Reaffirming Termination Standards and Mandating Explicit Sibling‑Visitation Rulings:
Commentary on In re K.H. and Q.H. (W. Va. Nov. 25, 2025)

I. Introduction

The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia’s memorandum decision in In re K.H. and Q.H., No. 24‑495 (Nov. 25, 2025), sits at the intersection of parental rights, child protection, procedural safeguards, and the growing recognition of sibling relationships in abuse and neglect law.

The case concerns L.H. (“petitioner mother”) and her two minor children, K.H. and Q.H. (the latter being autistic and prone to elopement). The Mason County circuit court terminated the mother’s parental rights, denied her post‑termination visitation, and oversaw the out‑of‑state residential placement of Q.H. The mother raised an array of substantive and procedural challenges on appeal, including alleged due process violations and failure to comply with various provisions of Chapter 49 of the West Virginia Code and the Rules of Procedure for Child Abuse and Neglect Proceedings.

The Supreme Court affirmed termination of parental rights and the denial of post‑termination visitation, but remanded with specific instructions for the circuit court to rule on an unresolved request for sibling visitation. The decision reinforces several core principles in West Virginia abuse and neglect jurisprudence:

Parental rights may be terminated where the parent fails to acknowledge and address the core problems leading to abuse or neglect.
Post‑termination visitation is exceptional, not routine, and must clearly serve the child’s best interests.
Procedural errors will justify reversal only when they substantially disregard or frustrate the statutory and rule‑based process.
Circuit courts have an affirmative duty to expressly address sibling visitation when termination occurs and sibling contact is requested.

While issued as a memorandum decision under Rule 21, In re K.H. and Q.H. provides important guidance on how trial courts must structure termination decisions, manage improvement periods, weigh procedural defects, and—most notably— handle sibling‑visitation issues on the record.

II. Factual and Procedural Background

A. Initiation of the Abuse and Neglect Case

In July 2023, the West Virginia Department of Human Services (DHS) filed an abuse and neglect petition against L.H. alleging that her alcohol abuse and mental health issues led to the abuse and neglect of her children, K.H. (then five) and Q.H. (then six and autistic).

The triggering incident was serious: the children were found alone about a quarter‑mile from home. K.H. told a nearby resident that their mother was “dead” at home. Law enforcement discovered the petitioner passed out in the residence; she admitted drinking Scotch and falling asleep. She was arrested and charged with child neglect. DHS also alleged a long history of Child Protective Services (CPS) involvement tied to the mother’s mental health, domestic altercations, and alcohol use.

Particularly concerning was Q.H.’s condition: he had a documented pattern of escaping the home, required constant supervision to prevent elopement, and communicated only at a very basic level. The risk posed by inadequate supervision was therefore acute.

B. Adjudication and Improvement Period

At the August 2023 adjudicatory hearing, L.H. admitted that her alcohol use impaired her ability to properly care for the children. The circuit court adjudicated her as an abusing parent and the children as abused and neglected.

The court granted a six‑month post‑adjudicatory improvement period and even allowed the children to be returned to her custody during that period. On the record, the judge specified terms, including:

Parenting and adult life skills classes;
Random drug and alcohol screening;
A parental fitness evaluation and adherence to its recommendations.

DHS filed a family case plan the same day, identifying the problem as a “drinking issue” and incorporating those conditions. The mother raised no objections, either to the terms as recited on the record or to the written case plan.

C. Parental Fitness Evaluation

In October 2023, L.H. completed the required parental fitness evaluation. Her disclosures to the evaluating psychologist were telling:

She had been involved in two prior CPS cases, including one where Q.H. left the home and required police assistance to locate.
She minimized the current incident as an “over‑reaction,” asserting it was merely an “accident.”
She denied having alcohol issues, claiming to have consumed only one beer eight hours before falling asleep.
She acknowledged a bipolar diagnosis and anxiety but rejected medication (“didn’t really believe in medication stuff for bipolar”) and disparaged therapy (“did not ‘believe in that crap’”).

The psychologist concluded her prognosis for adequate parenting was “highly guarded” because of:

Failure to fully accept responsibility for the incident;
Failure to recognize the seriousness of her mental health issues and history of CPS involvement;
Minimization of apparent alcohol problems.

The evaluation recommended outpatient substance abuse treatment, random drug screens, individual psychotherapy, and psychiatric consultation for medication management, among other services.

