Reaffirming the Stringent Standard for Withdrawal of Guilty Pleas and Deference to Within-Guidelines Sentences in the Fourth Circuit: Commentary on United States v. Hollis

I. Introduction

This commentary analyzes the unpublished per curiam decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in United States v. Chauncey Alexander Hollis, No. 25‑4133 (4th Cir. Dec. 22, 2025). Although unpublished and therefore non‑binding in the Fourth Circuit, the opinion is a compact but instructive restatement of several important criminal procedure principles:

The high bar a defendant must clear to withdraw a guilty plea after a proper Rule 11 colloquy;
The deferential “abuse of discretion” standard governing both plea-withdrawal rulings and sentencing review;
The presumption of substantive reasonableness afforded to within‑Guidelines sentences;
The limits on what may be raised on direct appeal, especially ineffective assistance of counsel and conditions‑of‑confinement claims;
The operation of the Anders framework when appellate counsel finds no meritorious grounds for appeal.

The decision offers a useful synthesis of Fourth Circuit and Supreme Court precedent on guilty pleas, sentencing review, and the treatment of pro se arguments lodged alongside an Anders brief. It exemplifies how appellate courts evaluate the record to determine whether a guilty plea and sentence should stand in the absence of clear constitutional or procedural error.

A. Parties and Procedural Posture

Plaintiff–Appellee: United States of America
Defendant–Appellant: Chauncey Alexander Hollis
Originating Court: U.S. District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina (Greensboro), Judge Thomas D. Schroeder
Charge: Conspiracy to defraud the United States
Plea: Guilty under Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c)(1)(B) (non‑binding plea agreement)
Sentence: 33 months’ imprisonment, within the advisory Sentencing Guidelines range

On appeal, appointed counsel filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, signaling that, after a conscientious review of the record, she could identify no meritorious basis for appeal, but nevertheless raising two potential questions:

Whether the district court abused its discretion in denying Hollis’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea; and
Whether Hollis’s within‑Guidelines sentence is unreasonable.

Hollis, acting pro se, supplemented counsel’s submission with his own briefs and motions, challenging the district court’s jurisdiction, the validity of the sentencing proceedings, the appointment of standby counsel, the adequacy of discovery, and the effectiveness of his trial counsel. The Government did not file a brief, leaving the court to resolve the appeal on the defense submissions and the record.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Fourth Circuit affirmed the conviction and sentence in all respects. The court held:

Hollis’s guilty plea was knowing, voluntary, and supported by an adequate factual basis, and the district court therefore did not abuse its discretion in denying his motion to withdraw the plea.
The 33‑month within‑Guidelines sentence was both procedurally and substantively reasonable; Hollis failed to rebut the presumption of reasonableness that attaches to a within‑Guidelines sentence.
Hollis’s pro se claims concerning subject‑matter and personal jurisdiction, due process, denial of discovery, Faretta rights and standby counsel, and conditions of confinement were either meritless on the existing record or not cognizable on direct appeal.
Any ineffective assistance of counsel claim was not reviewable on this record and must be pursued, if at all, in a post‑conviction motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.

Invoking the Anders framework, the court independently reviewed the entire record, found no non‑frivolous issues, and affirmed without oral argument, deeming argument unnecessary to the decisional process.

III. Detailed Analysis

I. Validity of the Guilty Plea and the Motion to Withdraw

A. Legal Framework: Rule 11 and the “Fair and Just Reason” Standard

A central component of the opinion is its application of established standards governing the validity of guilty pleas and motions to withdraw such pleas.

1. Constitutional Validity of a Guilty Plea

A guilty plea must be:

Knowing: The defendant understands the nature of the charges and the consequences of pleading guilty.
Voluntary: The plea is not the product of coercion, threats, or improper promises.
Intelligent: The defendant has sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences.

The court quotes United States v. Fisher, 711 F.3d 460, 464 (4th Cir. 2013):

A guilty plea is valid if the defendant knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently pleads guilty “with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences.”

And relies on United States v. Moussaoui, 591 F.3d 263, 278 (4th Cir. 2010) to underscore that courts look to the totality of the circumstances surrounding the plea and grant the defendant’s sworn declarations of guilt a presumption of truthfulness.

