Reasonable Efforts in Repeat Abuse-Neglect Cases: Prior Services and Targeted Evaluations Can Satisfy DHS’s Obligation When Recurrence Shows Futility — In re D.G. and L.G. (W. Va. 2025)

Introduction

In a memorandum decision affirming the termination of parental rights, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia in In re D.G. and L.G., No. 24-620 (Sept. 30, 2025), addresses the scope of the Department of Human Services’ (DHS) duty to make “reasonable efforts” to preserve and reunify a family in a repeat abuse-and-neglect case. The case arises from a second set of proceedings against an adoptive mother (T.G.) involving deplorable home conditions and medical neglect of one of the children. The central appellate issue was whether the circuit court erred in concluding that DHS made reasonable efforts before parental rights were terminated.

The decision clarifies an important practical point in West Virginia child welfare law: when a parent has already received substantial services in a recent, prior case addressing the same conditions—and those conditions recur, even while the parent is still engaged in services—DHS’s reasonable-efforts obligation may be satisfied by that prior service history together with targeted supports (such as psychological evaluations) in the new proceeding. In other words, the Department need not provide redundant or extended services where the record demonstrates futility—i.e., that the parent cannot correct conditions “even with the assistance of the [DHS].”

Case Overview

Parties: Petitioner Mother T.G. (adoptive mother of D.G. and L.G.); West Virginia Department of Human Services (DHS); the children’s guardian ad litem (GAL). The father’s parental rights were also terminated but he is not the appellant here.
Procedural Posture: Appeal from the Nicholas County Circuit Court’s September 18, 2024 order terminating parental rights. The Supreme Court issued a memorandum decision under Rule 21, concluding oral argument was unnecessary.
Key Issue on Appeal: Whether DHS made “reasonable efforts” to preserve/reunify the family prior to termination.

Summary of the Opinion

The Court affirmed termination. It admonished the mother’s appellate briefing for failing to cite controlling legal authority as required by Rule 10(c)(7) of the West Virginia Rules of Appellate Procedure and the Court’s 2012 Administrative Order on noncompliant filings. Despite this deficiency, the Court evaluated the merits and held that the circuit court did not err in finding that DHS made reasonable efforts.

The Supreme Court emphasized that:

DHS arranged and paid for psychological evaluations during the current case.
The mother had received eight months of parenting and adult life-skills services in the 2020 case addressing the same “deplorable home” conditions; the children were returned in 2021.
Critically, the home returned to a dangerously deplorable state while the mother was still receiving services (including ongoing work with a licensed clinical social worker).

On this record, the circuit court could conclude further services would be futile because the mother could not correct the conditions “even with the assistance of the [DHS],” and therefore that DHS’s reasonable-efforts obligation had been met. The Court also noted the circuit court’s findings that there was no meaningful bond between mother and children and that not returning the children would not harm them, while returning them had proven emotionally damaging.

Factual Background

DHS filed its petition in December 2023 after D.G. cut his leg with a hunting knife, told his parents he needed hospital care, and the parents—seeking to avoid CPS involvement, according to the circuit court—nonetheless declined medical treatment, using a bandage and duct tape before sending him to school. Teachers observed the severity of the wound, which required stitches. DHS also documented deplorable home conditions: a foul odor, significant clutter, seven animals in the home, and a urine-soaked child’s bed that had not been cleaned.

The family had a prior abuse-and-neglect case in 2020 for similarly deplorable conditions. The mother was adjudicated, received an improvement period with eight months of services, and the children were returned in July 2021.

In the present case, the court ordered psychological evaluations at the preliminary stage; the mother’s prognosis was “guarded” due to a “general lack of attachment” to the children. At adjudication in January 2024, the court found abuse and neglect based on the unsafe home and medical neglect.

Disposition occurred across hearings in March and September 2024. The evidence included:

A licensed clinical social worker testified she had worked with the mother since 2021 and that the mother had been compliant with services.
The children’s psychiatrist, who saw the children six or seven times over eighteen months, testified to significant special needs diagnoses (including autism, ADHD/ADD, OCD, Tourette’s, trauma-related disorders, and affective behavior disorder) and opined that the children appeared bonded to the parents and that severing the bond would be detrimental.
A CPS worker testified the children were doing well in placement, visited monthly, and neither asked to go home; D.G. became upset at the prospect of seeing the parents and expressed that he did not want to see them.
The GAL proffered that the children had no emotional attachment to the mother. DHS and the GAL recommended termination, citing lack of attachment and the recurrence of deplorable home conditions despite prior services.

