Reaffirming Summary Dismissal and the Prejudice Requirement in Immigration Ineffective-Assistance Claims: Commentary on Alba Castillo‑De Molina v. Bondi

Reaffirming Summary Dismissal and the Prejudice Requirement in Immigration Ineffective-Assistance Claims: Commentary on Alba Castillo‑De Molina v. Bondi

I. Introduction

This nonprecedential order from the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, Alba Leticia Castillo‑De Molina, et al. v. Pamela J. Bondi (No. 24‑1333, Dec. 19, 2025), addresses two recurring procedural issues in immigration litigation:

  • When the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) may summarily dismiss an appeal because the appellant promised, but failed, to file a brief; and
  • What a noncitizen must show to prevail on a motion to reopen based on ineffective assistance of counsel before the immigration judge (IJ).

Although styled as a “Nonprecedential Disposition” under the Seventh Circuit’s internal rules, the order reinforces and applies established circuit law in two important areas:

  1. Summary dismissal for failure to file a promised brief under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(2)(i)(E), even when the notice of appeal is more detailed; and
  2. The prejudice requirement in ineffective-assistance claims in immigration cases, requiring concrete, outcome‑affecting deficiencies, not generalized complaints about “evidentiary gaps.”

The petitioners—a mother and her two children from El Salvador—sought review of the BIA’s summary dismissal of their appeal and its denial of a motion to remand (treated as a motion to reopen) based on alleged ineffective assistance by prior counsel. The court denied the petition, upholding the BIA on both issues.

II. Summary of the Opinion

A. Parties and Posture

  • Petitioners: Alba Leticia Castillo‑De Molina and her two children, who entered the U.S. near Roma, Texas, in November 2018 and were charged as removable under INA § 212(a)(6)(A)(i) for entering without inspection.
  • Respondent: The Attorney General of the United States (Pamela J. Bondi).
  • Procedural posture: Petition for review from a BIA order that (1) summarily dismissed their appeal from an IJ’s denial of asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT relief, and (2) denied a motion to remand/reopen based on ineffective assistance of counsel before the IJ.

B. Key Holdings

  1. Summary dismissal was proper.
    The court held that the BIA lawfully invoked 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(2)(i)(E) to summarily dismiss the appeal because:
    • On the Notice of Appeal, the petitioner affirmatively indicated she would file a brief;
    • The BIA repeatedly warned her that failure to file could result in summary dismissal;
    • She obtained an extension of the briefing deadline but still did not file a brief or a timely explanation; and
    • Under binding Seventh Circuit precedent, a notice of appeal—even if detailed—cannot substitute for the promised brief.
  2. The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to reopen based on ineffective assistance of counsel.
    Although everyone agreed the petitioner complied with the procedural requirements for an ineffective-assistance claim under In re Lozada, she failed to show prejudice. Specifically:
    • The IJ denied the asylum application both for failure to satisfy biometrics requirements and, independently, on the merits after a full hearing.
    • The petitioner did not identify specific evidence or legal arguments her counsel failed to present, nor how they would have changed the outcome.
    • General references to “gaps” in evidence were insufficient to satisfy the requirement that counsel’s errors have “the potential for affecting the outcome of the proceedings.”

On that basis, the court denied the petition for review in full.

