Reaffirming the Limits of Mandamus and Procedendo over Dismissed Criminal Cases: Commentary on State ex rel. Conomy v. Rohrer, 2025‑Ohio‑5296

Reaffirming the Limits of Mandamus and Procedendo over Dismissed Criminal Cases: Commentary on State ex rel. Conomy v. Rohrer, 2025‑Ohio‑5296

I. Introduction

The Supreme Court of Ohio’s decision in State ex rel. Conomy v. Rohrer, 2025‑Ohio‑5296, is a significant reaffirmation—and in some respects clarification—of the limits on extraordinary writs (mandamus and procedendo) when used to:

  • Attack or “sanitize” the record of dismissed criminal cases;
  • Compel a trial judge to alter the basis or form of a dismissal after the case is closed;
  • Force prosecutors and municipal authorities to withdraw statements or filings already made in court; and
  • Secure damages based on those alleged wrongs.

The case arises from two misdemeanor prosecutions of the relator, Christopher P. Conomy, in the Delaware Municipal Court. In one, the municipal judge found him incompetent to stand trial and not restorable; in the other, the prosecutor dismissed the charge without prejudice on the same basis. Both criminal cases were ultimately dismissed.

Conomy, proceeding pro se, then sought extraordinary relief in the Fifth District Court of Appeals against:

  • Judge Kyle Rohrer of the Delaware Municipal Court;
  • Delaware City Prosecutor Amelia Bean‑DeFlumer;
  • Delaware City Attorney Natalia Harris; and
  • The City of Delaware.

He alleged that the findings and statements about his incompetency were false and had been weaponized in his ongoing domestic relations litigation, allegedly contributing to the loss of custody of his children. He asked the court of appeals to compel:

  • Alteration of the criminal records (including changing dismissals “without prejudice” to “with prejudice”);
  • Withdrawal of allegedly defamatory prosecutorial statements;
  • Compliance with subpoenas and discovery demands without privilege objections;
  • Payment of damages under the mandamus statute.

The court of appeals (Fifth District) dismissed his petition on a motion for judgment on the pleadings. The Supreme Court of Ohio, in a unanimous per curiam opinion, affirmed that dismissal and rejected four separate motions filed by Conomy in the Supreme Court proceedings.

Doctrinally, the opinion:

  • Emphasizes that extraordinary writs cannot be used to control the exercise of judicial or prosecutorial discretion;
  • Clarifies that post‑dismissal jurisdiction in criminal cases is extremely limited, contrasting it with broader “continuing jurisdiction” over collateral matters in civil cases;
  • Interprets R.C. 2953.33(B) to distinguish between DNA‑related records (subject to a statute‑of‑limitations bar) and ordinary case records (not so limited);
  • Reaffirms that the mere presence of potential immunity defenses does not convert a standard civil action (e.g., for defamation) into an “inadequate” remedy justifying mandamus;
  • Restates that damages under R.C. 2731.11 depend on achieving success in mandamus itself.

II. Summary of the Opinion

A. Core Holding

The Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed the Fifth District’s dismissal of Conomy’s petition for writs of mandamus and procedendo and denied all of his motions filed in the Supreme Court. The Court held:

  1. Mandamus against the judge (competency finding and dismissal in 23CRB00517):
    • Sealing/expungement under R.C. 2953.32–.33 provides an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, even when there is no conviction.
    • A writ of mandamus cannot be used to control how a judge exercises judicial discretion, including the choice to dismiss a case with or without prejudice or the underlying competency determination.
  2. Procedendo against the judge (post‑dismissal motion in 23CRB01129):
    After a criminal case is dismissed, the trial court lacks jurisdiction to revisit and substantively alter that dismissal order (e.g., changing “without prejudice” to “with prejudice” or striking the finding of incompetence). Because the judge had no jurisdiction to grant the requested relief, procedendo could not issue.
  3. Mandamus against the city and prosecutors (alleged false statements):
    • A defamation action in the court of common pleas constitutes an adequate remedy, notwithstanding the likelihood of immunity defenses.
    • Mandamus cannot compel prosecutors to withdraw filings or statements after the cases have been dismissed, as they have no legal authority to do so.
    • Mandamus cannot be used to compel prosecutorial decision‑making, such as withdrawing or dismissing charges.
  4. Damages under R.C. 2731.11:
    Because Conomy was not entitled to mandamus relief, he could not recover damages under R.C. 2731.11, which applies only when the relator wins in mandamus.

