A mere difference in size, the Court noted (citing State v. Duarte, 1996‑NMCA‑038, ¶ 10), is not, by itself, enough to establish a genuine subjective fear of death or great bodily harm. Nor was there any evidence that the victim had a reputation for such extreme violence or had previously inflicted such harm on Defendant.

Consequently, Defendant failed to demonstrate:

• a subjective fear of immediate death or great bodily harm, and
• that the killing resulted from such a fear.

c. Objective unreasonableness of Defendant’s conduct

The Court further held there was no basis to find that Defendant responded reasonably. Echoing Lucero and State v. Baroz, 2017‑NMSC‑030, ¶ 18, it emphasized:

• Deadly force is justified only in response to a threat of death or great bodily harm (Lucero, ¶ 15);
• When the supposed assailant is unarmed and there is no evidence of weapons, a belief in the need for deadly force is objectively unreasonable (Baroz, ¶ 18).

Applied to the facts:

• Defendant initiated the confrontation by arming himself and firing “warning shots” toward the unarmed victim’s family and vehicle, at a time when the victim remained seated and nonthreatening.
• When the victim finally exited, he:
  • was unarmed,
  • had his hands raised, and
  • said, “We’re leaving.”

Under these circumstances, no reasonable jury could find that a reasonable person in Defendant’s position would have believed:

• that the victim posed a threat of death or great bodily harm, or
• that shooting the victim multiple times with an AR‑15 was a reasonable response.

Thus, the Court held that Defendant was not entitled to a self-defense instruction, and the district court committed no reversible error by refusing it.

3. Voluntary manslaughter instruction: insufficient provocation

a. Legal standard

Voluntary manslaughter under § 30‑2‑3(A) requires:

• a killing that occurs in the context of a sudden quarrel or heat of passion, and
• provocation sufficient to negate the malice otherwise necessary for murder. (State v. Reynolds, 1982‑NMSC‑091, ¶ 8).

“Sufficient provocation” is defined in UJI 14‑222 NMRA as:

“any action, conduct or circumstances which arouse anger, rage, fear, sudden resentment, terror or other extreme emotions,”

provided that:

• the provocation would cause an ordinary person of average disposition to lose self-control, and
• an ordinary person would not have had time to cool off before acting.

Crucially, New Mexico follows the “general rule” that the victim must be the source of the provocation. (State v. Manus, 1979‑NMSC‑035, ¶ 16, overruled on other grounds). In State v. Gaitan, 2002‑NMSC‑007, ¶ 13, the Court held that a defendant who intentionally instigates an assault cannot rely on the victim’s reasonable response as “provocation” to reduce murder to manslaughter.

b. Defendant’s claim of provocation

Defendant argued that:

• the victim “charged at him” after shots had been fired; and
• there had been a prior argument between them about employment and property use.

But the Court found these claims legally insufficient:

• The prior work-related argument occurred days earlier; any emotional impact would have cooled by the time of the killing.
• The record showed that Defendant was the initial aggressor at the scene, firing multiple rounds with an assault rifle from the porch in the general direction of Emili and the vehicle, before the victim even stepped out.
• When the victim did exit, he was unarmed, raised his hands, and announced that they were leaving—the opposite of conduct that would constitute “provocation” sufficient to inflame an ordinary person to kill.

Under Gaitan, a defendant cannot create the dangerous situation himself and then rely on the victim’s reasonable reaction as a mitigating factor. Here, any “charging” behavior by the victim arose in direct response to Defendant’s firing a rifle toward his fiancée and children. That reaction, if anything, was a reasonable attempt to shield others, not legally sufficient “provocation” originating from the victim.

Because Defendant could not point to evidence that the victim was the source of “sufficient provocation” as defined by UJI 14‑222, the Court held the district court properly refused to instruct on voluntary manslaughter.

4. Defense of habitation (castle doctrine): no evidence of an impending violent felony in the home

a. Preservation and standard

Unlike with self-defense and voluntary manslaughter, Defendant did not request a defense-of-habitation instruction at trial. The issue was therefore unpreserved and reviewed only for fundamental error under Benally, 2001‑NMSC‑033, ¶ 12.