III. Factual and Procedural Background

A. Immigration Court Proceedings

  1. Entry and initiation of removal proceedings.
    • On November 2, 2018, Castillo‑De Molina entered the U.S. with her two children near Roma, Texas.
    • On November 3, 2018, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) served a Notice to Appear, charging her as removable under INA § 212(a)(6)(A)(i).
    • She retained attorney Carlos Quichiz.
  2. Master calendar hearing (May 13, 2019).
    • She conceded removability.
    • She applied for:
      • Asylum;
      • Withholding of removal; and
      • Protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT).
    • Counsel told the IJ he would file a supporting brief within 30 days.
    • The IJ confirmed counsel received written biometrics instructions, expressly warning that non‑compliance could lead to the application being deemed abandoned and dismissed.
    • The IJ set the individual merits hearing for December 19, 2019.
  3. Motion to continue and biometrics issues.
    • On November 22, 2019, counsel moved to continue the hearing, citing difficulty obtaining documentation from the petitioner’s government clinic employer in El Salvador.
    • The IJ denied the motion on December 13, 2019, finding no “good cause,” noting:
      • Lack of evidence of diligent efforts over the previous seven months; and
      • The anticipated documents would be cumulative of her testimony about being a nurse.
    • Counsel sent her biometric information to a USCIS service center (he later estimated about four weeks before the hearing), but the court had not received the necessary biometrics by the hearing date.
    • On December 18, 2019, counsel filed a written brief supporting the I‑589 application.
  4. Merits hearing (December 19, 2019).
    • The IJ acknowledged receipt and review of the supporting documentation and stated the case was ready to proceed.
    • The government, invoking 8 C.F.R. § 1208.10, asked the IJ to deem the asylum application abandoned because biometrics had not been properly submitted.
    • Counsel represented that biometrics had been submitted to USCIS approximately four weeks earlier.
    • Even though the biometrics were missing from the court’s file, the IJ elected to proceed with a full merits hearing.
    • Substance of testimony:
      • Petitioner worked as a nurse in government clinics in El Salvador.
      • Gang members demanded medical services and prescription drugs from her on multiple occasions.
      • Out of fear, she complied but reported the incidents to her employer.
      • Her supervisor told her nothing could be done about the gangs.
      • She did not report the incidents to the police, believing they would not act.
    • At the end of the hearing, the IJ indicated a written decision would issue and directed counsel to file biometrics with the court when available.
  5. IJ’s written decision (November 11, 2020).
    The IJ denied asylum, withholding, and CAT protection on two independent grounds:
    • Procedural ground – biometrics noncompliance.
      The IJ found no “good cause” for failing to timely comply with biometrics requirements under 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.47(c) and 1208.10, and therefore dismissed the application.
    • Alternative merits ground.
      Even if the application were not dismissed for biometrics noncompliance, the IJ concluded:
      • No showing of past persecution or a well‑founded fear of future persecution;
      • No substantial risk of torture if returned to El Salvador for CAT purposes; and
      • No proven pattern or practice of persecution against the asserted particular social group: “nurses who refused to cooperate with gangs.”
    • The IJ ordered removal to El Salvador.

B. Appeal to the BIA

  1. Change of counsel and Notice of Appeal (December 16, 2020).
    • Petitioner had engaged new counsel on October 28, 2020, before the IJ’s written decision issued.
    • She filed a Notice of Appeal to the BIA on December 16, 2020.
    • On the form, she checked the box indicating she would file a separate brief or statement after receiving the BIA’s briefing schedule.
    • In an attached supplement, she asserted:
      • The IJ erred in denying the motion to continue;
      • The IJ erred in dismissing the application for failure to comply with biometrics requirements;
      • The IJ erred in denying relief on the merits; and
      • She reserved the right to argue ineffective assistance of counsel.
  2. BIA briefing schedule and extension.
    • The BIA issued a briefing schedule, expressly warning:
      “If you indicate on the Notice of Appeal (Form EOIR‑26) that you will file a brief or statement, you are expected to file a brief or statement in support of your appeal. If you fail to file a brief or statement within the time set for filing in this briefing schedule, the Board may summarily dismiss your appeal. See 8 CFR § 1003.1(d)(2)(i)(E).”
    • Petitioner requested, and the BIA granted, an extension, setting June 8, 2022, as the new deadline. The BIA repeated the same warning.
  3. No brief; motion to remand instead.
    • Petitioner did not file the promised brief by June 8, 2022.
    • The following day, she filed a motion to remand, alleging that prior counsel (Quichiz) had been ineffective before the IJ.
    • She attached:
      • A complaint she filed with the Illinois Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission (ARDC) against Quichiz;
      • The ARDC’s receipt;
      • Her own declaration; and
      • Quichiz’s response to the ARDC, with exhibits.
    • The BIA acknowledged the motion on June 13, 2022, but noted the briefing schedule remained in effect.
  4. BIA’s decision: summary dismissal and denial of remand/reopening.
    A single BIA member:
    • Summarily dismissed the appeal under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(2)(i)(E), reasoning that:
      • The notice of appeal did not specifically and sufficiently identify the grounds for appeal; and
      • Despite indicating she would file a brief and receiving warnings, petitioner did not file any brief.
    • Denied the motion to remand/reopen for ineffective assistance of counsel because:
      • Petitioner did not explain how she was prejudiced by counsel’s performance;
      • She did not identify what additional evidence or legal arguments would have been presented; and
      • The IJ had already considered her testimony and rejected her claims on the merits, in addition to the biometrics issue, and counsel’s representation had been “thorough.”

