Reaffirming the Discretionary Nature of §5K1.1 and the High Bar for Withdrawing Guilty Pleas After a Proper Rule 11 Colloquy

Introduction

In United States v. Latrel Jackson (No. 24-12863), the Eleventh Circuit (per curiam) affirmed the district court’s denial of a defendant’s motion to withdraw a guilty plea entered a week before trial. Jackson, who had pleaded guilty to interstate murder-for-hire and conspiracy to commit the same, argued that he misunderstood his plea agreement because he believed he would receive a sentencing reduction for substantially assisting the government under U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1.

The case centers on a familiar but often litigated fault line in federal criminal practice: when a defendant’s subjective expectations—especially regarding sentencing benefits for cooperation—can justify withdrawal of a guilty plea after a full Rule 11 colloquy in which the court explains the plea’s consequences. The Eleventh Circuit concludes that they generally cannot, particularly where the plea agreement explicitly reserves the government’s discretion on substantial-assistance motions and the district court confirms the defendant’s understanding under oath.

Although designated “Not for Publication” and decided on the non-argument calendar, the opinion reinforces core principles of plea law in the Eleventh Circuit, including the Buckles factors for plea withdrawal, the binding force of a thorough Rule 11 colloquy, and the government’s sole discretion to determine whether a defendant’s cooperation warrants a §5K1.1 motion.

Summary of the Opinion

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the denial of Jackson’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Applying the four-factor test from United States v. Buckles, the court held:

Jackson had close assistance of counsel (a point he conceded).
His plea was knowing and voluntary. The plea agreement clearly reserved to the government the discretion whether to move for a §5K1.1 reduction; the district court emphasized this during the plea colloquy; and Jackson swore he understood.
Judicial resources would not be conserved by allowing withdrawal, as the government had already prepared a complex, multi-state witness presentation for a lengthy trial.
The government would be prejudiced by withdrawal because locating and preparing reluctant witnesses again would be difficult and unpredictable, especially given the passage of time and memory concerns.

The court rejected Jackson’s arguments that he misunderstood the substantial-assistance provisions due to counsel’s explanations or his dyslexia. The district court’s direct, verbal explanation during the Rule 11 colloquy—and Jackson’s sworn confirmation that he understood—foreclosed those claims. Finding no abuse of discretion, the court affirmed.

Detailed Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Role

United States v. Medlock, 12 F.3d 185, 187 (11th Cir. 1994): Establishes that there is no absolute right to withdraw a guilty plea. This baseline principle frames the analysis; defendants must carry the burden of showing a “fair and just reason” under Rule 11(d)(2)(B).
Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(d)(2)(B): The governing standard for presentence plea withdrawal. The Rule requires a “fair and just reason,” which the Eleventh Circuit evaluates using Buckles factors and the totality of circumstances, with considerable weight given to the Rule 11 colloquy.
United States v. Buckles, 843 F.2d 469, 471–74 (11th Cir. 1988): Supplies the four-factor framework: (1) close assistance of counsel; (2) whether the plea was knowing and voluntary; (3) conservation of judicial resources; and (4) prejudice to the government. The court applied each factor here and found they collectively supported denial.
United States v. Brehm, 442 F.3d 1291, 1298 (11th Cir. 2006): Clarifies that denial of a plea-withdrawal motion is reviewed for abuse of discretion and that a thorough Rule 11 colloquy strongly supports denial. The opinion leans on Brehm’s deference to the district court when a full colloquy has been conducted.
United States v. Rodriguez, 751 F.3d 1244, 1253–54 (11th Cir. 2014): Describes what makes a plea “knowing and voluntary”—understanding the charges, consequences, and absence of coercion. Jackson’s colloquy met these criteria.
United States v. Gonzalez-Mercado, 808 F.2d 796, 800 n.8, 801 (11th Cir. 1987): Reinforces two important points: (a) a defendant’s sworn statements at the plea hearing are presumed true; and (b) if the first two Buckles factors are not satisfied, the court need not deeply analyze the remaining factors. The court nevertheless addressed all factors and found they weighed against withdrawal.
United States v. Varr, 740 F.2d 339, 345–46 (5th Cir. 1984) (quoted in Buckles): Establishes deference to the district court’s assessment of the effect of withdrawal on judicial resources. The Eleventh Circuit relied on this deference when crediting the district court’s view that trial preparation would have to be re-done at significant cost.

