Reaffirming the Reasonable Person Standard in Obscenity Law: Pope v. Illinois

Reaffirming the Reasonable Person Standard in Obscenity Law: Pope v. Illinois

Introduction

Pope et al. v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497 (1987), is a pivotal Supreme Court decision that addresses the application of community standards in determining the obscenity of materials. The case arose when Glenn A. Stanko and Michael Morrison, attendants at adult bookstores in Illinois, were convicted under state obscenity laws for selling magazines deemed obscene. The central issue revolved around whether the jury should assess the "value" of the material using community standards or an objective "reasonable person" standard as outlined in MILLER v. CALIFORNIA, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).

This commentary delves into the background of the case, the Supreme Court's judgment, the legal reasoning employed, the precedents cited, and the broader implications of the decision on future obscenity prosecutions and First Amendment jurisprudence.

Summary of the Judgment

The Supreme Court held that in prosecutions for the sale of allegedly obscene materials, juries should not be instructed to apply community standards when determining the "value" of the work. Instead, the Court reaffirmed that the "reasonable person" standard from Miller should govern this assessment. The majority opinion, delivered by Justice White, emphasized that the value of the material should be evaluated objectively, irrespective of local community sentiments. The Court also addressed whether the erroneous jury instructions warranted a reversal of the convictions, ultimately deciding to vacate and remand the case for further consideration of harmless error.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

The decision in Pope v. Illinois extensively references several key Supreme Court cases that have shaped obscenity law and First Amendment protections:

  • MILLER v. CALIFORNIA, 413 U.S. 15 (1973): Established the tripartite test for obscenity, emphasizing community standards in determining obscenity.
  • SMITH v. UNITED STATES, 431 U.S. 291 (1977): Clarified that only the first two prongs of the Miller test (prurient interest and patent offensiveness) should reference community standards, not the value prong.
  • ROSE v. CLARK, 478 U.S. 570 (1986): Addressed harmless error in jury instructions, setting a precedent for when convictions should be upheld despite instructional errors.
  • CHAPMAN v. CALIFORNIA, 386 U.S. 18 (1967): Provided the standard for determining whether an error is harmless in the context of appeals.

The Court contrasted and compared these cases to delineate the boundaries of acceptable jury instructions regarding obscenity.

Legal Reasoning

Justice White, writing for the majority, underscored that the third prong of the Miller test—determining whether the material lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value—should not be influenced by contemporary community standards. Instead, this evaluation must be objective, based on whether a reasonable person would find such value in the material when considered as a whole.

The Court argued that using community standards could lead to variability in the application of the law, potentially allowing majority opinions to unjustly influence the determination of a work's value. By adhering to the reasonable person standard, the Court aimed to maintain consistency and protect minority viewpoints from being overridden by local norms.

On the issue of whether the erroneous jury instructions warranted a reversal of convictions, the Court deferred this determination to the appellate courts. It emphasized that if the appellate court finds that no rational juror, properly instructed, could have found the material valuable, then the convictions should stand.

Impact

The decision in Pope v. Illinois has significant implications for future obscenity cases:

  • Standardization of Value Assessment: By reaffirming the reasonable person standard, the Court seeks to minimize regional disparities in the evaluation of obscene materials, promoting a more uniform application of obscenity laws across different jurisdictions.
  • Protection of Minority Views: The decision offers protection to works that may not be widely appreciated but possess intrinsic value, preventing local majority opinions from unduly influencing constitutional protections.
  • Jury Instruction Clarity: The ruling clarifies the limits of jury instruction regarding community standards, guiding lower courts in properly framing the value assessment prong without referencing potentially biased local norms.
  • First Amendment Reinforcement: By emphasizing objective standards over subjective community sentiments, the Court strengthens First Amendment protections against arbitrary censorship based on fluctuating public opinions.

Additionally, the case highlights the importance of precise jury instructions in upholding constitutional standards, influencing how future trials approach the delicate balance between regulation and free expression.

Complex Concepts Simplified

The Miller Test

The MILLER v. CALIFORNIA decision established a three-part test to determine whether material is obscene and thus not protected by the First Amendment:

  • Prurient Interest: Whether the average person, applying contemporary community standards, would find that the work appeals to the prurient interest.
  • Patent Offensiveness: Whether the work depicts sexual conduct in a patently offensive way as defined by state law.
  • Lack of Value: Whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.

In Pope v. Illinois, the focus is on the third prong, clarifying that it should be evaluated based on an objective standard rather than community-specific norms.

Reasonable Person Standard vs. Community Standards

- Reasonable Person Standard: An objective measure used to determine how an average person would perceive a situation or piece of work, without personal biases.

- Community Standards: The prevailing norms and values of a particular community or locality, which can vary widely from one region to another.

The Supreme Court in Pope v. Illinois emphasized that the "value" of a work should be assessed by a reasonable person standard, not by shifting community standards, to maintain consistency and protect broader constitutional values.

Conclusion

Pope et al. v. Illinois serves as a critical reaffirmation of the objective standards in assessing the value of allegedly obscene materials. By distinguishing the value prong from community standards and anchoring it in the reasonable person benchmark, the Supreme Court reinforced the principle that constitutional protections against obscenity should not be swayed by transient or localized public opinions.

This decision not only provides clarity for future obscenity prosecutions but also fortifies the broader framework of First Amendment protections, ensuring that artistic, literary, political, and scientific expressions are evaluated on their inherent merits rather than the prevailing sentiments of specific communities.

Ultimately, Pope v. Illinois underscores the judiciary's role in safeguarding objective legal standards, promoting uniformity, and protecting minority viewpoints within the diverse tapestry of American society.

Case Details

Year: 1987
Court: U.S. Supreme Court

Judge(s)

Byron Raymond WhiteAntonin ScaliaHarry Andrew BlackmunWilliam Joseph BrennanJohn Paul StevensThurgood Marshall

Attorney(S)

Glenn A. Stanko argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs was J. Steven Beckett. Sally Louise Dilgart, Assistant Attorney General of Illinois, argued the cause for respondent. On the brief were Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney General, Roma J. Stewart, Solicitor General, and Mark L. Rotert and Jack Donatelli, Assistant Attorneys General. Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the American Booksellers Association, Inc., et al. by Michael A. Bamberger, R. Bruce Rich, Roger L. Funk, and Maxwell J. Lillienstein; for the American Civil Liberties Union et al. by Bruce J. Ennis, Jr., David W. Ogden, Harvey Grossman, Jane M. Whicher, Jack Novik, and David Goldstein; and for Volunteer Lawyers for the Arts, Inc., by Irwin Karp and I. Fred Koenigsberg. Edward Cooper and James J. Clancy filed a brief for the city of Santa Ana, California, as amicus curiae.

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