IV. Governing Legal Framework and Precedents

A. BIA Summary Dismissal – 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(2)(i)(E) and Kokar, Cortina‑Chavez

The regulation at the center of the summary‑dismissal issue provides:

The Board may summarily dismiss any appeal or portion of any appeal in any case in which: …
(E) The party concerned indicates on Form EOIR‑26 or Form EOIR‑29 that he or she will file a brief or statement in support of the appeal and, thereafter, does not file such a brief or statement, or reasonably explain his or her failure to do so, within the time set for filing.

Two Seventh Circuit precedents frame how this regulation operates:

  1. Kokar v. Gonzales, 478 F.3d 803 (7th Cir. 2007).
    • The court held that where an appellant checks the box indicating that a brief will be filed, but then fails to file that brief, the BIA may summarily dismiss under § 1003.1(d)(2)(i)(E), even if the notice of appeal itself is detailed and specific.
    • Key point: a notice of appeal cannot substitute for a promised brief. Once the litigant elects to file a brief, the regulation’s conditions and consequences apply.
  2. Cortina‑Chavez v. Sessions, 894 F.3d 865 (7th Cir. 2018).
    • The court reaffirmed that the BIA may summarily dismiss an appeal when:
      • The appellant promises to file a brief;
      • The BIA warns of the consequences for failing to do so; and
      • No brief or explanation is timely filed.
    • The court in Cortina‑Chavez collected cases upholding such dismissals and emphasized the BIA’s authority to manage its docket through enforcement of this rule.

The petitioner in Castillo‑De Molina tried to sidestep these precedents by arguing that her notice of appeal satisfied the separate regulation governing the content of a notice of appeal, 8 C.F.R. § 1003.3(b). But as the Seventh Circuit points out, compliance with § 1003.3(b) does not negate § 1003.1(d)(2)(i)(E) once an appellant elects to file a brief and then fails to do so.

B. Biometrics Requirements – 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.47(c), 1208.10

The IJ’s initial procedural dismissal of the asylum application rested on biometrics regulations:

  • 8 C.F.R. § 1003.47(c) requires asylum applicants to comply with DHS biometrics and biographical data instructions. Failure, without good cause, can result in dismissal or denial of the application.
  • 8 C.F.R. § 1208.10 authorizes the IJ to deem an asylum application abandoned if an applicant does not comply with the biometrics process after proper notice.

Here, the IJ found no good cause for late compliance and dismissed the application on that basis. But importantly, the IJ also issued an independent merits decision, which later became central to the prejudice analysis in the ineffective‑assistance claim.

