Reaffirming that Accomplice Testimony and Circumstantial Evidence Can Sustain Straw-Purchase Convictions: United States v. Shepherd (6th Cir. 2024)

Introduction

In United States v. Shepherd, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the convictions of Cameron Shepherd for conspiracy to make false statements during the purchase of firearms and for aiding and abetting the making of such false statements, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 371, 922(a)(6), and 2. The case grew out of an ATF investigation into multiple handgun purchases by a single buyer—Miasia McElroy—from a licensed dealer in Ohio, with several of the firearms later recovered in southern California.

The appeal raised a single issue: whether the evidence at trial was sufficient to sustain the jury’s verdict. Shepherd argued that the government’s case hinged entirely on the uncorroborated testimony of McElroy, who had pleaded guilty and cooperated. The panel rejected that challenge, emphasizing long-standing principles that:

Appellate courts review sufficiency claims in the light most favorable to the prosecution and will not reweigh credibility; and
The uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice can support a federal conviction—even though, in this case, the testimony was corroborated by circumstantial evidence and recorded admissions.

Although marked “Not Recommended for Publication,” the opinion offers a compact and potent reaffirmation of familiar doctrines in the context of “straw purchases” of firearms: what the government must prove, how a jury may infer agreement and intent, and why accomplice testimony—bolstered by circumstantial indicia—can be legally sufficient.

Summary of the Opinion

The court, per Judge McKeague, held that a rational juror could find the essential elements of both conspiracy under § 371 and aiding-and-abetting liability for false statements in firearm purchases under § 922(a)(6) and § 2. The panel recited the deferential sufficiency standard (JACKSON v. VIRGINIA) and reiterated that:

Uncorroborated accomplice testimony may support a conviction in federal court; and
Circumstantial evidence alone can sustain a conviction.

The government’s case featured McElroy’s detailed account of a straw-purchase arrangement: Shepherd selected specific firearms, coached her on how to deal with the dealer, supplied the cash (and paid her a small fee), waited outside the store, and took possession of the guns after each sale. He was unable to purchase firearms himself due to his criminal history. On ATF Form 4473, McElroy falsely certified six times that she was the “actual buyer.” The government corroborated her account with:

Six completed Form 4473s;
Dealer testimony describing suspicious purchasing behavior;
ATF trace reports showing eight of the guns later recovered in California, including one recovered 25 days after purchase;
A recorded call in which Shepherd acknowledged that the guns were purchased with “straight cash,” were “not around here no more,” admitted he sold them, and discussed what “story” McElroy should tell investigators.

Relying on precedents including Abramski v. United States, the court reaffirmed that falsely claiming to be the actual buyer on Form 4473 is a material falsehood under § 922(a)(6). It then held that the jury could reasonably find both an agreement and overt acts for conspiracy, and acts plus intent for aiding and abetting. The convictions were affirmed.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Role

JACKSON v. VIRGINIA, 443 U.S. 307 (1979)

Jackson supplies the federal sufficiency standard: whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could find each element beyond a reasonable doubt. The Shepherd panel anchors its review in Jackson and refuses to second-guess the jury’s credibility determinations or reweigh evidence—a throughline that defeats Shepherd’s “it’s just her word” argument.

United States v. Bauer, 82 F.4th 522 (6th Cir. 2023)

Bauer confirms that sufficiency claims are reviewed de novo, but under the Jackson lens. The Sixth Circuit thus evaluates the record anew, yet constrained to inferences favorable to the verdict and to the jury’s role in judging credibility.

United States v. Charles, 138 F.3d 257 (6th Cir. 1998)

Charles states there is a “strong presumption in favor of sustaining a jury conviction.” The court uses this to underline the defendant’s “heavy burden” on appeal—a key framing that discourages sufficiency challenges predicated on credibility attacks alone.

United States v. Martinez, 430 F.3d 317 (6th Cir. 2005)

Martinez reiterates that appellate courts do not reweigh evidence or re-evaluate witness credibility. Applied here, McElroy’s cooperation agreement and motives were for the jury to weigh; the appellate court will not substitute its judgment for the jurors’.

United States v. Davis, 306 F.3d 398 (6th Cir. 2002)

Two aspects of Davis matter. First, circumstantial evidence alone can sustain a conviction. Second, Davis provides the aiding-and-abetting formulation: an act by the defendant contributing to the offense, coupled with intent to aid its commission. The Shepherd opinion applies both: it tallies acts (selection of firearms, cash, logistics, coaching) and infers intent from the coordinated scheme and Shepherd’s admissions.

United States v. Spearman, 186 F.3d 743 (6th Cir. 1999)

Spearman supplies the proposition most fatal to Shepherd’s core appellate claim: uncorroborated accomplice testimony may support a federal conviction. While the government here offered additional corroboration, Spearman ensures that, even had corroboration been thinner, McElroy’s testimony could be enough.

