Reaffirming Strict Standards for Fundamental and Harmless Error in New Mexico: Commentary on State v. Hayhurst

I. Introduction

The New Mexico Supreme Court’s unpublished decision in State v. Hayhurst, No. S-1-SC-40183 (Nov. 20, 2025), offers a clear application—and quiet reaffirmation—of New Mexico’s demanding standards for:

Fundamental error review of unpreserved claims of prosecutorial misconduct in closing argument, and
Harmless error review of unsolicited, arguably inadmissible, testimony from a State witness.

Though the decision is not selected for publication and is therefore restricted in its use as precedent under Rule 12-405 NMRA, it is a useful illustration of how the Court views:

The threshold for reversing on the basis of mischaracterizations during closing,
The treatment of unsolicited, prejudicial statements by witnesses, and
The narrowness of the cumulative error doctrine when the evidentiary record is strong.

The case arises from the fatal shooting of Solomon “Butch” Hayhurst, Jr. by his son, Solomon “Sam” Hayhurst III, in Sierra County. The defendant admitted the killing but claimed self-defense. A jury convicted him of first-degree willful and deliberate murder, and he received a life sentence. On direct appeal, he challenged:

A prosecutor’s alleged mischaracterization of his testimony about whether he was afraid at the time of the shooting (prosecutorial misconduct/fundamental error),
Testimony from a witness (Richard Mills) that defendant had said he would “just as soon kill” his sister and niece as see them again (inadmissible and prejudicial character-type evidence/harmless error), and
The combined effect of those alleged errors under the doctrine of cumulative error.

The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction on all grounds. This commentary examines the Court’s reasoning, the precedents it relies upon, and the broader implications for criminal practice in New Mexico.

II. Summary of the Opinion

A. Core Holding

The Court (Thomson, C.J.) affirms Hayhurst’s conviction for first-degree willful and deliberate murder. It holds:

Prosecutorial Mischaracterization in Closing Argument: The prosecutor did mischaracterize the defendant’s testimony in closing argument by asserting that the defendant said “I was not afraid. I never said I was afraid,” when in fact the defendant had said he did not remember whether he said he was afraid, then added that he “had to have been” afraid.
This was error, but it did not rise to the level of fundamental error because:
- It was an isolated remark,
- It did not invade a specific constitutional protection,
- The jury had extensive direct evidence (videos and defendant’s own statements) from which to evaluate his fear, and
- Jury instructions explicitly told jurors that lawyers’ arguments are not evidence.
Witness Testimony About Threats to Sister and Niece: The Court assumes, without deciding, that the allegation of error was preserved and that Mills’s testimony about defendant threatening to kill his sister and niece was improper. Nonetheless, any error was harmless:
- The statement was unsolicited and not intentionally elicited by the prosecutor,
- The prosecutor quickly redirected away from the topic,
- Defense counsel chose for strategic reasons not to request a limiting (curative) instruction or a mistrial, and
- The State’s case was supported by abundant, direct evidence, including video of the shooting sequence and extensive statements by defendant.
No Cumulative Error: Because neither the mischaracterization nor the threat testimony created a reasonable probability of affecting the verdict, there was no cumulative effect sufficient to deprive the defendant of a fair trial under State v. Roybal, 2002-NMSC-027.

The Court’s overarching message is that where there is strong direct evidence and jurors are properly instructed, isolated missteps in argument or unsolicited prejudicial comments by witnesses rarely justify reversal, particularly if not objected to at trial.

III. Factual and Procedural Background

A. The Shooting and Defendant’s Account

The events occurred just after midnight on July 24, 2019, at the Hayhurst residence near Truth or Consequences, New Mexico. Police responded to an automated alarm from a home security company reporting a firearm discharge and a need for an ambulance. Dispatch contacted the defendant, who admitted shooting his father but claimed self-defense.

Officers found the victim lying in a pool of blood on the living room floor near a hospital bed where his wife, Keva (defendant’s mother), was lying. The victim had been killed by a single shotgun blast to the face.

Defendant waived his Miranda rights and spoke with Lt. Josh Baker. His recorded account was:

He refused to pour more alcohol for his “highly intoxicated” father, who then became irate and threatened suicide.
The victim allegedly retrieved two guns and went outside. Defendant expected him to back out of suicide, as he had reportedly threatened it often in the past.
When the victim re-entered, defendant claimed he came in screaming, cursing, threatening to kill defendant, and brandishing a pistol.
According to defendant, the victim—very drunk and infirm—struggled to operate the pistol but defendant feared he would eventually succeed in chambering a round.
Defendant stated he grabbed his 12-gauge shotgun and shot his father in the head, calling it a “me or him” situation. He expressed “regret but no remorse.”