C. Motions to Reopen and Ineffective Assistance – Lozada, Sanchez, Patel, Perez‑Perez

  1. Procedural framework – In re Lozada, 19 I. & N. Dec. 637 (BIA 1988).
    Under Lozada, a noncitizen claiming ineffective assistance of counsel in removal proceedings must:
    • Submit an affidavit explaining the prior representation and alleged deficiencies;
    • Inform prior counsel of the allegations and give them an opportunity to respond; and
    • File a complaint with the appropriate disciplinary authority or explain why not.
    In this case, “all agree” that Castillo‑De Molina met these procedural requirements.
  2. Substantive prejudice requirement – Sanchez v. Sessions, 894 F.3d 858 (7th Cir. 2018).
    • Beyond Lozada compliance, the noncitizen must show prejudice—that counsel’s errors “actually had the potential for affecting the outcome of the proceedings.”
    • The Seventh Circuit applied that standard here and found it unmet.
  3. Necessity of new evidence – Sanchez v. Keisler, 505 F.3d 641 (7th Cir. 2007).
    • In motions to reopen based on ineffective assistance, the movant must typically present:
      • New, previously unavailable evidence; or
      • Specific evidence that competent counsel would have introduced and how it would likely change the outcome.
    • Merely asserting that evidence was “missing” is not enough.
  4. Standard of review for motions to reopen – Patel v. Gonzales, 496 F.3d 829 (7th Cir. 2007); Perez‑Perez v. Wilkinson, 988 F.3d 371 (7th Cir. 2021); Gamero v. Barr, 929 F.3d 464 (7th Cir. 2019).
    • Motions to reopen are disfavored and reviewed for “abuse of discretion.”
    • The Seventh Circuit will uphold the BIA unless its decision:
      • Lacks a rational explanation;
      • Departs inexplainably from established policies; or
      • Is based on impermissible considerations such as invidious discrimination.
    • This is a highly deferential standard under which the petitioner bears a heavy burden.

V. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

A. Summary Dismissal of the BIA Appeal

1. The statutory and regulatory framework

The Seventh Circuit began by restating the text of 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(2)(i)(E) and noting its prior holdings permitting summary dismissal when an appellant promises a brief but fails to file it despite warnings. The rule is designed to:

  • Ensure that appeals are meaningfully briefed when the appellant elects to file a brief; and
  • Allow the BIA to manage its heavy docket by dismissing appeals where the appellant ignores the briefing schedule.

2. Application to Castillo‑De Molina

The court emphasized four key facts:

  1. On the Notice of Appeal, petitioner affirmatively indicated that she would file a brief.
  2. The BIA’s briefing schedule—and later extension order—contained clear written warnings that failure to file a brief could result in summary dismissal under § 1003.1(d)(2)(i)(E).
  3. Petitioner did not file any brief by the deadline and did not submit a timely explanation for that failure.
  4. Instead, she filed a motion to remand one day late, which did not purport to serve as the promised appeal brief on the underlying IJ errors.

Under Cortina‑Chavez and related precedents, these circumstances fit squarely within the conditions for summary dismissal. The court underscored that petitioner’s arguments on petition for review did not meaningfully address § 1003.1(d)(2)(i)(E) at all.

3. The attempted reliance on 8 C.F.R. § 1003.3(b)

Petitioner focused instead on 8 C.F.R. § 1003.3(b), which specifies what a notice of appeal must include (e.g., identifying the challenged findings and legal errors). She argued her notice of appeal was legally sufficient and thus the BIA should not have summarily dismissed.

The Seventh Circuit rejected this position as foreclosed by Kokar v. Gonzales:

  • Kokar held that even if a notice of appeal is detailed and otherwise compliant with § 1003.3(b), it cannot substitute for a brief when the appellant has promised to file one.
  • Once the appellant checks the “I will file a brief” box, the failure to file triggers § 1003.1(d)(2)(i)(E), and the BIA may summarily dismiss, so long as adequate notice is provided.
  • The petitioner offered no persuasive reason to depart from or distinguish Kokar.