D. Deterioration of the Case and Expiration of the Improvement Period

In January 2024, L.H. was arrested for threatening statements directed at the father’s girlfriend. DHS then removed the children and placed them with their adult sibling, A.H. The guardian ad litem moved to revoke the improvement period. After L.H. was released, she began supervised visitation with the children.

In April 2024, at a review hearing, the guardian requested that Q.H. be placed in an acute care behavioral health program in South Carolina for diagnostic testing, due to the lack of an equivalent in‑state facility. The court approved the out‑of‑state placement as in his best interests and necessary for his well‑being. Subsequently, upon the therapist’s recommendation, the court approved a transition to a long‑term residential care program at the same facility. Meanwhile, K.H. was moved from A.H.’s home to non‑relative foster care because A.H. could not safely care for her.

At a July 2024 hearing (post‑expiration of the six‑month period in roughly March 2024), the court took evidence on the guardian’s motion to revoke. Multiple service providers testified:

Visitation supervisor – L.H. frequently ended visits early due to being overwhelmed by Q.H.’s behavior; she failed to supervise adequately, not pursuing him when he ran out of the visit room.
Drug screener – L.H. had seventeen “administrative positive” drug screens between January and May 2024 because she failed to appear.
Parenting provider – L.H. denied wrongdoing, often appeared irate, failed to implement parenting skills taught, and made threats against the guardian, the judge, a CPS worker, and a police officer.
Former CPS case manager – L.H. failed to address mental health needs, did not engage in therapy or medication management, and was verbally combative with CPS workers and providers.

L.H. admitted limited therapy attendance, claimed no mental health problems, stated she missed drug screens because of stress‑related physical symptoms, insisted staff should help chase Q.H. during visits, and acknowledged conflicts with multiple service providers and CPS staff. When asked directly about making threats, she invoked her Fifth Amendment privilege.

The guardian and DHS argued that:

The improvement period had already expired; and
Even considered as a whole, L.H. failed to complete it successfully or make meaningful progress.

The court agreed, specifically clarifying that it was not “terminating” the improvement period (which had expired by operation of time) but was finding that the mother had not successfully completed it. The court then set the case for disposition.

E. Disposition: Termination of Parental Rights

At the August 2024 dispositional hearing, the court took judicial notice of prior testimony and heard additional evidence, including from a CPS worker who recommended termination, emphasizing the mother’s unwillingness to comply with services or recognize the need for change.

L.H. testified that she:

Had complied with services;
Passed all drug screens;
Was regularly attending counseling and anger management;
Sought reunification, or alternatively, termination of only her custodial rights rather than full parental rights.

The circuit court found that:

There was no reasonable likelihood that the conditions of abuse and neglect could be substantially corrected in the near future.
L.H. failed to accept meaningful responsibility, comply with services, or cease threatening behavior.
Termination was necessary for the children’s welfare, particularly given their need for permanency and continuity of care.

The court terminated her parental rights. The father’s parental rights were also terminated. K.H.’s permanency plan is adoption in her current placement; Q.H.’s is adoption following completion of his residential program.

F. Post‑Termination Visitation and Sibling Visitation Issue

In September 2024, L.H. moved for:

Post‑termination visitation with K.H. and Q.H., and
An order requiring visitation between the children and their older siblings.

At the hearing, the court again took judicial notice of prior evidence. L.H. testified about her relationship with the children and the sibling bonds. DHS and the guardian opposed post‑termination visitation.

The circuit court denied post‑termination visitation with L.H., finding it would be detrimental to the children’s well‑being and contrary to their best interests. Crucially, however, the written order did not rule on the request for sibling visitation. That omission becomes the central basis for the Supreme Court’s limited remand.

G. Appeal and Issues Raised

On appeal, the mother raised multiple assignments of error, including:

The circuit court erred in terminating her parental rights (insufficient evidence of “no reasonable likelihood” of correction and of necessity for the children’s welfare).
The court erred in denying post‑termination visitation.
The court erred—or failed to act—regarding continued association between the children and their siblings.
Multiple alleged due process violations and failures to comply with abuse and neglect procedural rules and statutes (including improvement period terms, dispositional procedures, timing of orders, relative and sibling placement preferences, and out‑of‑state residential placement procedures).

