Reasonable Suspicion to Detain Managers of Unlicensed Bars; Deleted Undercover Texts Do Not Trigger Due‑Process Spoliation Absent Apparent Exculpatory Value or Bad Faith

Introduction

In United States v. Edward Burgess, No. 24-1497 (3d Cir. Mar. 31, 2025) (not precedential), the Third Circuit affirmed the denial of two defense motions in a felon-in-possession prosecution arising from an undercover raid of an unlicensed bar in Philadelphia. The appeal presented two recurring suppression and due-process issues:

Whether officers had reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigatory seizure of a person observed managing an establishment selling liquor without a license, even though he was not personally seen serving alcohol; and
Whether deletion of real-time text messages between undercover and raid officers warranted dismissal for spoliation under Trombetta/Youngblood.

The panel (Judges Shwartz, Krause, and Chung; opinion by Judge Chung) held that officers had reasonable suspicion to detain Burgess based on his managerial role and social-media admissions of ownership, coupled with observed ongoing unlicensed liquor sales, and that the “collective knowledge” doctrine imputed the undercover officer’s knowledge to the uniformed arrest team. On the spoliation claim, the court concluded that the deleted texts lacked apparent exculpatory value and that, in any event, there was no showing of bad faith; thus, due process did not require dismissal. The conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) was affirmed.

Summary of the Opinion

After undercover officers twice patronized the Glass Door Lounge and confirmed it was operating without a liquor license, they observed Edward Burgess performing managerial functions and identified him as a co-owner through social media. Coordinating by text with a nearby raid team, the undercover officers gave descriptions of suspects inside. When uniformed officers entered, two approached Burgess and took hold of his arms. Burgess resisted, retrieved a gun from his waistband, and tossed it; he was arrested and later convicted of being a felon in possession.

Burgess moved to suppress the firearm as the fruit of an unlawful seizure and moved to dismiss the indictment due to spoliation when officers failed to preserve the raid-night text messages. The district court denied both motions. On appeal:

Suppression: The Third Circuit held that officers had reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigatory seizure based on credible testimony that Burgess managed an establishment actively selling liquor without a license and had publicly claimed co-ownership. Pennsylvania law criminalizes unlicensed sales “directly or indirectly,” including via employees or agents, so management of the ongoing illicit operation supplied reasonable suspicion. The undercover officer’s knowledge was imputed to the uniformed officers under the collective knowledge doctrine. The firearm, discarded during the lawful seizure, was therefore admissible.
Spoliation/Due Process: Applying California v. Trombetta and Arizona v. Youngblood, the court concluded the deleted texts (physical descriptions of suspects and crowd counts) did not have apparent exculpatory value and that Burgess failed to prove bad faith in their deletion. Officers credibly testified they deleted the texts to protect undercover identities and safety. Without apparent exculpatory value or bad faith destruction of “potentially useful” evidence, no due-process violation occurred, and dismissal was unwarranted.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119 (2000): Cited for the definition and threshold of reasonable suspicion—less demanding than probable cause but requiring objective justification. The court used Wardlow to frame the analytical standard for the seizure.
United States v. Coggins, 986 F.2d 651 (3d Cir. 1993): Establishes that evidence must be suppressed if derived from an unlawful seizure and clarifies that abandonment precipitated by an unlawful seizure does not cleanse taint. The court referenced Coggins to explain why the firearm would have been suppressible if the seizure lacked reasonable suspicion; because the stop was lawful, abandonment did not matter.
United States v. Kole, 164 F.3d 164 (3d Cir. 1998) and United States v. Marcavage, 609 F.3d 264 (3d Cir. 2010): Both reinforce the deference owed to district-court credibility determinations and factfinding under the clear-error standard. These cases undergird the appellate court’s decision to accept the district court’s crediting of the undercover officers’ testimony about Burgess’s role and the content of the texts.
United States v. Whitfield, 634 F.3d 741 (3d Cir. 2010) and Rogers v. Powell, 120 F.3d 446 (3d Cir. 1997): Articulate the “collective knowledge” doctrine, which imputes the knowledge of an officer with reasonable suspicion/probable cause to other officers who act on that information. These precedents allowed the court to treat the raid-team seizure as justified by the undercover officer’s observations and identifications communicated via text.
California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479 (1984) and United States v. Haywood, 363 F.3d 200 (3d Cir. 2004): Trombetta sets the due-process standard for destroyed evidence with “apparent exculpatory value” not otherwise obtainable; Haywood applies Trombetta in the Third Circuit and supplies the “significant role in the defense” formulation. The panel used these to conclude the texts did not meet the exculpatory threshold.
Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51 (1988) and Lambert v. Blackwell, 387 F.3d 210 (3d Cir. 2004): Youngblood distinguishes “potentially useful” evidence from apparently exculpatory evidence and requires a showing of bad faith to establish a due-process violation for the former. Lambert acknowledges and applies Youngblood in the Third Circuit. The panel relied on this line to reject Burgess’s spoliation claim for lack of bad faith.
United States v. Perez, 280 F.3d 318 (3d Cir. 2002) and United States v. Menendez, 831 F.3d 155 (3d Cir. 2016): Provide the standards of review—plenary for legal conclusions; clear error for factual findings; and strong deference to the district court’s plausible view of the record. These informed the court’s affirmance of credibility-based rulings.