United States v. Mathis, 738 F.3d 719 (6th Cir. 2013)

Mathis provides both the Jackson standard and the conspiracy elements: agreement and an overt act in furtherance. The Shepherd panel uses Mathis to structure its analysis of the straw-purchase agreement and the numerous overt acts (e.g., trips to the dealer, cash transfers, texted instructions, post-purchase possession).

United States v. Deitz, 577 F.3d 672 (6th Cir. 2009), and United States v. Salgado, 250 F.3d 438 (6th Cir. 2001)

These cases allow juries to infer a “common plan” from concerted action. The opinion cites them to underscore that Shepherd’s and McElroy’s coordinated conduct—travel, selection, payment, possession—reasonably evidences a conspiratorial agreement to misrepresent the actual buyer.

United States v. Harvey, 653 F.3d 388 (6th Cir. 2011)

Harvey provides the elements of 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(6): a knowing false statement that is material to the lawfulness of the sale and intended or likely to deceive the dealer. The court uses Harvey to frame why the “actual buyer” certification on Form 4473 is a material statement and why the false certification satisfied § 922(a)(6).

Abramski v. United States, 573 U.S. 169 (2014)

Abramski is the Supreme Court’s definitive articulation that misrepresenting the “actual buyer” on Form 4473 is quintessentially material—“We can hardly think of a misrepresentation any more material to a sale’s legality.” The opinion invokes Abramski to remove any doubt that McElroy’s “actual buyer” answers were material false statements when purchasing on Shepherd’s behalf.

United States v. McKenzie, 33 F.4th 343 (6th Cir. 2022)

McKenzie reiterates in the Sixth Circuit that “straw purchasers” who falsely claim to be buying for themselves commit a § 922(a)(6) offense. The panel cites it as a straightforward application of Abramski at the circuit level.

Statutory and Regulatory Background on Trafficking Indicators

The opinion also references the federal reporting requirement for multiple handgun sales to the same purchaser within five days (18 U.S.C. § 923(g)(3)(A); 27 C.F.R. § 478.126a). That reporting flag triggered the ATF review here, which led to discovery of McElroy’s six Form 4473s and the downstream recovery of eight guns in California.

Legal Reasoning Applied

1) Conspiracy under 18 U.S.C. § 371

Elements: agreement and overt act. The court found both:

Agreement: McElroy testified Shepherd asked her to purchase firearms as a favor, selected models via text, explained how to approach the dealer, and had her accompany him on coordinated trips to Dave’s Pistols. The recorded call reflects joint awareness and shared objectives (e.g., “we legitly paid for” the guns with “straight cash,” discussing a “story” to tell law enforcement).
Overt acts: multiple trips to the dealer; cash handoffs of $1,000–$2,000 per trip; her completing six Form 4473s falsely identifying herself as the actual buyer; immediate transfer of possession to Shepherd; subsequent sale and movement of the guns (with some recovered in California).

Under Deitz and Salgado, coordinated conduct is sufficient to infer a common plan. The court concluded that this pattern, and the post-purchase concealment/“story” discussion, furnished ample evidence of a conspiratorial agreement to conceal the true transferee.

2) Aiding and Abetting under 18 U.S.C. § 2

Elements: act contributing to the offense and intent to aid. Applying Davis, the court identified the following:

Act: Shepherd originated and orchestrated purchases; chose models; provided funds; arranged and drove to the store; coached McElroy on interactions; waited during the transaction; took the guns immediately after purchase; and later sold them.
Intent: Inferences arise from the very structure of the scheme (she bought because he could not, due to his criminal record), his coaching, cash financing, and his recorded admissions. The intent to cause a false “actual buyer” representation can be inferred when a prohibited person uses a surrogate purchaser, then takes possession after the sale.

On this record, a rational juror could easily find both contribution and intent to facilitate the § 922(a)(6) offense.

3) The Substantive Offense under § 922(a)(6) and Materiality

Harvey sets the elements, and Abramski resolves materiality: lying about the “actual buyer” is paradigmatically material to lawfulness of the sale. The government had to prove that McElroy knowingly made the false statement to deceive or likely to deceive the dealer. Her six Form 4473 certifications that she was the actual buyer, combined with the surrounding circumstances (and Shepherd’s immediate acquisition of the firearms), fully satisfied the elements.

4) Why the “Uncorroborated Accomplice” Challenge Fails

Spearman forecloses any categorical requirement of accomplice corroboration in federal criminal cases. But the court also highlighted corroboration:

Dealer observations consistent with a third-party beneficiary waiting outside and atypical, pre-decided purchases (“eerie feeling,” no handling of guns, cheap handguns consistent with trafficking).
ATF trace reports showing recovery of eight guns in California, with one recovered only 25 days after purchase.
Shepherd’s recorded admissions: “we legitly paid for” the guns with “straight cash,” the guns were “not around here no more,” he had sold them, and he discussed the “best story” for McElroy to tell law enforcement.
Six Form 4473s documenting the repeated “actual buyer” misrepresentation.