III. Summary of the Supreme Court’s Decision

Applying the abuse and neglect standard of review set out in In re Cecil T., 228 W. Va. 89, 717 S.E.2d 873 (2011), the Supreme Court:

Affirmed termination of L.H.’s parental rights, holding that:
- DHS proved there was no reasonable likelihood that the abuse and neglect conditions could be substantially corrected in the near future under W. Va. Code § 49‑4‑604(d); and
- Termination was necessary for the children’s welfare under § 49‑4‑604(c)(6).
Affirmed the denial of post‑termination visitation with the mother, finding that continued contact would be detrimental and not in the children’s best interests under In re Daniel D. and In re Christina L.
Remanded for the limited purpose of requiring the circuit court to decide whether continued sibling visitation (both between K.H. and Q.H., and with their older siblings) is in the children’s best interests, and—if so—to formulate an appropriate visitation plan, relying on:
- James M. v. Maynard, 185 W. Va. 648, 408 S.E.2d 400 (1991) (Syl. Pt. 4), and
- In re H.M. and In re K.S. regarding the need for a concrete visitation plan when visitation is ordered.
Rejected the mother’s due process and procedural challenges, holding either that:
- The alleged errors were waived because they were not raised below (citing Appellate Rule 10(c)(7), Shaffer v. Acme Limestone, and Noble v. DMV), or
- The noncompliance was minor and did not “substantially disregard or frustrate” the process such that reversal was required (under In re Edward B. and In re G.G.).

Thus, the Supreme Court left intact the core dispositional outcomes (termination and no post‑termination visitation) but insisted on a complete appellate record via explicit sibling‑visitation findings.

IV. Analysis of the Decision

A. Standard of Review

The Court reiterated the familiar standard from Syllabus Point 1 of In re Cecil T.:

Findings of fact in abuse and neglect proceedings are reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard.
Conclusions of law are reviewed de novo.

This framing is important: most of the mother’s arguments challenged the circuit court’s factual determinations about her progress, credibility, and the children’s best interests. Those determinations receive substantial deference on appeal.

B. Termination of Parental Rights

1. The Statutory Framework

Two portions of W. Va. Code § 49‑4‑604 were central:

§ 49‑4‑604(d) – specifies when there is “no reasonable likelihood that the conditions of neglect or abuse can be substantially corrected.” The Court highlighted two subsections:
- § 49‑4‑604(d)(1): Applies where a parent is addicted to alcohol or drugs “to the extent that proper parenting skills have been seriously impaired” and has not responded to treatment.
- § 49‑4‑604(d)(3): Applies where a parent “has not responded to or followed through with a reasonable family case plan.”
§ 49‑4‑604(c)(6) – authorizes termination of parental rights when there is no reasonable likelihood of correction within the near future and termination is necessary for the child’s welfare.

2. Application to the Mother’s Conduct

The Supreme Court emphasized several factual themes to uphold the circuit court’s findings:

Failure to engage with substance abuse treatment – The record showed:
- Inconsistent participation in drug and alcohol screening, including seventeen administrative positives (no‑shows) in a five‑month span.
- No meaningful engagement with recommended outpatient substance abuse services.
Failure to address mental health issues – The mother:
- Admitted to bipolar disorder and anxiety;
- Expressly disavowed belief in medication and therapy during the parental fitness evaluation;
- Had only minimal contact with a therapist and quickly stopped, admitting she “got into it” with the therapist;
- Remained combative and hostile with CPS workers and service providers.
Inability or unwillingness to supervise a special‑needs child – The evidence that she would not pursue Q.H. when he ran from the visit room (despite his known elopement risk) was particularly weighty, given his autism and history of escaping the home.
Refusal to acknowledge problems – The Court relied heavily on the principle from In re Timber M. and In re Charity H.:
“In order to remedy the abuse and/or neglect problem, the problem must first be acknowledged. Failure to acknowledge the existence of the problem . . . results in making the problem untreatable.”
L.H. consistently denied that the children were abused or neglected, downplayed the seriousness of her alcohol and mental health issues, and treated the incident as an “over‑reaction.” This failure of insight was fatal to any meaningful rehabilitation.
Threatening, combative behavior – Threats to CPS staff, the guardian, a judge, and law enforcement personnel undercut the feasibility of safe case management and strongly suggested ongoing instability and poor impulse control.

