Reaffirming the Jurisdictional Limits on Interlocutory Qualified-Immunity Appeals:
A Comprehensive Commentary on Xyavier Calliste v. Officer Xeng Lor (4th Cir. 2025)

1. Introduction

Background. On 31 July 2018, Officer Xeng Lor of the Charlotte Police Department fired two shots at Xyavier Calliste as Calliste drove his vehicle past Lor in an airport parking lot. The bullets struck Calliste, who nevertheless drove away and later sought medical help. Criminal charges lodged against Calliste were ultimately dismissed.

Procedural posture. Calliste brought a civil suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (excessive force) and related state-law tort claims. At summary judgment the district court denied Officer Lor’s assertion of qualified immunity, finding genuine disputes of fact regarding whether Lor was still “in the car’s trajectory” when he fired. Lor filed an interlocutory appeal to the Fourth Circuit.

Key issue on appeal. Whether, assuming the facts in the light most favorable to Calliste, Officer Lor was entitled to qualified immunity—and, critically, whether the Fourth Circuit had jurisdiction to answer that question when the appeal challenged the district court’s factual determinations rather than raising a pure question of law.

2. Summary of the Judgment

A per curiam panel (Judges King, Thacker, and Berner) dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The court reiterated that on an interlocutory appeal from a denial of qualified immunity it may review only the purely legal question of whether, under the facts as found (or assumed) by the district court, the officer is immune. Because Lor’s briefing attacked the district court’s factual view—contending that he was still in imminent danger when he shot—the panel could not reach the merits and therefore dismissed.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• Waterman v. Batton, 393 F.3d 471 (4th Cir. 2005)
  – Held that deadly force against a fleeing driver is reasonable only while the officer remains in immediate danger; shots fired after that danger passes violate the Fourth Amendment.
• Williams v. Strickland, 917 F.3d 763 (4th Cir. 2019)
  – Reaffirmed Waterman; officers “violate the Fourth Amendment if they employ deadly force once they are no longer in the car’s trajectory.”
• Pegg v. Herrnberger, 845 F.3d 112 (4th Cir. 2017)
• Iko v. Shreve, 535 F.3d 225 (4th Cir. 2008)
• Hicks v. Ferreyra, 965 F.3d 302 (4th Cir. 2020)
• Winfield v. Bass, 106 F.3d 525 (4th Cir. 1997) (en banc)

These cases jointly set two separate guideposts that controlled the panel:

1. Substantive Fourth-Amendment Rule. Waterman & Williams establish that once an officer is outside a vehicle’s trajectory, continued or new use of deadly force is unconstitutional.
2. Jurisdictional Rule on Interlocutory Appeals. Under Pegg, Iko, and their progeny, an interlocutory appeal lies only when the defendant accepts the district court’s record-based version of events and contests solely the legal significance of those events.

3.2 The Court’s Legal Reasoning

The panel applied the familiar two-step qualified-immunity framework (Nazario v. Gutierrez, 103 F.4th 213, 2024): (1) violation of a constitutional right; (2) right clearly established. But both steps became moot once the panel recognized it had no jurisdiction to reconsider the district court’s factual assessments.

Key logical moves:

1. The district court explicitly found (for summary-judgment purposes) that Lor was no longer in danger when he fired.
2. Lor’s entire appellate argument was that the district court misread or misinterpreted the record—that in fact the threat persisted.
3. Per Hicks and Williams, such fact-based challenges fall outside appellate jurisdiction on an interlocutory posture.
4. Having no jurisdiction, the panel could neither reconsider the factual dispute nor reach the legal merits and thus dismissed.

3.3 Potential Impact

Although unpublished, the opinion reinforces several practical doctrines:

• Gate-Keeping for Qualified-Immunity Appeals. Defense counsel must frame interlocutory appeals narrowly around pure issues of law; contesting facts invites dismissal and delay.
• Evidentiary Emphasis in Excessive-Force Litigation. Plaintiffs should strategically develop factual records—especially timelines showing when threats dissipate—knowing those facts will be functionally insulated on appeal.
• Trajectory Test Cemented. The “car’s trajectory” language from Williams receives further endorsement, signaling to law-enforcement agencies that split-second transitions from threat to flight can strip officers of constitutional justification for deadly force.
• Judicial Economy. The opinion deters premature appeals that would otherwise clog the dockets, reinforcing that discovery-stage fact disputes belong in the district court.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Qualified Immunity. A defense shielding government officials from liability unless (a) they violated a constitutional right (b) that was “clearly established” at the time.
• Interlocutory Appeal. An appeal taken before final judgment. In qualified-immunity contexts, it is permitted but strictly limited to pure legal questions.
• Collateral-Order Doctrine. A narrow exception to the final-judgment rule allowing certain decisions—like the denial of qualified immunity—to be appealed immediately.
• “Clearly Established” Right. A right so well defined by precedent that a reasonable officer would know the conduct was unconstitutional.
• “Trajectory” Test. In vehicle shooting cases, deadly force is justified only while the officer’s body is in the anticipated path of the car; once clear, continued force is unreasonable.

5. Conclusion

Calliste v. Lor adds another brick to the jurisprudential wall barring defendants from using interlocutory appeals to re-litigate facts. By dismissing the appeal, the Fourth Circuit underscores that officers may obtain early appellate review only when they concede the plaintiff-friendly factual landscape and present a strictly legal question. Substantively, the case also re-highlights Waterman and Williams: deadly force against a fleeing driver becomes unconstitutional the instant the officer is no longer in danger. Together, these dual messages—procedural and substantive—will shape both litigation strategy and police-training protocols in the Fourth Circuit and beyond.