Reaffirming the Sexual-Abuse Exception to Reasonable Efforts and the Strict Standard for Extending Improvement Periods: Commentary on In re C.N.

I. Introduction

This commentary analyzes the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia’s memorandum decision in In re C.N., No. 24-767 (Cabell County CC-06-2022-JA-159), issued November 4, 2025. The decision affirms the Cabell County Circuit Court’s December 2, 2024, order terminating the parental rights of the petitioner father, J.N., to his minor child, C.N.

The case arises from a child abuse and neglect proceeding initiated in November 2022. The West Virginia Department of Human Services (“DHS”) alleged that the father:

committed domestic violence against the child’s mother,
abused controlled substances, and
physically and sexually abused C.N.

After an initial partial adjudication for neglect based on exposure to domestic violence and a post-adjudicatory improvement period, the circuit court later adjudicated the father as an abusing parent on grounds of physical and sexual abuse. Following a dispositional hearing, the court found no reasonable likelihood that the father could substantially correct the conditions of abuse and neglect in the near future and terminated his parental rights. C.N. was reunified with her mother, whose parental rights were preserved after she successfully completed her own improvement period.

On appeal, the father challenged:

The denial of an extension of his improvement period; and
The termination of his parental rights, arguing that he was substantially compliant and that he should receive the same non-termination outcome as the mother.

He also attempted to dispute the sufficiency of the evidence regarding sexual abuse, but that issue was not properly briefed and therefore was not addressed on the merits.

The Supreme Court, deciding the case without oral argument under Rule 21 of the West Virginia Rules of Appellate Procedure, affirmed the termination order. While the memorandum decision does not purport to announce entirely new law, it meaningfully reaffirms and sharpens two key principles in West Virginia abuse and neglect jurisprudence:

Improvement-period extensions require genuine “substantial compliance,” not partial or minimal participation, and remain wholly discretionary with the circuit court.
A substantiated finding that a parent sexually abused a child triggers both the statutory exception to “reasonable efforts” to preserve the family and the statutory presumption that there is no reasonable likelihood the conditions of abuse or neglect can be substantially corrected, thereby supporting termination of parental rights.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Court’s reasoning can be distilled into the following key holdings:

Standard of Review. In appeals from abuse and neglect dispositions, the Court reviews findings of fact for clear error and legal conclusions de novo, citing Syl. Pt. 1 of In re Cecil T., 228 W. Va. 89, 717 S.E.2d 873 (2011).
No Entitlement to Extension of Improvement Period. Under W. Va. Code § 49-4-610(6), an extension may be granted only if the parent has “substantially complied” with the terms of the improvement period and the extension is consistent with the child’s best interests. The Court held the record showed the father did not substantially comply and that an extension was not in C.N.’s best interest. It emphasized:
- three positive drug screens,
- failure to maintain stable employment and housing,
- combative behavior with a service provider (including slamming the door during a home visit),
- failure to begin therapy until late in the improvement period, and
- discharge from parenting services for noncompliance.
Relying on In re Tonjia M., 212 W. Va. 443, 573 S.E.2d 354 (2002), the Court reiterated that circuit courts have discretion to deny improvement periods (and by implication, extensions) when no meaningful improvement is likely.
Reasonable-Efforts Exception for Sexual Abuse. Once the circuit court found that the father had sexually abused C.N., W. Va. Code § 49-4-604(c)(7)(A) relieved DHS of any further obligation to make “reasonable efforts” to preserve or reunify the family. Thus, DHS was not required to continue or extend services to the father after the sexual-abuse adjudication.
Termination Proper Despite Claimed Compliance and Mother’s Alternative Disposition. The Court rejected the father’s argument that:
- his alleged substantial compliance barred termination, or
- he was entitled to the same non-termination outcome as the mother.
Based on W. Va. Code § 49-4-604(d)(5), the Court held that sexual abuse by an abusing parent establishes that there is “no reasonable likelihood” that the conditions of neglect or abuse can be substantially corrected. That, in turn, supports termination under W. Va. Code § 49-4-604(c)(6), as recognized in Syl. Pt. 5 of In re Kristin Y., 227 W. Va. 558, 712 S.E.2d 55 (2011), quoting Syl. Pt. 2 of In re R.J.M., 164 W. Va. 496, 266 S.E.2d 114 (1980). The Court further relied on In re Emily, 208 W. Va. 325, 540 S.E.2d 542 (2000), to affirm that one parent’s successful completion of services and retention of parental rights does not “automatically entitle” the other parent to the same result.
Waiver of Challenge to Sexual-Abuse Evidence. Although the father complained that the evidence of sexual abuse was insufficient, he did not identify a separate assignment of error or provide legal authority in support of that contention as required by W. Va. R. App. P. 10(c)(7). Citing State v. Kaufman, 227 W. Va. 537, 711 S.E.2d 607 (2011), and the oft-quoted passage from United States v. Dunkel, 927 F.2d 955 (7th Cir. 1991), the Court declined to address the issue.

