Reaffirming the High Bar for Post‑Judgment Relief: Eleventh Circuit Clarifies that Alleged Opponent‑Induced Attorney Conflicts and Summary‑Judgment Misstatements Do Not Constitute Rule 60 Fraud or “Exceptional Circumstances” Without Clear, Prejudicial Proof

Case: Louemma Cromity v. City of Orlando

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Date: September 26, 2025

Disposition: Affirmed (non‑argument calendar; unpublished)

Introduction

This appeal arises from a post‑judgment effort by plaintiff‑appellant Louemma Cromity to undo an adverse summary judgment on her Title VII and Florida Civil Rights Act claims for hostile work environment, disparate treatment, and retaliation. After the district court entered judgment for the City of Orlando and the Eleventh Circuit affirmed that judgment in 2024, Ms. Cromity—proceeding pro se—moved under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60 to vacate the judgment, alleging that the City had procured it through fraud on the court and by engineering a conflict of interest for her former counsel. The district court denied relief, and the Eleventh Circuit now affirms.

The central issues on appeal were:

Whether the district court abused its discretion in denying Rule 60(b)(3) relief based on alleged misrepresentations and an opponent‑induced conflict of interest;
Whether the court erred in denying Rule 60(b)(6) “catch‑all” relief where the asserted grounds overlapped with (b)(3); and
Whether the strict “fraud on the court” standard under Rule 60(d)(3) was satisfied by the allegations presented.

In addition, the panel addressed procedural guardrails: it declined to consider new Rule 60(b)(1) arguments raised for the first time on appeal, and it granted in part the City’s motion to strike non‑record material in the appendices under Eleventh Circuit Rule 30‑1.

Summary of the Opinion

Standard of review and scope: Denials of Rule 60 motions are reviewed for abuse of discretion, and appellate review is limited to the Rule 60 ruling—not the merits of the underlying judgment.
Rule 60(b)(3): Relief for fraud, misrepresentation, or misconduct requires clear and convincing evidence and a showing that the misconduct prevented the movant from fully presenting her case. The court held that Ms. Cromity’s assertions—largely reiterations of summary‑judgment disputes and an unsubstantiated attorney‑conflict allegation—did not meet this demanding standard.
Rule 60(b)(6): The “catch‑all” provision cannot be used when the asserted grounds fall within Rule 60(b)(1)–(5). Because the (b)(6) arguments overlapped with (b)(3), and no exceptional circumstances were shown, the denial was within the court’s discretion.
Rule 60(d)(3): “Fraud on the court” requires highly probable proof of egregious misconduct, typically involving an officer of the court undermining the judicial process (e.g., bribery of a judge or attorney‑implicated fabrication of evidence). The allegations here did not rise to that level.
Procedural rulings: The panel refused to entertain new Rule 60(b)(1) arguments raised for the first time on appeal and granted in part the City’s motion to strike portions of the appendices that exceeded the record below.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Big Top Koolers, Inc. v. Circus‑Man Snacks, Inc., 528 F.3d 839 (11th Cir. 2008): Reinforces that Rule 60 rulings are reviewed for abuse of discretion. The panel relied on this to frame the deferential posture, highlighting that Rule 60 is not a vehicle for relitigating merits.
Mills v. Commissioner, Alabama Department of Corrections, 102 F.4th 1235 (11th Cir. 2024), cert. denied, 144 S. Ct. 2600 (2024): Clarifies abuse‑of‑discretion standards and, crucially, the “highly probable” proof requirement for Rule 60(d)(3) fraud on the court. It also reiterates that Rule 60(b)(6) cannot be used to circumvent (b)(1)–(b)(5). The panel used Mills to emphasize the demanding evidentiary threshold and the non‑overlap rule for (b)(6).
Buck v. Davis, 580 U.S. 100 (2017): Quoted for the breadth of district court discretion under Rule 60 and the implication that appellate intervention is rare absent unreasonable application of law or manifest error.
Rice v. Ford Motor Co., 88 F.3d 914 (11th Cir. 1996): Limits the scope of appellate review on Rule 60 denials to the propriety of that denial, not the underlying judgment, and underscores that a movant must show a compelling justification requiring the court to grant relief.
Carmichael v. United States, 966 F.3d 1250 (11th Cir. 2020): Establishes liberal construction for pro se filings. The panel explicitly construed Ms. Cromity’s briefing to encompass arguments under Rules 60(b)(3), 60(b)(6), and 60(d)(3), but still found the showings insufficient.
Timson v. Sampson, 518 F.3d 870 (11th Cir. 2008): Deems unbriefed arguments abandoned on appeal. The court used Timson to treat Cromity’s Rule 60(d)(1) theory as abandoned.
Depree v. Thomas, 946 F.2d 784 (11th Cir. 1991): Courts will not consider issues raised for the first time on appeal. The panel relied on Depree to decline Rule 60(b)(1) arguments that were not presented below.
Carter ex rel. Carter v. United States, 780 F.2d 925 (11th Cir. 1986) (quoting Fackelman v. Bell, 564 F.2d 734 (5th Cir. 1977)): Addresses the purpose of Rule 60: correcting obvious errors or injustices, not providing a second bite at the apple. This supported the district court’s conclusion that the motion attempted to relitigate summary‑judgment disputes.
Terrell v. Secretary, Department of Veterans Affairs, 98 F.4th 1343 (11th Cir. 2024): Confirms that Rule 60 cannot be used to relitigate old matters or present arguments or evidence that could have been raised before judgment. This directly undercut the thrust of Ms. Cromity’s motion.
Waddell v. Hendry County Sheriff’s Office, 329 F.3d 1300 (11th Cir. 2003): Sets the Rule 60(b)(3) standard: clear and convincing proof of fraud/misconduct that prevented the movant from fully presenting her case. The panel applied Waddell to find that neither alleged misrepresentations nor the asserted attorney conflict met this standard.
Liljeberg v. Health Services Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847 (1988): Establishes the scope and limitations of Rule 60(b)(6)—extraordinary remedy for exceptional circumstances not covered by (b)(1)–(b)(5). The panel used Liljeberg to underscore that (b)(6) is not a backdoor for (b)(3) claims.
Griffin v. Swim‑Tech Corp., 722 F.2d 677 (11th Cir. 1984), and Galbert v. W. Caribbean Airways, 715 F.3d 1290 (11th Cir. 2013): Emphasize that (b)(6) relief requires exceptional circumstances and an extreme, unexpected hardship, and even then remains discretionary. These authorities supported denying (b)(6) where the record showed neither exceptionality nor hardship of the requisite magnitude.
Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Gore, 761 F.2d 1549 (11th Cir. 1985), and Rozier v. Ford Motor Co., 573 F.2d 1332 (5th Cir. 1978): Define “fraud on the court” narrowly: only the most egregious misconduct—like judicial bribery or attorney‑implicated fabrication—qualifies; ordinary perjury or evidentiary disputes do not. These cases were pivotal to rejecting the Rule 60(d)(3) theory.

