Reaffirming the “Time-of-Conviction” Standard for Career-Offender Predicate Controlled-Substance Offenses
Commentary on United States v. Enrique Diaz, No. 22-13149 (11th Cir. June 20, 2025) (unpublished)

1. Introduction

In United States v. Enrique Diaz, the Eleventh Circuit revisited four familiar—but increasingly intricate—sentencing battlegrounds:

• the career-offender enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1,
• the “premises” enhancement for drug distribution under § 2D1.1(b)(12),
• eligibility for the safety-valve reduction set out in § 2D1.1(b)(18) and § 5C1.2(a), and
• the overall procedural and substantive reasonableness of the sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).

While the court ultimately affirmed the 151-month sentence in full, the opinion’s lasting importance lies in its explicit reliance on, and extension of, the “time-of-conviction” rule articulated in United States v. Dubois. That rule dictates that whether a prior state drug conviction qualifies as a “controlled-substance offense” under § 4B1.2(b) is determined by the state law in force at the time of that conviction, even if the state later removes or narrows the substance from its schedules. By applying the rule to Florida cocaine convictions that pre-dated a later carve-out for ioflupane, the panel cemented Dubois’s reach and signalled its durability after the Supreme Court’s limited remand in that case.

2. Summary of the Judgment

• Career-Offender Status: Upheld. Diaz’s 2006 and 2007 Florida cocaine convictions remained qualifying predicates because Florida regulated cocaine (including the radiotracer ioflupane) when he was convicted.
• Premises Enhancement (§ 2D1.1(b)(12)): Upheld. Evidence of repeated sales, cash, firearms, and packaging material at Diaz’s residence showed that drug distribution was a “primary use.”
• Safety-Valve Reduction (§ 2D1.1(b)(18)/§ 5C1.2): Denied. Diaz’s criminal-history score exceeded amended thresholds as clarified in Pulsifer v. United States.
• Reasonableness of Sentence: Affirmed. A low-end Guidelines sentence (151 months) was neither procedurally nor substantively unreasonable.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• United States v. Dubois, 94 F.4th 1284 (11th Cir. 2024), reinstated 2025
  • Established the “time-of-conviction” benchmark for defining a state controlled-substance offense under § 4B1.2(b).
  • Diaz relies on this holding to validate the use of pre-2017 Florida cocaine convictions even though the state later exempted ioflupane.
• United States v. Rodriguez, 75 F.4th 1231 (11th Cir. 2023) & United States v. George, 872 F.3d 1197 (11th Cir. 2017)
  • Provide the evidentiary yardsticks for when a location is “maintained” as a drug premises.
  • The Diaz panel analogised the discovery of scales, currency, and multiple sales from a residence to the facts in Rodriguez and George.
• Pulsifer v. United States, 601 U.S. 124 (2024)
  • Interprets the amended federal safety-valve statute (18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)).
  • Diaz’s history—>4 criminal-history points and a prior 3-point conviction—barred relief under any post-amendment reading.
• Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007); Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338 (2007)
  • Supply the procedural and substantive reasonableness framework applied by the Eleventh Circuit.

3.2 The Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. Career-Offender Enhancement
   • Step 1: Identify qualifying predicates—must be “controlled-substance offenses” with sentences >13 months imposed within 15 years.
   • Step 2: Apply Dubois—look to Florida law in 2006–2007; at that time, cocaine (and any stereoisomer) was squarely scheduled.
   • Step 3: Treat the 2006 and 2007 convictions separately because of intervening arrests (Guidelines § 4A1.2(a)(2)).
   • Result: Offense level and criminal-history category triggered § 4B1.1’s career-offender table.
2. Premises Enhancement
   • Governing test: Was manufacturing or distribution a primary use of the premises?
   • Evidence: four controlled buys from the home; discovery of firearms, cash counter, drug paraphernalia, and cash.
   • Comparison to Rodriguez/George: similar or stronger indicia, so no clear error.
3. Safety Valve
   • Even under the expanded criteria (§ 5C1.2(a)(1) (2024)), Diaz had (A) >4 criminal-history points and (B) a prior 3-point offense—either one disqualifies him per Pulsifer’s “and”/“or” reading.
4. Reasonableness Review
   • Procedural: correct Guidelines range, fact-findings not clearly erroneous, reasons given on the record.
   • Substantive: 151 months = low-end of 151–188 month range; district court emphasized deterrence and public safety—allowed to give those factors more weight than mitigating mental-health evidence.

3.3 Potential Impact of the Judgment

• Solidifies Dubois Post-SCOTUS Remand: By citing the reinstated Dubois opinion, Diaz reassures district courts that the “time-of-conviction” rule remains binding circuit precedent notwithstanding the Supreme Court’s partial GVR.
• Clarifies Scope vis-à-vis Schedule Changes: Even minor statutory carve-outs (e.g., Florida’s later exclusion of diagnostic ioflupane) will not retroactively strip a prior conviction of predicate status.
• Guidance for Practitioners:
  • Defense counsel must scrutinize state schedules as they existed at the plea/sentencing date of the prior offense—post-hoc changes are irrelevant in the Eleventh Circuit.
  • Prosecutors may rely on certified historical statutory excerpts to meet the Government’s burden at sentencing.
• Possible Circuit Split Preservation: Other circuits (e.g., the Ninth in Lara) employ a categorical match to current federal schedules. Diaz widens an existing inter-circuit fault line, increasing the likelihood of future Supreme Court review.
• Premises Enhancement Blueprint: The opinion reinforces that modest quantities of drugs, coupled with sale activity and paraphernalia, suffice—no need to show large-scale operations.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Career-Offender Enhancement (§ 4B1.1)

• Boosts offense level and criminal-history category for defendants with (a) a current crime of violence or controlled-substance offense and (b) two prior qualifying felonies.
• Result: Dramatically higher guideline range.

“Controlled-Substance Offense” (§ 4B1.2(b))

• A prior state or federal felony involving distribution, manufacture, or intent to distribute a controlled substance.
• In the Eleventh Circuit, whether a drug is “controlled” depends on state law at the time of the prior conviction.

Premises Enhancement (§ 2D1.1(b)(12))

• Adds two offense levels if a defendant “maintained” a location primarily for drug distribution or manufacture.
• “Maintained” = control plus demonstrable ongoing drug activity.

Safety-Valve (§ 5C1.2/§ 3553(f))

• Allows certain non-violent, low-level drug offenders to avoid mandatory minimums and gain a 2-level reduction.
• Pulsifer clarified that having any one of three disqualifying traits (4+ CH points, a prior 3-point offense, or a 2-point violent offense) bars relief.

Procedural vs. Substantive Reasonableness

• Procedural: correct calculations and explanations.
• Substantive: sentence length viewed against the § 3553(a) goals—deterrence, public safety, parity, etc.

5. Conclusion

United States v. Enrique Diaz may be unpublished, but its implications are significant. By unambiguously applying Dubois, the Eleventh Circuit:

1. Anchors predicate analysis to the historical state schedules, immunising the career-offender enhancement from later legislative re-scheduling;
2. Provides a clear, evidence-based roadmap for applying the premises enhancement to dwellings that double as drug hubs;
3. Affirms the broad reach of Pulsifer’s safety-valve interpretation; and
4. Demonstrates deference to district-court sentencing discretion when Guidelines are correctly applied.

For defense lawyers, Diaz underscores the uphill battle of contesting predicate drug felonies in the Eleventh Circuit; for prosecutors, it offers a streamlined evidentiary template. And for sentencing judges, it supplies renewed confidence that the “time-of-conviction” approach remains authoritative until, and unless, the Supreme Court says otherwise.