Fundamental error applies only in “exceptional circumstances when guilt is so doubtful that it would shock the judicial conscience to allow the conviction to stand.” (State v. Cunningham, 2000‑NMSC‑009, ¶ 13). Before reaching that question, the Court first asks whether there was any error at all—i.e., whether the evidence could have supported giving the instruction. (Boyett, 2008‑NMSC‑030, ¶ 12; State v. Silva, 2008‑NMSC‑051, ¶ 11).

b. New Mexico’s defense-of-habitation doctrine

The Court relies heavily on:

• State v. Boyett, 2008‑NMSC‑030, and
• State v. Galindo, 2024‑NMSC‑004, ¶ 22.

These cases articulate that:

• An occupant enjoys “significant latitude” in using force to defend the home (Galindo, ¶ 22), but
• The use of deadly force is justified only if:
  • the defendant reasonably believed that the commission of a violent felony in the home was immediately at hand, and
  • it was necessary to kill the intruder to prevent that felony. (Boyett, ¶ 15).
• “Felony” in this context is limited to violent felonies. (Boyett, ¶ 21).
• A defense-of-habitation instruction (UJI 14‑5170) requires evidence sufficient for reasonable minds to differ as to all elements, including:
  • (1) the place was the defendant’s dwelling;
  • (2) it appeared to the defendant that a violent-felony commission in the dwelling was immediately at hand and killing the intruder was necessary; and
  • (3) a reasonable person in the same circumstances would have acted similarly.

Although actual entry is not strictly required, Boyett stresses that there must be an assault upon the home with intent to enter. Mere presence outside the dwelling, without evidence of an imminent breach, does not suffice.

c. Application to Defendant’s claim

It was undisputed that the house was Defendant’s dwelling, so the Court focused on elements (2) and (3).

1. Subjective belief: no evidence of an imminent violent felony in the home.
   • Defendant argued he reasonably believed the victim intended to commit an aggravated battery (a violent felony) on him in the home.
   • The Court noted that, at most, Defendant’s own statements suggested a fear of being beaten up on the porch—not of an intrusion into the dwelling itself.
   • There was no evidence that:
     • Defendant believed the victim intended to enter the home, or
     • Defendant believed the victim intended harm to Kelly or Defendant’s daughter inside the house.
   Under Boyett, the absence of any belief in an intended intrusion or violent felony inside the home defeats the second element of defense of habitation.
2. Objective reasonableness.
   • The victim was not an “intruder” in the classic castle doctrine sense:
     • Kelly had invited him (through Emili) to retrieve the cooler;
     • He never attempted to enter the house;
     • He only exited the vehicle after Defendant fired multiple shots toward his family;
     • He raised his hands and said, “We’re leaving”; and
     • He had no weapons or tools to force entry or commit a violent felony inside.
   • As in Boyett (¶ 23), where there was no evidence the victim was attempting to force entry, the Court found no objectively reasonable basis to infer the victim was about to invade the home or commit a violent felony inside.

With no evidence supporting either the subjective or objective components, the Court held there was no error—much less fundamental error—in not giving a defense-of-habitation instruction.

Because none of the instruction issues had merit, the Court also rejected any claim of cumulative error, citing State v. Saiz, 2008‑NMSC‑048, ¶ 66 (“where there is no error to accumulate, there can be no cumulative error”), later clarified on other grounds in State v. Belanger, 2009‑NMSC‑025.

C. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel (IAC)

1. The Strickland framework

The Court evaluated the ineffective assistance claim under the familiar two-pronged test of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), as adopted in New Mexico:

1. Deficient performance. Counsel’s performance must fall below an objective standard of reasonableness—counsel must have failed to exercise the skill of a reasonably competent attorney. (Duncan v. Kerby, 1993‑NMSC‑011, ¶ 10; State v. Paredez, 2004‑NMSC‑036, ¶ 13).
2. Prejudice. There must be a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, the outcome would have been different. (State v. Trammell, 2016‑NMSC‑030, ¶ 23, quoting Strickland).

A failure to establish either prong defeats the claim. (Guerra, 2012‑NMSC‑027, ¶ 23; State v. Reyes, 2002‑NMSC‑024, ¶ 48).

2. Application to failure to request a defense-of-habitation instruction

Defendant argued that trial counsel was ineffective for not requesting a defense-of-habitation instruction. The Supreme Court rejected this argument on the first prong (deficient performance):

• As already explained in the jury instruction section, the evidence did not support a defense-of-habitation instruction: there was no proof that Defendant believed the victim intended to enter the home and commit a violent felony, nor that such a belief would be reasonable.
• Competent counsel is not expected to request instructions that are unsupported by the evidence. Not making such a request is not deficient performance.