The result: the Supreme Court affirmed the termination of the father’s parental rights, while not disturbing the reunification of C.N. with her mother.

III. Detailed Analysis

A. Factual and Procedural Background

1. The Petition and Initial Allegations

In November 2022, DHS filed an abuse and neglect petition against the father. The allegations were serious and multi-faceted:

Domestic violence against the mother: C.N. reportedly saw the father choke the mother and strike her in the face. This led to his arrest and guilty plea to first-offense domestic battery.
Substance abuse: The father was alleged to be abusing substances, although the record, as summarized in the opinion, focuses primarily on later positive drug screens rather than on initial details.
Physical abuse of C.N.: C.N. disclosed that the father choked her as well.
Sexual abuse of C.N.: Serious sexual allegations included that the father:
- made C.N. watch pornographic videos with him; and
- once attempted to penetrate her while she was sleeping.

2. Initial Adjudication and Limited Stipulation

At the initial adjudicatory hearing in May 2023, the father entered a limited stipulation: he admitted to exposing the child to domestic violence, leading the circuit court to adjudicate him as a neglectful parent regarding that issue. Importantly, the court held in abeyance any adjudication as to the allegations of physical and sexual abuse, pending completion of a psychological assessment of C.N. This segmented approach is common where sexual abuse allegations require additional, expert-informed evaluation.

3. Post-Adjudicatory Improvement Period and Compliance Problems

After the initial adjudication, the father successfully moved for a post-adjudicatory improvement period. Under West Virginia’s statutory scheme, such an improvement period is a structured opportunity for a parent to correct the underlying conditions of abuse or neglect with the support of court-ordered services.

The father’s improvement period required him to:

obtain stable income and housing,
complete a Batterer Intervention and Prevention Program (“BIPP”),
submit to random drug screening,
participate in individualized therapy, and
complete parenting and adult life-skills services.

Across multiple review hearings, culminating in January 2024, DHS presented evidence of significant noncompliance:

Three positive drug screens;
Discharge from parenting and adult life-skills services for repeated non-attendance;
Combative behavior during a home assessment: a provider testified that the father “freaked out,” slammed the door in her face, and yelled that she could not be on his property without prior permission;
Delayed therapy: he did not begin individualized therapy until late in the improvement period;
Lack of stable employment and housing, at least as viewed by DHS at later stages.

The Court notes that, “otherwise,” he remained compliant with the terms of his improvement period, and the circuit court initially allowed that period to continue. This suggests that he was engaging in at least some services (such as BIPP and some drug screens), but the deficits described above weighed heavily against a finding of “substantial” compliance.

4. Adjudication on Physical and Sexual Abuse

In February 2024, the circuit court reconvened for adjudication of the physical and sexual abuse allegations, at which point the father’s improvement period had expired.

DHS presented a strong evidentiary record of C.N.’s disclosures:

She had made repeated, consistent disclosures to multiple sources:
- a teacher,
- Child Protective Services personnel,
- a forensic interviewer, and
- a psychologist.

The father flatly denied any abuse, asserting instead that C.N. had fabricated the allegations due to her “low intelligence.” However, expert testimony established that her intellectual functioning did not impair her ability to recall and relate her experiences. The circuit court credited the child’s disclosures and the expert testimony over the father’s denials and found:

that the father had physically abused C.N.; and
that the father had sexually abused C.N.

He was accordingly adjudicated as an abusing parent.

5. Disposition and Termination

At the April 2024 dispositional hearing, DHS presented evidence that, by that point:

the father was no longer employed,
he lacked stable housing,
he had been discharged from parenting services due to noncompliance, and
he and C.N. had no contact, due to the nature of the allegations and C.N.’s expressed fear and refusal to visit him.