Legal Reasoning

1) Reasonable Suspicion for the Investigatory Seizure

The court accepted the district court’s finding that the officers conducted an investigative (Terry) seizure, not an arrest, and Burgess did not contest that characterization on appeal. The question, therefore, narrowed to whether reasonable suspicion existed.

Two undercover officers testified they observed Burgess moving in and out of staff-only areas, assisting bar staff, and otherwise acting as a manager. Social media postings corroborated that Burgess identified himself as a co-owner. On both undercover visits, alcohol was sold despite the absence of a license—confirmed by the Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board. This constellation of facts, viewed through the lens of 47 Pa. Stat. § 4-491(1), which prohibits unlicensed liquor sales made “by [a person] or by an employe or agent … either directly or indirectly,” reasonably suggested that a manager/owner who was present and assisting in ongoing operations was “indirectly” engaged in the illegal sale of alcohol.

Burgess argued that no officer observed him personally handling or serving alcohol or tobacco. The panel rejected this as too narrow: the Pennsylvania statute reaches indirect sales through employees and agents. Thus, his managerial role in a bar actively engaged in unlicensed sales supplied the minimal objective justification Wardlow requires for a stop.

Finally, although the uniformed raid team performed the actual seizure, undercover officer Pigatt’s knowledge was imputed to them under the collective knowledge doctrine (Whitfield; Rogers), based on her contemporaneous texts describing suspects, including Burgess. That linkage preserved the lawfulness of the seizure even if the seizing officers themselves lacked firsthand observations of Burgess’s managerial conduct.

2) Admissibility of the Firearm Despite “Abandonment” During the Encounter

Citing Coggins, the court recognized that evidence abandoned as a direct result of an unlawful seizure should be suppressed. Because the seizure was lawful, the abandonment doctrine did not bar admission; the firearm was not the fruit of an illegality. This cleanly disposed of Burgess’s suppression motion.

3) Spoliation and Due Process: Deleted Text Messages

On the dismissal motion, the court applied the two related but distinct due-process frameworks:

Apparently exculpatory evidence (Trombetta/Haywood): Due process is violated if the government destroys evidence whose exculpatory value was apparent before destruction and for which the defendant cannot obtain comparable evidence by other reasonably available means.
Potentially useful evidence (Youngblood/Lambert): Destruction of evidence that is merely “potentially useful” violates due process only if the defendant proves bad faith by law enforcement.

The district court credited Officer Pigatt’s testimony that the texts relayed only physical descriptions of suspects to be detained/arrested and estimates of the number of patrons. The Third Circuit found no clear error in that credibility assessment and held that such content lacked apparent exculpatory value at the time of deletion: a physical description matching Burgess is inculpatory or neutral, not exculpatory, and crowd counts are immaterial to the charged § 922(g)(1) offense or to the suppression issues.

As to bad faith, Burgess offered no specific proof beyond inference from the fact of deletion. Officers supplied an alternative, facially legitimate rationale—protection of undercover identities and safety if texts were exposed to bar staff—which the district court credited. Absent clear error, that credibility finding defeated the necessary showing of bad faith under Youngblood.

The panel added that even if other officers’ deletions might suggest bad faith, the lack of apparent exculpatory value still foreclosed relief. Read in tandem with the opinion’s earlier articulation of Youngblood, this reflects two independent and sufficient bases for rejecting the due-process claim: (i) no apparent exculpatory value (Trombetta path fails), and (ii) no bad faith (Youngblood path fails).

Impact and Practical Significance

A. Investigatory Stops in Regulatory Raids

Managerial role suffices: In regulatory contexts (e.g., liquor, tobacco, cannabis), officers may form reasonable suspicion to detain a suspected manager/owner of an unlicensed operation even absent direct observation of the person handling contraband or money. The statutory reach to “indirect” sales is pivotal.
Social media admissions: Self-identification as an owner or operator on social media can materially bolster reasonable suspicion when combined with on-scene observations of ongoing illegal operations.
Collective knowledge via real-time communications: Reasonable suspicion or probable cause can be built and transmitted through contemporaneous texts or similar communications; the seizing officer need not personally observe all facts if the informing officer’s knowledge is sound.