Because Defendant failed to show counsel acted below a reasonably competent standard, the Court did not need to reach the prejudice prong, and the ineffective assistance claim failed.

V. Precedents and Doctrinal Threads

Although Ricoy is unpublished and nonprecedential, it is doctrinally significant as a synthesis of several important New Mexico precedents:

• Deliberate intent and animus/lack of remorse.
  • Smith, Guerra, Duran, and Chavez collectively establish that:
    • prior hostility and threats,
    • manner of the attack (e.g., multiple focused shots), and
    • post-crime boasting or indifference
    are powerful circumstantial indicators of deliberate intent. Ricoy applies this line of cases squarely in a domestic/family context.
• Self-defense and the threshold of “death or great bodily harm.”
  • Lopez, Coffin, Lucero, and Baroz are reaffirmed:
    • The subjective fear must be of death or great bodily harm, not mere physical injury;
    • Simple battery or generalized fear of a fight is insufficient;
    • Where the supposed assailant is unarmed, the objective reasonableness of using deadly force is highly suspect.
• Voluntary manslaughter and sufficient provocation.
  • Reynolds, Manus, and Gaitan provide the framework applied in Ricoy:
    • Provocation must come from the victim;
    • It must be serious enough to unhinge an ordinary person’s self-control;
    • And the killer cannot instigate the confrontation and then rely on the victim’s defensive response as mitigation.
• Defense of habitation / castle doctrine.
  • Boyett and Galindo are central: they limit the defense to circumstances where:
    • a violent felony in the dwelling is believed to be immediately at hand, and
    • deadly force is truly necessary to prevent it.
  • Ricoy underscores that:
    • lawful visitors or invitees are not “intruders” simply because the defendant dislikes them;
    • no “assault upon the home” is present if the person remains outside and does not attempt entry; and
    • castle doctrine is not a free-standing license to kill adversaries or disliked relatives near one’s home.
• Jury instruction framework and error review.
  • Gaines, Boyett, Benally, Parish, Cunningham, and Silva shape the procedural foundation:
    • Evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the requested instruction;
    • Preserved errors are reviewed for reversible error; unpreserved ones for fundamental error;
    • Ultimately, the concern is whether the jury was confused or misdirected.
• Ineffective assistance of counsel.
  • Strickland, Paredez, Kerby, Trammell, and Reyes are reaffirmed as the controlling framework.
  • Ricoy illustrates a basic but important point: failing to pursue a meritless defense or an unsupported instruction is not deficient performance.

VI. Impact and Practical Implications

A. For criminal practitioners

• Prosecutors.
  • Ricoy confirms that evidence of:
    • prior statements of hostility,
    • threats before the incident,
    • deliberate rearming and ignoring pleas to desist, and
    • post-crime lack of remorse
    can powerfully buttress proof of deliberate intent for first-degree murder.
  • In domestic contexts, prosecutors can expect courts to treat family or quasi-family victims similarly to strangers when analyzing self-defense and castle doctrine claims, where the defendant is the first aggressor.
• Defense counsel.
  • Self-defense and voluntary manslaughter instructions require a concrete evidentiary foundation:
    • For self-defense, evidence must show of death or great bodily harm, not a generalized fear of a fight, and a plausible basis (weapons, prior violent acts, etc.) for that fear.
    • For voluntary manslaughter, evidence must show victim-originated provocation that would unhinge an ordinary person and that had not “cooled.”
  • With castle doctrine / defense of habitation:
    • Be prepared to show evidence of the victim’s intended entry into the home and a perceived imminent violent felony inside, not merely a confrontation at the doorstep or in the yard;
    • Absent such evidence, requesting the instruction may be futile.
  • On ineffective assistance:
    • Ricoy reinforces that appellate courts will not deem counsel ineffective simply for failing to request a legally and factually unwarranted instruction.

B. For trial judges

• The decision helps clarify the boundary lines for when instructions on:
  • self-defense,
  • voluntary manslaughter, and
  • defense of habitation
  are supported by the evidence. Judges can rely on Ricoy’s analysis—backed by published authorities—to deny instructions when:
  • the defendant is clearly the first aggressor;
  • the victim is unarmed and objectively nonthreatening; or
  • there is no evidence of an imminent violent felony in the home or of victim-originated provocation.

