Reaffirming the Narrow Lopez Exception:
People v Freeman on Equivocal Plea Allocutions and Coercion Claims

I. Introduction

In People v Freeman, 2025 NY Slip Op 07125 (4th Dept Dec. 23, 2025), the Appellate Division, Fourth Department, confronted a recurring and sensitive question in New York criminal practice: when does a defendant’s equivocal or confused response during a guilty plea colloquy obligate the trial court to probe further, and when does a failure to challenge the plea in the trial court bar appellate review?

The case arises from Christopher Freeman’s guilty plea in Seneca County Court to assault in the first degree (Penal Law § 120.10[1]) for repeatedly stabbing the victim and causing serious physical injury. On appeal, Freeman argued that his plea was not knowing, voluntary, or intelligent because:

He was allegedly coerced by the County Court and his own defense counsel into accepting the plea; and
He did not understand the plea proceedings, given his history of special education and his statements during the colloquy.

He also claimed ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to pursue a voluntary intoxication defense and failing to seek a competency (mental health) examination.

The majority affirmed the conviction, while Justice Nowak dissented, arguing that the record squarely triggered the “Lopez exception” to the preservation requirement and that the County Court failed to undertake the further inquiry necessary to ensure a valid plea.

The central significance of People v Freeman lies in how it:

Confirms the narrowness of the People v Lopez exception that permits appellate review of plea allocutions despite lack of a post-plea motion;
Clarifies what constitutes a sufficiently “further” inquiry by the trial court when a defendant initially hesitates or expresses uncertainty about the elements of the crime; and
Reaffirms that judicial discussion of sentencing exposure and the strength of the People’s case, and counsel’s similar advice, ordinarily do not amount to coercion.

II. Summary of the Opinion

A. The Majority’s Holding

The Fourth Department (Lindley, J.P., Montour, Greenwood, and Keane, JJ.) affirmed Freeman’s conviction, holding:

Preservation and the Lopez exception: Although a defendant always retains the right to challenge the voluntariness of his plea notwithstanding a waiver of appeal (citing People v Thomas, 34 NY3d 545 [2019]), Freeman did not preserve his challenge because he failed to move to withdraw his plea or to vacate the judgment of conviction in County Court. The court held that the case did not fall within the narrow exception recognized in People v Lopez, 71 NY2d 662 (1988), which allows appellate review without preservation when the plea record itself clearly calls the validity of the plea into question.
Trial court’s “further inquiry” was adequate: The majority acknowledged that Freeman initially equivocated when first asked whether, with the requisite intent, he caused serious physical injury by repeatedly stabbing the victim. That equivocation triggered the trial court’s duty to conduct a further inquiry under Lopez and cases like People v McNair, 13 NY3d 821 (2009). The majority concluded the County Court fulfilled that duty: after off-the-record consultation with counsel, Freeman repeatedly and unequivocally asserted the plea was voluntary and admitted the elements of assault in the first degree, including his intent and conduct. Those answers, in the majority’s view, “removed any doubt about his guilt.”
Voluntariness and coercion on the merits: Even if preserved, Freeman’s claim lacked merit. The record showed:
- Freeman denied being threatened or pressured, including specifically denying that the court had pressured him;
- The court’s statements concerning potential sentencing if he went to trial were a permissible description of sentencing exposure, not coercion (citing People v Boyde, People v Obbagy);
- Similarly, the court’s comments on the strength of the People’s evidence and counsel’s advice that Freeman risked harsher punishment after trial did not amount to coercion (citing People v Pitcher, People v Griffin, and others).
Ineffective assistance of counsel: The court held that Freeman’s ineffective assistance claim—centered on counsel’s failure to pursue intoxication and competency issues—did not survive his guilty plea. There was no showing that the alleged deficiencies “infected” the plea bargaining process or that he pleaded guilty because of counsel’s deficiencies (citing People v Blount and related cases). To the extent these contentions turned on matters outside the record, they could not be reviewed on direct appeal (citing People v Loper).

