Reaffirming the Final-Decision Requirement After Zoning Amendments: Mills Pond Group, LLC v. Town of Smithtown

1. Introduction

Mills Pond Group, LLC v. Town of Smithtown (2d Cir. June 20, 2025) is the latest Second Circuit decision to underscore the strictness of the “final-decision requirement” in federal land-use litigation. The case concerns a real-estate developer’s attempt to construct an assisted-living facility in Smithtown, New York, and the Town’s mid-stream zoning amendment that purportedly doomed the project. Plaintiffs sued under the Fair Housing Act (FHA), Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), Equal Protection Clause, and Due Process Clause, arguing that the Town’s change was discriminatory and unconstitutional. The district court dismissed the claims as unripe and, alternatively, for lack of standing. The Second Circuit affirmed solely on ripeness grounds, holding that plaintiffs must still seek a variance—even when an intervening zoning amendment apparently makes the desired use impossible—before turning to federal court.

2. Summary of the Judgment

The Second Circuit (Judges Lohier, Carney, and Pérez) issued a summary order affirming dismissal:

• Ripeness: Plaintiffs failed to satisfy the “final-decision requirement” because they never applied to the Town’s Zoning Board of Appeals (ZBA) for a variance.
• Futility Exception Rejected: Plaintiffs could not show that applying for a variance would have been futile; mere hostility from the legislative body (Town Board) is insufficient without evidence that the ZBA would certainly deny relief.
• No Need to Reach Standing: Because ripeness alone barred the action, the court declined to revisit the district court’s standing analysis, though it hinted that the lower court might reconsider standing if the case returns.
• Outcome: District court’s judgment of dismissal affirmed; supplemental state-law claims remain dismissed without prejudice.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• Williamson County Reg’l Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172 (1985) – Origin of the “final-decision requirement” for land-use disputes; plaintiffs must secure a definitive position from local authorities before suing in federal court.
• Knick v. Township of Scott, 588 U.S. 180 (2019) – Abrogated Williamson’s state-court exhaustion rule but left the final-decision requirement intact; cited to clarify the doctrine’s continued vitality.
• Murphy v. New Milford Zoning Comm’n, 402 F.3d 342 (2d Cir. 2005) – Expounded on ripeness in the Second Circuit; emphasized the necessity of at least one meaningful application for relief.
• Sunrise Detox V, LLC v. City of White Plains, 769 F.3d 118 (2d Cir. 2014) – Set the “high burden” for futility; unless the board has “dug in its heels,” plaintiffs must apply for a variance.
• Sherman v. Town of Chester, 752 F.3d 554 (2d Cir. 2014) – Discussed rare exemption when repeated zoning changes make municipal conduct “farcical.”
• BMG Monroe I, LLC v. Village of Monroe, 93 F.4th 595 (2d Cir. 2024) – Reiterated that doubts about success do not equal futility and that ripeness can dispose of a case without reaching standing.
• Village Green at Sayville, LLC v. Town of Islip, 43 F.4th 287 (2d Cir. 2022) – Applied the final-decision rule to FHA, Equal Protection, and Due Process claims.

Together, these authorities reinforce a consistent circuit message: federal courts are not zoning boards of appeal, and litigants must exhaust local procedures unless they can show exceptional circumstances.

3.2 Court’s Legal Reasoning

The panel applied a two-step analysis:

1. Identify the Proper Local Decision-Maker. Under the Smithtown Code, the Zoning Board of Appeals is empowered to grant variances. Because plaintiffs never approached the ZBA, the court lacked a “final, definitive position.”
2. Evaluate Futility. The court demanded clear evidence that the ZBA would certainly deny relief. Plaintiffs’ allegations focused on hostility from the Town Board (the legislative body) and community opposition—insufficient under Sunrise Detox. There were no facts indicating the ZBA “dug in its heels.”

Having found no futility, the court concluded the claims were unripe, ending the inquiry and obviating the need to explore constitutional standing or the merits.

3.3 Potential Impact of the Judgment

• FHA & ADA Litigation: Civil-rights plaintiffs in land-use contexts must heed ripeness just as traditional takings plaintiffs do. The decision underscores that broad remedial statutes do not dilute ripeness.
• Zoning Strategy: Developers must include variance applications in their litigation strategy, even where code amendments appear prohibitory.
• Municipal Conduct: Town boards may legislate zoning changes without instantly facing federal suit; however, repeated or “farcical” amendments (cf. Sherman) may still trigger the futility exception.
• District Court Practice: Trial courts in the Second Circuit now have fresh, 2025-dated confirmation that ripeness can—and often should—be resolved before standing.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Ripeness: A doctrine ensuring courts decide cases only when a dispute has “matured” into a concrete legal conflict. In land-use cases, maturity is measured by whether local authorities have issued a final decision.
• Final-Decision Requirement: Plaintiffs must obtain a definitive ruling (e.g., denial of a variance) from the authorized local body before suing federally.
• Variance: Permission to deviate from zoning rules, granted by a zoning board of appeals. It is a built-in safety valve intended to provide flexibility and avoid undue hardship.
• Special Exception: A use allowed under certain conditions in a zoning district, subject to discretionary approval—different from a variance but similarly flexible.
• Futility Exception: A narrow escape hatch from the final-decision rule; applies only when it is virtually certain the local board will deny relief.
• Standing vs. Ripeness: Standing asks whether the plaintiff is the right party; ripeness asks whether the dispute is ready for judicial review. Courts may dismiss on ripeness without reaching standing.

5. Conclusion

Mills Pond Group, LLC v. Town of Smithtown does not create new substantive land-use rights, but it powerfully reaffirms procedural gatekeeping in the Second Circuit. The court’s insistence on the final-decision requirement—even after an adverse zoning amendment—signals that federal courts remain reluctant to intrude on local land-use processes. Litigants alleging discriminatory or unconstitutional zoning must exhaust local remedies unless they can make the demanding futility showing. The decision thus shapes future FHA, ADA, Equal Protection, and Due Process actions by emphasizing that ripeness is king: the courthouse door opens only after local avenues have been truly—and demonstrably—closed.