Based on these findings, the Court held there was “ample evidence” that L.H. had not responded to treatment and had not followed through with the reasonable family case plan, justifying a finding of “no reasonable likelihood” of substantial correction in the near future under § 49‑4‑604(d)(1), (3).

3. Necessity of Termination for the Children’s Welfare

The Court then turned to whether termination was necessary for the children’s welfare. Emphasizing the children’s need for “continuity of care and caretakers” and timely permanency, the Supreme Court noted that the time required to safely reunify the children with the mother was not compatible with their best interests.

Citing In re Emily, 208 W. Va. 325, 540 S.E.2d 542 (2000), the Court again underscored that the paramount goal in abuse and neglect proceedings is to secure safe, stable, and permanent homes. It concluded that the circuit court’s decision to terminate parental rights under § 49‑4‑604(c)(6) was supported by the record.

C. Post‑Termination Visitation with the Parent

1. Governing Law

The Court applied the standards from:

In re Christina L., 194 W. Va. 446, 460 S.E.2d 692 (1995) (Syl. Pt. 5), and
In re Daniel D., 211 W. Va. 79, 562 S.E.2d 147 (2002) (Syl. Pt. 11 in part).

Together, those cases hold that a circuit court may grant post‑termination visitation or contact with an abusing parent if:

Visitation would not be detrimental to the child’s well‑being; and
Visitation would be in the child’s best interests.

The Supreme Court also noted that after the circuit court’s order in this case, it provisionally amended Rule 15 of the Rules of Procedure for Child Abuse and Neglect Proceedings and adopted explicit standards for post‑termination visitation (see In re Z.D.-1, 251 W. Va. 743, 916 S.E.2d 375 (2025), n.21). But because those changes post‑dated the order on review, the older Daniel D./Christina L. framework governed here.

2. Application

The mother argued that:

She had a close emotional bond with the children;
She had been their longtime primary caregiver; and
Visitation would not be detrimental to them.

However, the circuit court weighed those assertions against:

Her complete failure to acknowledge the abuse and neglect;
Her combative and threatening behavior;
Lack of meaningful progress in addressing substance abuse and mental health issues;
Evidence that interactions with her were destabilizing and unsafe.

On that record, the Supreme Court held that the circuit court reasonably concluded that continued contact with the mother would be detrimental and contrary to the children’s best interests. The denial of post‑termination visitation was therefore not error.

D. Sibling Visitation and the Limited Remand

1. The Omission

The most significant doctrinal piece of this decision concerns sibling visitation. The petitioner specifically asked the circuit court to order:

Continued association between K.H. and Q.H.; and
Contact between the children and their adult siblings.

The written order denying post‑termination visitation with the mother did not address sibling visitation at all. Because there was no ruling to review, the Supreme Court found itself unable to decide the issue on the existing record.

2. Legal Framework: James M. and Adequate Findings

Two authorities were critical:

James M. v. Maynard, 185 W. Va. 648, 408 S.E.2d 400 (1991), Syl. Pt. 4:
“In cases where there is a termination of parental rights, the circuit court should consider whether continued association with siblings in other placements is in the child's best interests, and . . . should enter an appropriate order to preserve the rights of siblings to continued contact.”
This syllabus point imposes an affirmative duty on trial courts to consider and rule on sibling contact at the time of termination.
In re Edward B., 210 W. Va. 621, 558 S.E.2d 620 (2001):
- Stressed that adequate findings are necessary “to protect the rights of litigants and to facilitate review.”
- In Syllabus Point 5, it held that substantial disregard or frustration of the process under the rules can require vacating the disposition and remand.

The Supreme Court also noted its recent practice of remanding when a circuit court fails to rule on a properly raised issue, e.g., in In re Z.D.-1 (remand required when court failed to include a ruling on a parent’s motion for a post‑adjudicatory improvement period in the dispositional order).

3. The Court’s Directive on Remand

Because the circuit court had not made any findings on sibling visitation, the Supreme Court:

Remanded with instructions to determine whether continued association:
- Between the siblings (K.H. and Q.H.); and
- Between them and their older siblings
is in the children’s best interests.
Required that, if visitation is granted, the circuit court must formulate a concrete visitation plan, consistent with:
- In re H.M., 251 W. Va. 333, 912 S.E.2d 885 (2025); and
- In re K.S., 246 W. Va. 517, 874 S.E.2d 319 (2022).