B. Disposition of the Four Motions Filed in the Supreme Court

The Supreme Court denied:
  1. Motion to disqualify appellees’ counsel:
    No attorney‑client relationship existed between Conomy and the lawyers representing the appellees, and there was no conflict under Prof.Cond.R. 1.7 warranting disqualification.
  2. Motion for referral to a special master under Civ.R. 60(B)(5):
    Civ.R. 60(B) does not provide for such a referral, and Conomy’s request improperly attempted to introduce new arguments beyond his briefing, contrary to S.Ct.Prac.R. 16.08.
  3. Motion to strike affidavits:
    Though an appellate court cannot consider new evidence to decide the merits of an appeal, affidavits may be used to respond to collateral procedural motions (here, to rebut alleged conflicts of interest). They were permissible for that limited purpose.
  4. Motion for show‑cause order (contempt):
    The alleged non‑response or non‑ruling on sealing motions in municipal court did not render sealing an “unavailable” remedy, nor did it show that appellees misled the Supreme Court. A remedy is not inadequate merely because it might not succeed.

III. Detailed Analysis

A. Factual and Procedural Background

1. The underlying criminal cases

  • Case 23CRB00517 – Aggravated menacing & competency finding
    In this case, Judge Rohrer ordered a competency evaluation, allegedly at the request of Conomy’s own counsel. Based on the written report, the court found him incompetent to stand trial and not restorable within the statutory time. The judge dismissed the charge on September 25, 2023. This dismissal order and the competency finding became central to Conomy’s later claims.
  • Case 23CRB01129 – Second misdemeanor case & dismissal without prejudice
    In a subsequent case, the prosecutor moved under Crim.R. 48(A) to dismiss the charge without prejudice, relying on the prior finding that Conomy was incompetent and not restorable. Judge Rohrer granted the motion and dismissed the case without prejudice.

Roughly a month after the dismissal in 23CRB01129, Conomy filed a motion in the municipal court to:

  • Amend the dismissal entry (presumably to remove the incompetency basis and change the dismissal to “with prejudice”); and
  • Impose sanctions on the prosecutor and city attorney.

He alleged that the municipal court never ruled on that motion.

2. The original action in the court of appeals

In the Fifth District Court of Appeals, Conomy sought:

  1. Mandamus against Judge Rohrer in 23CRB00517 to:
    • Remove the allegedly “false, defamatory, and collusive” entry finding him incompetent and not restorable;
    • Clear the record of alleged false statements; and
    • Convert the dismissal from “without prejudice” to “with prejudice.”
  2. Procedendo against Judge Rohrer in 23CRB01129 to:
    • Compel a ruling on his post‑dismissal motion to amend the dismissal entry and for sanctions;
    • Correct the record as to allegedly false statements; and
    • Change that dismissal as well from “without prejudice” to “with prejudice.”
  3. Mandamus against the prosecutors and the City of Delaware to:
    • Withdraw or cause withdrawal of all allegedly false statements they or their subordinates made;
    • Withdraw all charges in both cases and “clear his name;”
    • Comply with subpoenas and discovery without asserting privilege or withholding evidence.
  4. Damages under R.C. 2731.11 for:
    • Emotional and psychological distress;
    • Loss of income and consortium;
    • Other economic and non‑economic harms; and
    • Litigation costs.

Appellees sought and obtained judgment on the pleadings under Civ.R. 12(C), and the court of appeals dismissed the petition. Conomy appealed to the Supreme Court of Ohio.

B. Standards Governing Mandamus and Procedendo

The Supreme Court recited the familiar standards:

  • Mandamus (State ex rel. Martre v. Reed, 2020‑Ohio‑4777, ¶ 8):
    • A clear legal right in the relator to the requested relief;
    • A corresponding clear legal duty in the respondent to provide that relief; and
    • No adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
  • Procedendo (State ex rel. Sawicki v. Lucas Cty. Court of Common Pleas, 2010‑Ohio‑3299, ¶ 11):
    • A clear legal right in the relator to require the judge to rule on an unresolved claim;
    • A clear legal duty in the judge to rule; and
    • No adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.

