Reasonable Suspicion to Frisk Vehicle Passengers Based on Driver’s Hidden Firearm: Commentary on United States v. Ducksworth (5th Cir. 2025)

I. Introduction

In United States v. Ducksworth, No. 24‑60473 (5th Cir. Nov. 26, 2025), the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit addressed three distinct issues:

Whether a police officer had reasonable suspicion under the Fourth Amendment to conduct a pat-down search (a Terry frisk) of a car’s passenger after discovering a concealed firearm on the driver;
Whether, after the Fifth Circuit’s Second Amendment decision in United States v. Diaz, the government must prove a specific predicate felony to sustain a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1); and
Whether § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional, either facially or as applied to a defendant on parole.

Judge Irma Carrillo Ramirez, writing for a unanimous panel (Judges Smith, Stewart, and Ramirez), affirmed the conviction and sentence of Andrew Ducksworth for being a felon in possession of a firearm. The opinion clarifies several points of law, most notably:

For the first time in the Fifth Circuit, that a driver’s possession of a concealed firearm—especially when combined with dishonesty, nighttime conditions, a high‑crime area, and the officer being outnumbered—can contribute to a “reasonable, individualized suspicion” that a passenger is also armed and dangerous, justifying a Terry frisk.
That Diaz did not change the elements of § 922(g)(1) or require the government to plead or prove a historically analogous “founding-era felony”; a stipulation tracking the statutory language is sufficient to establish the prior-felony element.
That facial and as-applied Second Amendment challenges to § 922(g)(1) remain foreclosed in key circumstances, particularly where the defendant is under criminal justice supervision, as reinforced by United States v. Kimble.

Taken together, Ducksworth is an important Fifth Circuit opinion at the intersection of Fourth Amendment search-and-seizure law and post‑Bruen Second Amendment and § 922(g)(1) litigation.

II. Factual and Procedural Background

A. The Traffic Stop and Discovery of the Firearms

Around 9:00 p.m. on November 29, 2021, a Hattiesburg police officer stopped a vehicle for a defective tag light—an undisputedly lawful stop. The driver:

Had no identification or proof of insurance;
Was asked to step out and was subjected to a protective pat-down; and
Had a “hard, solid object” between his legs, which he initially denied was a weapon but ultimately admitted was a firearm.

The officer handcuffed the driver and placed him in the squad car. He then turned to the passenger, Andrew Ducksworth. Ducksworth stated he was paralyzed from the waist down. The officer:

Asked Ducksworth to raise his hands, which he did;
Began a pat-down while informing Ducksworth that the driver had a firearm;
Felt an object between Ducksworth’s legs and remarked, “you’ve got one too”; and
After Ducksworth denied it was a firearm, handcuffed him and awaited backup.

Officers removed a loaded firearm from Ducksworth’s pants and learned he had a prior felony conviction, leading to his arrest for felon in possession.

B. Motion to Suppress and Evidentiary Hearing

Charged under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), Ducksworth moved to suppress the firearm, arguing that:

The officer lacked reasonable suspicion to believe Ducksworth was armed and dangerous; and
Thus, the pat-down and seizure violated the Fourth Amendment.

At the suppression hearing:

The officer testified in detail about the stop and frisk;
Bodycam and dashcam footage corroborated his testimony; and
He testified that the location was a “high‑crime area” based on his patrol experience.

The district court found the officer credible and denied the motion, holding that reasonable suspicion justified the frisk.

C. Motion to Dismiss the Indictment

Ducksworth next moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that § 922(g)(1) violated the Second Amendment:

Facially: i.e., in all (or nearly all) applications; and
As applied to him personally.

The district court denied this motion as well.

D. Bench Trial, Stipulation, and Appeal

At a bench trial, Ducksworth:

Stipulated to every element of § 922(g)(1); and
Presented no evidence in his defense.

He was convicted and sentenced to 36 months’ imprisonment and three years’ supervised release. On appeal, he challenged:

The denial of his motion to suppress;
The sufficiency of the evidence (raised for the first time on appeal); and
The denial of his motion to dismiss the indictment (facial and as-applied Second Amendment challenges).

