Reaffirming the Clear and Convincing Evidence Standard in Termination of Parental Rights

1. Introduction

In In the Interest of A.B.A., a Minor; Appeal of T.W.A. et al. (Nos. 15–24 MAP 2024), the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania dismissed as improvidently granted a coordinated set of ten appeals from York County Orphans’ Court decrees terminating the parental rights of E.D.A., Jr., and T.M.A. to their five minor children. By doing so, the Majority left intact the trial and appellate courts’ rulings, while declining to issue a published opinion addressing the parents’ contentions. Justice Donohue, in a detailed dissent, criticized that outcome and argued that the trial court’s termination orders rested on nothing more than the uncorroborated perceptions of a single CYF caseworker, in conflict with competent and convincing testimony from multiple other professionals. At stake was the permanent destruction of the fundamental right to parent—a right that, under both federal and state law, can be severed only upon proof by “clear and convincing evidence.”

2. Summary of the Judgment

The Supreme Court granted allowance of appeal to address whether the record contained clear and convincing evidence supporting the termination decrees when the trial court credited the testimony of a lone witness over that of multiple contradictory witnesses. Two days after oral argument, however, the Court dismissed the appeals as improvidently granted, thereby leaving undisturbed the Superior Court’s affirmance of the York County Orphans’ Court. No majority opinion was issued. Justice Donohue alone filed a lengthy dissent, urging a substantive ruling on the merits, a reversal of the trial court’s orders, or at minimum a remand for the trial court to conduct a proper evidentiary analysis under Section 2511 of the Adoption Act.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited

Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982) – Establishes that a state must employ at least the “clear and convincing” standard before terminating parental rights.
Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979) – Explains the function of varying civil standards of proof in instructing fact-finders on confidence in factual conclusions.
In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) – Underlies the high threshold for proving facts in cases that deprive individuals of liberty or fundamental interests.
Hiller v. Fausey, 904 A.2d 875 (Pa. 2006) – Recognizes parental rights as fundamental and subject to strict due-process protections.
In re Adoption of C.M., 255 A.3d 343 (Pa. 2021) – Emphasizes that “specificity and corroboration are crucial to the foundation of competent evidence” in termination hearings.
In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d 817 (Pa. 2012) – Holds that appellate review must ensure factual findings rest on record evidence and legal conclusions are free from error.
Interest of S.K.L.R., 256 A.3d 1108 (Pa. 2021) – Mandates that a trial court “carefully consider and weigh all of the evidence” at a termination hearing.
Interest of K.T., 296 A.3d 1085 (Pa. 2023) – Clarifies the two-part Section 2511 analysis and the requirement that a bond with a parent only be severed if it is “not necessary and beneficial” to the child.
Matter of Adoption of Charles E.D.M., II, 708 A.2d 88 (Pa. 1998) – Reiterates appellate courts’ duty to confirm competent evidence underlies any decree terminating parental rights.

3.2. Legal Reasoning in the Dissent

Due process and burden of proof: Justice Donohue reiterated that the permanent removal of parental rights—“the civil equivalent to the death penalty”—requires proof by at least clear and convincing evidence, as mandated by Santosky and adopted in Pennsylvania’s Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511.

Competent, corroborated evidence: The dissent emphasized that testimony deemed credible must rest on record facts. The trial court here relied almost exclusively on the CYF caseworker’s anecdotal impressions—two supervised‐visit observations, a handful of house‐condition complaints, and hearsay statements—while discounting detailed, consistent reports from Pressley Ridge family advocates, therapists, and drug‐treatment specialists, all of whom recommended service closure and testified to adequate housing, stable income, mental‐health progress, and healthy parent–child bonds.

Section 2511(a) analysis: Under subsections (a)(5) and (a)(8), CYF must show the conditions that led to placement persist and are unlikely to be remedied despite “services or assistance reasonably available.” The dissent found that multiple professionals testified Parents had remedied those conditions within a reasonable time—testimony the trial court did not meaningfully address.

Section 2511(b) analysis: Even if grounds exist under (a), CYF must prove that termination serves each child’s “developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare.” Per Interest of K.T., the court must assess each child’s particular needs, the necessity and benefit of any parental bond, and the child’s need for permanency. The dissent faulted the trial court for offering only cursory, generalized findings—focusing on foster placement stability and therapy—without a child-by-child, factor-by-factor inquiry.

3.3. Impact

Although the Supreme Court majority did not issue a published opinion, the dissent serves as a clarion call for future dependency and termination proceedings in Pennsylvania:

Trial courts must rigorously apply the clear and convincing standard and document specific, corroborated evidence for each statutory element in Section 2511(a) and (b).
Credibility findings alone cannot substitute for a factual predicate supported by record testimony, documents, or demonstrable progress.
Appellate courts have both the authority and the duty to scrutinize the record for competent evidence—even in “close calls”—and to remand if the trial court fails to meet the statutory burden.
Parties should be mindful of Pa.R.A.P. 1926(b)(1), which empowers appellate courts to order supplementation of an incomplete record.

The dissent thus lays groundwork for more exacting judicial review of termination decisions—and for ensuring that fundamental parental rights are not extinguished on the basis of unsubstantiated impressions.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Clear and convincing evidence: A civil standard of proof higher than “preponderance” but lower than “beyond a reasonable doubt,” requiring evidence that is “so clear, direct, weighty and convincing” that the fact‐finder has no hesitation about its truth.
“Indicated” finding: A determination by a child‐welfare agency, after investigation, that abuse or neglect likely occurred but without a formal judicial adjudication.
Permanency review hearing: A court proceeding held at statutorily prescribed intervals to assess whether services, placement, or case goals—such as family reunification—have been achieved or should be modified.
23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(5) vs. (a)(8): (a)(5) – Six months of removal; continuing conditions; lack of remedy despite services; best interests warrant termination.
(a)(8) – Twelve months of removal; unchanged conditions; termination serves best interests.
Two-part termination test: First, the court must find statutory grounds under § 2511(a) by clear and convincing evidence. Second, it must confirm under § 2511(b) that severing parental rights serves the child’s physical, emotional, and developmental welfare.

5. Conclusion

The unaccompanied dismissal of these appeals leaves in place a set of termination decrees that, as Justice Donohue persuasively argued, were built on insufficient grounds and flawed reasoning. By underscoring the necessity of clear and convincing evidence—supported by specific, corroborated facts—and a full, child-focused analysis under both subsections of 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511, the dissent offers a blueprint for future trial and appellate tribunals. Its reminders about due process, record completeness, and the discrete roles of credibility and competency are likely to resonate in subsequent dependency and termination litigation across Pennsylvania.