Both writs share two crucial limitations:

  1. No control over judicial discretion: They may compel a court to act where it has a duty to act, but they cannot dictate how that discretion is exercised—even if the judge allegedly abuses that discretion (State ex rel. Culgan v. Collier, 2012‑Ohio‑2916, ¶ 1).
  2. No writ when an adequate legal remedy exists: An alternative remedy is not “inadequate” simply because it is potentially unsuccessful (State ex rel. Nichols v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Mental Retardation & Dev. Disabilities, 1995‑Ohio‑215, ¶ 17).

On review of a Civ.R. 12(C) dismissal, the Supreme Court applied de novo review: taking all well‑pleaded factual allegations as true, but resolving purely legal questions (State ex rel. Harris v. Schwendeman, 2025‑Ohio‑4769, ¶ 10; State ex rel. Midwest Pride IV v. Pontious, 1996‑Ohio‑459, ¶ 21).

C. Mandamus Against Judge Rohrer: Competency Finding & Sealing as an Adequate Remedy

1. The relator’s argument

On appeal, Conomy’s first proposition of law challenged the Fifth District’s conclusion that sealing/expungement under R.C. 2953.32 and 2953.33 provided an adequate remedy at law, thereby barring mandamus relief concerning the September 25, 2023 entry in case 23CRB00517.

He argued:

  • There was no conviction, so expungement was inapplicable.
  • Sealing was unavailable because R.C. 2953.33(B)(3) (in his reading) required that charges not be capable of being revived, while the aggravated‑menacing charge could still be refiled.

He did not address the separate and independent ground on which the Fifth District had denied mandamus: that he was attempting to control the judge’s exercise of judicial discretion.

2. The Court’s resolution

The Supreme Court rejected his arguments on both fronts:

  1. Interpretation of R.C. 2953.33(B)(3)–(4): DNA vs. ordinary records
    The Court clarified that the limitation in R.C. 2953.33(B)(3)—requiring the expiration of the statute of limitations before sealing is available in a case dismissed without prejudice—applies only to DNA‑related material:
    • DNA specimens, DNA profiles, and records related to DNA (see R.C. 2953.33(B)(3)).
    • The aggravated‑menacing case did not involve DNA evidence, nor did the record suggest any DNA collection.
    Therefore, the applicable provision was R.C. 2953.33(B)(4), which does not condition sealing of ordinary case records on expiration of the statute of limitations.

    The Court relied on State v. Dye, 2017‑Ohio‑7823, which interpreted former R.C. 2953.52; the relevant provisions were later renumbered to R.C. 2953.33 without substantive change.
  2. Adequate remedy exists even if not yet used or guaranteed to succeed
    Because sealing and expungement are statutorily available to a defendant whose case has been dismissed, they constitute an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. The fact that the dismissal is “without prejudice” does not bar sealing, and the existence of pending or theoretical collateral consequences (e.g., in custody litigation) does not convert the remedy into an inadequate one.
  3. Mandamus cannot control judicial discretion
    Independently of the sealing statutes, the Court underscored that the relief Conomy sought—ordering the judge to:
    • Remove the finding of incompetency and non‑restorability; and
    • Change the dismissal from “without prejudice” to “with prejudice”—
    would necessarily direct how the judge exercises judicial discretion in assessing competence and determining the form of dismissal. Under Culgan and R.C. 2731.03, mandamus does not lie to control the manner in which judicial discretion is exercised.

Consequently, the Supreme Court held that the Fifth District correctly dismissed the mandamus claim against Judge Rohrer as to case 23CRB00517.

D. Procedendo and Post‑Dismissal Jurisdiction in Criminal Cases

1. The relator’s argument

In his second proposition of law, Conomy contended that procedendo should issue to compel Judge Rohrer to rule on his post‑dismissal motion in case 23CRB01129, which sought to:

  • Amend the dismissal entry (including changing “without prejudice” to “with prejudice”); and
  • Impose sanctions.

He argued that these were “collateral issues” over which the trial court retained jurisdiction even after dismissing the underlying criminal case, analogizing to civil cases in which courts retain jurisdiction to impose sanctions or decide fee issues after a voluntary dismissal (State ex rel. Hummel v. Sadler, 2002‑Ohio‑3605; State ex rel. Alff v. Harris, 2015‑Ohio‑2643 (5th Dist.)).