III. Summary of the Opinion

The Fifth Circuit affirmed in all respects:

Fourth Amendment / Suppression. The court held that the officer had reasonable suspicion to believe Ducksworth was armed and dangerous under Terry and its progeny. Key facts included:
- The driver’s concealed firearm;
- The driver’s lie about that firearm;
- Nighttime conditions in a high‑crime area;
- The driver’s lack of ID and insurance; and
- The officer being outnumbered (one officer, two occupants).
Taken together, those circumstances created a “reasonable, individualized suspicion” that justified a pat-down of the passenger.
Sufficiency of the Evidence / Elements of § 922(g)(1). The court rejected Ducksworth’s argument that, after Diaz, the government must prove a specific predicate felony that historically supports “permanent lifetime disarmament.”
- The court reaffirmed that the elements of § 922(g)(1) remain as previously described.
- It held that a stipulation using the statutory language (“convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term in excess of one year”) conclusively establishes the prior-felony element, citing United States v. Broadnax.
- Diaz did not and could not alter the statute’s elements; it addressed Second Amendment challenges, not sufficiency of evidence.
Second Amendment Challenge. The court:
- Noted that Ducksworth conceded his facial challenge was foreclosed by United States v. Diaz.
- Held that his as-applied challenge was foreclosed by United States v. Kimble, because he possessed a firearm while on parole—an analogous status to supervised release considered in Kimble.

The conviction and sentence for felon in possession under § 922(g)(1) were therefore affirmed.

IV. Analysis

A. The Fourth Amendment Holding: Passenger Frisks After a Driver’s Hidden Firearm

1. The Terry Framework

The court applied the classic two-step framework from Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), and Fifth Circuit precedent:

Was the stop justified at its inception?
Was the subsequent search or seizure reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified the stop?

A Terry frisk (pat‑down) is a narrow exception to the warrant requirement. It is permitted when:

The officer has reasonable suspicion, based on “specific and articulable facts,” that the person is armed and dangerous;
The suspicion is objective and individualized; and
The totality of the circumstances, known to the officer at the time, would lead a reasonably prudent person to believe that his safety, or that of others, is in danger.

Key citations:

United States v. Baker, 47 F.3d 691, 693 (5th Cir. 1995): restates the armed-and-dangerous standard.
United States v. Darrell, 945 F.3d 929, 932 (5th Cir. 2019): reasonable suspicion must have an objective basis.
United States v. Hanson, 801 F.2d 757, 762 (5th Cir. 1986); Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 334 n.2 (1990): suspicion must be “reasonable” and “individualized.”
United States v. Silva, 957 F.2d 157, 160 (5th Cir. 1992): totality-of-the-circumstances analysis.
Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 271 (2000): only what the officers knew before initiating the pat-down can be considered.

2. The Ybarra Problem: Guilt by Association?

Ducksworth’s central Fourth Amendment argument relied on Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85 (1979). There, the Supreme Court rejected guilt by association, holding that:

“A person’s mere propinquity to others independently suspected of criminal activity does not, without more, give rise to probable cause to search that person.” (emphasis added)

In Ybarra:

Officers had a warrant to search a tavern and its bartender.
They frisked a patron (Ybarra) about whom they “knew nothing in particular.”
Ybarra had no connection to the named suspect beyond being present in the public bar.

The Court found that such a patron cannot be searched based solely on proximity to others under suspicion. Ducksworth argued by analogy:

The driver’s possession and concealment of a firearm cannot, by itself, justify a pat-down of the passenger;
Otherwise, the officer would be engaging in the kind of guilt-by-association condemned in Ybarra.

3. Companionship as a Factor: Houghton, Wilson, and Silva

The Fifth Circuit rejected the notion that Ybarra categorically forbids considering a person’s association with a suspect. Several precedents make clear that companionship can be one factor in the totality-of-circumstances analysis:

Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 304 (1999): The Supreme Court observed that a “car passenger—unlike the unwitting tavern patron in Ybarra—will often be engaged in a common enterprise with the driver.”
United States v. Wilson, 143 F.4th 647, 660 (5th Cir. 2025): The Fifth Circuit recently reaffirmed that a suspect’s “companionship with or propinquity to an individual independently suspected of criminal activity is a factor to be considered in assessing the reasonableness” of police conduct (quoting United States v. Thomas, 997 F.3d 603, 611 (5th Cir. 2021)).
United States v. Silva, 957 F.2d 157, 161 (5th Cir. 1992): Prior Fifth Circuit cases had already treated companionship/propinquity as one of several factors bearing on reasonable suspicion.

