Reasonable Misperception of a Drawn Gun Supports Qualified Immunity Even with Inconclusive Bodycam Footage

Introduction

This commentary analyzes the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Earnise Pam v. City of Evansville, No. 24-2286 (7th Cir. Sept. 26, 2025), arising from the fatal police shooting of Rodriquez D’Aundre Pam in Evansville, Indiana. Pam’s estate sued two responding police officers, Cory Offerman and John McQuay, alleging excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The district court granted summary judgment to defendants. On appeal, the Seventh Circuit affirmed on qualified immunity grounds.

The case sits at the intersection of three recurring themes in modern police-litigation: how courts treat body-worn camera footage at summary judgment; how qualified immunity applies when officers act on mistaken but reasonable perceptions; and whether pre-shooting tactics can undermine the reasonableness of deadly force. The panel’s opinion, authored by Judge Kolar, synthesizes prior doctrine and clarifies that—even when bodycam video is inconclusive on whether the suspect actually had a gun at the instant of firing—qualified immunity will attach if the totality of undisputed circumstances supports an objectively reasonable perception that the suspect was drawing or threatening with a firearm.

Summary of the Opinion

The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for Officers Offerman and McQuay. The court undertook a careful, frame-by-frame review of body-worn camera footage and concluded that the video did not irrefutably establish whether Pam actually pointed or held a gun in the moment before the shots. Nonetheless, the court held that the undisputed circumstances—a contemporaneous 911 report of brandishing, Pam’s noncompliance, motions consistent with drawing a weapon in poor lighting, and a handgun rolling away from Pam’s body immediately after the shots—made it objectively reasonable for the officers to perceive that Pam was producing and raising a firearm.

Exercising its discretion to address the second qualified-immunity prong first, the court held that it was not “beyond debate” that using deadly force in these circumstances violated clearly established law. Because qualified immunity protects reasonable mistakes of fact as well as law, and because analogous case law permits lethal force when officers reasonably believe a suspect is drawing a gun, the court affirmed without deciding whether a constitutional violation occurred.

Factual Background

On the evening of November 8, 2020, a neighbor, Heather Geier, called 911 to report a man (matching Pam’s appearance) in her backyard who had pointed a handgun at her leashed dog and then at her. Officer Offerman arrived first, rifle trained on Pam, and issued commands from 50–75 feet away. Within roughly a minute of Offerman’s arrival (and about 14 seconds after Officer McQuay arrived, shouting “I’m going to shoot your ass”), both officers fired multiple shots in under a second when Pam raised his left hand and positioned his right hand near or behind his body after placing it into his pocket. A black object—later confirmed to be a handgun—rolled away from Pam’s body as he fell. Pam died at the scene.

Although dispatch relayed that Pam had shot the dog (Offerman did not hear gunshots and later saw the dog unharmed), Geier later clarified she had been mistaken in the frenzy. Post hoc toxicology showed Pam’s high intoxication (BAC .310), but that fact was unknown to the officers at the time.

Issues Presented

Whether genuine disputes of material fact—especially arising from ambiguous bodycam footage—preclude summary judgment on a Fourth Amendment excessive-force claim.
Whether officers are entitled to qualified immunity when the video is inconclusive about whether the suspect actually held or raised a gun, but undisputed circumstances support a reasonable perception that he was drawing one.
Whether differences in officers’ pre-shooting tactics (de-escalation versus immediate threats to shoot) undermine qualified immunity.