This portion of the decision effectively re‑affirms and operationalizes James M.: whenever parental rights are terminated and sibling contact is requested, trial courts must address sibling visitation expressly, on the record, and—if granted—through a detailed plan. Silence will trigger a remand.

E. Due Process and Procedural Issues

The mother asserted numerous procedural deficiencies by DHS and the circuit court. The Supreme Court’s treatment of these claims is an important reaffirmation of waiver doctrines and the “substantial disregard or frustration” standard for when procedural errors justify reversal.

1. Alleged Failure to Set Terms of the Improvement Period on the Record

L.H. argued that the circuit court violated W. Va. Code § 49‑4‑610(2) by failing to make findings on the record about the terms of her improvement period, supposedly causing “confusion” about expectations.

The Supreme Court flatly rejected this, calling the argument “disingenuous”:

The adjudicatory transcript showed the court explicitly set forth the terms on the record.
The written family case plan reflected those terms.
L.H. signed the case plan without objection and attended MDT meetings and review hearings, never claiming confusion.

Thus, there was no factual basis for the alleged due process violation.

2. Disposition and Timing of Termination

The mother contended that the court erred by “terminating her parental rights at the dispositional hearing” without first holding a separate dispositional hearing, citing Syl. Pt. 2 of In re Beth Ann B., 204 W. Va. 424, 513 S.E.2d 427 (1998).

The Supreme Court clarified that Beth Ann B. and Rule 35(b) do not require two separate events; they only require that when termination is sought and resisted, the court must:

Hold an evidentiary dispositional hearing; and
Make the statutory inquiries (e.g., no reasonable likelihood of correction, necessity for the child’s welfare) supported by evidence.

In K.H. and Q.H., the circuit court did precisely that. Therefore, terminating rights during the dispositional hearing was proper.

3. Timing and Content of the Dispositional Order (Rule 36)

The mother complained that:

The dispositional order was entered eleven days, rather than ten, after the conclusion of the dispositional hearing, violating Rule 36(a); and
The order did not list the date and time of the permanency hearing, as required by Rule 36(d).

The Supreme Court agreed that there was literal noncompliance, but held that these failures did not amount to a “substantial disregard or frustration” of the process under Syllabus Point 5 of In re Edward B. Accordingly, they did not warrant vacatur of the dispositional order.

4. Unpreserved Procedural Complaints (Waiver)

The mother also argued that:

DHS failed to comply with:
- Rule 28(c) (dispositional reports);
- Rule 35(b) (amendment/modification of case plans);
- W. Va. Code § 49‑4‑608(g), (h) (notice, reviews, and reports regarding residential placements);
- W. Va. Code § 49‑4‑601a (relative placement preferences and DHS’s duty to identify/notify relatives);
- W. Va. Code § 49‑4‑111(e) and § 49‑2‑126(a)(6) (sibling placement preferences and children’s rights to remain with siblings where possible).
The circuit court failed to ensure compliance with these statutes and preferences.

The Supreme Court declined to consider these issues because the petitioner failed to identify anywhere in the record where she raised them below. Citing:

Appellate Rule 10(c)(7) (requiring pinpoint citations showing how and when issues were raised);
Shaffer v. Acme Limestone Co., 206 W. Va. 333, 524 S.E.2d 688 (1999) (general rule against considering nonjurisdictional issues raised for the first time on appeal); and
Noble v. W. Va. Dep’t of Motor Vehicles, 223 W. Va. 818, 679 S.E.2d 650 (2009),

the Court concluded that such nonjurisdictional questions were waived.

This part of the decision is a strong reminder: counsel must preserve procedural objections in the circuit court to obtain appellate review.

5. Out‑of‑State Residential Placement for Q.H.

The mother asserted that Q.H.’s placement in an out‑of‑state residential facility violated:

W. Va. Code § 49‑4‑404 (MDT service plans and hearings when MDT members disagree);
§ 49‑4‑405 (MDT planning process, duties, and reporting); and
§ 49‑4‑608(e) (required findings following permanency hearings).

She argued the placement was neither the least restrictive setting nor in his best interests.

