Reaffirming the Limits of Martinez: Procedural Default Not Excused for Unbriefed Ineffective-Assistance Claims on Post-Conviction Appeal

Introduction

In Christopher Watts v. Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections, No. 24-10005 (11th Cir. June 30, 2025), the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit delivered a succinct but significant decision that tightens the contours of federal habeas review. Although the panel (Newsom, Grant, and Tjoflat, JJ.) resolved the case on the non-argument calendar, its opinion clarifies two recurring issues:

1. When an ineffective-assistance claim is deemed procedurally defaulted because it was not exhausted in state court; and
2. How the equitable exception recognized in Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1 (2012) operates—specifically, that it does not rescue claims abandoned on post-conviction appeal.

Parties: Christopher Watts (pro se state prisoner) v. Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections & Florida Attorney General.
Lower Court: U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Florida (denial of § 2254 petition).
Certificate of Appealability (COA): Limited to whether the district court erred in finding procedurally defaulted a claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to secure an expert to investigate alleged tampering with a baseball bat at the crime scene.

Summary of the Judgment

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of habeas relief. It held that:

• Watts procedurally defaulted his ineffective-assistance claim by failing to raise it throughout the complete state appellate process.
• The Martinez equitable exception cannot excuse defaults that occur on post-conviction appeal, as opposed to the initial collateral proceeding.
• Even if Martinez applied, Watts’s underlying Strickland claim (failure to hire a crime-scene expert over a baseball-bat theory) was not “substantial.”

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

1. O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838 (1999)
   – Established the federal exhaustion requirement: a petitioner must give state courts one full round of review.
   – The Eleventh Circuit used O’Sullivan to define exhaustion under Florida’s Rule 3.850 and the need to appeal any denial.
2. Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1 (2012)
   – Recognized narrow cause-and-prejudice exception for defaulted IAC claims when initial collateral counsel was ineffective.
   – Court reaffirmed that the exception ends at the first collateral tier; it does not extend to omissions on subsequent appeals (Lambrix).
3. Lambrix v. Secretary, Fla. DOC, 756 F.3d 1246 (11th Cir. 2014)
   – Previously held Martinez does not cover defaults during post-conviction appeal. The panel relies on Lambrix to foreclose Watts’s argument.
4. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)
   – Governs IAC claims (deficient performance + prejudice). The court used Strickland’s prejudice prong to deem Watts’s claim insubstantial.
5. Chandler v. United States, 218 F.3d 1305 (11th Cir. 2000) (en banc)
   – Described decisions on whether to call experts as quintessential trial strategy; cited to show counsel’s latitude.
6. Conklin v. Schofield, 366 F.3d 1191 (11th Cir. 2004)
   – Reinforced deference to strategic choices about experts.
7. Bailey v. Nagle, 172 F.3d 1299 (11th Cir. 1999)
8. Hittson v. GDCP Warden, 759 F.3d 1210 (11th Cir. 2014)

Legal Reasoning

The panel’s reasoning unfolds in three steps:

1. Identification of Default. Although Watts mentioned the baseball-bat theory in his initial Rule 3.850 motion, he failed to pursue or “fairly present” it in the subsequent appeal to Florida’s First DCA. Under O’Sullivan, exhaustion requires presentation through every tier of review; failure = procedural default.
2. Application of Martinez. The court recognized that Martinez can excuse a default only when (a) the default occurred in the initial collateral proceeding and (b) the underlying IAC claim is “substantial.” Because Watts defaulted on appeal, prong (a) fails. They also referenced Lambrix to show the circuit had already foreclosed any expansion.
3. Substantiality Inquiry. Alternatively, the panel held the claim is not “substantial” under Strickland. The baseball bat was never connected to the crime, the state produced overwhelming DNA evidence, and counsel’s choice not to hire an expert was strategic and non-prejudicial. Consequently, even if Watts overcame default, he would still lose on the merits.

Impact on Future Litigation and the Law

• Clarifies Martinez’s Boundaries. Reinforces that Martinez relief ends at the initial Rule 3.850 stage; omissions at the appellate level remain fatal.
• Elevates the “Substantiality” Threshold. The opinion underscores that speculation, without proffered expert affidavits or specific testimony, will not satisfy Strickland prejudice.
• Strategic-Expert Deference. Continues a line of Eleventh Circuit cases granting wide deference to trial counsel’s tactical decisions regarding expert engagement.
• Practical Effect on Florida Practitioners. • Defense counsel must ensure any IAC claim is meticulously preserved through the DCA stage.
  • Post-conviction counsel must recognize that appellate abandonment is irreparable at the federal level, absent extraordinary circumstances.
  • Prosecutors can rely on this precedent to resist Martinez-based “cause” arguments tied to post-conviction appeal failures.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Procedural Default

When a habeas petitioner has violated a state procedural rule (e.g., not appealing an issue), the federal court will not review the claim unless an exception applies.

Exhaustion Requirement

28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1) requires state prisoners to give the state courts “first crack” at correcting alleged constitutional errors by bringing the claim through every level of state review.

Martinez Exception

An equitable doctrine allowing a prisoner to overcome procedural default of an IAC claim when the failure to raise the claim in the initial collateral review was due to lack of counsel or ineffectiveness.

Substantiality (under Martinez)

The underlying IAC claim must have some merit or present a “close question” under the two-prong Strickland test; mere conjecture doesn’t meet this bar.

Strickland Test

(1) Deficient Performance: Counsel’s conduct fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.
(2) Prejudice: A reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, the result would have been different.

Conclusion

Christopher Watts v. Secretary, Florida DOC may be unpublished, but its doctrinal resonance is unmistakable. By drawing a bright line around the Martinez exception and demanding concrete, non-speculative showings of prejudice, the Eleventh Circuit fortifies procedural rigor in federal habeas practice. For litigants, the message is twofold:

1. Preserve every viable claim through the final state appellate rung, and
2. Support IAC theories with tangible evidence rather than “might-have-been” speculation.

Ultimately, the opinion re-emphasizes comity, finality, and federalism—cornerstones of modern habeas jurisprudence—while providing a cautionary tale for both trial and collateral counsel about the irreversible consequences of procedural missteps.