The father, in contrast, testified that:

he had been “substantially compliant” with his improvement period,
he had completed BIPP,
he had stable employment and housing “the whole time,”
he had continued counseling, and
his drug screens were clean.

Critically, however, when asked about the sexual abuse, the father adamantly denied it and insisted that C.N. was lying. This denial, in the face of an adjudicated finding of sexual abuse, is central to the court’s conclusion that there was no realistic prospect of correction.

Because of the sexual abuse finding, the circuit court concluded:

there was no reasonable likelihood that the father could substantially correct the conditions of abuse and neglect in the near future; and
termination of his parental rights was necessary for C.N.’s welfare.

Accordingly, the court terminated the father’s parental rights while leaving the mother’s intact. C.N. was reunified with her mother, achieving permanency.

B. Statutory Framework and Precedents Cited

1. Standard of Review – In re Cecil T.

The Court reiterates the established standard of review for abuse and neglect appeals, citing Syl. Pt. 1 of In re Cecil T., 228 W. Va. 89, 717 S.E.2d 873 (2011):

Findings of fact by the circuit court are reviewed under a “clearly erroneous” standard; and
Conclusions of law are reviewed de novo (afresh, without deference).

In practical terms, this means that the Supreme Court will not reweigh evidence or revisit credibility determinations unless the circuit court’s factual findings have no support in the record. Legal questions, including statutory interpretation, are reviewed anew.

2. Improvement Periods and Extensions – W. Va. Code § 49-4-610(6) & In re Tonjia M.

West Virginia law permits circuit courts to grant improvement periods so that parents may correct abuse or neglect conditions through structured services. The subsection directly at issue here is W. Va. Code § 49-4-610(6), which provides for extensions of improvement periods. An extension may be granted only if:

the parent has substantially complied with the terms of the improvement period; and
an extension is otherwise consistent with the best interest of the child.

The Court relies on In re Tonjia M., 212 W. Va. 443, 573 S.E.2d 354 (2002), for the proposition that whether to grant or deny an improvement period is within the sound discretion of the circuit court, which may deny an improvement period (or its extension) where no meaningful improvement is likely.

This case underscores that:

“Substantial compliance” is more than minimal or partial participation; and
Circuit courts may consider not just attendance, but the quality of engagement and the parent’s overall progress toward safe parenting.

3. Termination Standards – W. Va. Code § 49-4-604 & the Kristin Y. / R.J.M. Line

W. Va. Code § 49-4-604 contains the dispositional framework for abuse and neglect cases. The relevant subsections here are:

§ 49-4-604(c)(6): permits termination of parental rights “[u]pon a finding that there is no reasonable likelihood that the conditions of neglect or abuse can be substantially corrected in the near future and, when necessary for the welfare of the child.”
§ 49-4-604(d)(5): defines when “[n]o reasonable likelihood” exists, including when “the abusing parent or parents have sexually abused” the child.

The Court notes that it has “consistently held” that such a finding of “no reasonable likelihood” can support termination, citing:

In re Kristin Y., 227 W. Va. 558, 712 S.E.2d 55 (2011), Syl. Pt. 5, reaffirming that termination is authorized where there is no reasonable likelihood that conditions can be substantially corrected; and
In re R.J.M., 164 W. Va. 496, 266 S.E.2d 114 (1980), a foundational case for the “no reasonable likelihood” standard.

Together, these authorities make clear that sexual abuse functions as a statutory trigger for a presumption that the parent cannot realistically correct the underlying conditions in the near future, thereby justifying termination when necessary for the child’s welfare.

4. Reasonable-Efforts Exception in Sexual Abuse Cases – W. Va. Code § 49-4-604(c)(7)(A)

W. Va. Code § 49-4-604(c)(7)(A) provides that DHS is not required to make reasonable efforts to preserve the family when the court determines that the parent has subjected the child to sexual abuse. This codifies an “aggravated circumstances” concept: when the harm is sufficiently severe (e.g., sexual abuse), the State is relieved from offering or continuing services aimed at reunification.

In In re C.N., once the circuit court found that the father had sexually abused C.N., DHS was no longer required to:

provide additional reunification services,
seek or recommend an extension of the improvement period, or
continue to make “reasonable efforts” to preserve the father–child relationship.

The Supreme Court explicitly invokes this statute to support the denial of an extension and the move toward termination.