The Supreme Court rejected this argument, emphasizing:

The mother attended each hearing at which placement was discussed.
The court relied on the assessment and recommendations of Q.H.’s therapist.
The court expressly found that:
- Placement in the South Carolina facility was necessary for Q.H.’s well‑being and in his best interest; and
- No equivalent in‑state facility was available, satisfying § 49‑4‑404(b)’s requirement to state why in‑state placement was not chosen.
The Supreme Court does not re‑weigh evidence or make credibility determinations on appeal (In re D.S., 251 W. Va. 466, 914 S.E.2d 701 (2025)).

The Court also invoked a broader principle: the “polar star” in such decisions is always the child’s best interests (Michael K.T. v. Tina L.T., 182 W. Va. 399, 387 S.E.2d 866 (1989)). Citing In re Tyler D., 213 W. Va. 149, 578 S.E.2d 343 (2003), and In re Katie S., 198 W. Va. 79, 479 S.E.2d 589 (1996), the Court reiterated that mere procedural technicalities or bureaucratic errors cannot override a child’s safety and welfare.

In essence, even if there were minor procedural imperfections, they did not justify disturbing a placement that served Q.H.’s therapeutic needs and best interests.

F. “Substantial Disregard or Frustration” vs. Technical Error

The decision repeatedly distinguishes between:

Technical noncompliance with rules or statutes (e.g., entering an order one day late, omitting a permanency date); and
Substantial disregard or frustration of the process, which alone can warrant vacatur under Syllabus Point 5 of In re Edward B.

Using In re G.G., 249 W. Va. 496, 896 S.E.2d 662 (2023), the Court reiterated that only when the overall process has been materially undermined will a disposition be vacated for procedural failures. Here, the Court found that—even assuming some missteps by DHS or the court—there was no such substantial disregard or frustration. Consequently, the mother was “entitled to no relief” on those grounds.

V. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

The decision is anchored in a robust body of prior West Virginia abuse and neglect jurisprudence. Key precedents include:

In re Cecil T., 228 W. Va. 89, 717 S.E.2d 873 (2011) – Provides the standard of review (deferential to factual findings, de novo on law).
In re Carlita B., 185 W. Va. 613, 408 S.E.2d 365 (1991) – The Court cites Syl. Pt. 6 for the requirement that, at the conclusion of an improvement period, the court must review parental performance and determine whether goals were achieved. Here, that standard justified the circuit court’s review of L.H.’s performance after the natural expiration of her improvement period.
In re Timber M., 231 W. Va. 44, 743 S.E.2d 352 (2013) and In re Charity H., 215 W. Va. 208, 599 S.E.2d 631 (2004) – Stand for the principle that acknowledgment of the abuse/neglect problem is a precondition to successful treatment. These cases framed L.H.’s persistent denial and minimization as making the problem effectively “untreatable.”
In re Emily, 208 W. Va. 325, 540 S.E.2d 542 (2000) – Reaffirmed that the primary goal is safe, stable, permanent homes for abused/neglected children; used here to justify the emphasis on permanency and timely adoption.
In re Daniel D., 211 W. Va. 79, 562 S.E.2d 147 (2002) and In re Christina L., 194 W. Va. 446, 460 S.E.2d 692 (1995) – Established the standard for post‑termination visitation: allowed only when not detrimental and in the child’s best interests. Applied directly in rejecting post‑termination contact between the mother and children.
James M. v. Maynard, 185 W. Va. 648, 408 S.E.2d 400 (1991) – Syllabus Point 4 requires courts to consider and, where appropriate, preserve sibling contact upon termination. This decision relies on James M. to mandate explicit sibling‑visitation findings on remand.
In re Edward B., 210 W. Va. 621, 558 S.E.2d 620 (2001) – Supplies both:
- The requirement for adequate findings to facilitate appellate review; and
- The “substantial disregard or frustration” standard for vacating dispositions due to procedural errors.
In re Z.D.-1, No. 22‑0458, 2023 WL 2385835 (W. Va. Mar. 7, 2023) and In re Z.D.-1, 251 W. Va. 743, 916 S.E.2d 375 (2025) – Used for:
- Remanding when a circuit court fails to rule on a significant motion (e.g., improvement period), paralleling the omission here on sibling visitation; and
- Noting provisional amendments to Rule 15 and the codification of standards for post‑termination visitation.
Michael K.T. v. Tina L.T., 182 W. Va. 399, 387 S.E.2d 866 (1989); In re Tyler D., 213 W. Va. 149, 578 S.E.2d 343 (2003); In re Katie S., 198 W. Va. 79, 479 S.E.2d 589 (1996) – Together emphasize:
- The “polar star” of the child’s best interests;
- The principle that procedural technicalities and bureaucratic delays cannot override substantive child welfare concerns.
In re D.S., 251 W. Va. 466, 914 S.E.2d 701 (2025) – Cited to reiterate that the Supreme Court does not re‑weigh evidence or second‑guess credibility determinations made by circuit courts.
In re G.G., 249 W. Va. 496, 896 S.E.2d 662 (2023) – Cited to reaffirm that not every procedural misstep warrants reversal; only substantial disregard or frustration of process does.
In re H.M., 251 W. Va. 333, 912 S.E.2d 885 (2025) and In re K.S., 246 W. Va. 517, 874 S.E.2d 319 (2022) – Stress that when visitation (including sibling visitation) is found appropriate, a specific visitation plan must be crafted.
Shaffer v. Acme Limestone Co., 206 W. Va. 333, 524 S.E.2d 688 (1999); Noble v. W. Va. Dep’t of Motor Vehicles, 223 W. Va. 818, 679 S.E.2d 650 (2009) – Provide the general rule that nonjurisdictional issues not raised below will not be entertained on appeal.