2. The Court’s approach: jurisdiction as a prerequisite for procedendo

The Court began with a basic point: procedendo cannot issue to compel a court to act where it lacks jurisdiction to act (State ex rel. Peterson v. Miday, 2020‑Ohio‑5515, ¶ 7 (8th Dist.)). The writ can force a court to decide a pending matter; it cannot force a court to exercise jurisdiction it no longer has.

3. Dismissal ends a criminal case (with narrow exceptions)

The Court then reaffirmed a key principle from prior case law:

  • Once a criminal case is dismissed, “it is over—except in the case where the dismissal is appealed” (State ex rel. Douglas v. Burlew, 2005‑Ohio‑4382, ¶ 13, quoting State ex rel. Flynt v. Dinkelacker, 2004‑Ohio‑1695, ¶ 20).
  • The Court has repeatedly held that a trial court generally has no authority to reconsider its own valid final judgments in criminal cases, subject only to limited exceptions (State ex rel. Cruzado v. Zaleski, 2006‑Ohio‑5795, ¶ 18).

Cruzado recognized two such exceptions:

  1. Correcting a void sentence (now significantly narrowed by State v. Harper, 2020‑Ohio‑2913, which limits voidness to cases of lack of subject‑matter or personal jurisdiction); and
  2. Correcting clerical errors in judgments.

4. Application to Conomy’s post‑dismissal motion

The Court held that neither exception applied:

  • Conomy did not claim that the dismissal entry was void for lack of jurisdiction.
  • His requested changes were not clerical corrections but substantive alterations:
    • Removing or revising the factual/legal basis for dismissal (incompetence and non‑restorability);
    • Changing the legal effect of the dismissal from “without prejudice” to “with prejudice.”

These are quintessentially substantive modifications, not mere typographical or ministerial corrections.

Because the case had been dismissed under Crim.R. 48(A), and no appeal of that dismissal was pending, the trial court lacked continuing jurisdiction in the criminal matter to grant the relief requested. Without jurisdiction, there was no duty to rule on the motion; hence, no basis for procedendo.

The Supreme Court thus affirmed the dismissal of the procedendo claim, explicitly reinforcing the principle that:

When a criminal case is dismissed, the trial court ordinarily loses jurisdiction to substantively revisit the dismissal order, except to correct a void judgment or a clerical error.

E. Mandamus Against the City and Prosecutors: Defamation Remedy and Inability to Withdraw Filings

1. The relator’s argument

For his third proposition of law, Conomy challenged the Fifth District’s ruling that his remedy lies in a defamation action in the court of common pleas, rather than in mandamus. He argued that:

  • Any defamation suit against the city or its prosecutorial officials would likely be barred by prosecutorial immunity; and
  • Because of that anticipated immunity, defamation was not an “adequate” remedy, leaving mandamus as his only path to relief.

He also sought mandamus ordering the city to:

  • Withdraw the allegedly false statements from the court records; and
  • Withdraw charges and comply with discovery demands.

2. Adequate remedy despite immunity defenses

The Supreme Court rejected the notion that the mere presence of a likely immunity defense renders a legal remedy “inadequate.” Citing State ex rel. Rohrs v. Germann, 2013‑Ohio‑2497, ¶ 56 (3d Dist.), the Court embraced the reasoning that:

A plaintiff does not lack an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law simply because that remedy may be defeated by a defense such as governmental immunity.

Analogously, here:

  • Defamation is a standard tort remedy available in the court of common pleas.
  • Potential prosecutorial immunity is a defense within that action, not a reason to bypass the ordinary civil process in favor of an extraordinary writ.

Consequently, a defamation suit remains an “adequate remedy,” and mandamus cannot be used to circumvent that potential limitation.

3. Inability of prosecutors and city to “withdraw” filings post‑dismissal

On the request that the city and prosecutors be ordered to “withdraw” past statements and filings from the criminal cases, the Court highlighted a structural problem: once a case is dismissed and closed, prosecutors cannot unilaterally retract or rewrite the judicial record.

  • In 23CRB01129, the allegedly false statements appeared in the prosecution’s voluntary dismissal, which became the court’s dismissal entry once signed by the judge:
    • At that point, the document is not simply a prosecutorial filing; it is a judicial order.
    • Just as the judge cannot now modify the dismissal for lack of jurisdiction, prosecutors cannot “withdraw” a judicial entry.
  • In 23CRB00517, the allegedly false statements were contained in the court’s own dismissal entry, not in a specific prosecutorial filing identified by Conomy.

