Reaffirming the Prejudice Burden in AEDPA Habeas Claims for Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Introduction

Caballero v. Miller, 24-2602-pr (2d Cir. Apr. 2, 2025), addresses the stringent standards that govern federal habeas relief under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) when a petitioner claims ineffective assistance of trial or appellate counsel. Petitioner-Appellee Andrew Caballero was convicted in New York state court for a 1995 rooftop murder and later sought federal habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, arguing that his trial lawyer, Robert DiDio, failed to investigate key witnesses and alternative suspects, and that his appellate lawyer, Danielle Muscatello, failed to raise those failures on direct appeal. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed the district court’s grant of habeas corpus relief, holding that Caballero did not satisfy Strickland’s prejudice prong and had not demonstrated that the state court unreasonably applied “clearly established Federal law.”

Summary of the Judgment

The Second Circuit, in a summary order by Judges Gerard E. Lynch, Beth Robinson, and Alison J. Nathan, reversed the district court’s decision granting habeas relief. It held:

Under AEDPA § 2254(d) and Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), a habeas petitioner must show not only deficient performance by counsel but also a reasonable probability of a different result absent that deficiency.
Caballero failed to demonstrate prejudice from trial counsel’s alleged failure to investigate key witnesses (including those identified in pre-trial Rosario disclosures) or an alternative suspect, Michael Lugo, because he offered no evidence describing what new, admissible testimony a proper investigation would have produced.
His appellate counsel’s performance was not deficient for refraining from raising on direct appeal an ineffective-assistance claim that required evidence outside the trial record. Even if it had been, Caballero could not show a reasonable probability of success on appeal under Strickland.

Accordingly, the district court’s grant of habeas relief was reversed in full.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984): Established the two-pronged test for ineffective assistance of counsel—performance and prejudice.
AEDPA § 2254(d): Limits federal habeas relief to state court decisions that are “contrary to” or “an unreasonable application of” clearly established Supreme Court precedent.
Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86 (2011): Emphasized the doubly deferential standard when both AEDPA and Strickland apply.
Lindstadt v. Keane, 239 F.3d 191 (2d Cir. 2001) and Schulz v. Marshall, 345 F. App’x 627 (2d Cir. 2009): Demonstrated that prejudice may be obvious where identifying witnesses would produce concrete, exculpatory testimony.
Pierotti v. Walsh, 834 F.3d 171 (2d Cir. 2016): Explained New York law requiring collateral proceedings for ineffective-assistance claims that rest on facts outside the trial record.

Legal Reasoning

The Court’s reasoning unfolded in several steps:

Standard of Review: The Court applied de novo review to the grant or denial of habeas relief and clear-error review to underlying facts, but gave AEDPA’s § 2254(d) and Strickland’s prejudice prong “doubly deferential” application.
Performance vs. Prejudice: Even assuming that trial counsel’s failure to interview certain witnesses and alternative suspects was objectively unreasonable, Caballero’s burden was to show a reasonable probability of a different result, which required an affirmative proffer of what new evidence would have emerged.
Failure to Proffer New Evidence: The petition relied solely on hearsay contained in police reports and did not supply witness affidavits or testimony describing what helpful testimony each witness would have provided. This gap fatally undercut any claim of prejudice.
Appellate Counsel Claim: Under New York law, challenges to trial counsel’s performance that rest on evidence outside the record must be pursued collateral. Even if Muscatello’s omission was deficient, Caballero still could not show a reasonable probability of success on appeal absent the required evidentiary showing.

Impact

Caballero v. Miller clarifies and reaffirms two important principles in the habeas context:

Prejudice Is Not Presumed: A habeas petitioner must demonstrate—not speculate—what new evidence or impeachment material would likely have been uncovered by counsel’s investigation.
Deference to State Courts: Under AEDPA’s deferential standard, federal courts may not grant relief based on hindsight criticisms of strategy unless a petitioner marshals concrete proof of prejudice that state courts unreasonably disregarded.

Future habeas petitioners alleging ineffective assistance of counsel will need to ensure that their proffers include affidavits or testimony from the very witnesses they say should have been interviewed.

Complex Concepts Simplified

AEDPA: A 1996 federal statute that limits federal habeas relief by requiring state-court decisions to be given deference unless they are objectively unreasonable under clearly established Supreme Court law.
Strickland Test: A two-part standard for evaluating counsel’s performance: (1) Was counsel’s performance objectively unreasonable? (2) If so, was there a reasonable probability that the outcome would have been different?
Rosario Material: In New York criminal cases, prior statements by prosecution witnesses must be disclosed to the defense to allow impeachment on cross-examination.
Collateral Proceedings vs. Direct Appeal: In New York, ineffective-assistance claims based on evidence outside the trial record must be raised in post-conviction (e.g., § 440.10) proceedings, not on direct appeal.

Conclusion

Caballero v. Miller reinforces the high bar that habeas petitioners face when asserting ineffective assistance of counsel under AEDPA. It underscores that courts will not infer prejudice from counsel’s alleged failures; rather, petitioners must present admissible evidence demonstrating a reasonable probability of a different result. This decision will guide federal and state courts in requiring concrete proffers in post-conviction proceedings and illustrates the “doubly deferential” nature of Strickland and AEDPA review.