Collectively, these precedents shaped a decision that is doctrinally conservative but practically significant, reinforcing existing standards while clarifying their application in the context of modern statutory schemes and procedural rules.

VI. Clarifying Key Legal Concepts

1. “Improvement Period”

An “improvement period” is a court‑ordered period during which a parent is given an opportunity, under structured conditions and professional services, to remedy the problems that led to the abuse or neglect petition. It is not automatic; it is granted when the parent demonstrates a willingness to participate and benefit from services.

At the end of an improvement period, the court must assess whether:

The parent complied with the requirements; and
The underlying conditions have been sufficiently remedied to permit safe reunification.

In this case, the improvement period expired by time. The court did not “terminate” it; rather, consistent with In re Carlita B., it evaluated L.H.’s performance and found that she had not successfully completed it.

2. “No Reasonable Likelihood” of Correction

Under § 49‑4‑604(d), a court finds “no reasonable likelihood that conditions of neglect or abuse can be substantially corrected in the near future” when:

The parent’s behavior meets certain statutory criteria (e.g., untreated substance addiction, refusal to follow a case plan, chronic noncompliance); and
Evidence shows the parent has failed to respond meaningfully to services and interventions.

The law does not demand that correction be impossible forever; the focus is whether, within the near future, conditions can realistically be corrected to the point that the children can be safely returned.

3. “Administrative Positive” Drug Screens

In West Virginia abuse and neglect practice, when a parent fails to appear for a scheduled drug or alcohol screen, the result is often deemed “administratively positive.” The law generally treats such no‑shows as tantamount to a positive result for purposes of compliance, because otherwise a parent could evade testing and accountability simply by declining to appear.

Here, L.H. had seventeen such administrative positives in five months, which strongly indicated noncompliance with sobriety monitoring.

4. Post‑Termination Visitation

Post‑termination visitation is not a right. Once parental rights are terminated, the legal parent‑child relationship is severed. However, West Virginia jurisprudence has recognized that, in rare cases, limited contact with a former parent may:

Support the child’s emotional well‑being;
Promote continuity and stability; and
Not be detrimental to the child.

Under Christina L. and Daniel D., the circuit court has discretion to authorize such visitation when:

It will not harm the child; and
It affirmatively serves the child’s best interests.

In this case, the court found the opposite: that visitation would be detrimental and not in the children’s best interests, largely based on L.H.’s behavior and lack of improvement.

5. Sibling Visitation

Sibling relationships can be critically important to children’s emotional stability, identity, and healing from trauma. James M. v. Maynard directs trial courts in termination cases to consider whether siblings separated in different placements should have continued contact, and to enter orders that protect such relationships when in the children’s best interests.

In K.H. and Q.H., the Supreme Court effectively re‑enforced that directive: silence on sibling visitation is not acceptable when it has been requested and is plainly relevant.