Given the Jackson framework and the jury’s prerogative to credit McElroy’s testimony, the panel had no basis to overturn the verdict.

Impact and Practical Implications

Although designated “Not Recommended for Publication,” the decision’s reasoning is consistent with—and reinforces—settled federal law. Its practical impacts include:

Accomplice testimony remains powerful: Federal law imposes no corroboration requirement for accomplice testimony (Spearman). Defense strategies that hinge on the absence of corroboration face steep odds given Jackson’s deference to jury verdicts.
Circumstantial evidence carries the day: Dealer observations, sales paperwork, ATF trace data, and recorded calls together can present a compelling mosaic supporting conspiracy and aiding-and-abetting liability.
Abramski controls materiality: Any challenge to the materiality of the “actual buyer” question on Form 4473 is foreclosed; the misrepresentation directly affects the sale’s lawfulness.
Post-transaction conduct is probative: Admissions about selling the guns, their removal from the area, or crafting a “story” for law enforcement can evidence consciousness of guilt, intent, and the scope of the conspiracy.
Prosecutorial charging choices: Even after the creation of specific straw-purchasing and trafficking offenses in the Bipartisan Safer Communities Act (e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 932, § 933), § 922(a)(6) false-statement charges—paired with § 2 aiding and abetting and § 371 conspiracy—remain viable and well-supported paths, particularly for conduct predating those statutes.
Dealer red flags matter: The opinion implicitly validates the evidentiary weight of dealer testimony about suspicious purchasing patterns (e.g., rapid decisions, no handling of firearms, “companion” waiting outside), which prosecutors can use to corroborate straw-purchase theories.

Caveat: As a nonprecedential decision, this opinion does not bind future Sixth Circuit panels. Still, it is persuasive authority that distills established rules in a common prosecutorial setting.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Straw purchase: When someone buys a firearm from a licensed dealer while falsely claiming to be the “actual buyer,” but is really acquiring it for another person (often someone prohibited or seeking anonymity).
ATF Form 4473: The federal form every retail firearm purchaser must complete. Among other things, it asks whether the buyer is the “actual transferee/buyer,” and warns that purchasing on behalf of another person (with limited lawful exceptions) means the answer is “no.”
“Actual buyer” materiality: Per Abramski, misrepresenting who is the true buyer is highly material because the dealer’s obligations and the sale’s legality depend on the identity and eligibility of the transferee.
18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(6): Makes it a federal crime to knowingly make a false material statement intended or likely to deceive a firearms dealer during a purchase.
Aiding and abetting (18 U.S.C. § 2): You can be treated as a principal if you intentionally help commit a crime—by funding, planning, coaching, or otherwise facilitating it.
Conspiracy (18 U.S.C. § 371): An agreement to commit a federal offense plus any overt act in furtherance. The overt act need not itself be criminal.
“Sufficiency of the evidence” review: On appeal, courts ask whether any rational juror could convict, viewing the evidence in the government’s favor. Appellate courts do not reweigh evidence or second-guess credibility determinations.
Multiple handgun sales reporting: Dealers must notify ATF when a person buys multiple pistols or revolvers within five days, creating an investigative lead for possible trafficking.
“Time-to-crime”: The interval between retail sale and recovery by law enforcement. Very short times (e.g., 25 days) can indicate trafficking.
“Not Recommended for Publication”: In the Sixth Circuit, such opinions typically are nonprecedential, though they may be cited for persuasive value under applicable rules.

Conclusion

United States v. Shepherd reiterates—and concretely applies—bedrock principles governing sufficiency review and straw-purchase prosecutions. Framed by Jackson’s deference to jury verdicts, the Sixth Circuit underscores that accomplice testimony can sustain a conviction, and that circumstantial evidence—including dealer observations, trace data, and recorded admissions—can robustly corroborate an accomplice’s account. With Abramski fixing the materiality of “actual buyer” misrepresentations on Form 4473, the path to affirmance was clear.

For practitioners, the opinion illustrates how to assemble a compelling sufficiency record in straw-purchase cases and the challenges of overturning such verdicts on appeal when the jury has credited the government’s witness. While nonprecedential, Shepherd is persuasive in distilling settled rules: coordinated conduct evidences conspiracy, facilitative acts plus intent establish aiding-and-abetting liability, and misrepresentations about the true transferee lie at the heart of § 922(a)(6). The decision thus sits comfortably within—and reinforces—the modern federal enforcement architecture addressing straw purchasing and downstream trafficking.