Reasonable Reunification Efforts for Incarcerated Parents: Child Permanency Justifies Switching from Reunification to Adoption

1. Introduction

In In the Interest Of: DC, minor child, AC v. The State of Wyoming, 2026 WY 3 (Jan. 7, 2026), the Wyoming Supreme Court affirmed a juvenile court order changing a child’s permanency plan from reunification to adoption after the child, DC, had been in State custody for more than eighteen months.

The appellant, AC (Father), argued the juvenile court abused its discretion because: (1) incarceration was the “only” barrier to reunification, and (2) the Department of Family Services failed to make reasonable reunification efforts—particularly regarding mental health services while he was jailed. The State (through DFS) and the guardian ad litem supported the plan change.

The central legal issues were whether DFS made reasonable efforts (including for an incarcerated parent) and whether reunification remained in DC’s best interests given the length of foster care and Father’s progress.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Court held the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in changing the permanency plan to adoption and relieving DFS of further reunification efforts. Applying Wyoming’s established permanency framework, the Court concluded:

DFS provided services that were accessible, available, and appropriate, and tailored to the family’s needs, including during Father’s incarceration.
Father’s lack of meaningful progress—alongside repeated incarceration and anticipated multi-year prison sentence—meant reunification was not feasible within a reasonable time.
DC’s best interests required permanency: he had significantly improved in placement with grandparents and needed stability after lengthy foster care.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

The Court’s decision is best understood as an application and reinforcement of several interlocking lines of precedent: (A) the standard of review; (B) the “reasonable efforts” framework; (C) incarceration-specific guidance; and (D) the priority of child permanency.

A. Standard of review and evidentiary lens

In re LH and In re SK: Reaffirmed that permanency-plan changes are reviewed for abuse of discretion, and that the appellate court defers substantially to the juvenile court’s fact-finding and judgment about what is reasonable under the circumstances.
In re JF: Confirmed the sufficiency-of-the-evidence inquiry is measured against a preponderance of the evidence in this context.
In re AM and In re JPL: Directed appellate courts to view evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party below, discounting conflicting evidence offered by the appellant.
In re SRS: Contributed the articulation of “exceeds the bounds of reason” as the touchstone for abuse of discretion.

B. The “reasonable efforts” framework (accessible, available, appropriate; tailored; not indefinite)

In re MA and In re RR: Provided the core requirement the Court applied: to change from reunification to adoption, the juvenile court must find reasonable efforts were made without success and reunification is no longer in the child’s best interests. They also support the principle that efforts must be tailored to the family’s circumstances.
In re LC: Supplied a structured way to assess reasonable efforts—DFS must identify why out-of-home placement was necessary and show how services were directed at remedying those reasons.
KC v. State: Supported the proposition that once reasonable efforts are unsuccessful and the plan is no longer in the child’s best interests, the court may change the plan.
In re SW: Reinforced that DFS is not required to provide services indefinitely when a parent is unable or unwilling to apply instruction received.
In re VS and In re BG: Confirmed that “timely placement” consistent with a permanency plan can take precedence over reunification, and reunification efforts inconsistent with permanency may be discontinued—especially where the child’s stability demands action.

C. Incarceration-specific precedent: reasonableness is context-dependent; limits are not DFS’s fault

In re BG: Explicitly recognized DFS must still engage in reasonable efforts even when a parent is incarcerated—undercutting any blanket exemption, while leaving room for context-based limits.
Int. of BN and Int. of BP: Supplied the key analytical qualifier adopted here: what is “reasonable” must account for incarceration and the services available under the circumstances. These cases also advance the idea that limitations on services may be attributable to the parent’s criminal conduct and custody status.
In re Doe and In re M.T. (out-of-state): Cited through Int. of BP for persuasive support that the reduced scope of reunification services can be a consequence of incarceration rather than agency inaction.

D. Permanency and the child’s superior right to stability

In re SRS and In re JPL: Anchored the principle that children have a right to stability and permanency, and the statutory scheme prioritizes timely permanency over open-ended rehabilitation attempts.
Int. of SMD and Int. of SW: Expressly articulated the normative hierarchy: children “do not have the luxury of time,” and cannot be left in “parentless limbo” while a parent’s circumstances remain unresolved.
SD v. Carbon Cnty. Dep't of Fam. Servs.: Provided the collision principle the Court repeated: when parent and child rights conflict, the parent’s rights yield.
In re Beatrice M., Matter of Adoption of MAJB, In re A.D., In re Davonta V., and In re D.B.: Used in the adoption/permanency discussion to support adoption’s capacity to provide finality and long-term stability.
In re LH and In re JN: Reinforced that partial or intermittent progress is insufficient if not achieved within a reasonable time, particularly where the child has already spent many months in foster care.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

The Court’s reasoning followed the familiar two-part permanency inquiry: (1) Were reasonable efforts made without success? and (2) Is reunification no longer in the child’s best interests?