B. The Dissent (Nowak, J.)

Justice Nowak would have reversed, vacated the plea, and remitted for further proceedings. The dissent’s core points:

This is a classic “Lopez exception” case: The dissent emphasized that Freeman explicitly responded “I don’t know” when asked whether he intended to cause serious physical injury and did cause serious physical injury by repeatedly stabbing the victim. Such a negation or uncertainty about essential elements, in the dissent’s view, squarely triggers Lopez’s rare exception and permits appellate review without a postallocution motion.
The court’s “further inquiry” was insufficient and partly delegated:
- Instead of probing what Freeman did not understand or why he answered “I don’t know,” the court threatened to end the plea and proceed to trial.
- The court permitted an off-the-record conversation with defense counsel and then merely repeated the same question, obtaining a “yes” answer.
- Later, Freeman stated that counsel had “just told [him] to say yes” and again indicated that he did not understand the proceedings, while also noting his special education history and difficulty following the colloquy.
- The dissent stressed that the duty to make a “further inquiry” is non-delegable and rests with the court, not with defense counsel (see People v Mox, 20 NY3d 936 [2012]). The court never meaningfully explored Freeman’s confusion or his statements about counsel’s coaching.
Monosyllabic affirmations were insufficient: In light of Freeman’s contradictory statements and professed confusion, the dissent found little assurance in simple “yes” responses, especially where he also said that his lawyer had told him to say “yes.” Without a meaningful judicial inquiry, the dissent could not deem the plea knowing and voluntary.

III. Core Legal Issues and Reasoning

A. Preservation and the People v Lopez Exception

1. General preservation rule

New York’s preservation doctrine requires a defendant who seeks to challenge the validity of a plea to first raise that challenge in the trial court, typically by:

Moving to withdraw the plea prior to sentencing (CPL 220.60[3]), or
Moving to vacate the judgment after conviction (CPL 440.10).

The majority cites:

People v Evancho, 236 AD3d 1470 (4th Dept 2025);
People v Rounds, 140 AD3d 1657 (4th Dept 2016).

These decisions stand for the familiar principle that a defendant who fails to make such a motion generally forfeits appellate review of plea validity, because the trial court must be given the first opportunity to address any alleged defect in the plea process.

2. The Lopez exception

In People v Lopez, 71 NY2d 662 (1988), the Court of Appeals created a narrow carve-out to the preservation rule. Appellate review of the plea is allowed even without a motion to withdraw or vacate where:

The defendant’s statements during the plea allocution directly contradict guilt or otherwise cast significant doubt on the voluntariness of the plea; and
The trial court thereafter fails to conduct an adequate further inquiry to resolve that doubt.

Examples include:

Denial of an essential element (e.g., intent);
Assertions of self-defense or justification; or
Statements suggesting mental incapacity, confusion, or duress.

In such cases, appellate courts treat the defect as self-evident on the face of the record. Hence, a postallocution motion is not required; the error is apparent and can (indeed must) be corrected on direct appeal.

The dissent in Freeman relies heavily on this framework, also invoking:

People v Worden, 22 NY3d 982 (2013), and
People v Bovio, 206 AD3d 1568 (4th Dept 2022),

to emphasize that contradictions in the allocution about core elements—such as intent or causation of serious injury—bring a case squarely within Lopez.

3. The majority’s application of Lopez

The majority accepts that Freeman’s initial equivocation—ultimately culminating in “I don’t know” in response to whether he intended and did cause serious physical injury by repeatedly stabbing the victim—triggered the court’s duty to make a further inquiry under Lopez and:

People v McNair, 13 NY3d 821, 822–823 (2009);
People v Edwards, 55 AD3d 1337 (4th Dept 2008);
People v Castanea, 265 AD2d 906 (4th Dept 1999);
People v Bovio, 206 AD3d 1568 (4th Dept 2022).

The majority then asks whether that duty was satisfied. It relies on the standard, drawn from People v Mox, 84 AD3d 1723 (4th Dept 2011), aff’d 20 NY3d 936 (2012):

“At a minimum, the record of the plea proceedings must reflect that defendant’s responses to the court’s subsequent questions removed the doubt about defendant’s guilt.”

In the majority’s view, the trial court’s steps—threatening to end the plea, emphasizing it could not accept a non-voluntary plea, allowing renewed consultation with counsel, and then re-asking the element-based question and confirming the truthfulness of the response—were sufficient. The court noted that Freeman:

Repeatedly insisted the plea “is voluntary…is voluntary…is voluntary,” and
Then directly answered “yes” when asked:
- Whether he intended to cause serious physical injury and did cause serious physical injury to the victim by repeatedly stabbing her; and
- Whether he was telling the truth in answering that question.

