Reaffirming the Bail Reform Act’s Detention Presumption for Child Exploitation Offenses: United States v. Preston Creed-Boehm

Introduction

United States v. Preston Creed-Boehm (6th Cir. 2025) addressed a critical question under the Bail Reform Act of 1984: when a defendant is charged with a qualifying sex offense involving minors, and a rebuttable presumption of detention arises, what showing must the defendant make to secure pretrial release? Plaintiff‐Appellee United States of America sought to detain Creed-Boehm, who faced charges of sexual exploitation and distribution of child pornography, on the ground that no combination of conditions could reasonably assure community safety. The district court denied bond, and Creed-Boehm appealed. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, clarifying (1) the operation of the statutory detention presumption, (2) the respective burdens of production and persuasion, and (3) the proper weighing of the four § 3142(g) factors.

Summary of the Judgment

On appeal from the Eastern District of Michigan, the Sixth Circuit reviewed de novo the question whether pretrial detention was warranted under 18 U.S.C. § 3142. Creed-Boehm had been indicted for sexual exploitation of minors (18 U.S.C. § 2251(a)) and distribution/possession of child pornography (18 U.S.C. §§ 2252A(a)(2), (a)(5)(B)). The district court found probable cause, triggering a rebuttable presumption of detention under § 3142(e)(3). Although Creed-Boehm proposed supervised release at a specialized traumatic-brain-injury treatment facility and submitted expert declarations, the court concluded by clear and convincing evidence that no conditions would reasonably assure the safety of the community. Three of the four § 3142(g) factors (nature of the offense, weight of the evidence, and community danger) weighed in favor of detention; the fourth (defendant’s characteristics) was neutral. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of bond.

Analysis

1. Precedents Cited

United States v. Stone (6th Cir. 2010): Establishes that the default position of release under the Bail Reform Act can be overcome for “particularly dangerous defendants” and that the court considers the four § 3142(g) factors.
United States v. Mercedes (2d Cir. 2001): Explains that even after a defendant meets the burden of production, the presumption remains a factor in the court’s ultimate detention decision.
United States v. Motamedi (9th Cir. 1985): Illustrates a different circuit’s approach to the “weight of the evidence” factor—focused on guilt rather than dangerousness—but is distinguished by the Sixth Circuit.
The court also relied on the statutory text of 18 U.S.C. §§ 3142(e), (f), and (g) to articulate the presumption, burdens, and factors governing detention.

2. Legal Reasoning

The court’s reasoning unfolded in three steps:

Presumption and Burdens: Under § 3142(e)(3), probable cause to believe that the defendant committed a listed offense involving a minor triggers a rebuttable presumption that “no condition or combination of conditions will reasonably assure the safety of the community.” The defendant must produce “some evidence” to rebut, but the government retains the ultimate burden to prove by clear and convincing evidence that detention is necessary.
Application of the § 3142(g) Factors:
- Nature and Circumstances of the Offense: Hands-on molestation of three minors and substantial child pornography weighed heavily for detention.
- Weight of the Evidence: Although not dispositive, the evidence of predatory conduct supported a finding of dangerousness.
- History and Characteristics: Creed-Boehm’s traumatic brain injury and difficulties with social cues were offset by his education and technological competence—resulting in a neutral evaluation.
- Nature and Seriousness of the Danger: The risk to children in the community was deemed substantial and unmitigable by the proposed release plan.
Rejection of a “Guarantee” Standard: The defendant argued that the court imposed an unlawful requirement of “guaranteed” safety. The Sixth Circuit clarified that the Act demands only that conditions “reasonably assure” community safety, not guarantee it; detention is proper where even a well-structured facility cannot match the security of a detention center.

3. Impact on Future Cases

This decision reinforces the Sixth Circuit’s strict application of the Bail Reform Act in sex-offense cases involving minors. Key takeaways for lower courts:

When probable cause exists for a § 3142(e)(3) offense, the rebuttable presumption of detention is potent and remains a factor even after a defendant proffers evidence.
Defendants cannot rely solely on specialized residential or treatment facilities to discharge the government’s burden of proving no conditions can “reasonably assure” safety.
Courts must carefully balance all four § 3142(g) factors; serious allegations of predatory conduct may outweigh any rehabilitation plan.
The opinion clarifies that the statutory standard does not require a perfect guarantee of safety—only a reasonable assurance.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Rebuttable Presumption: An assumption in favor of detention that the defendant must counter by producing some evidence to the contrary.
Burdens of Production vs. Persuasion: “Production” means offering enough evidence to raise a question; “persuasion” means convincing the court by clear and convincing evidence that detention is necessary.
“Clear and Convincing” Standard: A burdensome intermediate proof standard—more than “preponderance of the evidence” but less than “beyond a reasonable doubt.”
§ 3142(g) Factors: The statutory checklist courts use to weigh whether pretrial release can safely occur.

Conclusion

United States v. Preston Creed-Boehm reaffirms the Bail Reform Act’s strong presumption in favor of detention for defendants charged with child sexual exploitation. By articulating the interplay between burdens of production and persuasion, and by affirming that “reasonable assurance” does not equate to an impossible guarantee, the Sixth Circuit has provided clear guidance to district courts weighing specialized release plans against the need to protect vulnerable members of the community. This decision will shape pretrial detention practice in cases involving serious allegations of harm to minors.