B. Digital Communications and Spoliation

Preservation duties remain bounded: Routine, real-time tactical texts that contain descriptions and headcounts—without apparent exculpatory value—do not, by themselves, trigger Trombetta’s preservation duty. Absent bad faith, their deletion will not establish a due-process violation under Youngblood.
Safety-based deletion can defeat bad-faith allegations: Credible testimony that deletion protected undercover safety can negate bad faith. That said, agencies should anticipate discovery challenges and consider retention policies that protect both safety and preservation obligations (e.g., redactions, secure storage).
Credibility is decisive: Because appellate courts defer heavily to district-court credibility findings, defendants who suspect exculpatory content in deleted communications should marshal objective indicators (e.g., device logs, policy violations, contradictory reports) to show either apparent exculpatory value or bad faith.

C. Limits and Cautions

Not precedential: Under Third Circuit I.O.P. 5.7, this disposition does not bind future panels, though it is persuasive.
Scope of seizure not litigated: Burgess did not challenge the district court’s characterization of the interaction as an investigative seizure. The opinion therefore provides little guidance on when aggressive tactics (e.g., grabbing a suspect’s arms) convert a Terry stop into an arrest.
Remedy sought: The defendant requested dismissal for spoliation. Lesser remedies (adverse inferences, evidentiary sanctions) were not analyzed; the opinion addresses only whether due process compels dismissal on these facts.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Reasonable Suspicion: A commonsense, fact-based reason to think someone is involved in a specific crime. It’s less than probable cause. Here, seeing Burgess manage an unlicensed bar in active operation was enough.
Investigatory Seizure (Terry Stop): A brief detention to check out suspected criminal activity. It requires reasonable suspicion, not the higher probable cause standard required for an arrest.
Collective Knowledge Doctrine: If Officer A has the facts and tells Officer B to stop someone, Officer B’s stop is legal even if B doesn’t personally know all the facts—A’s knowledge is “imputed” to B.
Abandonment Doctrine: If you drop or throw away evidence during a lawful stop, the police may usually seize it. But if the stop was illegal, courts may suppress the “abandoned” evidence as tainted.
Spoliation/Due Process (Trombetta/Youngblood):
- Apparently exculpatory evidence: If the police destroy evidence whose helpfulness to the defense was obvious at the time, and the defense can’t get an equivalent by other means, due process may be violated—even without bad faith.
- Potentially useful evidence: If the destroyed evidence might have helped but wasn’t obviously exculpatory, the defendant must prove police bad faith to show a due-process violation.

Key Takeaways

In a liquor-control enforcement context, officers had reasonable suspicion to detain a suspected manager/owner of an unlicensed bar engaged in ongoing illegal sales, even without observing the individual personally pour drinks or handle contraband.
Social media admissions of ownership can be part of the reasonable-suspicion calculus when corroborated by on-scene observations.
The collective knowledge doctrine validated the raid team’s stop based on the undercover officer’s real-time texts describing suspects inside.
For due-process spoliation, routine tactical texts containing descriptions and headcounts lacked apparent exculpatory value; and credible safety rationales for deletion defeated a showing of bad faith. No dismissal was warranted.
Appellate deference to district-court credibility findings was central; defendants challenging destroyed communications should develop objective proof of exculpatory value or bad faith.

Conclusion

Although nonprecedential, United States v. Burgess offers practical guidance on two fronts. First, it confirms that, in regulatory raids, officers may lawfully conduct an investigatory seizure of a person acting as a manager or owner of an enterprise engaged in ongoing unlicensed liquor sales, consistent with a statute that criminalizes indirect sales through agents and employees. The opinion underscores that reasonable suspicion can rest on the suspect’s managerial conduct and corroborating social media admissions, with knowledge shared among officers via real-time communications imputed under the collective knowledge doctrine.

Second, Burgess delineates the limits of due-process spoliation claims for deleted digital communications. Absent apparent exculpatory value or proof of bad faith, deletion of real-time tactical texts does not violate due process. The court’s reliance on credibility findings—both as to the content of the messages and the safety rationale for deletion—highlights the evidentiary burdens defendants face when pursuing such claims.

Taken together, the decision provides a roadmap for law enforcement coordinating complex operations and for litigants navigating the intersection of digital messaging, suppression doctrine, and spoliation-based due-process claims. While not binding, it will likely be cited for its clear articulation of reasonable suspicion in the unlicensed-sales context and its careful application of Trombetta/Youngblood to modern, ephemeral communications.