Reaffirming the Duty to Explain Major Upward Variances in Supervised Release Revocations: United States v. Ramos (2d Cir. Summary Order)

Introduction

This Second Circuit summary order vacates a 60-month revocation sentence imposed on Jose Ramos and remands for resentencing because the district court did not adequately explain its significant upward variance from the advisory range and appeared to rely on disputed, unproven conduct without making factual findings. Although the order is non-precedential, it offers a clear and practical restatement of principles governing procedural reasonableness in supervised release revocation sentencing, particularly the need for specific, reviewable reasons when imposing a major upward variance and the necessity of resolving factual disputes before relying on contested allegations.

The decision addresses multiple strands:

The standard for reviewing revocation sentences for procedural reasonableness;
The heightened obligation to explain significant departures from the advisory policy statement range in Chapter 7 of the Guidelines;
The prohibition on relying on disputed, unproven conduct without making findings;
Ancillary issues concerning the concurrency of supervised release terms and limits on collaterally attacking prior sentences in a revocation proceeding.

Parties: The United States (Appellee) and Jose Ramos (Defendant-Appellant). The appeal arises from judgments of the Southern District of New York (Kaplan, J.), with representation by Sher Tremonte LLP for Ramos and the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the SDNY for the government. The panel consisted of Circuit Judges Raggi, Wesley, and Kahn.

Summary of the Opinion

The Second Circuit vacated the amended judgments revoking supervised release and imposing 60 months’ imprisonment, and remanded for resentencing. The court concluded the district court’s explanation for a far-above-Guidelines sentence was insufficient. The district court stated it agreed with the prosecution’s assessment that the community was safe from Ramos only when he was incarcerated, but did not articulate specific reasons justifying a five-year sentence in light of the advisory range of 8–14 months and did not resolve disputes about key facts (including whether a fatal August 2022 shooting was connected to Ramos’s supposed narcotics activity).

Because the sentence rested, or appeared to rest, on unproved allegations without findings, and because the court did not state sufficiently specific reasons to justify such a substantial variance, the Second Circuit held the sentence procedurally unreasonable under established standards and remanded for the district court to clarify its rationale and make findings as needed.

Background

Ramos’s federal convictions stem from a 2002 superseding indictment (drug and firearm offenses) and a 2003 information (additional drug, robbery, and firearm offenses). He was sentenced in 2005 to a total of 144 months’ imprisonment and multiple terms of supervised release. The government now concedes the 2005 judgment erroneously ran several supervised release terms consecutively rather than concurrently, contrary to Second Circuit law. However, the panel emphasized that error could not be corrected in this revocation appeal because underlying sentences cannot be collaterally attacked in revocation proceedings.

Ramos was released in 2013, re-arrested on state cocaine charges in 2017, and in 2018 admitted a federal supervision violation, receiving 36 months’ imprisonment and five years’ supervised release. After release in 2021, Ramos had a series of encounters with violence (including being shot) and arrests (state robbery charges later dismissed). He was arrested after a July 26, 2022 domestic dispute and, a month later, was seriously injured and his girlfriend was killed when an unidentified gunman fired into their car. Ten envelopes of cocaine were found on Ramos at the hospital; he also provided police with an address different from the one on file with Probation.

Probation charged five violations in August 2022. In June 2023, Ramos pleaded guilty to two: petit larceny arising from the July 2022 domestic incident and failure to notify of a change of address. The advisory policy statement range for those admitted violations was 8–14 months. The district court revoked supervised release on both the 2002 and 2003 dockets and imposed a 60-month sentence (the statutory maximum under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3) for a Class A underlying offense), without contemporaneous objections by either party.

On appeal, Ramos argued the sentence was procedurally unreasonable because the court did not adequately explain its above-Guidelines sentence and appeared to rely on allegations unsupported by record evidence or findings, including an asserted narcotics connection to the August 2022 shooting.