The circuit court found the mother had a “fundamental inability to understand the conditions of abuse and neglect,” that DHS had made reasonable efforts, and that the mother failed to follow through with a reasonable family case plan or rehabilitative efforts. The court found that both removals had been emotionally damaging, that non-return would not harm the children, and that the children lacked a bond with the mother. It concluded there was “no reasonable likelihood that the conditions of abuse and neglect can be substantially corrected in the near future even with the assistance of the [DHS],” and terminated parental rights.

Detailed Analysis

1) Precedents and Authorities Cited

In re Cecil T., 228 W. Va. 89, 717 S.E.2d 873 (2011), Syl. Pt. 1: Reiterated the standard of review: factual findings for clear error; legal conclusions de novo. This frames the appellate Court’s deference to the circuit court’s weighing of evidence about conditions, services, and the children’s attachments.
West Virginia Rules of Appellate Procedure:
- Rule 21: Permits disposition by memorandum decision when the decisional process would not be significantly aided by oral argument and the law is settled—signaling that the Court viewed the governing “reasonable efforts” doctrine as established, not novel.
- Rule 10(c)(7): Requires arguments to cite authority and apply it. The Court underscored this rule, noting the mother’s brief lacked meaningful citation or application, and referenced the Administrative Order (Dec. 10, 2012) Re: Filings That Do Not Comply.
- Rule 10(j): Authorizes sanctions for noncompliant briefs, including refusal to consider a case or other appropriate sanctions.
- Rule 40(e): Use of initials to protect identities in abuse-and-neglect appeals.
Statutes:
- W. Va. Code § 49-4-601(d): Requires DHS to “provide supportive services in an effort to remedy circumstances detrimental to a child.”
- W. Va. Code § 49-4-604(c)(6)(C)(iii)–(iv): At disposition, the court must consider whether DHS made reasonable efforts to preserve and reunify the family before terminating parental rights.
- “No reasonable likelihood” standard (quoted in the decision): The circuit court found “no reasonable likelihood that the conditions of abuse and neglect can be substantially corrected in the near future even with the assistance of the [DHS],” echoing the dispositional framework in § 49-4-604 that authorizes termination where the parent cannot correct conditions in the near future.

2) Statutory Framework and Its Application Here

The child welfare code requires DHS to provide “supportive services” aimed at remedying the conditions and obliges courts, before termination, to assess whether DHS made reasonable reunification efforts. However, the statute does not require never-ending or redundant services. The inquiry is contextual and pragmatic: What services were provided? Did they target the identified conditions? Were further services likely to remedy the problem within the child’s time frame?

The Court highlighted three pillars supporting the reasonable-efforts finding:

Targeted current-case services: DHS arranged and paid for psychological evaluations of both parents.
Substantial prior services, recently delivered: The mother received eight months of parenting and adult life-skills services in the 2020 case concerning the same deplorable home conditions; the children were returned in 2021.
Recurrence despite ongoing services: The home again became deplorable while the mother was actively participating in services, including work with a licensed clinical social worker who had continued since the earlier case.

On this record, the circuit court could logically conclude that offering more of the same services would be futile because the mother could not correct the conditions even with DHS’s assistance. This futility finding dovetails with § 49-4-604’s dispositional standard permitting termination when there is no reasonable likelihood of substantial correction in the near future.

3) The Court’s Legal Reasoning

The Supreme Court’s reasoning proceeds in two steps.

Threshold admonition on briefing: The Court expressly noted the mother’s failure to cite authority or apply the law to her facts in violation of Rule 10(c)(7) and the 2012 Administrative Order—conduct that could warrant sanctions under Rule 10(j). Nonetheless, the Court chose to resolve the merits.
Merits analysis on “reasonable efforts”: The Court approved the circuit court’s analysis that:
- DHS did provide services in the current case (psychological evaluations).
- Services provided in the prior, recent case addressing the same conditions are relevant to the “reasonable efforts” calculus, especially given the relapse.
- Despite the mother’s “compliance,” the salient question is whether services effectuate actual correction. Here, the conditions recurred even during services, evidencing a fundamental inability or futility.
- Thus, DHS satisfied its obligation; further services were not required before termination.