5. Individualized Dispositions for Each Parent – In re Emily

The father argued that because the mother successfully completed her improvement period and retained her parental rights, he should also be entitled to an alternative (non-termination) disposition. The Court rejects this by citing In re Emily, 208 W. Va. 325, 540 S.E.2d 542 (2000), which teaches:

“[T]he mother’s retention of her parental rights after her successful completion of an improvement period does not automatically entitle the [father] to retain his[] parental rights if his[] conduct has endangered the child and such conditions of abuse and/or neglect are not expected to improve.”

This underscores a critical principle: dispositions are individualized. Each parent’s rights are evaluated based on that parent’s conduct, progress, and the risk they pose to the child, not on parity with the other parent.

6. Appellate Briefing Requirements – Rule 10(c)(7), State v. Kaufman, and Dunkel

The father attempted—but failed—to properly challenge the sufficiency of the sexual-abuse evidence. The Court notes that he did not:

set forth a specific assignment of error on this issue; nor
provide supporting legal authority or citations to the record, as required by W. Va. R. App. P. 10(c)(7).

Citing State v. Kaufman, 227 W. Va. 537, 555 n.39, 711 S.E.2d 607, 625 n.39 (2011), which quotes United States v. Dunkel, 927 F.2d 955, 956 (7th Cir. 1991), the Court reiterates that:

“[A] skeletal ‘argument,’ really nothing more than an assertion, does not preserve a claim . . . . Judges are not like pigs, hunting for truffles buried in briefs.”

As a result, the Court declines to address the father’s challenge to the sufficiency of the sexual-abuse evidence. This is an important procedural holding that emphasizes counsel’s obligation to properly frame and support appellate issues.

7. Procedural Context – Rule 21 and Memorandum Decisions

The Court disposed of the appeal via a memorandum decision under W. Va. R. App. P. 21, without oral argument, noting that affirmance was appropriate and that oral argument was unnecessary. Under Rule 21, memorandum decisions are typically used where the law is settled and the outcome is straightforward based on existing precedent. The choice of this procedural vehicle signals that the Court viewed In re C.N. as an application, rather than a revision, of established abuse and neglect law.

C. The Court’s Legal Reasoning Applied

1. Denial of Extension of the Improvement Period

The father’s first principal argument was that the circuit court erred by denying an extension of his post-adjudicatory improvement period. Under W. Va. Code § 49-4-610(6), the circuit court could extend the improvement period only if:

he was in substantial compliance with the improvement period; and
an extension was in C.N.’s best interests.

The Supreme Court agreed with the circuit court that substantial compliance was lacking. The following facts were central:

Substance Use: The father had three positive drug screens during his improvement period. Continued drug use undermines the core objective of ensuring a safe and stable environment for the child.
Parenting Services: He was discharged from parenting and adult life-skills services for failing to attend multiple sessions. These services are crucial for correcting parenting deficits; dropping out is a strong indicator of noncompliance.
Therapy: Individualized therapy did not start until “late” in the improvement period, suggesting a delayed, perhaps last-minute engagement rather than sustained effort.
Home Visit Incident: The father “freaked out,” slammed the door, and yelled at a service provider conducting a home assessment. This behavior suggests resistance to oversight and intervention and raises concerns about cooperation and safety.
Employment and Housing: DHS reported that he failed to obtain stable employment or stable housing. Although the father claimed otherwise, the circuit court apparently credited DHS’s evidence.

The Court acknowledges that the father “otherwise” complied with certain conditions (e.g., BIPP, at least some services), but it emphasizes the overall pattern of noncompliance. In this way, In re C.N. clarifies that:

Partial or selective compliance does not equal “substantial compliance.” The parent must show meaningful engagement with all core components aimed at remedying the conditions of abuse or neglect.
Conduct reflecting hostility or refusal to cooperate with service providers can weigh heavily against an extension.

On the best-interest prong, the Court notes that C.N. was reunified with her mother and remained fearful of her father. Given that permanency had been achieved through reunification with the nonabusing parent, and given the evidence of ongoing risk, an extension to prolong the father’s case was not consistent with her best interests.

The Court further bolsters its analysis by pointing to W. Va. Code § 49-4-604(c)(7)(A): once the father was adjudicated as having sexually abused C.N., DHS was no longer required to make reasonable efforts to preserve that parent–child relationship. Thus, the statutory framework itself undercut the father’s claim to additional services or time.

2. Termination Despite Claimed Substantial Compliance and Mother’s Alternative Disposition

The father next argued that termination was improper because:

he believed he was substantially compliant with the improvement period; and
the mother received an alternative (non-termination) disposition, implying he deserved the same.