Legal Reasoning and Application

The pivotal second Buckles factor: The plea was knowing and voluntary

The heart of the opinion is the Rule 11 colloquy. The district court:

Confirmed Jackson could read, write, understand English, and was “clearheaded.”
Verified he had read and understood every page of the plea agreement.
Explained the advisory nature of the Sentencing Guidelines and that counsel’s predictions were non-binding “guesses.”
Explicitly reviewed the substantial-assistance provision, emphasizing that the government “reserved its discretion” whether to move for a reduction under §5K1.1.

Jackson affirmed, under oath, that he understood each of these points. That sworn acknowledgement is presumed true and is difficult to overcome after the fact. The panel concluded the record “entirely” contradicted Jackson’s post-plea assertion that he believed cooperation would guarantee a §5K1.1 motion. The plea agreement made clear the government would only “consider” whether cooperation qualified as substantial assistance, the decision “rested” with the government, and Jackson agreed not to challenge that determination. The court’s independent, verbal explanation eliminated any ambiguity or reliance on counsel’s colloquial phrasing.

Addressing claims of misunderstanding, dyslexia, and counsel’s advice

Jackson argued two specific reasons for withdrawal: (1) his attorney improperly explained §5K1.1; and (2) dyslexia impaired his understanding of the written plea. The court rejected both.

Counsel’s advice: Even assuming defense counsel’s explanation was imperfect, the district court’s direct statements during the Rule 11 colloquy—and Jackson’s sworn affirmations—cured any misunderstanding. Rule 11 exists to ensure the plea is informed notwithstanding earlier misimpressions.
Dyslexia: The judge did not rely solely on the written agreement. The court verbally explained the key terms, including the government’s discretion on §5K1.1. Jackson swore he understood. That sworn understanding controls.

This reasoning reflects a consistent Eleventh Circuit approach: where the court carefully explains the plea’s terms and the defendant unequivocally affirms comprehension, later claims of confusion will rarely prevail absent extraordinary proof.

Judicial resources and prejudice to the government (factors three and four)

Even though the first two factors sufficed to affirm, the panel expressly considered the remaining factors and found they too favored denial:

Judicial resources: The government had already engaged more than forty witnesses across five states, preparing for a two-to-three-week trial. Allowing withdrawal would force the government and the court to “restart” a complex undertaking. The district court’s assessment of such burdens receives substantial deference.
Prejudice: Time had passed, witnesses were reluctant and fearful, and memory degradation was a real concern. Reassembling and reassuring lay witnesses would entail “considerable and unpredictable” effort, prejudicing the government’s trial posture.

These practical realities, particularly in serious multi-witness cases nearing trial, weigh heavily against undoing a duly accepted guilty plea.

What the Decision Does Not Do

It does not create a new rule; it applies established Eleventh Circuit principles. The opinion is “Not for Publication,” indicating it is not intended as binding precedent, though it reflects settled circuit doctrine.
It does not adjudicate a challenge to a government refusal to file a §5K1.1 motion (e.g., allegations of unconstitutional motive or bad faith). Rather, the defendant sought to withdraw his plea, not to compel a motion or claim breach, and the court addressed only the withdrawal standard.
It does not diminish the government’s discretion under §5K1.1, which remains the linchpin of cooperation-based reductions.