Because the city and prosecutors lack legal authority to withdraw or alter these judicial records, they have no “clear legal duty” to perform such acts. Under State ex rel. Sands v. Coulson, 2021‑Ohio‑671, ¶ 7, mandamus cannot compel an official to perform an act they lack power to perform.

4. No mandamus to control prosecutorial discretion

The Court also reaffirmed that charging decisions and the choice whether to dismiss or maintain charges are quintessential prosecutorial functions within the executive branch. Mandamus may not be used to:

  • Compel the city or prosecutor to withdraw charges; or
  • Direct how prosecutorial discretion is exercised.

This stems from separation‑of‑powers principles: courts do not supervise or direct the merits of executive charging decisions via extraordinary writs, absent a clear, non‑discretionary legal duty.

Accordingly, the Supreme Court agreed that:

  • Defamation is the appropriate remedy to challenge alleged false statements; and
  • Mandamus cannot be used to re‑engineer the record, withdraw past filings, or control prosecutorial judgment.

F. Damages Under R.C. 2731.11

In his fourth proposition of law, Conomy asserted a statutory right to damages under R.C. 2731.11, arguing that the court of appeals erred in dismissing this claim.

The statute, however, is explicit: damages are available only “[i]f judgment in a proceeding for a writ of mandamus is rendered for the relator.” The Supreme Court cited State ex rel. Shie v. Ohio Adult Parole Auth., 2022‑Ohio‑270, ¶ 12, emphasizing that a relator who does not succeed in obtaining mandamus relief cannot recover damages under this provision.

Because all of Conomy’s mandamus claims failed on the merits (for lack of a clear right, lack of a clear duty, or the availability of adequate alternative remedies), there was no predicate for damages. The Fifth District properly rejected this claim.

G. The Four Motions in the Supreme Court: Conflicts, Special Masters, Affidavits, and Contempt

1. Motion to disqualify appellees’ counsel

Conomy claimed a conflict because the Ohio Judges’ Professional Liability Self‑Insurance Program is administered through the state, allegedly causing the Supreme Court to be “entangled” in financing the defense of the respondent judge and others.

The Court relied on fundamental conflict‑of‑interest principles:

  • Prof.Cond.R. 1.7(a) prohibits representation where an attorney’s representation is directly adverse to a current client or materially limited by responsibilities to another client, a former client, or a third person, or by the attorney’s own interests.
  • Courts generally do not disqualify counsel for conflicts unless the moving party had an actual attorney‑client relationship with the lawyer to be disqualified (State ex rel. Peterson v. Licking Cty. Bd. of Elections, 2024‑Ohio‑646, ¶ 10; Morgan v. N. Coast Cable Co., 63 Ohio St.3d 156, 159 (1992)).

Because:

  • Conomy had no attorney‑client relationship with appellees’ counsel; and
  • He cited no authority establishing a disqualifying conflict based on the insurance program’s structure;

the Court denied the motion as not well‑taken.

2. Motion for referral to a special master under Civ.R. 60(B)(5)

Conomy next argued that the law firm representing appellees also represented the Fifth District under the judges’ liability program, creating a conflict of interest that supposedly tainted the court of appeals’ decision. He sought referral to a special master under Civ.R. 60(B)(5) to address this.

The Court rejected the request because:

  • Civ.R. 60(B) is a procedural rule for relief from judgment in trial courts; it does not authorize the Supreme Court to appoint a special master for an appeal.
  • There was no cited authority for such a procedure in this context.
  • The motion appeared to be an effort to introduce new arguments beyond those in the merit briefing, contrary to S.Ct.Prac.R. 16.08, which bars supplemental briefing absent leave.

Appellees’ counsel also submitted affidavits stating they had not represented or given legal advice to any judge involved in Conomy’s case in the Fifth District, reinforcing the absence of a disqualifying conflict.

3. Motion to strike affidavits

In response, Conomy moved to strike those affidavits, arguing that the Supreme Court was confined to the appellate record and could not consider new material.