Defendant also described his father’s poor health: Vietnam veteran on full disability, significant back problems, mobility limited to walking with a cane, and severe visual impairment (one eye lost, cataract in the other).

In a later interview, Lt. Baker confronted defendant with the fact that the home’s security cameras had captured the events and did not show the victim pointing a gun at defendant. Defendant appeared stunned, said he did not know the cameras were operational, and could not reconcile the footage with his prior account.

B. The Security Video and Trial Evidence

At trial, the State played the security video, which is central to the Court’s analysis:

The cameras covered the living room, showing the victim seated at his ailing wife’s bedside while defendant waved a stack of papers and gestured emphatically.
The victim sits calmly with hands in his lap, occasionally nodding; defendant appears more agitated.
Defendant leaves the room and returns with two guns, which he hands to the victim.
The victim sets one gun aside, exits the house with the other, and later returns, holding the gun upside down by the stock in his left hand.
As the victim begins to move toward the hallway, he steps backward, raises his empty right hand in front of him, and the left hand holding the gun remains low.
Moments later, the victim collapses—corresponding to the shotgun blast.
After the shooting, defendant is seen calmly stepping over the victim's body multiple times while looking at his phone.

Additional evidence included:

Forensic pathology: fatal shotgun wound to the right side of the face at less than five feet.
Toxicology: blood alcohol content of .066% (below the New Mexico per se DWI level, § 66-8-102(C)(1)), and morphine consistent with prescribed medication.
Estate/motive evidence:
- Richard Mills (Keva’s stepbrother and estate administrator) testified about prior conversations in which defendant was angry about the victim adding niece “Kodi” to the will and expressed that he should be the sole beneficiary.
- Mills appraised the estate at over $400,000, with roughly $81,900 in real estate.

Defendant testified in his own defense, repeating the self-defense narrative given to police. He:

Maintained that the victim came in armed and threatening,
Explained that the papers he was waving were related to a restraining order, not the will, and
Professed confusion at why he returned to the living room with guns and handed them to his father, as seen in the video.

On cross-examination he:

Admitted that his earlier account to police was “obviously mistaken” in sequencing,
Conceded that his father may not have been screaming when approaching the hallway, and
Acknowledged that he already had his shotgun leveled when his father appeared in the hallway.

Crucially, when asked whether he was afraid:

At first he did not recall saying he was afraid.
Pressed by the prosecutor, he eventually responded: “I had to have been. I mean, obviously. There’s no other reason why I would’ve armed myself in the first place.”

C. The Contested Threat Testimony

Before Mills testified about his rooftop conversation with defendant, defense counsel asked for a bench conference and apparently objected (on relevance grounds) to anticipated testimony about threats against family members (“Keri and Keri’s daughter, Kodi”). The prosecutor responded that he did not intend to elicit such testimony.

In front of the jury, the prosecutor tried to limit Mills to a conversation “in regards to [defendant’s] father and mother and their situation.” Nevertheless, Mills recounted defendant saying that he would “just as soon kill both of them [sister Keri and niece Kodi] as to have them show up here at this house again.” The prosecutor then cut him off and moved the conversation forward to estate-related comments.

Defense counsel did not object in the jury’s presence, request a limiting instruction, or move for mistrial. Instead, after conviction, he raised the issue in a motion for new trial, characterizing the remark as “REMARKABLY prejudicial” and irrelevant.

D. The Prosecutor’s Closing Argument Misstatement

In closing argument, the prosecutor summarized defendant’s testimony about his fear:

"He says, 'I was not afraid. I never said I was afraid.' And then he said, quote, 'well, I guess I would've been.' He slipped."

This was not an accurate quote. As the opinion notes, defendant actually said he did not recall whether he had said he was afraid, then concluded he “had to have been.” The prosecutor transformed uncertainty and implied fear into a flat denial of fear, which went directly to the heart of the self-defense claim.

Again, defense counsel did not object contemporaneously, did not address the misstatement in his own closing, and did not include this issue in his motion for a new trial. It was raised for the first time on appeal.