Thus, while Ybarra prohibits bare guilt-by-association, it does not prevent courts from considering:

The nature of the association (e.g., driver-passenger in the same car versus a stranger in a public bar); and
The presence of additional specific facts suggesting joint involvement or elevated danger.

4. The First Circuit’s Tiru-Plaza and the Fifth Circuit’s Adoption

The Fifth Circuit noted that it had “not yet considered whether a driver’s possession of a firearm can create reasonable suspicion to pat-down his passenger.” It turned to the First Circuit’s decision in United States v. Tiru-Plaza, 766 F.3d 111 (1st Cir. 2014), which addressed a very similar scenario:

Police saw a firearm in the driver’s waistband.
They then frisked the passenger and found another firearm.
The passenger, invoking Ybarra, argued that his mere association with the armed driver could not justify the frisk.

The First Circuit distinguished Ybarra based on Houghton:

Unlike a random bar patron, a passenger is often engaged in a “common enterprise” with the driver.
The officers in Tiru‑Plaza were outnumbered, it was dark, and the circumstances reasonably appeared volatile.

The First Circuit concluded that these facts created a reasonable concern for officer safety, sufficient to support the passenger frisk.

The Fifth Circuit expressly agreed with this reasoning. Quoting the First Circuit, it emphasized that:

“It would be beyond folly for our court to ask police officers to ignore the clear relevance of discovering a hidden firearm on the driver” — especially where the driver had lied about having a weapon.

5. The Fifth Circuit’s Application: What Made the Suspicion “Individualized”?

The opinion carefully aggregates several facts to show that the suspicion was not mere guilt-by-association, but “reasonable, individualized suspicion” as required by Buie:

Driver’s concealment and dishonesty
- The driver possessed a hidden firearm.
- He initially lied about it—an indicator of criminal intent and risk.
Shared vehicle context and likely common enterprise
- As in Houghton, occupants of the same car are often engaged in a common enterprise.
- The same weapon-concealment method (between the legs) eventually turned out to apply to both individuals.
Administrative and situational red flags
- The driver had no identification or proof of insurance.
- The stop occurred at night in a high‑crime area, which the officer attested to based on field experience.
- There was a single officer confronting two occupants—he was outnumbered.

Ducksworth attempted to dispute the “high‑crime area” finding, arguing that the record lacked sufficient proof. The Fifth Circuit pointed to its precedent:

Rucker v. Marshall, 119 F.4th 395, 401 (5th Cir. 2024); United States v. Hill, 752 F.3d 1029, 1035 (5th Cir. 2014); United States v. Flowers, 6 F.4th 651, 656 (5th Cir. 2021): Courts routinely accept an officer’s testimony that an area has a high incidence of criminal activity.

Because the district court’s “high‑crime area” finding was “plausible in light of” the officer’s testimony, it was not clearly erroneous.

Importantly, the Fifth Circuit did not hold that the driver’s gun alone automatically justifies a passenger frisk. Instead, it treated the driver’s firearm as a highly relevant factor, particularly when combined with:

Driver’s deception;
Absence of ID/insurance;
High‑crime area at night; and
Officer being outnumbered.

On those combined facts, “a reasonably prudent man in the circumstances would be warranted in the belief that his safety or that of others was in danger,” thereby validating the pat‑down.

The court explicitly declined to reach whether Ducksworth’s alleged noncompliance with instructions was an additional factor, because the other circumstances alone sufficed.

6. Doctrinal Significance

This is the first Fifth Circuit opinion to directly address whether a driver’s firearm can support a reasonable suspicion that a passenger is armed and dangerous. The rule emerging from Ducksworth can be summarized:

Within the Fifth Circuit, discovery of a concealed firearm on a driver is a strong and proper factor in assessing reasonable suspicion that a passenger is armed and dangerous—especially where the discovery occurs in a high‑risk setting (nighttime, high‑crime area, officer outnumbered) and the driver has been dishonest about the weapon or other circumstances.

The opinion harmonizes Ybarra with Houghton and the First Circuit’s Tiru‑Plaza, explicitly confirming that companionship and car co-occupancy can play a significant role in the officer-safety calculus, so long as the suspicion remains individualized and supported by specific, articulable facts beyond mere proximity.