2. Rule 11 Requirements

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 imposes specific obligations on the district court before accepting a guilty plea:

Rule 11(b)(1): The court must inform the defendant of, and ensure he understands:
- The rights he is giving up (e.g., trial by jury, confrontation of witnesses);
- The nature of the charge(s);
- The maximum and any mandatory minimum penalties.
Rule 11(b)(2): The court must confirm that the plea is voluntary and not the result of threats, force, or promises outside the plea agreement.
Rule 11(b)(3): The court must determine that there is a factual basis for the plea, ensuring the defendant’s conduct satisfies the elements of the offense.

The opinion notes that, after reviewing the record, the panel concluded that:

The Rule 11 colloquy was properly conducted;
Hollis’s plea was knowing and voluntary; and
The plea was supported by a sufficient factual basis.

The court cites United States v. Ketchum, 550 F.3d 363, 367 (4th Cir. 2008) for the standard of review, confirming that the adequacy of a factual basis and the propriety of the Rule 11 inquiry are reviewed for abuse of discretion.

3. Withdrawal of a Guilty Plea: The Moore–Ubakanma Factors

After a plea is accepted but before sentencing, a defendant may seek to withdraw it. However, as the court emphasizes, there is no absolute right to withdraw a guilty plea.

Citing United States v. Walker, 934 F.3d 375, 377 n.1 (4th Cir. 2019) and United States v. Ubakanma, 215 F.3d 421, 424 (4th Cir. 2000), the court reaffirms:

The defendant bears the burden of showing a “fair and just reason” for withdrawal;
The district court’s decision is reviewed only for abuse of discretion.

The panel then recites the familiar six‑factor test, first articulated in United States v. Moore, 931 F.2d 245, 248 (4th Cir. 1991), and reaffirmed in Ubakanma:

Whether the defendant has offered credible evidence that his plea was not knowing or otherwise involuntary;
Whether the defendant has credibly asserted his legal innocence;
Whether there has been a delay between entry of the plea and filing of the motion;
Whether the defendant has had close assistance of counsel;
Whether withdrawal will cause prejudice to the government; and
Whether withdrawal will inconvenience the court and waste judicial resources.

The court also emphasizes, quoting United States v. Nicholson, 676 F.3d 376, 384 (4th Cir. 2012):

The most important consideration in resolving a motion to withdraw a guilty plea is an evaluation of the Rule 11 colloquy at which the guilty plea was accepted.

That is, if the Rule 11 hearing was thorough and proper, it is very difficult for a defendant to later show that the plea was unknowing or involuntary.

B. Application to Hollis

Applying these standards, the panel concludes that the district court acted well within its discretion in denying Hollis’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea. The key points were:

No credible evidence of an unknowing or involuntary plea. The court reviewed the plea proceeding and found that Hollis had been properly advised of his rights and the consequences, and that he indicated understanding and voluntariness. His later assertions did not credibly undermine his sworn statements at the plea hearing.
No credible assertion of legal innocence. The panel expressly notes that Hollis “failed to credibly assert his legal innocence.” Mere dissatisfaction with the plea or regret about the decision does not qualify as a credible claim of innocence.
Seven‑month delay. Hollis waited “approximately seven months” before moving to withdraw. This extended delay weighs heavily against him under the third Moore factor, suggesting after‑the‑fact reconsideration rather than genuine plea infirmity.
Prejudice to the Government and waste of judicial resources. The court agrees with the district court that allowing withdrawal so late in the process would prejudice the Government and waste judicial resources, especially in the absence of a credible innocence claim. Witnesses may have dispersed, memories may have faded, and the Government would need to reconstruct a trial posture it had reasonably set aside once the plea was entered.

Considering the Moore factors and the strength of the Rule 11 colloquy, the court finds no abuse of discretion in the district court’s refusal to allow Hollis to undo his plea.

C. Significance of the Plea Analysis

Although the opinion is unpublished, it:

Reaffirms the heavy weight courts place on a properly conducted Rule 11 colloquy;
Shows that a substantial delay (seven months) between plea and withdrawal motion can be a powerful factor against withdrawal;
Illustrates how appellate courts view post‑hoc claims of innocence skeptically when they conflict with earlier sworn statements in open court.