Thus, the court concluded that the BIA acted within its regulatory authority and consistent with binding circuit precedent in summarily dismissing the appeal.

B. Denial of the Motion to Reopen for Ineffective Assistance

1. Scope of review and issue narrowing

The court then turned to petitioner’s challenge to the BIA’s denial of her motion to reopen, framed as a motion to remand, for ineffective assistance by her IJ‑level counsel, Quichiz.

Everyone agreed that petitioner complied with the Lozada procedural steps. As a result, the only contested question was whether she had shown prejudice.

Under Sanchez v. Sessions, the petitioner had to demonstrate that the alleged errors “actually had the potential for affecting the outcome of the proceedings.”

2. Alleged errors by prior counsel

Petitioner attributed prejudice to two categories of alleged attorney missteps:

  1. Failure to timely submit biometrics and biographical information.
    This failure led the IJ to dismiss the I‑589 application under 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.47(c) and 1208.10.
  2. “Significant gaps in evidence” due to failure to submit corroborating documentation.
    Petitioner claimed her attorney did not obtain or introduce sufficient documentary evidence supporting her claims, particularly regarding her work as a nurse and threats from gangs.

3. The court’s assessment of prejudice

The court’s prejudice analysis pivoted on the IJ’s decision to conduct a full merits hearing and issue an alternative merits ruling notwithstanding the biometrics problem.

  • Biometrics deficiency as an independent ground insufficient to show prejudice.
    The court acknowledged that counsel’s failure to secure timely biometrics supported an independent ground for dismissal. However:
    • The IJ proceeded to hear petitioner’s testimony in full.
    • The IJ expressly denied the application on the merits as an alternative holding.
    • Therefore, even if the biometrics issue were cured, the IJ’s adverse merits ruling would remain a separate barrier to relief.
  • Lack of specificity about missing evidence or arguments.
    On the supposed “gaps” in the evidentiary record, the court was unpersuaded:
    • Petitioner failed to specify what concrete evidence counsel should have obtained (e.g., particular affidavits, official records, or expert reports) that was unavailable or not introduced.
    • She did not explain how any such evidence would have materially strengthened her case beyond her own (credibly accepted) testimony.
    • Under Sanchez v. Keisler, a motion to reopen for ineffective assistance must present new or clearly identifiable evidence that could change the result; vague complaints about “missing” evidence do not suffice.
    • She similarly failed to identify any legal arguments counsel omitted that would have had a realistic chance of altering the IJ’s analysis of asylum, withholding, or CAT.

In light of these deficiencies, the court agreed with the BIA that petitioner had not carried her burden to show that counsel’s mistakes had “the potential for affecting the outcome.”

4. Deferential review of the BIA

Applying the abuse‑of‑discretion standard from Patel, Perez‑Perez, and Gamero, the Seventh Circuit found the BIA’s decision:

  • Rationally explained;
  • Consistent with established policy on motions to reopen and ineffective assistance; and
  • Free of any impermissible basis such as discrimination.

Accordingly, there was no basis to disturb the BIA’s denial of reopening.

VI. Impact and Implications

A. Reinforcing Strict Enforcement of BIA Briefing Obligations

This order reinforces the Seventh Circuit’s firm approach to:

  • Holding appellants to their election on the Notice of Appeal; and
  • Allowing the BIA to summarily dismiss when an appellant promises, but fails, to file a brief.

Key practical consequences:

  1. No “substitution” theory. Appellants in the Seventh Circuit cannot rely on a detailed notice of appeal to avoid summary dismissal after indicating they will file a brief. Once that box is checked, the obligation is real.
  2. Extension does not relax obligations. Even where an extension is granted, failure to meet the extended deadline carries the same risk of summary dismissal.
  3. Separate motions do not necessarily “cure” the default. Filing a motion to remand or reopen, particularly after the brief deadline has passed, does not automatically constitute a “reasonable explanation” for failing to file the promised brief unless it squarely addresses the failure and is timely.