The Court acknowledged the general rule from Dzina v. Celebrezze, 2006‑Ohio‑1195, ¶ 16, that an appellate court may not add new matter to the record for the purpose of deciding the merits of an appeal. However, it distinguished:

  • The affidavits did not relate to any issue on appeal from the court of appeals’ judgment; rather, they responded to a new collateral allegation of conflict raised in a post‑briefing motion.
  • Using affidavits to resolve procedural or collateral motions is permissible and does not violate the rule that the merits must be decided on the record below.

Accordingly, the motion to strike the affidavits was denied.

4. Motion for show‑cause order (contempt)

Finally, Conomy alleged that appellees had misled the Supreme Court when they agreed with the Fifth District’s conclusion that sealing/expungement was an available remedy. He pointed out that:

  • He had filed motions to seal in the municipal court;
  • The city had not filed responses; and
  • The judge had not ruled on those motions.

He argued that appellees were “making unavailable that which they assured this Court would be available” and sought an order to show cause why they should not be held in contempt.

The Court found this argument meritless:

  • Appellees had never guaranteed that the records would be sealed; they merely argued that the statutes provided a mechanism by which sealing could be sought.
  • The mere fact that the city might oppose sealing—or that the judge might deny sealing—does not make the sealing remedy “unavailable” or “inadequate.”
  • Under Nichols, a remedy does not become “inadequate” simply because it may not succeed.

Thus, no basis for contempt existed, and the motion was denied.

IV. Precedents and Doctrinal Threads

A. Extraordinary Writs: Mandamus and Procedendo

  • State ex rel. Martre v. Reed, 2020‑Ohio‑4777 – Restates the three elements of mandamus: clear right, clear duty, no adequate legal remedy.
  • State ex rel. Sawicki v. Lucas Cty. Court of Common Pleas, 2010‑Ohio‑3299 – Defines the elements of procedendo and explains it is appropriate when a court refuses or unduly delays proceeding to judgment.
  • State ex rel. Culgan v. Collier, 2012‑Ohio‑2916 – Emphasizes that neither mandamus nor procedendo will issue to control judicial discretion.
  • State ex rel. Midwest Pride IV v. Pontious, 1996‑Ohio‑459 – Clarifies that Civ.R. 12(C) motions resolve questions of law, supporting the Supreme Court’s de novo standard of review.

B. Adequate Remedy and Immunity

  • State ex rel. Nichols v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Mental Retardation & Dev. Disabilities, 1995‑Ohio‑215 – Holds that a remedy is not inadequate just because it has been or might be unsuccessful; used here both for sealing motions and the defamation remedy.
  • State ex rel. Rohrs v. Germann, 2013‑Ohio‑2497 (3d Dist.) – Two appellants could not claim lack of an adequate remedy merely because their tort claims failed due to governmental immunity; applied by analogy to defamation and anticipated prosecutorial immunity in Conomy.

C. Post‑Judgment and Post‑Dismissal Jurisdiction in Criminal Cases

  • State ex rel. Cruzado v. Zaleski, 2006‑Ohio‑5795 – States the general rule that trial courts lack authority to reconsider valid final judgments in criminal cases, with narrow exceptions for void sentences and clerical errors.
  • State v. Harper, 2020‑Ohio‑2913 – Substantially narrows what constitutes a void sentence to those imposed without subject‑matter or personal jurisdiction.
  • State ex rel. Douglas v. Burlew, 2005‑Ohio‑4382, and State ex rel. Flynt v. Dinkelacker, 2004‑Ohio‑1695 – Reiterate that when a criminal case is dismissed, it is over, except for an appeal.

These precedents underpin the Court’s conclusion that the municipal court lacked jurisdiction to hear a post‑dismissal motion to substantively alter the basis or form of the dismissal order.

D. Sealing and Expungement

  • State v. Dye, 2017‑Ohio‑7823 – Interprets the sealing statute (then R.C. 2953.52, now renumbered to R.C. 2953.33) and supports the Court’s reading that the statute‑of‑limitations precondition in R.C. 2953.33(B)(3) is limited to DNA‑related materials, not to ordinary case records.

E. Prosecutorial Authority and Mandamus

  • State ex rel. Sands v. Coulson, 2021‑Ohio‑671 – Holds that a prosecutor cannot be compelled in mandamus to perform an act that is beyond his legal authority, a principle applied to the request to “withdraw” past filings or statements once the case is closed.