VII. Practical and Doctrinal Impact

A. Reinforcement of Core Termination Principles

The decision reinforces long‑standing rules:

Parental rights may be terminated when the parent is persistently noncompliant with treatment and case plan obligations.
A parent’s refusal to acknowledge the problem is powerful evidence of untreatability and weighs heavily toward termination.
The child’s right to safety, stability, and permanency takes precedence over a parent’s interest in extended opportunities to improve.

For practitioners, this case underscores that:

Compliance in form (e.g., attending some visits or a few therapy sessions) is not enough; meaningful change is the touchstone.
Minimizing or denying abuse, neglect, or addiction is often outcome‑determinative against the parent.

B. Strong Message on Procedural Waiver and Harmless Error

The Court’s handling of procedural complaints sends a clear message:

Counsel must timely object in the circuit court and build a record under Appellate Rule 10(c)(7). Raising procedural noncompliance for the first time on appeal will generally fail.
Even when noncompliance is shown (e.g., slightly late dispositional order, missing permanency date), reversal will not be granted unless the process has been substantially disregarded or frustrated in a way that threatens the integrity of the outcome.

This gives DHS and circuit courts some operational leeway: minor timing errors or documentation gaps are not self‑executing grounds to undo a termination, especially where the substantive evidence of abuse, neglect, and lack of parental progress is strong.

C. Clarification on Improvement Periods and Disposition

The Court clarified two practical points:

An improvement period can expire by time; the court may then assess success or failure without needing to “revoke” it. This avoids confusion about the label used in the circuit court order.
A circuit court may both conduct a dispositional hearing and terminate parental rights during that same hearing, as long as it makes the statutory inquiries and bases its decision on evidence. There is no requirement of a separate, later termination hearing.

D. Heightened Attention to Sibling Relationships

Doctrinally, the most distinctive part of the decision is its insistence on an explicit sibling‑visitation ruling:

The Court reaffirmed that sibling rights to continued association survive and require independent consideration when parental rights are terminated.
Remanding solely for sibling visitation, while affirming all other aspects of the case, underscores the importance of this issue in West Virginia law.
Trial judges are now on clear notice: failing to rule on a properly presented sibling‑visitation request will lead to a remand, even when the primary disposition is fully affirmed.

Practically, guardians ad litem and child’s counsel should ensure that:

Siblings’ wishes and needs for contact are thoroughly documented; and
Specific visitation proposals are presented to facilitate the court’s formulation of a “proper visitation plan” if visitation is found appropriate.

E. Interaction with Evolving Post‑Termination Visitation Standards

Although the Court applied the pre‑amendment case‑law standards for post‑termination visitation, it acknowledged that Rule 15 has since been amended to codify a more structured approach. In re K.H. and Q.H. thus serves as a bridge between the earlier, purely case‑law‑driven framework and the newer rule‑based regime.

Going forward, trial courts must:

Follow the specific factors and procedures in amended Rule 15;
Continue to adhere to the basic principles from Daniel D. and Christina L. (non‑detriment and best interests).

This case illustrates that, even under either framework, post‑termination visitation will be denied where the parent is combative, noncompliant, and in denial about the very conditions that led to termination.

VIII. Conclusion

In re K.H. and Q.H. is, on one level, a straightforward affirmation of a termination decision in a case where the evidence of parental noncompliance and lack of insight was overwhelming. It reiterates familiar principles: the primacy of children’s best interests, the centrality of parental acknowledgment of problems, and the high deference accorded to circuit courts’ factual findings in abuse and neglect matters.

On another level, the decision is significant in three ways:

It crystallizes the threshold for reversing on procedural grounds, insisting that only substantial disregard or frustration of statutory and rule‑based processes—properly preserved below—will justify vacatur.
It clarifies the handling of improvement periods and dispositional hearings, confirming that courts may review expired improvement periods and terminate rights at the dispositional hearing when statutory criteria are met.
It robustly enforces the duty to address sibling visitation, remanding when the trial court failed to rule on a request for sibling contact and requiring a concrete visitation plan if such contact is ordered.

In sum, the case strengthens the jurisprudence that balances procedural regularity with the overriding concern for children’s safety and stability, and it emphatically elevates sibling relationships as a discrete and indispensable component of the abuse and neglect framework in West Virginia.

Reaffirming Termination Standards and Mandating Explicit Sibling‑Visitation Rulings: Commentary on In re K.H. and Q.H. (W. Va. Nov. 25, 2025)