Legal Reasoning

1) Standard of review and limited appellate scope

The court reiterated that it reviews denials of Rule 60(b) and 60(d)(3) motions for abuse of discretion, a standard that asks whether any reasonable jurist could agree with the district court’s decision. Crucially, an appeal from a Rule 60 denial is not a vehicle to attack the underlying judgment’s merits. This framing sharply curtailed the import of Ms. Cromity’s re‑arguments about summary‑judgment evidence.

2) Rule 60(b)(3): Fraud, misrepresentation, misconduct

The movant had to show, by clear and convincing evidence, that the adverse party obtained the judgment through fraud or misconduct, and that the misconduct prevented her full presentation of the case.
The panel agreed with the district court that the motion largely recycled summary‑judgment disputes and that the asserted conflict of interest—allegedly created by the City’s outside firm offering work to her attorney—was unsupported by clear and convincing proof and unconnected to any concrete prejudice that impaired her case presentation.
Absent credible, specific evidence and a showing of prejudicial impact on the opportunity to litigate, Rule 60(b)(3) relief was unavailable.

3) Rule 60(b)(6): The catch‑all—and its limits

The panel emphasized that (b)(6) cannot be used to relitigate matters that fit within (b)(1)–(b)(5). Where the factual predicates sound in fraud or misrepresentation, (b)(3)—with its one‑year time limit and heightened proof—is the proper vehicle, not (b)(6).
Because Ms. Cromity did not differentiate her (b)(6) grounds from her (b)(3) contentions, and because she failed to show exceptional circumstances and extreme hardship, the district court acted within its discretion in denying (b)(6) relief.

4) Rule 60(d)(3): “Fraud on the court”

The court underscored that “fraud on the court” is reserved for the most egregious conduct aimed at the judicial machinery itself—e.g., judicial bribery or attorney‑implicated fabrication of evidence—and must be proven by clear and convincing evidence to a “highly probable” level.
Allegations of misstatements or evidentiary disputes, and even ordinary perjury, do not qualify because such wrongs can be—indeed must be—addressed in the trial or summary‑judgment process, not recharacterized later as institutional fraud.
Here, even assuming the truth of the alleged work offer from the City’s outside firm to Ms. Cromity’s attorney, the record did not show egregious, system‑corrupting misconduct by an officer of the court, nor did it show attorney‑implicated fabrication of evidence or similar conduct. The claim fell far short of the demanding standard.