F. Conflicts and Record on Appeal

  • State ex rel. Peterson v. Licking Cty. Bd. of Elections, 2024‑Ohio‑646 – Cites Prof.Cond.R. 1.7 and restates that conflicts of interest typically warrant disqualification only when there is an attorney‑client relationship between the moving party and the attorney to be disqualified.
  • Morgan v. N. Coast Cable Co., 63 Ohio St.3d 156 (1992) – Similarly holds that disqualification based on conflict of interest generally requires an actual attorney‑client relationship with the moving party.
  • Dzina v. Celebrezze, 2006‑Ohio‑1195 – Recognizes that an appellate court cannot consider extra‑record material to decide the merits of an appeal, but the Supreme Court distinguishes use of affidavits for collateral motions.

G. Damages in Mandamus

  • State ex rel. Shie v. Ohio Adult Parole Auth., 2022‑Ohio‑270 – Reinforces that R.C. 2731.11 allows damages only when the relator obtains a judgment in mandamus.

V. Complex Concepts Simplified

Mandamus
A special court order commanding a public official or court to perform a duty that the law clearly requires. It does not tell the official how to exercise judgment; it only forces action where the duty is clear and non‑discretionary.
Procedendo
A writ used to compel a lower court to move a case along—specifically, to issue a judgment or otherwise proceed when the court is refusing or unduly delaying action. It cannot dictate how the court rules, only that it must rule.
Adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law
A regular legal path—like an appeal, motion, or civil lawsuit—that can address the harm complained of. If such a path exists, even if it might fail or be subject to defenses, extraordinary writs are typically barred.
Dismissal “with prejudice” vs. “without prejudice”
  • With prejudice: The case is permanently ended; the same charge cannot be refiled, absent unusual circumstances.
  • Without prejudice: The case is dismissed for now, but the state may refile the charge, subject to statutes of limitations and other constraints.
Incompetent to stand trial vs. mental illness
“Incompetence to stand trial” is a legal standard: whether a defendant has a rational and factual understanding of the proceedings and can assist counsel. It is not a medical diagnosis, though it relies on mental‑health evaluations. A person can be incompetent for trial purposes without being legally insane or permanently mentally ill.
Expungement and sealing
Ohio law allows certain non‑conviction records, including dismissed charges, to be “sealed” or “expunged.” Sealing closes the records from public view (with some exceptions); expungement more thoroughly destroys them. The statutes distinguish between DNA‑related materials and other case records; DNA materials have stricter conditions.
Prosecutorial immunity
Prosecutors generally have absolute immunity from civil liability for actions intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process (e.g., filing charges, making statements in court). This can bar defamation and other tort claims over courtroom conduct, but the existence of this defense does not itself justify resort to mandamus.
Void vs. voidable judgments
  • Void: A judgment entered without subject‑matter jurisdiction or personal jurisdiction; it can be attacked at any time and corrected by the trial court.
  • Voidable: Legally erroneous but entered by a court with jurisdiction; must be corrected on direct appeal or by specific statutory mechanisms. After Harper, most sentencing errors are voidable, not void.

VI. Impact and Future Implications

A. Tightening the Use of Extraordinary Writs in Criminal Contexts

State ex rel. Conomy v. Rohrer sends a clear signal that Ohio’s high court will maintain a narrow view of extraordinary writs in the criminal context, especially where:

  • The criminal case has already been dismissed;
  • Defendants seek to relitigate or “rewrite” the reasons for dismissal; or
  • The relief requested would intrude on judicial or prosecutorial discretion.

Practitioners should expect courts to steer litigants toward:

  • Sealing/expungement remedies to address reputational or collateral consequences;
  • Direct appeals (where available);
  • Conventional civil actions (e.g., defamation), even when immunity may be a formidable obstacle.

B. Clarifying Post‑Dismissal Jurisdiction in Criminal Cases

The decision reinforces that, in criminal matters:

  • Once a case is dismissed, trial courts lack continuing jurisdiction to revisit the factual or legal basis for dismissal or to change the dismissal from “without prejudice” to “with prejudice.”
  • Exceptions are tiny: correcting void judgments (rare after Harper) and clerical errors.

This contrasts with civil cases, where courts may retain jurisdiction to impose sanctions or decide fees after voluntary dismissals. Criminal practitioners should not expect similar latitude post‑dismissal.