The Court also signaled the trial court’s primacy in resolving evidentiary conflicts—particularly regarding the children’s attachments. Although the psychiatrist opined a bond existed and severance would be detrimental, the circuit court credited the CPS worker’s testimony and the GAL’s position that the children had no meaningful attachment and were ambivalent about returning, with D.G. affirmatively not wanting contact. Under the clear-error standard, those factual determinations stood.

4) Evidentiary Findings That Drove the Outcome

Repeat deplorable conditions: The same dangerous conditions re-emerged after prior services, even while services continued.
Medical neglect to avoid CPS: The court found the mother did not seek care for a serious injury and did so to avoid CPS involvement—an aggravating fact supporting unfitness.
Attachment and best interests: The circuit court found no meaningful bond; non-return would not harm the children; repeated removals had caused damage. The Supreme Court deferred to these credibility-driven findings.

5) Impact and Practical Implications

Although issued as a memorandum decision, the Court’s application of settled law has practical significance:

Reasonable efforts across cases: DHS may rely on prior services delivered in a recent case involving the same conditions as part of the present reasonable-efforts showing. The temporal and substantive continuity matters.
Futility principle reaffirmed: Where evidence shows recurrence despite ongoing services, courts may find further services unnecessary before terminating parental rights because the parent cannot correct conditions “even with the assistance” of DHS.
Compliance vs. correction: Formal “compliance” with services does not compel reunification. The dispositive question is whether the parent has corrected the conditions.
Children’s welfare and voice: Credible testimony about the children’s wishes and attachments, particularly against a backdrop of repeat removals and special needs, can weigh heavily in the best-interests analysis.
Appellate practice: Counsel must cite and apply governing authorities. Deficient briefing invites admonition and possible sanctions and risks forfeiting issues.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Reasonable efforts: DHS must take reasonable steps—such as providing services, evaluations, and supports—aimed at remedying the problems that led to removal. The requirement is practical, not unlimited; it does not demand endless or redundant services where they have proved ineffective.
Improvement period: A court-ordered span of time during which a parent participates in services to correct conditions of abuse or neglect. Successful completion returns the children, but recurrence can lead to a new petition and, if uncorrected, termination.
No reasonable likelihood (even with assistance): A dispositional finding that the parent cannot substantially correct the conditions in the near future, even if DHS continues to help. This finding enables termination when continued efforts would be futile.
Adjudication vs. disposition: Adjudication determines whether abuse/neglect occurred; disposition decides what should happen next (e.g., reunification with conditions, guardianship, or termination).
Clear-error vs. de novo review: Appellate courts defer to the trial court’s factual findings unless clearly wrong (clear error) but independently review legal questions (de novo).
Guardian ad litem (GAL): An attorney appointed to represent the child’s best interests, separate from DHS and the parents.
Memorandum decision (Rule 21): A streamlined decision used when the law is settled and oral argument would not materially aid the decisional process. Typically clarifies rather than creates new law.

Conclusion

In re D.G. and L.G. reaffirms that DHS’s “reasonable efforts” duty is evaluated holistically and pragmatically. Where a parent has already received substantial, recent services to address the same conditions and the conditions recur—even while services continue—courts may conclude that DHS has satisfied its obligation without providing additional, redundant services, particularly when the record supports a finding of futility (“even with the assistance” of DHS).

The decision underscores three practitioner takeaways:

Document service history across cases: Prior services addressing identical conditions count toward reasonable efforts in a subsequent case.
Focus on results, not just participation: “Compliance” is not the metric; correction and safety are.
Brief properly: Appellate arguments must cite and apply relevant authority; noncompliance risks sanctions and undermines advocacy.

Ultimately, the Court’s affirmance aligns with the statute’s child-centered focus: when the conditions are recurring and resistant to intervention, the law favors timely permanency and safety over open-ended service extensions.

Key Citations

In re D.G. and L.G., No. 24-620 (W. Va. Sept. 30, 2025) (memorandum decision)
In re Cecil T., 228 W. Va. 89, 717 S.E.2d 873 (2011), Syl. Pt. 1
W. Va. Code § 49-4-601(d); § 49-4-604(c)(6)(C)(iii)–(iv)
W. Va. R. App. P. 10(c)(7), 10(j), 21, 40(e)
Administrative Order (Dec. 10, 2012), Re: Filings That Do Not Comply With the Rules of Appellate Procedure