The Court rejects both points.

a. Substantial Compliance vs. Statutory Presumption from Sexual Abuse

Even if one credited some degree of compliance, the finding of sexual abuse is dispositive under W. Va. Code § 49-4-604(d)(5), which specifies that “no reasonable likelihood” of correction exists when “the abusing parent . . . [has] sexually abused” the child. This creates a statutory presumption that:

the parent cannot substantially correct the abuse conditions in the near future; and
further efforts at reunification are not warranted.

Once that presumption is in place, the statutory framework in § 49-4-604(c)(6) allows, and often strongly supports, termination of parental rights when necessary to protect the child. Consistent with In re Kristin Y. and In re R.J.M., the Court emphasizes that termination is appropriate where there is no reasonable likelihood of correction.

The father’s continued denial of sexual abuse is particularly significant. From a practical standpoint, if a parent refuses even to acknowledge that the abuse occurred, it is difficult to see how therapy or services could effectively address the underlying risk. This denial reinforces the conclusion that the conditions of abuse are not likely to be remedied.

b. The Mother’s Alternative Disposition – Individualized Analysis

The father’s parity argument—that he should be treated like the mother—fails under In re Emily. That case firmly establishes that:

A co-parent’s successful completion of an improvement period and retention of parental rights does not “automatically entitle” another parent to avoid termination.
Each parent is assessed individually based on their own conduct, progress, and the risk they pose.

In In re C.N., the mother completed her post-adjudicatory improvement period and was reunified with C.N. The father, by contrast, was found to have:

committed domestic violence,
physically abused C.N.,
sexually abused C.N., and
failed to substantially comply with his improvement period.

These are fundamentally different circumstances. The law allows—and indeed requires—dispositions to reflect these differences.

3. Waiver of the Sexual-Abuse Evidentiary Challenge

The father’s final, underlying complaint was that there was insufficient evidence to support the finding that he sexually abused C.N. However, he did not:

set forth this contention as a separate assignment of error; or
cite case law or statutory authority supporting his argument, or meaningfully discuss the evidence.

Under W. Va. R. App. P. 10(c)(7), arguments on appeal must include:

a clear statement of the alleged error,
citations to the record, and
applicable legal authority.

Because the father’s challenge was little more than a bare assertion, the Court, consistent with State v. Kaufman and the Dunkel admonition, refused to address it. This operates as an implicit waiver of the issue.

Of note, had the Court reached the issue, it would have been required to defer heavily to the circuit court’s credibility determinations. The circuit court had the opportunity to observe:

C.N.’s disclosures over time,
the testimony of the teacher, CPS workers, forensic interviewer, and psychologist, and
the father’s demeanor and denial.

Appellate courts rarely disturb factual findings grounded in such credibility assessments absent clear error. The procedural waiver thus dovetails with the substantive deference that likely would have applied.

D. Impact and Practical Implications

1. For Trial Courts

Discretion Over Improvement Periods: In re C.N. reinforces that trial courts have substantial discretion in determining what constitutes “substantial compliance” and whether to extend an improvement period. Courts may look beyond surface-level participation to the parent’s overall pattern of engagement, behavior, and change.
Weight of Sexual Abuse Findings: Once sexual abuse is found, trial courts may rely on the statutory presumption of “no reasonable likelihood” of correction and the reasonable-efforts exception to move promptly toward termination when that serves the child’s welfare.
Child’s Fear and Wishes: The child’s fear of the parent and refusal to visit, particularly in sexual-abuse contexts, can play a significant role in best-interest and dispositional determinations.

2. For DHS and Child Welfare Practitioners

Documenting Compliance and Noncompliance: The decision highlights the importance of thoroughly documenting parents’ attendance, positive and negative drug screens, cooperation with services, and interactions with providers (including hostility or refusal of access).
Sexual Abuse as an Aggravated Circumstance: Once sexual abuse is established, DHS may (and should) consider whether continued reunification efforts are appropriate. The statute expressly removes the duty to make reasonable efforts in such cases.
Coordination with GALs and Experts: The reliance on consistent child disclosures, forensic interviews, and psychological assessments underscores the value of multidisciplinary evidence in substantiating abuse allegations.