For immigration practitioners, the case underscores the necessity of:

  • Carefully deciding whether to check “I will file a brief” on Form EOIR‑26;
  • Monitoring BIA deadlines and seeking extensions before deadlines expire; and
  • Ensuring that any motion filed near a briefing deadline explicitly addresses and justifies any need to forego the brief (if that is the strategy).

B. Clarifying the High Bar for Ineffective-Assistance Claims

The decision also illustrates the demanding nature of ineffective‑assistance claims in immigration proceedings:

  • Prejudice is central. Compliance with Lozada is necessary but not sufficient; the movant must show a plausible causal link between counsel’s error and the outcome.
  • Alternative merits rulings are a major obstacle. Where an IJ issues:
    • A procedural dismissal (e.g., biometrics failure); and
    • An independent merits denial;
    it becomes significantly harder to prove that the procedural misstep prejudiced the case.
  • Vague assertions of “gaps” in the record are inadequate. A petitioner must:
    • Identify specific missing evidence (e.g., named witnesses or concrete documents);
    • Explain why the evidence was reasonably obtainable with competent counsel; and
    • Show how the evidence could have tipped the balance under applicable asylum/CAT standards.

For noncitizens, this outcome is a cautionary tale: even where counsel undoubtedly performed poorly in some respects (e.g., biometrics handling), relief on an ineffective‑assistance theory will turn on whether a plausible winning case can be articulated and substantiated.

C. Significance for Asylum Seekers with Gang‑Related Claims

While the Seventh Circuit does not review the IJ’s substantive asylum analysis in detail (because of the summary dismissal), the background facts are typical of many Central American asylum claims:

  • Employment in a public or quasi‑public role (a nurse in government clinics);
  • Demands by gangs for services or resources; and
  • Fear of retaliation if they refuse assistance or seek help from the police.

The IJ’s alternative merits findings suggest that, in this case:

  • Isolated or limited incidents of coercion by gangs, even if frightening, did not rise to the level of persecution under asylum law; and
  • The proposed social group—“nurses who refuse to cooperate with gangs”—was not shown to face a pattern or practice of persecution on account of that status.

The case underscores how procedural missteps (missing biometrics, failure to file a BIA brief) can completely foreclose meaningful judicial review of potentially complex substantive asylum questions.

D. Nonprecedential Status but Persuasive Value

The court explicitly labels its disposition “NONPRECEDENTIAL,” meaning:

  • Under the Seventh Circuit’s local rules and Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1, it may be cited, but it does not bind future panels in the same way a published opinion does.
  • Its value lies in confirming and illustrating the application of already existing precedents (Kokar, Cortina‑Chavez, Sanchez cases, etc.) to a new factual setting.

Practitioners can therefore use this order as persuasive authority to:

  • Demonstrate how strictly the Seventh Circuit applies § 1003.1(d)(2)(i)(E);
  • Show the level of specificity required to establish prejudice in ineffective‑assistance motions; and
  • Argue analogically about biometrics‑related dismissals and alternative merits rulings.

VII. Clarifying Key Legal Concepts and Terminology

A. “Nonprecedential Disposition”

A nonprecedential disposition is:

  • An appellate decision the court chooses not to publish as binding precedent;
  • Often used for fact‑bound or routine applications of settled law;
  • Still citable as persuasive authority under FRAP 32.1 but not controlling in future cases.

B. “Summary Dismissal” by the BIA

“Summary dismissal” means the BIA:

  • Dismisses an appeal without issuing a full, reasoned opinion on the merits;
  • Typically does so under a regulation like § 1003.1(d)(2), for one of several enumerated reasons (e.g., failure to file a brief after promising one, failure to state reasons for appeal);
  • Uses this as a docket‑management tool when appellants do not comply with basic procedural requirements.