B. Sufficiency of the Evidence and the Elements of § 922(g)(1)

1. The Elements of § 922(g)(1)

The court reiterated the familiar elements for a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), as previously summarized in United States v. Johnson, 990 F.3d 392, 400 (5th Cir. 2021):

The defendant had a previous conviction punishable by a term of imprisonment exceeding one year;
He knowingly possessed a firearm;
The firearm traveled in or affected interstate commerce; and
He knew at the time of possession that he had previously been convicted of a crime punishable by more than one year (the knowledge requirement from Rehaif v. United States).

Ducksworth attacked the first element.

2. Ducksworth’s Theory: Diaz Adds a “Predicate-Felony-Justification” Element

Ducksworth argued that after the Fifth Circuit’s decision in United States v. Diaz, 116 F.4th 458 (5th Cir. 2024), the government must prove:

A specific prior felony conviction; and
That this particular felony is of a type that supports “permanent lifetime disarmament” under the Second Amendment, in light of the historical-tradition test articulated in New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen.

From this, he claimed the record was “devoid” of evidence of an essential element, because he had stipulated only that:

he “was previously convicted in a court of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term in excess of one year,”

and not to the identity or characteristics of the specific prior felony.

3. The Court’s Response: Statutory Elements vs. Constitutional Validity

The Fifth Circuit’s response is straightforward and significant:

Diaz addressed the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1) under the Second Amendment, not the statutory elements of the offense.
It did not add a new evidentiary or elemental requirement that the government identify a particular founding-era-analogous felony or show that the specific predicate supports permanent disarmament.
Citing McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 111 (1993), the court reminded that courts “are not free to rewrite statutory text.”

The opinion explains the actual contribution of Diaz:

Diaz held that § 922(g)(1) is facially constitutional, but
It “left the door open” for as-applied challenges because “not all felons today would have been considered felons at the founding.”

That is a separate question from what must be proved as an element at trial. Ducksworth, the panel notes, “conflates as-applied challenges with sufficiency review.”

4. The Role of Stipulations and Old Chief

The Supreme Court, in Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 186 (1997), recognized that in § 922(g)(1) prosecutions, the government:

Is not required to allege the specific prior felony in the indictment; and
May accept a stipulation from the defendant that he has been convicted of a crime punishable by more than one year, thereby avoiding potentially prejudicial details of the prior conviction.

The Fifth Circuit has followed this approach, including in:

United States v. Johnson, 880 F.3d 226, 232 (5th Cir. 2018) (noting Old Chief and reaffirming that allegation of a specific predicate felony is not required).

Ducksworth simply reaffirms that rule: the statute requires proof that the defendant has been convicted of a crime punishable by more than one year, not proof of a historically satisfying predicate felony at the guilt phase.

5. Broadnax and the Binding Effect of a Statutory-Language Stipulation

The court then relied on United States v. Broadnax, 601 F.3d 336 (5th Cir. 2010), which held:

“Where a defendant’s stipulation to a prior felony offense uses the very language of the statute that defines that element of the offense, he has stipulated that the element is satisfied as a matter of law.”

Because Ducksworth stipulated in terms that mirror § 922(g)(1):

that he “was previously convicted in a court of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term in excess of one year,”

he “stipulated that the element is satisfied as a matter of law.”

Given that the sufficiency challenge was raised for the first time on appeal and subject to plain error review, the court had no difficulty concluding that:

There was no error in the district court’s acceptance of the stipulation; and
Even under a less deferential standard, the evidence was sufficient on the prior-felony element.

Put simply, the government does not need to:

Prove which particular felony forms the § 922(g)(1) predicate at trial; or
Demonstrate that that predicate, in isolation, historically warrants permanent disarmament at the elements stage.

Those questions, if raised, belong in a constitutional (facial or as-applied) challenge, not a sufficiency-of-the-evidence attack.

C. The Second Amendment Challenge: Diaz, Kimble, and Defendants Under Supervision

1. Facial Challenge Foreclosed by Diaz

Ducksworth conceded that his facial Second Amendment challenge was foreclosed by United States v. Diaz, 116 F.4th 458 (5th Cir. 2024), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 2822 (2025). In Diaz:

The Fifth Circuit, applying Bruen’s historical-tradition framework, upheld § 922(g)(1) against a facial attack.
The court recognized, however, that the Founding-era concept of “felony” was narrower and did not necessarily cover all modern felonies.
It therefore left open the possibility that some as-applied challenges could succeed in narrow circumstances.

Accordingly, all facial challenges to § 922(g)(1) in the Fifth Circuit are effectively controlled by Diaz.