IV. Analysis of the Court’s Reasoning

A. Prosecutorial Mischaracterization and Fundamental Error

1. Standard of Review: Fundamental Error for Unpreserved Misconduct

Because the defense did not object to the closing argument at trial, the Court reviewed under the fundamental error doctrine:

Rule 12-321 NMRA (preservation rule): an issue must typically be preserved by a ruling or decision fairly invoked at trial. Unpreserved errors may nonetheless be reviewed under fundamental error.
State v. Allen, 2000-NMSC-002, ¶ 95: Prosecutorial misconduct amounts to fundamental error only when it is so egregious and persuasive that it deprives the defendant of a fair trial. An “isolated, minor impropriety” will not suffice because “a fair trial is not necessarily a perfect one.”

In the specific context of closing argument, the Court relied on State v. Sosa, 2009-NMSC-056, which articulates three central considerations:

Did the challenged statement invade a distinct constitutional protection (e.g., commenting on a defendant’s silence or refusal to consent to a search)?
Was the statement isolated and brief, or repeated and pervasive?
Was the statement “invited” by the defense?

All are assessed “objectively in the context of the prosecutor’s broader argument and the trial as a whole.” The appellate court begins with a presumption that the verdict is justified and asks whether the error was fundamental; the conviction stands unless:

Guilt is so doubtful as to “shock the conscience,” or
The error undermines the “fundamental integrity of the judicial process.”

2. Acknowledging Error: The Misquote

The Court is explicit that the prosecutor mischaracterized defendant’s testimony:

Defendant had said he did not remember saying he was afraid and then added he “had to have been” afraid.
By contrast, the prosecutor told the jury that defendant said, “I was not afraid. I never said I was afraid” and then “slipped.”

This is treated as a misstatement of evidence and thus an error. The Court’s decision is not an endorsement of such advocacy; it is an analysis of whether this merits reversal absent a contemporaneous objection.

3. Application of the Sosa Factors

(a) No invasion of a distinct constitutional protection

The mischaracterization did not implicate:

Defendant’s right to remain silent,
His right against unreasonable searches and seizures (e.g., refusal to consent to a search), or
Other specific constitutional rights discussed in Sosa and cases such as State v. Ramirez, 1982-NMSC-082, and Garcia v. State, 1986-NMSC-007.

Instead, it was a distortion of what the defendant had actually said. The Court effectively treats this as serious but qualitatively different from direct affronts to constitutionally protected silence or non-consent.

(b) Isolated and brief, not pervasive

The remark was a single sentence in an hour-long closing. It was neither repeated nor developed as a major theme. The Court emphasizes:

Defense counsel did not object in real time,
Did not try to correct it in his own closing, and
Did not raise it in a motion for new trial, even though he alleged other trial errors there.

Its late emergence on appeal underscores its lack of perceived significance at the time of trial, which supports a conclusion of non-fundamental error.

(c) Not invited by the defense

The Court notes that the error was not “invited” (i.e., provoked or opened up) by the defense. But under Sosa, this factor typically points toward finding no fundamental error. Here, it is neutral at best: it removes one possible reason to excuse the misstatement, but it does not transform it into structural or fundamental error.

4. “Context is Paramount”: Direct Evidence and Jury Instructions

The Court repeatedly stresses that “context is paramount.” Here, the context included “an extraordinary amount of direct evidence”:

The security video shows:
- The defendant initiating the interaction with the victim while waving papers,
- The defendant bringing guns into the scene and handing them to the victim,
- The victim’s limited and non-aggressive movements prior to being shot, and
- Defendant’s calm demeanor afterward (stepping over the body, looking at his phone).
Defendant’s own recorded interviews and his sworn trial testimony gave the jury a direct window into his narrative, demeanor, and claimed state of mind.

Under UJI 14-5001 NMRA, such evidence is classic direct evidence, permitting the jury to decide for itself whether defendant was genuinely in fear.

The Court also relies on standard jury instructions:

UJI 14-104 NMRA: tells jurors that they must determine facts from the evidence presented in court and that “what is said in the arguments is not evidence.”
State v. Smith, 2001-NMSC-004, ¶ 40: juries are presumed to follow written instructions.

Against this backdrop, the Court refuses to assume that jurors relied more on the prosecutor’s inaccurate summary than on what they had just seen and heard directly from the defendant and on video.

5. Conclusion on Fundamental Error

Balancing the Sosa factors and the whole record, the Court holds that:

The mischaracterization was an error,
But it did not have such a “persuasive and prejudicial effect” that it deprived the defendant of a fair trial, and
It did not render the verdict fundamentally unreliable or the process fundamentally unfair.