C. For the development of New Mexico law

While Ricoy is unpublished and not generally citable as precedent under Rule 12‑405 NMRA, it illustrates how the Supreme Court currently applies a set of mature doctrines:

• First-degree murder via deliberate intent,
• Self-defense limitations,
• Heat-of-passion voluntary manslaughter,
• Castle doctrine / defense of habitation, and
• Ineffective assistance of counsel.

It is especially notable for its firm stance that castle doctrine cannot be stretched to validate shooting an unarmed, retreating or non-intruding family member on or near the property, even when the defendant claims fear and anger over perceived disrespect or prior conflict.

VII. Simplifying Key Legal Concepts

For non-lawyers, several technical concepts recur in this opinion. In simplified terms:

• Deliberate intent (first-degree murder). The law distinguishes between:
  • killing someone in a sudden, impulsive moment, and
  • killing after at least some mental weighing of whether to kill.
  “Deliberate intent” does not require a long plan; it only requires that the person actually thought about killing and decided to go through with it, even briefly.
• Self-defense.
  • A person may lawfully use force, including deadly force, if they:
    • truly believe they are in immediate danger of being killed or seriously injured, and
    • their belief and reaction are reasonable under the circumstances.
  • Fear of being punched or in a normal fistfight, by itself, is usually not enough to justify killing.
• Voluntary manslaughter (heat of passion).
  • This is a lesser form of homicide where the killer acted in the heat of strong emotions—anger, rage, terror—triggered by the victim’s actions.
  • The victim must have done something seriously provocative that would make an average person momentarily lose self-control.
  • The law does not allow you to start a fight and then claim the other person’s reasonable reaction as “provocation” that excuses or reduces your crime.
• Defense of habitation (castle doctrine).
  • New Mexico recognizes a strong right to defend one’s home, but it is not unlimited.
  • You may use deadly force only if:
    • you reasonably believe a violent felony inside your home is about to occur, and
    • killing the intruder is necessary to stop it.
  • The doctrine generally applies to intruders or attackers trying to force their way in—not to invited guests or family members who are outside and trying to leave.
• Reversible error vs. fundamental error (jury instructions).
  • Reversible error: If the defendant asked for an instruction and the court wrongly refused it, and that refusal likely misled the jury, the conviction can be reversed.
  • Fundamental error: If the defendant never asked for the instruction, the conviction is only reversed in especially extreme cases, where the error is so serious that it calls the fairness of the entire trial into question.
• Ineffective assistance of counsel.
  • Defendants are entitled to competent legal representation.
  • To win an IAC claim, they must show:
    • their lawyer’s work fell below reasonable professional standards, and
    • that this likely changed the outcome of the trial.
  • Not asking for a legally unsupported instruction is not poor lawyering—it is appropriate.

VIII. Conclusion

State v. Ricoy does not break new doctrinal ground, but it powerfully illustrates the current contours of several crucial doctrines in New Mexico homicide law:

• First-degree murder via deliberate intent can be proven from a combination of:
  • prior hostility,
  • deliberate arming and continuation of an attack despite opportunities to stop, and
  • callous post-killing remarks.
• Self-defense is tightly constrained: fear of a beating or generalized anxiety does not justify deadly force, especially when the victim is unarmed, raising his hands, and announcing intent to leave.
• Voluntary manslaughter requires victim-originated “sufficient provocation.” A defendant who starts the violence cannot turn the victim’s response into a mitigating factor.
• Defense of habitation, although robust in principle, is limited to situations involving an imminent violent felony in the home. Family members or invitees lawfully present outside the dwelling do not become “intruders” simply because the homeowner objects to their presence.
• Ineffective assistance claims cannot be built on counsel’s refusal to advance meritless or unsupported defenses.

As a nonprecedential decision, Ricoy cannot ordinarily be cited under Rule 12‑405 NMRA, but it remains an important window into how the Supreme Court of New Mexico understands and applies its homicide, self-defense, and castle doctrine jurisprudence to high-conflict domestic situations. The opinion serves as a clear warning that New Mexico courts will strictly police the evidentiary boundaries of defensive theories and will not permit them to be used to shield what is, in substance, an unprovoked or grossly disproportionate use of lethal force.