II. Sentencing Review and the Presumption of Reasonableness

A. Two‑Step Review: Procedural and Substantive Reasonableness

The panel turns next to the challenge to the 33‑month sentence, which fell within the properly calculated Sentencing Guidelines range.

The court follows the two‑step framework articulated by the Supreme Court in Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007) and applied in Fourth Circuit cases such as United States v. Nance, 957 F.3d 204 (4th Cir. 2020) and United States v. Lewis, 18 F.4th 743 (4th Cir. 2021).

Procedural reasonableness. The court examines whether the district court:
- Correctly calculated the advisory Guidelines range;
- Gave both parties an opportunity to argue for a particular sentence;
- Considered the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors;
- Addressed the defendant’s non‑frivolous arguments for a different sentence;
- Explained the chosen sentence sufficiently to permit meaningful appellate review.
Substantive reasonableness. If the sentence is procedurally sound, the court then considers whether, under the totality of the circumstances, the sentence is reasonable in light of the § 3553(a) factors – for example, the nature and circumstances of the offense, the defendant’s history and characteristics, and the goals of punishment (deterrence, protection of the public, rehabilitation, etc.).

Both aspects of review proceed under a deferential abuse‑of‑discretion standard, as mandated by Gall, 552 U.S. at 41.

B. Presumption of Reasonableness for Within‑Guidelines Sentences

The opinion emphasizes the presumption of substantive reasonableness that attaches to sentences imposed within (or below) a properly calculated Guidelines range. Citing United States v. Louthian, 756 F.3d 295, 306 (4th Cir. 2014), the court restates the rule:

Any sentence that is within or below a properly calculated Guidelines range is presumptively [substantively] reasonable.

This is a rebuttable presumption: the defendant can show that, despite being within the Guidelines, the sentence is unreasonable when measured against the § 3553(a) factors. But the burden is on the defendant to overcome this presumption, and that is a demanding task in practice.

C. Application to Hollis’s Sentence

The court concludes that Hollis’s sentence is both procedurally and substantively reasonable:

Procedural soundness:
- The district court correctly calculated the Guidelines range.
- Both sides were allowed to present argument.
- Hollis personally had an opportunity to allocute (speak directly to the judge) before sentencing.
- The judge expressly considered Hollis’s mitigation arguments.
- The court referenced and considered the relevant § 3553(a) factors.
- An adequate explanation was provided for the chosen within‑Guidelines sentence.
Substantive reasonableness:
- Given the presumption attached to the within‑Guidelines sentence, Hollis was required to show that his sentence was unreasonable in light of § 3553(a).
- The panel concludes that he failed to make such a showing; he did not identify any factor making the sentence disproportionately harsh or otherwise unwarranted.

Accordingly, the panel holds that the district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing the 33‑month sentence.

D. Practical Impact of the Sentencing Analysis

The opinion reinforces several important realities of federal sentencing appeals:

As long as the district court gets the Guidelines calculation right, addresses the parties’ arguments, and explains itself, procedural challenges are unlikely to succeed.
A within‑Guidelines sentence will usually be affirmed absent some marked disregard of § 3553(a) or clearly compelling mitigating circumstances.
Defendants appealing within‑Guidelines sentences face a significant uphill battle due to the presumption of reasonableness.

III. Treatment of Hollis’s Pro Se Claims

In addition to issues raised by counsel, the panel addresses several claims Hollis advanced pro se, both in supplemental briefs and in motions to expedite.

A. Jurisdiction and Due Process

Hollis argued that:

The district court lacked subject‑matter and personal jurisdiction over him; and
His due process rights were violated by the court proceeding to sentencing.

The panel rejects these claims, concluding that:

The district court did have jurisdiction – federal district courts have subject‑matter jurisdiction over “all offenses against the laws of the United States” (28 U.S.C. § 3231), and personal jurisdiction is established when the defendant is properly brought before the court in a federal prosecution.
Proceeding to sentencing after acceptance of a valid guilty plea does not violate due process. Once a valid plea is in place, the court is not required to revisit guilt; sentencing is the appropriate next step.