Accordingly, there was no fundamental error, and the conviction is not disturbed on that ground.

B. The Threat Testimony and Harmless Error

1. Standard: Harmless Error (Preserved or Plain)

Defendant argued that Mills’s testimony—that defendant would “just as soon kill” his sister and niece as see them again—was prejudicial and irrelevant, warranting reversal. There was some question whether the objection at sidebar preserved the exact issue presented on appeal; the Court sidesteps this by assuming preservation and proceeding to harmless error analysis.

Key precedents:

State v. Tollardo, 2012-NMSC-008:
- Established a rigorous harmless error framework, especially for non-constitutional errors.
- The question is whether there is a reasonable probability the improperly admitted evidence affected the verdict.
State v. Serna, 2013-NMSC-033:
- Harmless error must be evaluated in light of “all of the circumstances surrounding the error,” including:
  - Source of the error,
  - Emphasis placed on it,
  - Strength of the State’s case apart from the error,
  - Importance of the erroneously admitted evidence to the prosecution’s theory, and
  - Whether the evidence was merely cumulative.
State v. Bregar, 2017-NMCA-028:
- Discusses the difference between review for abuse of discretion (preserved evidentiary error) and plain error (unpreserved), but under either approach, harmlessness remains a key question.

2. Source of the Error: Unsolicited Witness Comment

The Court emphasizes that the threat statement arose from an unsolicited comment by the witness, not from prosecutorial design:

The prosecutor told Mills to stay focused on defendant’s parents and their situation.
Mills nonetheless recounted defendant’s alleged statement about wanting to kill his sister and niece.
The prosecutor immediately redirected the discussion away from threats and back to estate issues.

This characterization is important because:

In State v. Gonzales, 2000-NMSC-028 (overruled on other grounds by Tollardo), the Court considered whether inadmissible testimony was deliberately elicited or unsolicited.
In State v. Samora, 2013-NMSC-038, unsolicited prejudicial remarks (e.g., about “brain matter” on the defendant’s shoes) were held curable by a limiting instruction.
Similarly, in State v. Fry, 2006-NMSC-001, testimony that defendant seemed “a little mean” was treated as curable, even though the defense an offered curative instruction.
By contrast, in State v. Hernandez, 2017-NMCA-020, unsolicited testimony that the defendant had confessed could not be cured because it went to the heart of guilt and was false.

Here, the Court places Mills’s comment in the Samora/Fry category: unsolicited, peripheral, and curable.

3. Defense Strategy and Curative Instructions

Notably, defense counsel chose not to:

Request a limiting (curative) instruction, or
Move for a mistrial.

At the hearing on the motion for a new trial, counsel explained that this decision was strategic—he feared that a curative instruction would only draw more attention to the remark.

The Supreme Court explicitly accepts this as a legitimate tactical choice, but it refuses to transform it into reversible error. Citing State v. Smith, 2016-NMSC-007, ¶ 47, the Court notes:

Defense counsel’s decision not to request an instruction suggests that even defense counsel viewed the prejudice as modest.
Had a curative instruction been offered and declined, any prejudice would have been cured under Fry.
The voluntary choice not to mitigate the remark does not enhance its prejudicial value for appellate purposes.

4. Significance of the Threat Testimony in the Overall Case

Applying the Serna/Tollardo framework, the Court finds:

Minimal emphasis: The prosecutor neither argued the threat nor returned to it in questioning or closing. It was a one-off remark.
Weak connection to the core issues: The case turned on whether defendant acted with deliberate intent and without lawful self-defense when he shot his father, not on his general hostility toward other relatives.
Strong independent evidence of guilt:
- The security video contradicts defendant’s version of an immediate, life-threatening attack.
- The estate/will evidence supplied a financial motive.
- Defendant’s own inconsistent statements and calm post-shooting behavior undercut his self-defense claim.
Peripheral and non-cumulative: The threat evidence may paint defendant in a negative moral light, but it was not central to the legal question of whether he reasonably believed lethal force was necessary at that moment.

In short, there is no reasonable probability that this single, unchecked, and unemphasized comment tipped the scales in a case already strongly supported by direct video and testimonial evidence.

The Court therefore concludes that—even assuming error—the admission was harmless and the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying a new trial.

C. Cumulative Error

Lastly, defendant invoked the doctrine of cumulative error, arguing that even if each alleged error was harmless in isolation, together they deprived him of a fair trial.