2. As-Applied Challenge Foreclosed by Kimble

Ducksworth also raised an as-applied Second Amendment challenge. Crucially, he was on parole at the time of the firearm possession. The panel cited United States v. Kimble, 142 F.4th 308 (5th Cir. 2025), which held:

“[I]f a defendant is caught possessing a gun while out on supervised release for a prior felony sentence, his as-applied challenge will . . . fail.”

The logic is that individuals still serving a criminal sentence (even outside prison walls) do not enjoy the same measure of Second Amendment protections as law‑abiding, fully free citizens. Supervised release—and by extension parole—marks a continuing penal status with historically recognized restrictions on liberty, including weapons possession.

By analogy, because Ducksworth was on parole when he possessed the firearm, his as-applied challenge fails under Kimble’s rule.

3. Clarifying the Distinction Between Constitutional Challenges and Elements

The pairing of Diaz and Kimble—and now Ducksworth—reinforces a critical doctrinal distinction:

Elements and Sufficiency:
- Are about what the government must prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, to convict.
- Exist in the statutory text (§ 922(g)(1)), not in later constitutional decisions.
Facial or As-Applied Constitutional Challenges:
- Ask whether, even if all elements are proved, the statute can lawfully be applied under the Constitution (here, the Second Amendment).
- Are litigated via motions to dismiss, motions to vacate, or the like—not by relabeling the constitutional question as a missing element.

Ducksworth makes clear that criminal defendants in the Fifth Circuit may not:

Attempt to “smuggle” Second Amendment arguments into a sufficiency-of-the-evidence framework; or
Claim that Diaz created new elements that the government must now prove at trial.

V. Complex Concepts Simplified

A. Terry Stops and Frisks

A “Terry stop” is a brief, investigative detention based on reasonable suspicion (less than probable cause) that a person is engaged in criminal activity. A “Terry frisk” is a limited pat-down of a person’s outer clothing during such a stop, justified only when the officer reasonably suspects the person is armed and dangerous. It is not a full search; it is focused purely on discovering weapons for officer safety.

B. Reasonable Suspicion vs. Probable Cause

Reasonable suspicion:
- Requires specific, articulable facts and rational inferences that criminal activity is afoot or that the person is armed and dangerous.
- Is a lower standard than probable cause.
- Is evaluated under the totality of the circumstances.
Probable cause:
- Requires a higher degree of likelihood that a crime has been committed and that the person or place searched is connected to it.
- Is generally required for arrests and full searches.

C. High-Crime Areas

“High‑crime area” is a factor courts allow officers to consider in forming reasonable suspicion. It does not by itself justify a stop or frisk, but:

It can make otherwise ambiguous behavior appear more suspicious;
Officers’ testimony that they are familiar with crime rates in a given area is generally credited, absent contrary evidence;
Courts, including the Fifth Circuit, give some deference to such testimony, but still require additional, individualized facts.

D. Exclusionary Rule and Motions to Suppress

The exclusionary rule bars the use of evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment. A defendant files a motion to suppress to ask the court to exclude such evidence. Courts:

Review factual findings (what actually happened) for “clear error” (deferential); and
Review legal conclusions (whether what happened violated the Fourth Amendment) de novo (no deference).

E. Facial vs. As-Applied Constitutional Challenges

Facial challenge:
- Asserts that a statute is unconstitutional in virtually all of its applications.
- If successful, the statute is invalid for everyone.
As-applied challenge:
- Argues that the statute is unconstitutional as applied to a particular person or specific facts.
- Even if the statute is generally valid, some individuals may fall outside its permissible scope.

F. Plain Error Review

When a defendant raises an argument for the first time on appeal (for example, a sufficiency challenge not raised below), the appellate court reviews for plain error. Under this standard, the defendant must show:

There was an error;
The error was clear or obvious under current law;
The error affected his substantial rights (e.g., likely changed the outcome); and
The error seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.

This is a demanding standard; many claims fail at one or more steps.

G. Stipulations at Trial

A stipulation is an agreement between the parties that certain facts are true and need not be proved by evidence. In criminal cases, defendants often stipulate to:

Prior-felony status in § 922(g)(1) cases, to avoid revealing the name or nature of the prior felony to the jury (which might be unduly prejudicial).

When a defendant stipulates in the language of the statute, courts treat that element as conclusively established. It cannot later be attacked as if there were insufficient evidence to prove it.