Although the panel does not spell out the statutory citations, its conclusions reflect straightforward application of basic jurisdictional principles.

B. Faretta, Standby Counsel, and Waiver of Counsel

Hollis contended that:

He refused standby counsel;
He never signed a Faretta waiver; and
The appointment of standby counsel was improper.

The panel responds:

The district court “properly appointed standby counsel.”
The record does not support Hollis’s claim that his rights were violated in this regard.

Although the opinion does not cite Faretta v. California by name, it is plainly addressing issues that arise under Faretta, which recognizes a defendant’s right to self‑representation but also permits courts to appoint standby counsel to assist or take over if the defendant is unable or unwilling to proceed properly.

Key points embedded in the panel’s brief rejection of Hollis’s argument:

A defendant has a right to represent himself if he knowingly and intelligently waives counsel, but the court may still appoint standby counsel without violating that right.
There is no constitutional right to a specific form of “Faretta waiver,” such as a particular written form; what matters is the adequacy of the court’s colloquy and the defendant’s clear understanding and choice.
A defendant may not use Faretta and standby counsel disputes as a vehicle to upend otherwise valid plea and sentencing proceedings absent concrete prejudice or violation of core rights.

C. Discovery and Access to Evidence

Hollis claimed he was denied access to discovery. The panel notes that:

The district court “required full discovery be provided to Hollis.”
There is nothing in the record showing that he was actually deprived of discovery in a way that undermined the fairness of the proceedings.

Moreover, as a matter of doctrine (though the panel does not expressly highlight this), a voluntary guilty plea generally waives non‑jurisdictional defects that occurred before the plea, including many types of discovery disputes.

D. Conditions of Confinement Claims

Hollis also raised constitutional complaints about his conditions of confinement, apparently for the first time on appeal. The panel responds that such claims are not cognizable on direct appeal from a criminal conviction.

Instead, conditions‑of‑confinement claims are typically:

Brought through civil rights actions (for example, a Bivens action for federal officials, or 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against state actors), or
In some circumstances, raised in a habeas corpus petition if the conditions allegedly render the confinement itself unconstitutional in a manner cognizable under habeas law.

The appellate court, confined to reviewing the criminal judgment and sentence, lacks a proper vehicle in this appeal to adjudicate such complaints.

IV. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel: Reserved for § 2255

Hollis claimed that his trial counsel was ineffective. The panel addresses this with reference to Fourth Circuit law on ineffective assistance claims on direct appeal.

The court quotes United States v. Freeman, 24 F.4th 320, 326 (4th Cir. 2022) (en banc):

On direct appeal, “we will reverse only if it conclusively appears in the trial record itself that the defendant was not provided effective representation.”

And then cites United States v. Faulls, 821 F.3d 502, 508 (4th Cir. 2016), for the proposition that:

Because the present record does not conclusively show that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance, Hollis’s claim is not cognizable on direct appeal and “should be raised, if at all, in a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion.”

The panel underscores that at his plea hearing, Hollis affirmed under oath that he was “fully satisfied” with his counsel’s services—statements that cut strongly against later ineffective assistance allegations, absent very clear contrary evidence.

In essence:

Direct appeal is not the usual forum for ineffective assistance claims;
Such claims nearly always require a factual record beyond the trial transcript (e.g., counsel’s strategy, what advice was given, what investigation was done), which is developed in a § 2255 proceeding;
Only in rare cases where ineffectiveness is obvious on the face of the record will an appellate court consider and sustain such a claim on direct appeal.

V. The Anders Framework and the Court’s Independent Review

This case arrives via an Anders brief, invoking the Supreme Court’s decision in Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967).

A. What Is an Anders Brief?

When appointed appellate counsel, after diligent review, concludes that there are no non‑frivolous grounds for appeal, counsel may:

File a brief referring to anything in the record that might arguably support the appeal; and
Request permission to withdraw.

The client must be notified and permitted to file a pro se brief raising any issues he wishes. The appellate court must then:

Conduct its own independent review of the entire record; and
Determine whether any non‑frivolous issues exist that would merit full briefing or relief.