C. Interpreting the Sealing Statutes

The Court’s reading of R.C. 2953.33 is practically important:

  • Individuals whose cases were dismissed without prejudice may seek sealing of ordinary criminal case records immediately, without waiting for the statute of limitations to expire, so long as the statutory prerequisites are satisfied.
  • The statute‑of‑limitations barrier in R.C. 2953.33(B)(3) applies only to DNA‑related materials, not to standard docket entries or sentencing records.

This clarification is crucial for defendants seeking to mitigate collateral harms (e.g., in employment, housing, or family‑law proceedings) stemming from mental‑health‑related or other sensitive findings in dismissed criminal cases.

D. Managing Disputes About Prosecutorial Statements

The Court’s insistence that defamation (or related torts) is the proper vehicle to address allegedly false statements—even by prosecutors—has several implications:

  • Prosecutors remain largely shielded by immunity for in‑court statements, but challenges to those statements must be funneled through the ordinary civil process.
  • Mandamus is not available to cleanse transcripts or entries of statements perceived as defamatory.
  • Requests to “withdraw” or expunge content embedded in judicial orders are effectively barred in the absence of statutory mechanisms or appellate reversal.

E. Conflicts of Interest and Institutional Relationships

On the conflict‑of‑interest front, the Court implicitly recognizes that:

  • The existence of a statewide professional‑liability insurance program for judges, or shared representation by a firm that also represents courts or judges in unrelated matters, does not automatically create a disqualifying conflict at the Supreme Court level.
  • Challengers must show a specific, actualized conflict—usually predicated on an attorney‑client relationship with the lawyer whose disqualification is sought.

This provides a measure of institutional stability: routine administrative or insurance relationships are not, standing alone, grounds for disqualification of counsel or the Court.

F. Guidance for Self‑Represented Litigants

Though not written as a “pro se guide,” the opinion implicitly teaches several practical lessons for self‑represented litigants:

  • Extraordinary writs are poor vehicles to challenge trial‑court findings of incompetence or to “clear one’s name” after dismissal; sealing/expungement and civil suits are the intended remedies.
  • Writ practice focuses on legal duties and jurisdiction, not on factual correctness or fairness of underlying decisions.
  • Attempts to introduce new arguments through post‑briefing motions will be rebuffed as improper supplemental briefing.

VII. Conclusion

State ex rel. Conomy v. Rohrer, 2025‑Ohio‑5296, is best understood as a robust reaffirmation and modest refinement of existing Ohio law governing extraordinary writs in the criminal‑justice context.

Key takeaways include:

  • No extraordinary writ to rewrite dismissed criminal judgments: Once a criminal case is dismissed, trial courts lack jurisdiction to substantively revise the dismissal basis or convert “without prejudice” dismissals to “with prejudice,” absent narrow exceptions for void judgments or clerical errors.
  • Judicial and prosecutorial discretion is off‑limits to mandamus/procedendo: Writs cannot control the content of judicial competency findings, the form of dismissals, or prosecutorial charging and dismissal decisions.
  • Sealing and expungement are the intended remedies for reputational harm from dismissed cases: R.C. 2953.33(B)(4) allows sealing of ordinary records even where the statute of limitations has not expired; the statute‑of‑limitations bar in R.C. 2953.33(B)(3) is limited to DNA‑related materials.
  • Civil actions remain “adequate remedies,” despite immunity defenses: Anticipated prosecutorial or governmental immunity does not transform an ordinary tort action (such as defamation) into an inadequate remedy justifying extraordinary relief.
  • Damages under R.C. 2731.11 require success on the writ: Without a favorable mandamus judgment, no statutory damages are available.
  • Institutional relationships do not automatically create disqualifying conflicts: Alleged entanglements via insurance programs or shared counsel must be supported by concrete conflict‑of‑interest principles; otherwise, motions to disqualify or appoint special masters will fail.

In short, the decision fortifies the boundaries of extraordinary writ practice in Ohio, directing aggrieved criminal defendants and other litigants to the avenues that the law has already provided—appeals, statutory sealing and expungement, and civil suits—rather than allowing mandamus or procedendo to function as catch‑all remedies for perceived injustices in closed criminal cases.

Case Details

Year: 2025
Court: Supreme Court of Ohio

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