5) Procedural guardrails: new arguments and the record on appeal

New arguments on appeal: The panel refused to entertain, for the first time on appeal, Ms. Cromity’s Rule 60(b)(1) “mistake of law” challenges relating to a default motion and a stricken reply, invoking the well‑settled rule that issues not raised below are forfeited.
Appendices and record compliance: Granting in part the City’s motion to strike, the court enforced Eleventh Circuit Rule 30‑1 by striking the supplemental appendix and declining to consider specific non‑record pages. The message is clear: appellate review is confined to the record; legal argument and commentary cannot be smuggled into the record via appendices.

Impact

While unpublished and thus non‑precedential, the decision has meaningful persuasive force within the Eleventh Circuit and offers practical guidance for post‑judgment practice:

Rule 60 remains a narrow, extraordinary remedy. Parties cannot use it as a surrogate appeal or a means to relitigate adverse summary‑judgment rulings.
(b)(3) requires more than disagreement with the opposing party’s evidence or characterizations. Movants must marshal clear, specific, and convincing proof of misconduct and show that it prejudicially prevented a full presentation of the case.
(b)(6) is not a backdoor for (b)(3). Attempting to recast fraud‑type contentions as “exceptional circumstances” under (b)(6) will fail where the facts fit in (b)(1)–(b)(5).
“Fraud on the court” is rare. Absent evidence of system‑corrupting acts, like bribery or attorney‑implicated fabrication, ordinary litigation misconduct—even serious—will not trigger Rule 60(d)(3).
Attorney conflicts must be both proven and prejudicial. Creative allegations that the opposing side induced a conflict will not suffice without clear, corroborated facts and a causal showing that the conflict impeded the movant’s ability to litigate.
Preservation and the record matter. New theories cannot be raised for the first time on appeal, and appendices may not expand the record. Compliance with local and appellate rules is essential.

For employment discrimination litigants in particular, the opinion underlines that post‑judgment relief must rest on concrete, compelling proof of misconduct that materially compromised their opportunity to litigate—not on renewed challenges to evidentiary assessments already resolved at summary judgment and on direct appeal.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Abuse of discretion: A highly deferential standard. The appellate court asks whether the district court applied the right law, followed proper procedures, and made reasonable findings. Even if a grant of relief might have been reasonable, denial must be affirmed unless it was unreasonable.
Clear and convincing evidence: A higher standard than “more likely than not” but lower than “beyond a reasonable doubt.” The Eleventh Circuit frames it as proof making the truth of the allegations “highly probable.”
Rule 60(b)(3) (fraud/misconduct): Relief requires both (i) clear and convincing proof of the opponent’s fraud or misconduct and (ii) a showing that the misconduct prevented the movant from fully presenting her case (i.e., caused prejudice affecting the fairness of the proceeding).
Rule 60(b)(6) (catch‑all): Available only for exceptional circumstances not covered by (b)(1)–(b)(5). It cannot be used to evade the stricter rules and timelines applicable to the specific grounds listed in (b)(1)–(b)(5).
Rule 60(d)(3) (fraud on the court): Reserved for the most egregious assaults on the integrity of the judicial process—such as judicial bribery or attorney‑implicated fabrication of evidence. Ordinary perjury or evidentiary disputes are addressed within the adversary process and do not qualify.
Record on appeal: The appellate court generally considers only materials that were part of the district court record. Appellate appendices are vehicles to organize record materials, not to introduce new evidence or argument.

Conclusion

The Eleventh Circuit’s affirmance in Cromity v. City of Orlando underscores a consistent and stringent approach to post‑judgment relief under Rule 60. Three messages stand out. First, Rule 60(b)(3) requires clear, convincing, and prejudicial proof of misconduct; mere disputes over evidentiary characterizations or unsubstantiated conflict allegations will not do. Second, Rule 60(b)(6) cannot be used to repackage (b)(3) contentions, and it remains a truly extraordinary remedy. Third, “fraud on the court” under Rule 60(d)(3) is a narrow doctrine limited to the most egregious and system‑corrupting misconduct—far beyond the allegations presented here.

Procedurally, the opinion reinforces the importance of issue preservation and strict adherence to appellate rules governing the record. Substantively, it signals to litigants—especially those challenging employment‑law judgments—that post‑judgment relief will be available only in rare cases backed by compelling, corroborated evidence showing both misconduct and prejudice that undermined the fairness of the proceedings.