(1) Reasonable efforts—especially during incarceration

Father’s appeal narrowed the dispute: he challenged DFS’s efforts only as to mental health services during incarceration. The Court emphasized record evidence that Father had missed sessions and failed to complete tasks when he was not incarcerated, and did not contest the adequacy of services during non-incarcerated periods.

On incarceration-specific efforts, the Court credited DFS for sustained, practical engagement: continuing visitation at the detention center; arranging counseling through Volunteers of America; responding to Father’s complaints about scheduling; and making additional referrals to Mind of Peace and Specialty Counseling when problems persisted.

Critically, the Court treated “reasonableness” as a real-world standard constrained by jail operations and available programming. Any limitations were assessed in light of Father’s custody status and conduct, consistent with Int. of BN and Int. of BP. The Court also noted the record reflected Father sometimes asked sessions be limited to 30 minutes and discontinued some counseling—facts supporting the conclusion that services were offered but not effectively utilized.

(2) Best interests and the “reasonable time” requirement

The Court tied best interests to permanency timing. DC entered custody with “failure to thrive” concerns but later became healthy and developmentally on track in his grandparents’ care. With DC in foster care for over eighteen months—exceeding the federal/state permanency horizon reflected in Wyoming law—the Court endorsed the juvenile court’s view that DC required stable permanency now.

Father’s repeated incarcerations (about 370 days during the case) and expected 5–7 year prison sentence supported the finding that reunification could not be achieved in the foreseeable future. The Court emphasized that the juvenile court could consider not just past noncompliance, but practical unavailability to parent.

Statutory integration

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-3-440: The Court applied the statutory requirement that services be “accessible, available and appropriate,” and that the child’s health and safety are the paramount concern.
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-3-431(m): While not a termination case, the Court used the “15 of 22 months” benchmark to illustrate the legislature’s prioritization of timely permanency once a child has remained in foster care for an extended period.

3.3 Impact

This opinion’s practical impact is less about announcing a brand-new test and more about clarifying how existing Wyoming standards apply when incarceration is the parent’s primary barrier:

Incarceration does not excuse DFS from reunification efforts, but it materially shapes what is “reasonable” and what services can be demanded. Courts may treat jail/prison constraints—and the parent’s own discontinuation or nonparticipation—as powerful evidence that DFS’s efforts were sufficient.
A parent’s argument focused on a single service area (here, mental health counseling in custody) can fail where the record shows multiple referrals, problem-solving attempts, and parent non-engagement. The case underscores the importance of evidentiary detail (referrals, contacts, scheduling attempts, attendance).
Time in care remains decisive: when a child has spent well over fifteen months in foster care and is thriving in a stable placement, the Court is unlikely to require continued reunification efforts absent a concrete, near-term reunification pathway.
Adoption’s priority over guardianship is reaffirmed when adoption is feasible, reflecting the Court’s continued preference for the most permanent legal arrangement available to secure a young child’s stability.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Permanency plan: The court-approved long-term goal for a child in State custody (e.g., reunification, guardianship, adoption).
Concurrent goal: A backup plan pursued at the same time as reunification (e.g., reunification + adoption), used to avoid delay if reunification fails.
Reasonable efforts: Practical steps by DFS to help fix the problems that led to removal—measured by whether services were “accessible, available and appropriate,” and tailored to the case, with child safety as the paramount concern.
MDT (multidisciplinary team): A team (often including DFS, providers, and others) that reviews progress and recommends plan changes.
Guardian ad litem (GAL): A lawyer/advocate appointed to represent the child’s best interests.
Abuse of discretion: A highly deferential appellate standard; reversal occurs only if the juvenile court acted beyond the bounds of reason on this record.
Preponderance of the evidence: “More likely than not”—the standard used to evaluate whether evidence supports the permanency decision.

5. Conclusion

In the Interest Of: DC, minor child, AC v. The State of Wyoming reinforces a pragmatic rule of permanence: DFS must make reasonable, case-specific reunification efforts, including for incarcerated parents, but those efforts are judged in context and need not continue indefinitely when they are unsuccessful and the child’s timeline demands stability. Where a child is thriving in a stable placement after extended time in care and the parent’s incarceration and noncompletion of core case-plan objectives make reunification unlikely within a reasonable time, Wyoming courts may properly change the permanency plan to adoption and discontinue reunification efforts.