3. For Parents and Their Counsel

Early, Consistent Engagement is Critical: Starting therapy late, missing services, or partially complying with conditions can be fatal to a request for extension, especially in serious abuse cases.
Substance Use Must Be Addressed: Continued positive drug screens during an improvement period strongly undermine claims of progress and stability.
Cooperation with Providers Matters: Combative or obstructive behavior toward service providers can indicate resistance to change and may weigh heavily against the parent.
Denial of Sexual Abuse is a Major Barrier: Persistent denial, in the face of a court finding to the contrary, makes it very difficult to show that the conditions leading to removal can be corrected.
Appellate Practice: On appeal, counsel must:
- clearly state each assignment of error,
- cite to the record, and
- provide supporting authority.
Bare assertions are not preserved for review.

4. For Children and the Broader System

Permanency with a Safe Parent: The decision illustrates that termination of one parent’s rights can coexist with reunification with the other parent, achieving permanency without requiring termination across the board.
Protection from Sexual Abuse: The statutes and case law applied in In re C.N. reflect a strong policy choice: where sexual abuse has occurred, the State’s focus shifts decisively toward protection and permanency, rather than reunification efforts with the abusing parent.

IV. Clarifying Complex Concepts

1. Improvement Period

An improvement period is a defined period during which a parent is given the opportunity, with court-ordered services, to correct the conditions that led to a finding of abuse or neglect. In West Virginia, improvement periods can be:

pre-adjudicatory,
post-adjudicatory (as in this case), or
post-dispositional.

An extension of an improvement period is not automatic. It must be specifically granted by the court upon proof of substantial compliance and consistency with the child’s best interest.

2. Substantial Compliance

“Substantial compliance” means more than showing up sporadically or engaging minimally in services. It involves:

regular, meaningful participation in all key services,
demonstrable progress toward remedying the abuse/neglect conditions, and
behavior suggesting that the parent can safely care for the child in the near future.

In In re C.N., continued drug use, missed services, late therapy, and hostile behavior undermined any claim of substantial compliance.

3. Reasonable Efforts

“Reasonable efforts” refers to the State’s obligation to provide services, supports, and interventions designed to preserve and reunify families. However, West Virginia law recognizes certain “aggravated circumstances” in which this obligation is lifted. One such circumstance is sexual abuse by a parent.

Under W. Va. Code § 49-4-604(c)(7)(A), once a court determines that a parent sexually abused a child, DHS is not required to continue making reasonable efforts to preserve that family relationship.

4. No Reasonable Likelihood of Correction

The phrase “no reasonable likelihood that the conditions of neglect or abuse can be substantially corrected” is a legal standard defined in W. Va. Code § 49-4-604(d). Among other things, it is deemed to exist when the abusing parent has sexually abused the child. When this standard is met, and termination is necessary for the child’s welfare, the court may terminate parental rights under § 49-4-604(c)(6).

5. Guardian ad Litem (GAL)

A guardian ad litem is an attorney appointed to represent the best interests of the child, rather than the child’s expressed preferences alone. In this case, the GAL represented C.N.’s interests throughout the proceeding.

6. Memorandum Decision vs. Full Opinion

A memorandum decision is a shorter appellate disposition used under Rule 21 when the Court determines that the case can be resolved by applying settled law, without the need for a full, published opinion and without oral argument. While such decisions may not always carry the same weight as fully-developed opinions, they signal the Court’s understanding that the applicable principles are already well established.

V. Conclusion

In re C.N. is a significant application of West Virginia’s abuse and neglect framework to a fact pattern involving domestic violence, substance abuse, and, most importantly, sexual abuse of a child. The Supreme Court of Appeals’ memorandum decision:

reaffirms that extensions of improvement periods are strictly conditioned on substantial compliance and the best interests of the child, and remain within the circuit court’s discretion;
underscores that a finding of sexual abuse both:
- relieves DHS of further “reasonable efforts” toward reunification, and
- triggers a statutory presumption of “no reasonable likelihood” of correction that supports termination of parental rights;
clarifies that a co-parent’s successful reunification does not entitle the abusive parent to similar treatment; and
highlights the importance of proper appellate briefing, as inadequately developed issues will not be addressed.

In the broader landscape of West Virginia child welfare law, In re C.N. strengthens the message that, where credible evidence of sexual abuse exists and the parent fails to genuinely engage in services or accept responsibility, the law prioritizes the child’s safety and permanency over continued reunification efforts. It is a clear reaffirmation of the statutory and case-law framework that places the child’s welfare at the center of abuse and neglect proceedings.