Key Holdings

Body-worn camera evidence is not “special” evidence; it can resolve factual disputes at summary judgment only when it irrefutably contradicts a party’s version. Ambiguous video cannot, by itself, defeat qualified immunity when other undisputed facts support the officers’ reasonable perceptions.
Qualified immunity covers reasonable mistakes of fact. Even if Pam did not actually point a gun, the officers were entitled to immunity if a reasonable officer in their position could have perceived that he was drawing and raising a firearm.
Deadly force is not clearly unconstitutional in circumstances where an armed suspect appears to be drawing a gun in response to police commands; officers are not required to wait until the suspect points or fires the weapon.
Pre-shooting “bad tactics” do not defeat qualified immunity absent conduct so unreasonable that the deadly force is almost entirely the product of the officers’ own making.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Video evidence at summary judgment:
- Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007): Courts may rely on video that blatantly contradicts a party’s account such that no reasonable jury could believe it.
- Seventh Circuit refinements: Hurt v. Wise, Smith v. Finkley, Johnson v. Rogers, Horton v. Pobjecky, Kailin v. Village of Gurnee, Gant v. Hartman. Together, these cases teach that videos can be decisive only when they establish facts beyond reasonable question; unclear or incomplete footage cannot resolve disputes short of trial.
- Application here: The panel found ambiguity about whether a gun was actually in Pam’s hand pre-shot, but relied on undisputed context and physical evidence to assess reasonableness.
Summary judgment and evidentiary sufficiency:
- Anderson v. Street; Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a): Disputes must be genuine and material.
- Osborn v. JAB Mgmt. Servs., Inc.; Driveline Sys., LLC v. Arctic Cat, Inc.; Butts v. Aurora Health Care, Inc.: A non-movant must present “definite, competent” evidence; speculation is insufficient.
- King v. Hendricks County Commissioners: Special scrutiny where the decedent cannot testify; courts check the officers’ narrative against physical/concrete evidence.
Qualified immunity framework:
- Tolan v. Cotton; Mullenix v. Luna; Saucier v. Katz; Kisela v. Hughes; Reichle v. Howards; Ashcroft v. al-Kidd; Pearson v. Callahan; District of Columbia v. Wesby; Lopez v. Sheriff of Cook County; Kemp v. Liebel.
- These authorities underscore: avoid high-level generalities; the right must be clearly established with fact-specific guidance; qualified immunity protects reasonable mistakes of law and fact; courts may address either prong first.
Fourth Amendment deadly force standards:
- Tennessee v. Garner; Graham v. Connor; Weinmann v. McClone: Use of deadly force must be objectively reasonable based on totality of circumstances; being armed, without more, is not automatically an immediate threat.
- Muhammed v. City of Chicago (as distilled in Manery v. Lee, 2025): An officer needs probable cause to believe the armed suspect poses a serious threat, or has committed a serious violent crime and is about to escape.
- Sanzone v. Gray; DeLuna v. City of Rockford; Siler v. City of Kenosha: Officers need not wait until the last instant before being shot; motioning for a weapon changes the status quo and can justify deadly force.
- Estate of Biegert v. Molitor: Being armed is not per se an immediate threat; “bad tactics” do not automatically negate reasonableness unless the officers’ conduct essentially creates the need to use deadly force.
Sister-circuit consensus on mistaken perceptions and “drawing”:
- Gooden v. Howard County (4th Cir.); Pollard v. City of Columbus (6th Cir.); A.K.H. v. City of Tustin (9th Cir.); Wealot v. Brooks (8th Cir.): Qualified immunity protects reasonable misperceptions of fact.
- Estate of Valverde v. Dodge (10th Cir.); Valderas v. City of Lubbock (5th Cir.); Jean-Baptiste v. Gutierrez (11th Cir.); Elliott v. Leavitt (4th Cir.): Officers are not required to wait for confirmation that a displayed weapon will be used; drawing or pulling a gun can justify lethal force.
- Estate of Smart v. City of Wichita (10th Cir.): Qualified immunity may fail for “grossly mistaken” beliefs; the Seventh Circuit found no such gross error here.
Pre-force tactics and provocation:
- County of Los Angeles v. Mendez; Barnes v. Felix (2025): The Supreme Court has not resolved how officer-created risk factors into reasonableness analysis after rejecting the “provocation rule.”
- Estate of Starks v. Enyart: An example where officers’ conduct (stepping in front of a moving car) defeated immunity.
- Application here: McQuay’s escalatory language and speed did not cross the threshold where deadly force was “almost entirely” a product of officers’ actions; Offerman’s minute of commands reflected de-escalation attempts.

Legal Reasoning

The court’s reasoning proceeds in three stages.

Video evidence and factual framing at summary judgment: The panel reaffirmed that video is evaluated under ordinary Rule 56 principles. After “frame-by-frame” review, the footage was too blurry and poorly lit to conclusively show a gun in Pam’s hand when he raised his left arm. However, the video and undisputed circumstances showed that Pam placed his right hand in his pocket, adopted a posture consistent with drawing, kept his right arm hovering behind his body, raised his left hand toward the officers, and that a handgun rolled from his vicinity immediately after the shots. Plaintiffs offered no “definite, competent” countervailing facts that would explain the gun’s location or undermine the officers’ account.
Qualified immunity—clearly established prong first: Citing Pearson and Smith v. Kind, the court addressed prong two and evaluated reasonableness from the perspective of an objectively reasonable officer. Qualified immunity shields reasonable mistakes of fact; thus the question is whether officers could reasonably believe that Pam drew and began to raise a gun, not whether he actually did so. The court imputed common situational knowledge to both officers due to real-time communication (United States v. Williams).
Application to deadly-force jurisprudence: Considering the totality—the brandishing report, attempted entry, noncompliance for at least 15 seconds once Offerman entered the yard, reaching into a pocket, furtive hand positioning, poor lighting, and the immediate presence of a handgun—the court held it is not “beyond debate” that shooting under these circumstances violates clearly established law. Existing precedents confirm that officers need not wait until a gun is fully leveled or fired; drawing a gun in response to police presence suffices to create a reasonable perception of an imminent deadly threat. Because plaintiffs failed to identify factually analogous cases that would place the unlawfulness “beyond debate,” qualified immunity applied.