On that basis, the majority concluded that the earlier doubt had been removed and that Lopez’s exception therefore did not apply. Because the defect was deemed cured, the absence of a post-plea motion meant the challenge was unpreserved.

4. The dissent’s counter-view

Justice Nowak reads the same record differently:

Freeman’s initial “I don’t know” response is, to the dissent, a classic negation of an essential element—intent and causation of serious physical injury—squarely within the line of cases applying Lopez and Worden.
The trial court did not truly “inquire further”: it did not break down the elements, ask why defendant was uncertain, or explore his understanding. Instead, it threatened to take the case to trial, then deferred to an off-the-record consultation.
When Freeman later stated that his lawyer had “just told [him] to say yes” and that he did not understand proceedings, the court again failed to address that confusion or counsel’s alleged coaching.

For the dissent, the combination of:

An “I don’t know” answer to the core factual element,
Documented difficulty understanding the proceedings and a special education history, and
An explicit assertion that counsel told him what to say,

means that the allocution itself “calls into question the voluntariness of the plea” and that the failure of the court to make a substantive further inquiry invokes the Lopez exception. Thus, preservation is not a barrier, and reversal is warranted.

B. Voluntariness, Coercion, and Judicial Participation in Plea Discussions

1. Framework for coercion analysis

Coercion in the plea context revolves around whether the defendant’s will was overborne such that the plea is not the product of a free and deliberate choice. However, New York courts distinguish between:

Permissible judicial conduct: Describing the sentencing range, explaining the consequences of going to trial, discussing the strength of the People’s evidence, and encouraging the defendant to weigh the risks.
Impermissible coercion: Threatening to punish the defendant more harshly because he insists on trial, or otherwise putting unlawful pressure on the defendant to abandon the right to a trial.

The majority cites several key cases applying this distinction:

People v Boyde, 71 AD3d 1442 (4th Dept 2010), lv denied 15 NY3d 747 (2010);
People v Obbagy, 147 AD3d 1296 (4th Dept 2017), lv denied 29 NY3d 1035 (2017);
People v Williams, 198 AD3d 1308 (4th Dept 2021), lv denied 37 NY3d 1149 (2021);
People v Pitcher, 126 AD3d 1471 (4th Dept 2015), lv denied 25 NY3d 1169 (2015);
People v Dix, 170 AD3d 1575 (4th Dept 2019), lv denied 33 NY3d 1030 (2019);
People v Hall, 82 AD3d 1619 (4th Dept 2011), lv denied 16 NY3d 895 (2011).

2. Application in Freeman

The majority stresses that:

Freeman flatly denied that he had been threatened or pressured into pleading guilty;
He specifically denied that the court pressured him into taking the plea;
The court’s discussion of potential sentencing consequences if he proceeded to trial was characterized as a permissible description of the “range of potential sentences,” not as a threat.

The opinion quotes Boyde for the proposition that the court’s statements “amount to a description of the range of potential sentences rather than impermissible coercion.” It further reiterates a recurring principle:

“[T]he fact that defendant ‘may have pleaded guilty to avoid receiving a harsher sentence does not render his plea coerced’” (Boyde, 71 AD3d at 1443; see Obbagy, 147 AD3d at 1297).

Similarly, with respect to defense counsel’s advice, the court cites:

People v Griffin, 120 AD3d 1569 (4th Dept 2014), lv denied 24 NY3d 1084 (2014);
People v Moore, 229 AD3d 1279 (4th Dept 2024);
People v Vargas, 171 AD3d 1394 (3d Dept 2019).

From these cases, it reiterates that counsel’s advice that:

The defendant is unlikely to prevail at trial; and
He faces a harsher sentence if convicted after trial,

“does not constitute coercion.”

In practical terms, the majority frames Freeman’s decision as a rational, risk-based choice between:

A known plea outcome, and
The uncertainty and higher exposure of trial,

rather than as a plea wrested from him by improper threats or pressure.

C. Adequacy of the Plea Allocution in Light of Cognitive or Comprehension Concerns

A critical additional layer in Freeman involves the defendant’s comprehension. Freeman stated that:

He had been in special education classes in school; and
He had not understood “a lot of things” said during the proceedings and only “kind of” understood what was happening.

Later, in the context of People v Outley, 80 NY2d 702 (1993) warnings (i.e., conditions related to post-plea conduct and truthfulness that may affect sentencing), he again indicated confusion and said that counsel had “just told [him] to say yes.”