Complex Concepts Simplified

“Fair and just reason” (Rule 11(d)(2)(B)): A defendant can withdraw a plea before sentencing only if he demonstrates a compelling reason under the totality of circumstances. The Eleventh Circuit weighs four factors (Buckles), with particular emphasis on whether the plea was knowing and voluntary.
Knowing and voluntary plea: The defendant must understand the charges, potential penalties, and consequences of pleading guilty, and the plea must be free of coercion. A thorough Rule 11 colloquy safeguards and documents this understanding.
Substantial assistance (U.S.S.G. §5K1.1): A sentencing reduction for aiding the government typically requires a government motion affirming the assistance was “substantial.” Plea agreements often state the government will “consider” filing such a motion but reserve sole discretion to do so. Without the government’s motion, courts generally cannot grant a §5K1.1 reduction.
Advisory Guidelines: Federal Sentencing Guidelines are not mandatory. Judges must consider them alongside statutory factors (18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)), but the court can vary upward or downward from the advisory range.
Abuse of discretion (standard of review): The appellate court gives deference to the district court’s decision and will overturn it only if it was unreasonable or based on a misapplication of the law or clearly erroneous facts. A robust Rule 11 colloquy typically insulates the decision from reversal.
Government discretion on §5K1.1: The government alone decides whether to move for a substantial-assistance reduction. A defendant’s cooperation does not guarantee a motion; the government evaluates the usefulness, credibility, and impact of the assistance.

Potential Impact and Practice Pointers

The decision underscores settled but critical lessons for all actors in federal criminal cases:

For defendants

Do not assume cooperation guarantees a §5K1.1 motion. Unless the agreement says otherwise, the government retains full discretion. “Consideration” is not a promise to file.
Pay close attention to the court’s Rule 11 questions. Your sworn answers are presumed true and will be difficult to overcome later.
If you have reading or comprehension issues (e.g., dyslexia), raise them at the plea hearing so the court can take extra steps to ensure understanding on the record.
Understand that counsel’s sentencing predictions are non-binding estimates. The judge’s advisory-guidelines warning is central: you cannot withdraw your plea just because the outcome differs from expectations.

For defense counsel

Carefully delineate to clients the difference between “cooperation” and “substantial assistance.” Emphasize that §5K1.1 requires a government motion and that the government’s discretion is typically unreviewable absent extraordinary circumstances.
When clients have literacy or processing challenges, ensure the court is aware and request that the essential terms be explained orally and in plain language during the colloquy.
Preserve issues properly. If a dispute later arises over the government’s refusal to file a motion, the appropriate analysis often involves whether there is an unconstitutional motive or breach of the agreement, not withdrawal of the plea.

For prosecutors

Continue to use clear, unambiguous plea language reserving discretion on §5K1.1 and disclaiming any promise of a sentencing outcome. This opinion shows those clauses carry significant weight on appeal.
Where witnesses are reluctant, document those concerns early. They can support prejudice arguments if the defendant later seeks to withdraw the plea.

For judges

A thorough, tailored Rule 11 colloquy remains the best safeguard against later withdrawal attempts. Explicitly address key cooperation provisions and advisory-guideline concepts.
Invite defendants to disclose literacy or comprehension challenges. A clear, verbal explanation on the record will blunt later claims of misunderstanding.
When ruling on withdrawal motions, make findings on judicial resources and prejudice; those findings draw substantial deference on appeal, as the Eleventh Circuit emphasized here.

Conclusion

United States v. Jackson reinforces that a defendant’s post hoc disappointment about the absence of a §5K1.1 motion—without more—does not constitute a “fair and just reason” to withdraw a guilty plea, especially when the plea agreement and the court’s Rule 11 colloquy clearly conveyed that the government alone decides whether to file such a motion. The Eleventh Circuit’s application of Buckles, its reliance on the presumption of truthfulness of sworn plea statements, and its deference to the district court’s assessment of resource burdens and prejudice together uphold the finality of pleas entered knowingly and voluntarily.

Although unpublished, the opinion is a straightforward reaffirmation of well-settled principles: government discretion under §5K1.1, the binding weight of a proper Rule 11 colloquy, and the stringent standard for withdrawing a guilty plea after acceptance. Defendants and practitioners alike should treat this decision as a clear reminder that cooperation is not currency without the government’s motion, and that what is said—and acknowledged—under oath at the plea hearing will control the later course of the case.