VI. Impact and Future Implications

A. For Fourth Amendment Law and Police Practices

Ducksworth has concrete implications for law enforcement and litigation in the Fifth Circuit:

Expanded reliance on driver’s firearm to frisk passengers:
- Officers are now clearly permitted to treat discovery of a concealed firearm on a driver as a major factor supporting reasonable suspicion that a passenger may also be armed.
- This is especially true when:
  - The driver lied about the weapon;
  - The stop is at night in a high-crime area;
  - The officer is alone and outnumbered; and
  - Other irregularities exist (e.g., no ID, no insurance).
Limits remain: no automatic passenger frisks:
- The decision does not adopt a per se rule that any firearm on a driver always justifies frisking all passengers.
- Courts will still examine the totality of the circumstances and demand individualized suspicion.
- Defense counsel can argue that in less dangerous settings (daytime, non‑high-crime areas, multiple officers, cooperative behavior), the balance may shift against a frisk.

Nonetheless, the practical reality is that Ducksworth will be cited by prosecutors to defend passenger frisks whenever a driver is discovered to be armed, particularly in marginal cases where officer-safety concerns are not overwhelming but are present.

B. For Second Amendment and § 922(g)(1) Litigation

On the Second Amendment front, Ducksworth reinforces several lines of Fifth Circuit doctrine:

§ 922(g)(1) remains broadly enforceable:
- Diaz forecloses facial challenges.
- Kimble and Ducksworth foreclose as-applied challenges for defendants under supervision (supervised release, parole).
As-applied challenges are conceptually narrow:
- They remain theoretically possible for some fully free, non-violent felons whose convictions might not fit founding-era traditions of disarmament.
- But they must be brought as constitutional motions, properly framed under Bruen, not as sufficiency attacks on the elements.

Defense attorneys must be precise in framing § 922(g)(1) challenges:

Elements:
- Challenge whether the government can prove the prior conviction, knowledge, possession, and interstate commerce.
Constitutionality:
- Raise facial or as-applied Second Amendment challenges under Diaz and Bruen, ideally via pretrial motions.
- Recognize that such challenges are highly unlikely to succeed when the defendant is on any form of sentence or supervision.

C. For Trial Practice: Stipulations and Record-Building

The opinion underscores several trial-practice lessons:

Be cautious with stipulations:
- Defendants who stipulate to a prior felony using statutory language will face severe obstacles in later claiming insufficiency of evidence on that element.
- If a future as-applied Second Amendment challenge hinges on the nature of the prior felony, counsel should consider whether and how to place the specifics into the record without unduly prejudicing the defendant before the factfinder.
Develop the Fourth Amendment factual record:
- Defense counsel should scrutinize and, where appropriate, challenge assertions that an area is “high crime.”
- Cross-examination should probe the officer’s knowledge, training, and basis for that characterization.
- Body and dashcam evidence should be carefully reviewed for compliance with instructions, demeanor, and any facts that might undercut claims of danger.

VII. Conclusion

United States v. Ducksworth is an important Fifth Circuit decision that does three main things:

Fourth Amendment: It holds that discovery of a concealed firearm on a driver—especially when the driver lies about it, the stop is in a high‑crime area at night, and the officer is outnumbered—can contribute to a “reasonable, individualized suspicion” that a passenger is armed and dangerous, justifying a Terry frisk. The court aligns itself with the First Circuit’s Tiru‑Plaza and harmonizes Ybarra with Houghton.
Elements and Sufficiency in § 922(g)(1) Prosecutions: It reaffirms that the government need only prove that the defendant has a prior conviction punishable by more than one year, not the identity or historical characteristics of that predicate felony. A stipulation that tracks the statutory language conclusively establishes that element, and Diaz did not alter the statute’s elements or impose a new “permanent disarmament” proof requirement.
Second Amendment Doctrine: It confirms that facial challenges to § 922(g)(1) are foreclosed by Diaz, and that as‑applied challenges by defendants who are still serving sentences (on supervised release or parole) are foreclosed by Kimble. Defendants may not repackage constitutional arguments as sufficiency-of-the-evidence claims.

In sum, Ducksworth clarifies the contours of reasonable suspicion in vehicle contexts and consolidates the Fifth Circuit’s emerging post‑Bruen framework for evaluating Second Amendment challenges to felon‑in‑possession prosecutions. It is likely to be a key citation in future cases involving passenger frisks during traffic stops and in ongoing litigation over § 922(g)(1)’s scope and application.