Reaffirming the “More-Than-Mere-Inconvenience” Test for Dimensional Variances:
A Comprehensive Commentary on Watch Hill Fire District v. Westerly Zoning Board of Review, 330 A.3d ___ (R.I. 2025)
I. Introduction
The Supreme Court of Rhode Island’s decision in Watch Hill Fire District v. Westerly Zoning Board of Review (decided July 18, 2025) has resolved a simmering doctrinal tension within Rhode Island zoning law: whether applicants for a dimensional variance must satisfy the “no other reasonable alternative” clause that appears (or, more accurately, once appeared) in the definition of “dimensional variance,” or whether the well-established “more than a mere inconvenience” standard remains controlling. The Court squarely affirms that the operative hardship standard continues to be “more than a mere inconvenience,” and that the earlier reference in New Castle Realty Co. v. Dreczko, 248 A.3d 638 (R.I. 2021) did not modify that rule. By doing so the Court provides clarity to zoning boards, applicants, and litigants alike, while signaling that the General Assembly’s 2023 amendments definitively retire the “no reasonable alternative” phrase from the hardship calculus for dimensional variances filed after January 1, 2024.
II. Case Overview
- Parties:
- Petitioner: Watch Hill Fire District (WHFD), owner of nearby property and operator of tourist attractions abutting the subject parcel.
- Respondents: Westerly Zoning Board of Review (the Board) and Zoey Watch Hill, LLC, owner of a 3,049-square-foot nonconforming lot at 14 Larkin Road in Westerly.
- Procedural Posture: The Board granted Zoey dimensional variances for front, side, and rear setbacks to allow vertical expansion of a 1938 cottage. WHFD appealed to Superior Court, which affirmed. WHFD then sought certiorari to the Supreme Court.
- Core Issue on Certiorari: Whether the Board and the Superior Court employed the correct hardship standard—“more than a mere inconvenience” (§ 45-24-41(e)(2))—or whether they were required, under § 45-24-31(66)(ii) and New Castle, to demand proof that the applicant had “no other reasonable alternative” to enjoy a legally permitted beneficial use.
III. Summary of the Judgment
The Supreme Court (Suttell, C.J., writing for a unanimous four-justice panel) affirmed the Superior Court’s judgment. The Court held:
- The Board and the trial justice applied the proper hardship standard for a dimensional variance—proof that denial would cause “more than a mere inconvenience.”
- New Castle did not alter that standard; its reference to “no reasonable alternative” was contextual and tied to the separate statutory requirement that the relief sought be the “least relief necessary.”
- Subsequent statutory amendments in 2023 (effective January 1, 2024) excised the confusing language from the definition of dimensional variance, thereby validating the Court’s interpretation.
IV. Detailed Analysis
A. Precedents Cited
- New Castle Realty Co. v. Dreczko, 248 A.3d 638 (R.I. 2021) – Central to WHFD’s argument; Court distinguishes its dicta.
- Lischio v. Zoning Board of Review of North Kingstown, 818 A.2d 685 (R.I. 2003) – Early articulation of “more than a mere inconvenience” in dimensional variance context.
- Bernuth v. Zoning Board of Review of New Shoreham, 770 A.2d 396 (R.I. 2001) – First quotation of the definitional “no other reasonable alternative” language.
- East Bay Community Dev. Corp. v. Barrington Zoning Bd., 901 A.2d 1136 (R.I. 2006) – Principle that zoning amendments are not applied retroactively absent clear legislative intent.
- Freepoint Solar LLC v. Richmond Zoning Bd., 274 A.3d 1 (R.I. 2022) – Recitation of standard of review for zoning appeals.
By carefully explaining these precedents, the Court clarifies that none of them overturn the core hardship test. Instead, “reasonable alternatives” remains relevant only to the statutory “least relief necessary” criterion; it is not an independent or heightened hardship yardstick.
B. Legal Reasoning
- Statutory Hierarchy – The Court treats § 45-24-41 (variance criteria) as the operative, specific provision governing the decision because it directly addresses the showing required at the time of decision-making. In contrast, § 45-24-31 merely supplies definitions.
- Role of New Castle – The Court emphasizes that in New Castle, the “no reasonable alternative” phrase surfaced during analysis of the “least relief necessary” factor, not as a novel hardship test. Therefore relying on it to supplant the “mere inconvenience” language misconstrues the prior holding.
- Legislative Clarification – Amendments effective January 1, 2024 removed the contested phrase from § 45-24-31(68)(ii) and simultaneously defined “more than a mere inconvenience” as “relief minimal to a reasonable enjoyment of the permitted use.” The Court uses this curative statute to confirm that its interpretation reflects legislative intent, although it applies pre-amendment law because the application preceded 2024.
- Application to Facts – Zoey’s oddly shaped, sub-standard lot and 475-square-foot living space met the “more than mere inconvenience” threshold. The Board also found that vertical expansion— staying within height limits—constituted the least relief necessary. Substantial evidence supported those findings.
- Scope of Certiorari Review – Because WHFD’s petition raised only the legal-standard issue, the Court purposely refrained from re-weighing factual determinations or secondary arguments such as alleged “demolition.”
C. Potential Impact
- Doctrinal Certainty – Municipal boards and practitioners now have unambiguous guidance: dimensional variance hardship = “more than a mere inconvenience.”
- Legislative-Judicial Synergy – By harmonizing its holding with the 2023 amendments, the Court illustrates a collaborative evolution of zoning law and may deter future litigation over similar language.
- Practical Effects on Applicants – Applicants need not prove the virtual impossibility of any reasonable alternative; rather, they must show that denial would substantially inhibit reasonable use and that their design is the least intrusive fix.
- Litigation Strategy – Opponents of variances will likely pivot from hardship arguments toward challenges on “least relief necessary,” architectural massing, or comprehensive-plan consistency.
- Broader Zoning Trends – The case signals Rhode Island’s continued tolerance for granting variances to modernize antiquated shorefront cottages when vertical expansion is the only plausible method to meet current living and environmental standards.
V. Complex Concepts Simplified
- Dimensional Variance
- A license to deviate from bulk regulations (setbacks, height, lot coverage) while maintaining the underlying permitted use of the property.
- “More than a Mere Inconvenience”
- The applicant must prove that strict compliance would do more than create minor difficulties or added expense; it would materially frustrate reasonable use.
- “Least Relief Necessary”
- Even after hardship is proven, the applicant must show that the requested variance is the smallest departure from the ordinance that will alleviate the hardship—the Court often looks at “reasonable alternatives” here.
- Nonconforming Lot
- A parcel that fails to meet current dimensional requirements (e.g., minimum area) but lawfully predates the zoning ordinance.
- Certiorari Review
- An extraordinary writ allowing the Supreme Court to review legal errors on the record below; factual re-evaluation is off-limits.
VI. Conclusion
Watch Hill Fire District decisively restores doctrinal clarity to Rhode Island’s dimensional variance jurisprudence. Applicants must satisfy the twin tests of (1) hardship greater than mere inconvenience and (2) least relief necessary. They need not prove the absence of any other reasonable way to use their property, nor a total deprivation of beneficial use. For zoning boards, the decision confirms that traditional variance findings— unique lot characteristics, non-self-created hardship, compatibility with neighborhood character, and minimal relief—remain sufficient when supported by substantial evidence. Going forward, litigants should track the 2023 statutory amendments and this decision as complementary authorities that lock in the standard and prevent collateral relitigation of the abandoned “no reasonable alternative” language.
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