1. Majority’s treatment

The majority acknowledges those statements but concludes that, “the record establishes that the court properly accepted the plea only after making appropriate ‘further inquir[ies] to ensure that defendant understands the nature of the charge and that the plea is intelligently entered’” (quoting Lopez, 71 NY2d at 666). It cites:

People v Evancho, 236 AD3d 1470 (4th Dept 2025);
People v Brown, 305 AD2d 1068 (4th Dept 2003), lv denied 100 NY2d 579 (2003).

In the majority’s view, the trial court’s multiple confirmations of voluntariness, coupled with Freeman’s clear yes-or-no admissions to each element, are adequate to show comprehension and voluntariness—even in the face of his earlier confusion. The court treats his acceptance of the plea after counsel consultation and repeated affirmations as sufficient to meet the constitutional minimum.

2. Dissent’s treatment

The dissent attaches far more weight to Freeman’s cognitive concerns and explicit confusion:

It notes that he was in special education and had difficulty understanding “a lot of things” said in court;
Emphasizes that he stated his attorney “just told [him] to say yes” during the off-the-record consultation; and
Highlights that the court never squarely addressed these statements.

Justice Nowak stresses that the duty to inquire is on the court and cannot be discharged simply by allowing an off-the-record conference and then re-posing the same complex question. From this perspective, Freeman’s monosyllabic affirmations—particularly after alleged coaching—do not reliably demonstrate a knowing and intelligent plea.

D. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel After a Guilty Plea

Freeman further argued that his attorney was ineffective for failing:

To pursue a voluntary intoxication defense; and
To seek a mental health competency examination.

1. Post-plea ineffective assistance doctrine

New York’s framework, applied here, is that a claim of ineffective assistance in the context of a guilty plea generally survives the plea only if:

The alleged ineffectiveness bears directly on the voluntariness of the plea or the bargaining process; and
The defendant shows that but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial (or at least that the plea process was “infected” by counsel’s performance).

The majority relies on:

People v Blount, 239 AD3d 1426 (4th Dept 2025), lv denied 44 NY3d 981 (2025);
People v Williams, 159 AD3d 1343 (4th Dept 2018), lv denied 31 NY3d 1123 (2018);
People v Grandin, 63 AD3d 1604 (4th Dept 2009), lv denied 13 NY3d 744 (2009).

Those cases echo the principle that many complaints about trial strategy, investigation, or unpursued defenses are forfeited by a guilty plea unless they go to the heart of whether the plea was voluntary and intelligent.

2. Application to Freeman’s claims

The court holds that Freeman “failed to demonstrate that the plea bargaining process was infected by the allegedly ineffective assistance or that he entered the plea because of defense counsel’s allegedly poor performance.” Thus:

His claims about intoxication and competency either do not sufficiently relate to the plea’s voluntariness, or
They largely involve matters outside the appellate record—e.g., what evaluations were or were not done, what information counsel had about his mental state.

To the extent the claims rest on facts outside the record, the court holds they are not properly before it on direct appeal, citing People v Loper, 239 AD3d 1473 (4th Dept 2025). Those issues, if pursued, would need to be raised in a collateral motion (e.g., a CPL 440.10 motion in the trial court) where an evidentiary record can be developed.

IV. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

The opinion weaves together a set of key precedents, several of which are worth highlighting in context.

A. People v Thomas and Appeal Waivers

People v Thomas, 34 NY3d 545 (2019), cert denied – US –, 140 S Ct 2634 (2020), is cited to confirm that:

A defendant’s waiver of the right to appeal cannot bar review of the voluntariness of the plea itself.

However, Thomas does not eliminate the separate preservation requirement; it simply ensures that even a valid appeal waiver does not insulate an involuntary plea from scrutiny. In Freeman, the court therefore acknowledges that voluntariness can be reviewed in principle despite any appeal waiver, but it then dismisses the challenge as unpreserved under the general postallocution motion rule.

B. People v Lopez, McNair, and Mox: The “Further Inquiry” Duty

People v Lopez, 71 NY2d 662 (1988): Establishes two pillars:
1. The duty of the court to make a further inquiry when a defendant’s statements cast doubt on guilt or voluntariness; and
2. The narrow exception to preservation when that duty is not met.
People v McNair, 13 NY3d 821 (2009): Reinforces that equivocal or exculpatory statements during the plea require a more probing inquiry to ensure the plea is knowing and voluntary.
People v Mox:
- 84 AD3d 1723 (4th Dept 2011), aff’d 20 NY3d 936 (2012) – quoted for the “at a minimum” standard that subsequent questions must remove doubt about guilt.
- 20 NY3d 936 (2012) – cited in the dissent to underscore that the duty of inquiry is non-delegable; the court itself must ensure the plea is valid.