Issues Presented

Whether the district court committed procedural error by failing to adequately explain a major upward variance in a revocation sentence.
Whether the district court improperly relied on disputed, unproven conduct without making factual findings.
Ancillary, unresolved issues flagged by the panel: concurrency of supervised release terms in the 2005 judgment and any effect on which terms were active, and the potential impact on the applicable statutory maximum at this second revocation.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Role

United States v. Smith, 949 F.3d 60 (2d Cir. 2020): Establishes that revocation sentences are reviewed for reasonableness under the same framework as original sentences. Importantly, it recognizes that while explanations in revocation contexts can be less detailed than at initial sentencing, courts still must provide enough reasoning for meaningful appellate review. The panel relied on Smith to frame the standard of review and the relative level of specificity typically required in revocation sentencing explanations.
United States v. Aldeen, 792 F.3d 247 (2d Cir. 2015) (superseded by statute on other grounds as recognized in Smith): Provides the core principle that a sentence is procedurally unreasonable if the court fails to adequately explain the sentence, and that major departures require more significant justifications. The panel quoted Aldeen for the proposition that, without adequate explanation or findings, the appellate court cannot conclude the deviation was supported by sufficiently compelling reasons.
United States v. Cassesse, 685 F.3d 186 (2d Cir. 2012): Recognizes that the explanation for a within-Guidelines revocation sentence can be “minimal.” By contrast, when a sentence is outside the advisory range, more explanation is required. The panel contrasted the permissibility of minimal explanations when within-range with the heightened duty when imposing a major upward variance.
United States v. Sash, 396 F.3d 515 (2d Cir. 2005): Holds multiple supervised release terms must run concurrently. The government conceded plain error in the 2005 judgment insofar as it stacked certain supervised release terms consecutively. The panel underscored the point but declined to correct the 2005 sentence in this revocation appeal.
United States v. Warren, 335 F.3d 76 (2d Cir. 2003): Establishes that the validity of an underlying conviction or sentence may not be collaterally attacked in a supervised release revocation proceeding. The panel relied on Warren to explain why it could not revisit and correct the 2005 supervised release concurrency error in this posture.

Legal Reasoning

The court applied routine reasonableness review to a revocation sentence and focused on procedural reasonableness. It reaffirmed these propositions:

District courts must “sufficiently explain” the reasons for the sentence so that parties, the public, and a reviewing court can understand the justification.
While explanations can be “minimal” for within-Guidelines revocation sentences, a sentence outside the advisory range—especially a major upward variance—requires a more substantial, specific justification.
When disputed, uncharged, or unproven conduct is invoked as part of the rationale for a severe sentence, the district court must make factual findings or otherwise explain how it resolved the dispute so that appellate review is possible.

Applying these standards to Ramos, the panel held:

The district court imposed the statutory maximum of 60 months despite an advisory range of 8–14 months based on the two admitted violations (petit larceny and failure to notify of a change of address). That is a major upward variance requiring a “more significant justification.”
The court’s explanation—agreeing with the prosecutor that the community was safe only when Ramos was off the street—did not sufficiently articulate specific reasons, nor did it resolve factual disputes about incidents the prosecutor cited (including whether the fatal August 2022 shooting was linked to narcotics activity).
Because the record lacked the necessary findings or explanation, the appellate court could not discern whether the district court relied on unproven conduct or whether there were sufficiently compelling reasons to support the deviation, as required by Aldeen.

Accordingly, the panel found procedural error and vacated the sentence, remanding for resentencing with instructions that the district court clarify its rationale and make specific factual findings as needed.

Unresolved and Ancillary Issues Flagged by the Panel

Concurrency of supervised release terms (Sash error): The government conceded plain error in the 2005 judgment where certain supervised release terms were run consecutively rather than concurrently. The panel noted that if the terms had been concurrent, some terms would have ended before the violation report was filed. However, under Warren, the panel declined to correct the 2005 sentence in this revocation proceeding.
Which supervised release terms were active and the statutory maximum: The panel explicitly did not decide which terms of supervision were running at the time of the current violations or what impact the government’s concession about concurrency might have on the applicable statutory maximum for this second revocation. The court also observed that the five-year statutory maximum it referenced did not account for any time previously served on revocation. These questions remain open for the district court to address if relevant on remand.
Temporal scope of Count Six in the 2003 information: The government conceded no evidence showed conduct in May 2003; Ramos argued the “May 2003” end date was a typographical error that should have been May 2002. The panel deemed it unnecessary to resolve this point for purposes of the remand, and it did not decide the issue.