Under State v. Roybal, 2002-NMSC-027, ¶ 33:

“The doctrine of cumulative error applies when multiple errors, which by themselves do not constitute reversible error, are so serious in the aggregate that they cumulatively deprive the defendant of a fair trial.”
“The doctrine is to be strictly applied.”

Given its earlier findings that:

The prosecutorial mischaracterization did not materially alter the trial or confuse the jury, and
Mills’s threat testimony was harmless and marginal to the core issues,

the Court holds that their combined effect likewise fell short of depriving defendant of a fair trial. There is, in other words, no cumulative error.

V. Precedents and Authorities Explained

The opinion sits squarely within—rather than reshaping—existing New Mexico doctrine. Some of the key authorities it relies on are:

State v. Allen, 2000-NMSC-002 – Establishes that not every instance of prosecutorial impropriety in argument amounts to fundamental error; isolated minor missteps are tolerated.
Rule 12-321 NMRA – Codifies the preservation requirement and recognizes fundamental error review for unpreserved issues.
State v. Sosa, 2009-NMSC-056 – Provides the three-part test (constitutional protection, pervasiveness, invited error) and insists that “context is paramount” in evaluating alleged misconduct in closing argument.
State v. Ramirez, 1982-NMSC-082, and Garcia v. State, 1986-NMSC-007 – Examples of misconduct that implicate distinct constitutional protections (such as commenting on silence or refusal to consent to search), which are treated more severely.
State v. Cordova, 2014-NMCA-081 – Reinforces that statements by counsel in argument are not evidence.
UJI 14-104 NMRA and UJI 14-5001 NMRA – Standard instructions on jurors’ role in determining facts from evidence and the definition of direct evidence (e.g., eyewitness testimony and, by extension, videos).
State v. Tollardo, 2012-NMSC-008, and State v. Serna, 2013-NMSC-033 – Define and refine New Mexico’s modern harmless error analysis, moving away from simplistic quantitative assessments to a contextual, probability-based inquiry.
State v. Gonzales, 2000-NMSC-028 – Discusses the significance of whether improper testimony was deliberately elicited or spontaneously volunteered (overruled on other grounds but still influential on this point).
State v. Samora, 2013-NMSC-038, and State v. Fry, 2006-NMSC-001 – Stand for the proposition that many instances of unsolicited, prejudicial testimony can be cured by appropriate limiting instructions, and that declining such an instruction for strategic reasons does not heighten the error on appeal.
State v. Hernandez, 2017-NMCA-020 – Provides a counterexample where an unsolicited statement (that the defendant had confessed) was so prejudicial and false that it could not be cured.
State v. Smith, 2001-NMSC-004; State v. Smith, 2016-NMSC-007 – Emphasize the presumption that juries follow instructions and recognize defense strategic decisions regarding curative instructions as relevant to harmlessness.
State v. Roybal, 2002-NMSC-027 – Articulates the narrow and “strictly applied” doctrine of cumulative error.

State v. Hayhurst does not modify these precedents; it illustrates their coordinated application to a modern, evidence-rich criminal trial.

VI. Complex Concepts Simplified

1. Fundamental Error

Fundamental error is a safety valve that allows appellate courts to correct grave injustices even when trial counsel did not object. In New Mexico, it is reserved for:

Errors that make the defendant’s guilt so doubtful that a conviction would “shock the conscience,” or
Errors that undermine the basic integrity or fairness of the judicial process itself.

Most ordinary evidentiary errors, and even many instances of prosecutorial misconduct, do not qualify, especially when the evidence of guilt is strong and jurors were properly instructed.

2. Harmless Error

Not every trial error requires a new trial. Under harmless error analysis:

The existence of error is assumed or found, but the court asks whether there is a reasonable probability that the error influenced the verdict.
If the answer is no—because the properly admitted evidence is overwhelming or the error was peripheral—the conviction stands.
This doctrine is applied both to preserved errors (after abuse-of-discretion review) and, via “plain error” analysis, sometimes to unpreserved ones.

3. Prosecutorial Misconduct in Closing Argument

Prosecutors are allowed to:

Argue reasonable inferences from the evidence,
Challenge credibility, and
Advocate for a particular interpretation of the facts.

They may not:

Misstate the law,
Knowingly misstate the evidence,
Vouch for their own witnesses or inject personal beliefs, or
Comment on a defendant’s exercise of constitutional rights (e.g., remaining silent).