B. The Court’s Handling of the Anders Process in Hollis

In Hollis’s case:

Counsel filed an Anders brief, identifying two potential issues but asserting that no meritorious grounds for appeal existed.
Hollis was granted permission to file a pro se supplemental brief, which he did, and he also filed motions to expedite.
The Fourth Circuit states explicitly:
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire record in this case and have found no meritorious grounds for appeal.
Because the court decided the case on the merits and affirmed, it denied Hollis’s motions to expedite as moot.

Finally, the court reminds counsel of their continuing obligations:

Counsel must inform Hollis in writing of his right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further review.
If Hollis requests a certiorari petition but counsel believes it would be frivolous, counsel may seek leave to withdraw, certifying that Hollis has been served with a copy of the motion.

This portion of the opinion underscores the procedural safeguards built into the Anders regime to protect the defendant’s rights while allowing counsel to avoid filing frivolous appeals.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

Several legal concepts in the opinion can be distilled for non‑specialist readers:

1. “Abuse of Discretion” Standard

When a court uses an “abuse of discretion” standard, it is saying:

It will not overturn the lower court’s decision just because it might have decided differently;
It will reverse only if the lower court’s ruling was:
- Arbitrary or irrational;
- Based on an incorrect legal principle; or
- Rested on clearly erroneous factual findings.

This is a very deferential standard – especially important in:

Motions to withdraw guilty pleas; and
Sentencing decisions.

2. Rule 11 Colloquy

The “Rule 11 colloquy” is the in‑court conversation between the judge and the defendant when the defendant wishes to plead guilty. The judge must:

Explain the rights the defendant is giving up by pleading guilty (like the right to a jury trial);
Describe the charges and potential penalties;
Confirm that the plea is voluntary and not coerced; and
Establish that there are facts showing that the defendant is actually guilty of the crime charged.

If this colloquy is done correctly, it becomes very difficult for the defendant to later claim the plea was invalid.

3. “Fair and Just Reason” to Withdraw a Plea

After a plea is accepted but before sentencing, a defendant can ask to take back the plea. However, he must show a “fair and just reason”. Courts look at factors such as:

Was the plea unknowing or involuntary?
Does the defendant now credibly claim he is actually innocent?
How long did he wait to ask to withdraw the plea?
Did he have competent legal advice at the time?
Would changing course now harm the prosecution or waste court time?

A long delay and lack of credible innocence, as in Hollis’s case, weigh heavily against withdrawal.

4. Procedural vs. Substantive Reasonableness in Sentencing

Procedural reasonableness asks: Did the judge follow the right steps and consider the right factors? For example, did the judge:
- Calculate the Guideline range correctly?
- Let both sides argue?
- Consider the statutory factors (18 U.S.C. § 3553(a))?
- Explain why this particular sentence was chosen?
Substantive reasonableness asks: Given all the facts, is the length and nature of the sentence fair and appropriate in light of the statutory factors?

Only if the sentence is both procedurally and substantively reasonable will it be affirmed.

5. Presumption of Reasonableness for Guidelines Sentences

When a judge imposes a sentence that falls within the advisory Sentencing Guidelines range:

The appellate court presumes that the sentence is substantively reasonable;
The defendant must provide strong reasons, tied to the statutory factors, to show the sentence is still too high or otherwise unwarranted.

This presumption makes it difficult to succeed on appeal unless the district judge ignored or misapplied significant considerations.

6. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel on Direct Appeal vs. § 2255

To prove ineffective assistance of counsel under the usual Strickland framework (not named in the opinion, but underlying the law), a defendant must show:

Counsel’s performance was objectively unreasonable; and
The deficient performance prejudiced the defense (e.g., affected the outcome).

On direct appeal:

The court looks only at the existing record from the trial court;
If the record does not “conclusively” show ineffective assistance, the issue must be raised later in a separate post‑conviction motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, where evidence can be developed (affidavits, testimony, etc.).

That is why Hollis’s ineffective assistance claim was deemed premature for direct appeal.

7. Conditions of Confinement vs. Direct Criminal Appeal

Complaints about prison conditions (for example, overcrowding, medical care, safety, or facility policies) generally:

Do not affect whether the conviction is valid; and
Do not go to the legality of the sentence itself.