Impact

Even though this is a non-precedential summary order, it will likely influence practice in the Second Circuit’s district courts for revocation sentencings:

District judges: When imposing a sentence far above the advisory policy range, they should make explicit, reviewable findings and explain, with specificity, the reasons warranting the major variance, particularly when relying on disputed conduct that did not result in conviction. Bare assertions about public safety or general dangerousness, without tethered facts and findings, risk vacatur for procedural error.
Prosecutors: Should present reliable evidence and, where relying on allegations of uncharged or dismissed conduct, request explicit findings under the preponderance standard. Arguments should be tied to the admitted violations and the relevant 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors incorporated by § 3583(e).
Defense counsel: Should frame objections in real time when an upward variance appears to rest on disputed assertions. On appeal, focus on whether the district court articulated specific reasons and made findings resolving factual disputes.
Probation officers: Draft violation reports with clarity on the evidentiary basis for alleged conduct; where disputes are likely, identify the sources and reliability of information to facilitate judicial findings.

The order also serves as a reminder about the administrative complexities stemming from historical errors in imposing supervised release terms (e.g., stacking terms consecutively). Even if not correctable in a revocation proceeding, such issues can affect which terms remain active and the aggregate statutory cap on imprisonment upon revocation. Expect closer attention on remand—and in future cases—to identifying the precise term being revoked, any prior revocation time that counts toward the cap, and whether multiple dockets are properly implicated.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Supervised release: A period of court supervision following imprisonment. Violating conditions can lead to revocation and an additional prison term, limited by statute based on the class of the original felony (for a Class A felony, up to 5 years under § 3583(e)(3)).
Revocation sentencing vs. “plenary” (original) sentencing: At revocation, the court punishes the breach of trust reflected by violating supervised release conditions. The Sentencing Guidelines for revocation (Chapter 7) are advisory “policy statements,” not binding, but courts must consider them.
Advisory policy statement range: For Ramos’s admitted Grade C violations, the policy statement range was 8–14 months. A court may vary up or down, but significant variances require more robust explanations.
Procedural reasonableness: Concerns the process the court used in sentencing—e.g., calculating the correct range, considering the relevant factors, resolving disputes, and explaining the chosen sentence. An inadequate explanation or reliance on unproven facts without findings can render a sentence procedurally unreasonable.
Reliance on uncharged or dismissed conduct: A court can consider such conduct if supported by reliable evidence and if the court makes appropriate factual findings (usually by a preponderance of the evidence). If the conduct is disputed, the court should resolve the dispute on the record.
Summary order, citable but non-precedential: Under FRAP 32.1 and Second Circuit Local Rule 32.1.1, parties may cite summary orders issued after January 1, 2007, but they do not have precedential effect. They can still be persuasive.
Multiple supervised release terms must run concurrently: As held in Sash, separate supervised release terms imposed at the same time on different counts run concurrently, not consecutively. Errors in concurrency may affect which terms remain active years later.
No collateral attack in revocation: As in Warren, a defendant cannot use a revocation proceeding to challenge the legality of the original sentence or conviction.

Conclusion

United States v. Ramos reiterates a straightforward but essential proposition in revocation sentencing: when imposing a major upward variance, district courts must provide a specific, reviewable explanation and resolve factual disputes that bear on the sentence, rather than relying on conjecture or unproven allegations. The Second Circuit applied settled law—Smith, Aldeen, and Cassesse—to conclude that a bare assertion about public safety, coupled with unaddressed factual disputes regarding alleged narcotics-related violence, cannot sustain a fivefold increase over the advisory range. The court therefore vacated and remanded for the district court to clarify its reasoning and make findings as necessary.

While non-precedential, the order is a cautionary note to sentencing courts: the greater the variance from the advisory revocation range, the greater the duty to explain and to ground the sentence in factual findings that survive appellate scrutiny. The panel also highlighted, without deciding, unresolved issues about the concurrency of supervised release terms and the calculation of the statutory maximum in light of prior revocation imprisonment, which may shape the contours of resentencing on remand. The key takeaway is process: transparent reasoning and factfinding remain the backbone of lawful sentencing—even, and especially, when the court departs significantly from the advisory range.