In Freeman, these precedents frame the dispute over whether the County Court’s actions—allowing off-the-record counsel consultation and re-asking questions—met the “further inquiry” threshold.

C. People v Vogt, Shaw, and Woods: When Additional Inquiry Suffices

The majority analogizes Freeman to cases where courts have found the further inquiry requirement satisfied:

People v Vogt, 150 AD3d 1704 (4th Dept 2017);
People v Shaw, 222 AD3d 1401 (4th Dept 2023), lv denied 42 NY3d 930 (2024);
People v Woods, 126 AD3d 1543 (4th Dept 2015), lv denied 27 NY3d 970 (2016).

These authorities demonstrate a judicial pattern: as long as the court, after an equivocal statement, asks follow-up questions that elicit clear admissions to all elements and voluntariness, the allocution is typically upheld, and Lopez relief is denied.

D. People v Boyde, Obbagy, Pitcher, Griffin, Moore, and Vargas: Coercion and Advice

This line of cases is used to:

Differentiate lawful judicial conduct (explaining sentencing ranges and evidentiary strength) from impermissible threats; and
Clarify that defense counsel’s blunt advice about the risks of trial does not amount to coercion.

Collectively, they form the doctrinal backbone for rejecting coercion claims where the record shows:

Court and counsel simply informed the defendant of realistic consequences; and
The defendant nevertheless clearly affirmed the voluntary nature of the plea.

E. People v Outley: Sentencing Warnings

The dissent references People v Outley, 80 NY2d 702 (1993), in describing the portion of the proceeding where the court warned Freeman about the consequences of future conduct or dishonesty (commonly called Outley warnings). That context is important because it is at that stage that:

Freeman stated he did not understand what was occurring; and
He said his attorney told him to “just say yes.”

For the dissent, the failure to probe those statements during or after the Outley portion further undermines confidence in the plea’s validity.

V. Clarifying Key Legal Concepts

A. “Knowingly, Voluntarily, and Intelligently” Entered Plea

A guilty plea waives fundamental constitutional rights, including the right to a jury trial, the right to confront witnesses, and the privilege against self-incrimination. Therefore, due process requires that a plea be:

Knowing: The defendant understands the nature of the charge, the elements of the offense, and the direct consequences of the plea (including the sentence range).
Voluntary: The plea is not the product of threats, force, improper promises, or coercion.
Intelligent: The defendant has the capacity and adequate information to make a rational choice among alternatives (pleading vs. going to trial).

The plea colloquy is the mechanism by which the court tests these requirements and creates a record that the plea meets constitutional standards.

B. Preservation and Postallocution Motions

“Preservation” refers to the principle that issues must be raised in the trial court to be reviewable on appeal. For guilty pleas:

A defendant generally must move to withdraw the plea (pre-sentence) or move to vacate the judgment (post-sentence) to challenge the plea’s voluntariness on appeal.
The Lopez exception allows review without such a motion only when the defect is apparent on the face of the allocution and the court has failed its duty of further inquiry.

C. Assault in the First Degree – Penal Law § 120.10(1)

Under Penal Law § 120.10(1), a person is guilty of assault in the first degree when, with intent to cause serious physical injury to another person, he causes such injury to such person or to a third person by means of a deadly weapon or a dangerous instrument.

Two central elements are:

Intent to cause serious physical injury; and
Actual causation of serious physical injury (a statutorily defined high level of injury).

Freeman’s equivocal “I don’t know” answer directly related to both of these core elements, which is why both the majority and dissent agreed that the court’s duty of further inquiry was triggered—though they disagree on whether that duty was met.

D. Serious Physical Injury

“Serious physical injury” is typically defined in Penal Law § 10.00(10) as a physical injury which creates a substantial risk of death, or which causes death or serious and protracted disfigurement, protracted impairment of health, or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily organ.

Understanding

Reaffirming the Narrow Lopez Exception: People v Freeman on Equivocal Plea Allocutions and Coercion Claims