: More than 12 hours of driving from Texas, inability to give a concrete hotel address, suggesting he was staying at “the Hilton” while traveling away from the only nearby Hilton, and uncertainty about the length of the job. See Boyce.

While each datum has an innocuous explanation, the court emphasized totality: reasonable suspicion may arise from a constellation of individually innocent facts. See Bishop; Acosta. The officer’s commonsense judgments—rooted in experience with highway interdiction—were given “due weight.” The body-worn camera corroborated the pacing and fidgeting, and the district court’s credibility findings (that Galvan was shaking) received deference under Lewis.

Two additional points reinforce the panel’s conclusion:

Timing matters: The court located reasonable suspicion at the moment the alleged prolongation began (radioing the partner and conducting LPR checks), thereby avoiding any Rodriguez problem.
Mission-based detention as an alternative: In a footnote, the court observed that verifying a driver’s license is part of the stop’s mission; officers were entitled to detain Galvan for that purpose. Notably, Galvan’s out-of-state license was confirmed only later via a database not accessible to the stopping officer and after consent to search. This observation supplies a separate, mission-related justification that likely covered some or all of the elapsed time even without reasonable suspicion.

5) Impact and Practical Implications

Although unpublished and non-precedential, the opinion is a useful indicator of how Eleventh Circuit panels apply Rodriguez and Campbell to common interdiction fact patterns. Several takeaways emerge:

Weight of “ordinary” indicators in aggregate: Pre-stop evasive maneuvers, persistent nervousness, borrowed vehicles with unclear paperwork, and itinerary inconsistencies—each commonly encountered and often innocent—can, in combination, justify extension of a stop.
Early formation of reasonable suspicion: Officers who quickly articulate a totality-based rationale before undertaking unrelated tasks can avoid suppression under Rodriguez/Campbell. The panel’s focus on the officer’s state of knowledge at the precise moment of prolongation underscores this.
License verification as a safety valve: Because license checks are “mission” tasks, continued efforts to verify an out-of-state license may permissibly extend the stop. Here, the panel flagged that verification required a database the stopping officer could not access, implicitly recognizing that logistical realities affect how long mission tasks reasonably take.
Role of body-worn cameras and credibility: Video evidence plus deference to trial-level credibility calls can be outcome determinative, especially regarding contested demeanor observations (shaking, pacing, fidgeting).
Consent as a separate ground: Once reasonable suspicion exists, subsequent voluntary consent will typically be upheld. Even if a defendant challenges prolongation, an alternative mission-based justification (license verification) may insulate the detention window preceding consent.

Anticipated effects on litigation strategies:

For law enforcement: Document timeline precisely; articulate specific, particularized facts as they accrue; tie itinerary inconsistencies to observable geography; and note persistence (not mere presence) of nervousness.
For defense counsel: Scrutinize the sequence of events minute-by-minute; challenge whether the officer’s “commonsense” inferences (e.g., the one Hilton nearby) are factually accurate; explore whether mission tasks could have been completed more quickly; and marshal benign explanations (work travel unfamiliarity, reliance on coworkers/GPS, borrowed car norms) while emphasizing the absence of objective corroboration of criminality in database checks.
For trial courts: Make explicit credibility findings and anchor reasonable suspicion to the specific moment of alleged prolongation. Detailed findings facilitate deferential review.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Reasonable suspicion: A modest standard requiring specific, articulable facts suggesting criminal activity under the totality of circumstances. It is less than probable cause and can arise from behavior that is entirely lawful when viewed in isolation.
Prolongation of a traffic stop: Police may ask questions and run checks related to the original traffic mission. If they pursue unrelated investigations that add time, they must have reasonable suspicion at that moment. If no time is added, no reasonable suspicion is required.
“Mission” tasks: Core functions tied to the traffic violation and safety—license, registration, insurance, warrants checks, and routine questions about travel plans and vehicle ownership.
Totality of circumstances: The court considers all facts together rather than in isolation. Even if each fact is innocuous, their combination can justify suspicion.
Standard of review: Appellate courts defer to trial courts on fact and credibility (clear error) but review legal conclusions (e.g., whether facts amount to reasonable suspicion) anew (de novo).
Unpublished, per curiam decision: A brief opinion issued by the court as a whole without a single judge’s authorship and not binding as precedent in the Eleventh Circuit, though often persuasive.

Conclusion

United States v. Galvan reinforces, within the Eleventh Circuit, that a cluster of commonplace indicators—pre-stop evasive behavior, persistent nervousness, gaps in license/authorization proof for a borrowed vehicle, and itinerary inconsistencies—can collectively establish reasonable suspicion sufficient to justify a brief prolongation of a traffic stop for unrelated investigative steps. The opinion also highlights an often underappreciated, independent ground for continued detention: completion of mission tasks such as verifying an out-of-state driver’s license, which may reasonably take time due to database limitations and inter-agency coordination.

While unpublished, the decision provides practical guidance: officers should contemporaneously articulate the facts giving rise to suspicion at the precise moment of alleged prolongation, and defense counsel should challenge both the factual premises of “commonsense” inferences and the timing of when reasonable suspicion emerged. The case thus occupies a significant, if non-precedential, place in the evolving application of Rodriguez and Campbell to roadside interdiction, signaling the Eleventh Circuit’s continued willingness to credit totality-based reasonable suspicion where officers can point to concrete, particularized observations beyond a mere hunch.