In Hayhurst, the prosecutor crossed the line by misquoting defendant’s testimony. But because it was isolated, did not implicate a core constitutional right, and came in a trial with strong direct evidence and cautionary instructions, it was not deemed fundamental error.

4. Cumulative Error

Cumulative error is about the “snowball effect” of multiple errors. Even if none is independently reversible, their combined effect can sometimes deny a fair trial. Courts apply this doctrine sparingly and require:

Multiple actual errors (not merely alleged), and
A plausible showing that together they undermined the fairness of the proceedings.

In Hayhurst, the Court found only minor, non-prejudicial errors, so there was nothing to cumulate into a due process violation.

5. Limiting (Curative) Instructions

When a jury hears something it should not have (e.g., inadmissible character evidence), the court can:

Tell the jury to ignore that evidence, or
Explain that the evidence may be considered only for a specific, limited purpose.

Appellate courts presume that juries follow such instructions. Defense counsel may sometimes not to request one, fearing it will highlight the damaging remark. But as Hayhurst and cases like Fry and Smith show, declining a potential cure usually undercuts any later claim that the error was fatally prejudicial.

VII. Practical and Doctrinal Impact

A. For Defense Counsel

Objections matter. Failure to object to misstated evidence in closing or to unsolicited prejudicial remarks significantly increases the difficulty of obtaining reversal on appeal; the standard becomes fundamental or plain error, not ordinary abuse of discretion.
Curative instructions are a double-edged sword, but inaction has consequences. Strategic decisions to avoid drawing attention to a remark by foregoing a limiting instruction are legitimate, but they weaken later claims of prejudice.
Video and recorded evidence raise the bar. When jurors can see the crime unfold and hear the defendant in his own words, courts are more willing to treat other improprieties as harmless or non-fundamental.

B. For Prosecutors

Accuracy in quoting testimony is critical. Hayhurst confirms that mischaracterizing testimony is error, even if ultimately non-reversible. Good practice demands careful attention to the record.
Handle unsolicited prejudicial remarks immediately. The prosecutor in Hayhurst gained credit for trying to keep Mills focused and redirecting after the threat comment. That fact proved important in the Court’s harmless error analysis.
Do not rely on “harmless error” as a safety net. The presence of strong evidence here saved the conviction, but future cases may not be so robust. Prosecutors should aim to avoid creating reviewable issues at all.

C. For Trial Judges

Make a record of objections and rulings. Clear on-the-record reasoning for admitting or excluding evidence, and for handling unsolicited testimony, helps appellate courts apply harmless error review.
Be ready to offer curative instructions. Even if neither party requests one initially, offering a limiting instruction can preserve the fairness of the trial and foreclose arguments of incurable prejudice.

D. For Appellate Practice and Future Cases

Although Hayhurst is unpublished and restricted in citation under Rule 12-405 NMRA, it shows how the Supreme Court:

Applies Sosa, Allen, and Tollardo in a contemporary setting with abundant digital evidence,
Continues to treat fundamental error as an exceptional remedy, and
Maintains a demanding harmless error standard that looks to the totality of the circumstances.

At a doctrinal level, the case reinforces—not alters—the line that New Mexico appellate courts have drawn between:

Unfortunate but non-reversible trial imperfections, and
Truly outcome-determinative or process-corrupting errors that justify a new trial.

VIII. Conclusion

State v. Hayhurst is a textbook illustration of New Mexico’s strict approach to fundamental and harmless error. The Court acknowledges:

An improper mischaracterization of the defendant’s testimony in closing, and
Potentially inadmissible, prejudicial testimony about threats against other family members.

Yet, in a trial anchored by powerful direct evidence—especially home security video and the defendant’s own statements—the Court concludes that:

The misstatement in closing was an isolated and non-constitutional error, insufficiently prejudicial to be fundamental, and
The threat testimony was unsolicited, unemphasized, and harmless in light of the record as a whole.

Coupled with a firm presumption that juries follow instructions distinguishing evidence from argument, these findings foreclose relief under both individual and cumulative error theories. The decision underscores that, in New Mexico, reversal on unpreserved claims of misconduct or evidentiary error will be rare—especially when jurors have had direct, visual access to the events in question.

While unpublished and non-precedential in the formal sense, Hayhurst is a clear signal that New Mexico’s appellate courts will continue to demand a compelling showing of prejudice before overturning jury verdicts on claims of imperfect advocacy or unintended evidentiary slips.