They must therefore be raised in a separate lawsuit or, in rare cases, a habeas corpus petition—not in an appeal from the conviction and sentence, which is limited to reviewing the correctness of the criminal judgment itself.

V. Impact and Broader Significance

Although United States v. Hollis is unpublished and explicitly “not binding precedent” in the Fourth Circuit, it nonetheless has several practical and interpretive implications.

A. Guilty Pleas and Withdrawal Motions

The opinion reinforces how difficult it is to withdraw a guilty plea once a full and proper Rule 11 colloquy has been conducted.
It highlights that long delays (here, seven months) between the plea and a withdrawal motion will usually be held against the defendant.
It underscores that credible assertions of actual innocence are central. Bare claims of innocence, unsupported by facts or inconsistent with prior sworn statements, will not satisfy the “fair and just reason” standard.

B. Sentencing Appeals in the Fourth Circuit

The opinion reiterates the deference accorded to district judges under the Gall framework.
It confirms that the presumption of reasonableness for within‑Guidelines sentences articulated in Louthian remains robust.
Defense counsel contemplating appeals from within‑Guidelines sentences must recognize the steep uphill battle: success will usually require showing either a serious procedural error or truly extraordinary circumstances under § 3553(a).

C. Pro Se Litigants and Misconceived Jurisdictional/Constitutional Claims

Hollis’s pro se filings reflect a pattern often seen in federal criminal appeals:

Attempts to challenge the court’s subject‑matter or personal jurisdiction without any genuine legal basis;
Invocations of due process and self‑representation rights in ways not supported by the record or governing law;
Efforts to transform discovery or detention‑related grievances into grounds for undoing a valid plea and sentence.

The court’s succinct rejection of these arguments serves as a reminder:

Federal criminal jurisdiction is firmly grounded in statute (28 U.S.C. § 3231);
Faretta rights and counsel issues must be evaluated in the full procedural context; and
Collateral concerns (like conditions of confinement) must be raised through the correct procedural vehicles.

D. Clarifying the Proper Forum for Ineffective Assistance Claims

By directing Hollis to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 for any ineffective assistance of counsel claims, the court:

Reinforces the general rule that direct appeal is not the appropriate vehicle for litigating the performance of defense counsel unless the record clearly shows ineffectiveness;
Ensures that such claims, if pursued, will be litigated with a full factual record rather than on the truncated record available on appeal.

E. Role of Anders in Safeguarding Defendants’ Rights

Finally, the court’s adherence to Anders procedures, including granting Hollis leave to file a pro se brief and conducting an independent review, underscores a key institutional role:

Protecting defendants’ rights even when counsel believes no meritorious appellate issues exist;
Maintaining the integrity of the appellate process by ensuring frivolous appeals do not proceed under the guise of an adversarial dispute.

VI. Conclusion

United States v. Hollis is not a path‑breaking opinion, but it is a clear and instructive restatement of core principles in federal criminal procedure and sentencing:

A guilty plea, once entered after a thorough Rule 11 colloquy, is extremely difficult to undo. The “fair and just reason” standard for withdrawal is demanding, particularly when:
- There is a substantial delay before the motion to withdraw; and
- The defendant lacks a credible assertion of legal innocence.
Sentences falling within the properly calculated Guidelines range are presumptively substantively reasonable, and appellate courts defer heavily to the district court’s judgment when it has followed the correct procedures and given an adequate explanation.
Not all grievances are properly raised on direct appeal. Ineffective assistance of counsel claims and conditions‑of‑ confinement issues generally belong in § 2255 or separate civil proceedings, not in the direct review of a conviction and sentence.
The Anders process continues to function as an important safeguard, ensuring that defendants receive an independent judicial assessment of the record even when counsel believes an appeal lacks merit.

Collectively, these principles maintain the stability and finality of criminal judgments while preserving avenues for redress when genuine constitutional or legal errors exist. Hollis thus stands as a concise reaffirmation of the Fourth Circuit’s established approach to plea withdrawals, sentencing review, and the limited role of direct appeal in addressing broader complaints about representation and confinement.