C. “Biometrics” in Immigration Proceedings

“Biometrics” refers to:

  • Fingerprints, photographs, and sometimes signatures and other identifying data;
  • Used by DHS to run security, identity, and criminal background checks;
  • Required for many forms of relief, including asylum, with strict compliance deadlines.

Failing to comply with biometrics instructions—after being properly informed—can result in:

  • The IJ deeming the application abandoned; and/or
  • Denial or dismissal of the application absent “good cause.”

D. “Motion to Reopen” vs. “Motion to Remand”

  • Motion to reopen: A request (usually to the BIA) to reopen proceedings to consider new evidence or changed circumstances after a decision has become final.
  • Motion to remand: A request to the BIA to send a case back (“remand”) to the IJ for further proceedings while the appeal is still pending.

In practice, when a motion to remand is filed with the BIA while an appeal is pending, and it seeks to present new facts or evidence (e.g., ineffective assistance), the BIA often treats it under the same standards as a motion to reopen. That is how the Seventh Circuit treats Castillo‑De Molina’s motion here.

E. “Ineffective Assistance of Counsel” in Immigration Cases

Unlike criminal defendants, noncitizens in removal proceedings have no constitutional right to government‑appointed counsel. However:

  • They have a statutory and regulatory right to retain counsel at their own expense; and
  • Serious attorney misconduct may deny them a fair hearing, implicating due process.

Under Lozada and Seventh Circuit law:

  1. The petitioner must follow specific procedural steps (affidavit, notice to counsel, bar complaint); and
  2. Must show prejudice—a reasonable likelihood that competent representation would have led to a different outcome or at least affected the decision in a meaningful way.

F. “Abuse of Discretion” Standard

When reviewing the BIA’s denial of a motion to reopen or remand, the Seventh Circuit asks whether:

  • The BIA’s decision was rationally explained;
  • It adhered to established standards and rules; and
  • It did not rest on impermissible factors (e.g., discrimination).

If the BIA’s reasoning is plausible and coherent, the court will not substitute its own judgment, even if it might have decided differently in the first instance.

VIII. Conclusion and Key Takeaways

Alba Castillo‑De Molina v. Bondi is not a precedential landmark, but it meaningfully illustrates and reinforces several important procedural rules in immigration law:

  • Summary dismissal: In the Seventh Circuit, once an appellant checks the box promising to file a BIA brief, and then misses the deadline without a timely, adequate explanation, the BIA may summarily dismiss the appeal under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(2)(i)(E). A detailed notice of appeal cannot retroactively substitute for the missing brief (Kokar).
  • Importance of heeding BIA warnings: Repeated explicit warnings from the BIA about the consequences of failing to brief will be taken seriously by the courts; ignoring them carries real risk.
  • Biometrics and alternative merits decisions: Even serious procedural missteps—such as failure to timely complete biometrics—do not, by themselves, establish prejudice in an ineffective‑assistance claim when the IJ has independently denied relief on the merits after a full hearing.
  • Ineffective assistance and prejudice: To succeed on a motion to reopen for ineffective assistance, a noncitizen must:
    • Comply with Lozada’s procedural requirements; and
    • Identify specific missing evidence or arguments and show they had the potential to change the outcome (Sanchez cases, Sanchez v. Keisler).
    General statements about “gaps” in the record are insufficient.
  • Deferential review of the BIA: Under the abuse‑of‑discretion standard, the Seventh Circuit will uphold BIA decisions on motions to reopen so long as they are rational, consistent with precedent, and free of improper motives.

For practitioners and noncitizens alike, the case underscores that procedural rigor in immigration appeals is critical: failure to comply with briefing schedules and biometrics requirements can foreclose appellate review of potentially life‑altering substantive claims. At the same time, it clarifies that not every attorney mistake—however unfortunate—will justify reopening; only those that can be shown to have realistically affected the outcome will suffice.

Case Details

Year: 2025
Court: Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Judge(s)

PerCuriam

Comments