Impact

Excessive force litigation in the Seventh Circuit: Plaintiffs cannot defeat qualified immunity with ambiguous bodycam footage alone if undisputed contextual facts support a reasonable perception of a drawn weapon. To create a triable issue, estates will need physical, forensic, or testimonial evidence that concretely undercuts the officers’ perception (for example, gun location and trajectory inconsistent with a draw; third-party witness accounts; forensic evidence showing the gun was inaccessible or not on the decedent).
Clarifying the “drawing versus pointing” threshold: The decision extends prior holdings by protecting officers who reasonably—but possibly mistakenly—perceived that a suspect was drawing a gun. The focus is on the reasonableness of perception in real time, not on post hoc certainty about actual gun positioning.
Role of 911 reports and real-time information: The court’s acceptance of officers’ reliance on the contemporaneous brandishing report (even though the dog was not shot) strengthens the ability of officers to incorporate reported threats into their risk calculus, absent countervailing evidence known at the scene.
Pre-force tactics and training: Although the panel criticized neither officer, the opinion reiterates that “bad tactics” seldom defeat qualified immunity unless they nearly create the necessity of deadly force. That standard encourages, but does not require, de-escalation. Departments should continue to train on de-escalation and communication, while documenting contemporaneous perceptions that support threat assessments.
Bodycam evidence doctrine: The opinion consolidates Seventh Circuit guidance that bodycam video is powerful but not talismanic. Courts will parse it alongside physical evidence and undisputed context; when fuzzy or incomplete, video will not by itself generate a jury question.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Qualified immunity: A two-step shield for officials: (1) Did the conduct violate a constitutional right? (2) Was the right clearly established at the time, such that every reasonable officer would know the conduct was unlawful? Courts can decide either step first. It protects reasonable mistakes of fact (misperceiving a threat) and law.
Clearly established law: Not abstract maxims like “excessive force is unlawful,” but closely analogous cases that would inform an officer that this specific conduct is forbidden. In Fourth Amendment contexts, where facts vary widely, specificity is critical.
Objective reasonableness: Courts assess reasonableness from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, without 20/20 hindsight, considering severity of crime, immediacy of threat, and resistance or flight.
“Drawing” versus “possessing” a gun: Mere possession is not automatically a threat. But moving to draw a weapon—especially in response to police—can justify deadly force. Officers need not wait to be shot at.
Bodycam at summary judgment: Video can end factual disputes only if it indisputably shows what happened. If video is ambiguous, courts consider it with other evidence; ambiguity does not automatically send a case to a jury.
Imputation of knowledge: When officers are in close communication, one officer’s knowledge can be attributed to another for purposes of assessing reasonableness; late-arriving officers may rely on shared information.
“Bad tactics” and provocation: Poor tactical choices alone seldom negate reasonableness. Only when officers’ actions essentially create the need to use force (e.g., stepping into the path of a fleeing vehicle) might immunity fail. The Supreme Court has not endorsed a broad “provocation rule.”

Discussion of Specific Doctrinal Moves

Choosing the clearly established prong first: By deciding on prong two, the court avoids declaring new constitutional law on a murky record. This is consistent with Pearson’s flexibility and is common where outcomes turn on the specificity requirement for clearly established law.
Handling the decedent’s silence: Citing King v. Hendricks County Commissioners, the court scrutinized the record for physical or concrete evidence contrary to the officers’ account. Finding none that contradicted the core narrative (including the gun rolling from Pam’s vicinity), the court deemed the officers’ perceptions reasonable.
Manery/Muhammed “useful test” restated: The court distilled the deadly-force inquiry into two alternative showings: probable cause that the suspect poses a threat of serious physical harm, or that he committed a serious violent crime and is about to escape. This case principally concerned the first branch—imminent threat.
Reconciling Weinmann: The court distinguished prior denial of qualified immunity where officers fired at a person who merely possessed a gun in his home. Here, undisputed facts supported a reasonable perception of an imminent draw-and-raise in public, after reported brandishing and attempted entry, and amid noncompliance.

Practical Takeaways for Litigants

Plaintiffs should gather and present concrete evidence that challenges the perceived threat: forensic analyses (gun location, trajectories, fingerprints), third-party witnesses, expert testimony on timing and movement, and alternative explanations for physical artifacts (e.g., how and when a gun could roll or fall).
Defendants should contemporaneously document perceived threat cues: dispatch information, suspect motions toward waistbands or pockets, lighting, visibility, distances, timing, and any efforts at de-escalation.
Courts will closely parse the narrow window and milliseconds before shots, but will also contextualize with the entire encounter and pre-encounter information available through dispatch and witnesses.

Conclusion

Earnise Pam v. City of Evansville clarifies that qualified immunity protects officers who make reasonable, split-second assessments that a suspect is drawing a gun—even if bodycam footage is too ambiguous to prove the gun was in hand at the instant of firing. The court’s approach to video evidence is careful and consistent: video can resolve disputes only when it is irrefutable; where it is murky, courts look to the undisturbed constellation of facts and physical evidence. The opinion also underscores that “bad tactics” alone do not vitiate immunity absent extraordinary officer-created danger.

Doctrinally, the case strengthens a practical rule for deadly-force encounters: when the totality shows noncompliance, motions consistent with drawing a firearm, and corroborating physical evidence, it is not clearly established that firing violates the Fourth Amendment. For future cases, the opinion raises the evidentiary bar for plaintiffs relying on ambiguous footage and emphasizes the importance of tangible, contradictory proof to challenge an officer’s reasonable perception of a lethal threat.